Sloan v. Ambrose et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00992-CNS-KAS
JOHN H. SLOAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMUEL P. AMBROSE,
KIARRA C. JENKINS,
ALFONSO K. CARRERA, and
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff 	John 	H. 	Sloan 	objects 	to 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Kathryn 	A. 	Starnella’s
Recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended
complaint. ECF No. 47 (Recommendation); ECF No. 49 (objection). The Court has
reviewed Plaintiff’s objections and upon de novo review of the Recommendation, finds
that his objections lack merit. Accordingly, the Court overrules his objections and affirms
Magistrate Judge Starnella’s Recommendation as an order of this Court. Plaintiff’s claims
are dismissed with prejudice in part and without prejudice in part.
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I. 	SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFF
Magistrate Judge Starnella recommends that this Court grant Defendants’ motion
to dismiss. You filed an objection to that Recommendation, arguing that the statute of
limitations on your search and seizure claims should have been tolled, and that Magistrate
Judge Starnella should have permitted you to amend your claim. After analyzing the
arguments raised in your objection and performing a de novo review of the findings you
challenge, the Court is overruling your objections and affirming Magistrate Judge
Starnella’s Recommendation. The Court will explain why it is doing so further below,
including a discussion of the legal authority that supports this conclusion.
II. 	BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff was arrested on February 7, 2022, in Aurora, Colorado. ECF No. 13 at 4.
Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that the Denver Police Department (DPD) pulled
over because it had been reported stolen. Id. The officers ordered Plaintiff out of the car
and handcuffed him, and Defendant Alfonso Carrera asked Plaintiff a question and
searched him “in the guise of a pat-down for weapons.” Id. Defendant Carrera then placed
him under arrest and transferred to the police station. ECF No. 13-1 at 1.
On the way, Plaintiff said that he wanted to speak with the officer who had been in
charge at the scene. Id. Defendant Kiarra Jenkins spoke with Plaintiff in the police vehicle
once he arrived at the station. Id. Plaintiff made a complaint to her about Defendant
1 The following facts are taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF Nos. 13 and
13-1 (continuation sheet).
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Carrera’s conduct during the arrest. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jenkins asked no
questions, acted disinterested, and purportedly took no action on his complaint. Id.
Defendant Samuel Ambrose, another police officer who had not been at the scene
of Plaintiff’s arrest, used Defendant Carrera’s account of the arrest to complete a probable
cause statement for Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. Based on Defendant Ambrose’s statement, a
judge found probable cause. Id. at 1–2.
On August 9, 2022, Plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion to suppress evidence based
on Defendant Carrera’s search of Plaintiff. Id. at 3. On September 6, 2022, prior to a
hearing on the suppression motion, the government moved to dismiss all charges against
Plaintiff, which the Denver County court granted. Id. Plaintiff then filed the present lawsuit,
asserting various constitutional claims against Defendants for unreasonable search,
unreasonable seizure, supervisory liability, and Monell liability. Id. at 1–2; ECF No. 13 at
4.
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 22. This Court referred
Defendants’ motion to Magistrate Judge Starnella for initial determination. ECF No. 23.
On February 27, 2025, Magistrate Judge Starnella recommended granting Defendants’
motion. ECF No. 47. Plaintiff objected to the Recommendation, ECF No. 49, and
Defendants responded, ECF No. 52. The objection is now ripe for review.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 22 at 4. A court may dismiss a complaint for a
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“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The dispositive inquiry is
whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must take all the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and “view these allegations in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving
party. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010). On a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a court’s function is “not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present
at trial, but to assess whether the [] complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim
for which relief may be granted.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
The Court is cognizant that a “pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed
liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520–21 (1972)). “The Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se
litigant.” Id. at 1110 n.3. The Court, however, cannot be a pro se litigant’s advocate. See
Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3)
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, the
presiding district judge must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
[recommended] disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. 72(b)(3). An
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objection to a recommendation is properly made if it is both timely and specific. United
States v. 2121 East 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059–60 (10th Cir. 1996). An objection is
sufficiently specific if it “enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—
factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Id. at 1059. In conducting
its review, “[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
Magistrate Judge Starnella determined that some of Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by the statute of limitations and some are insufficiently pleaded. ECF No. 47 at 4–11. The
Court addresses these findings in turn.
A. Statute of Limitations: Plaintiff’s Search and Seizure Claims
Plaintiff’s first three claims are directly related to the February 7, 2022 search and
arrest—events that occurred two years and two months before Plaintiff initiated this
lawsuit on April 12, 2024. ECF No. 1; ECF No. 13 at 4. Plaintiff argues that the claims are
not time-barred because he did not know that he had been “detained” when he was
searched until he was able to review the files from the Denver District Attorney’s office.
ECF No. 27 at 5; ECF No. 49 at 9. He later reviewed body camera footage, which
allegedly depicted “very different” events from those described in Defendant Ambrose’s
statement of probable cause. ECF No. 27 at 6. He alleges that he later learned that the
arrest did not follow DPD protocol. Id.
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Magistrate Judge Starnella determined that Plaintiff’s first claim (“Unreasonable
Search”); second claim (“Unreasonable Seizure of a Person”); third claim (“Supervisor –
Unreasonable Seizure of a Person”); and sixth claim (“Local Governing Body’s Policy
That Fails to Prevent Violations of Law”), to the extent that it is premised on the first three
claims, should be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations. ECF
No. 47 at 8. She found that Plaintiff’s assertions that he did not know that he had been
formally seized, searched, or arrested were “incredulous at best.” ECF No. 47 at 6.
Because Plaintiff generally knew or had reason to know of his injuries underlying his
claims—in other words, he plainly knew that he had been searched and placed into
custody, regardless of whether he knew the legal significance—Magistrate Judge
Starnella determined that his claim began to accrue on February 7, 2022.
Plaintiff objects to this finding, arguing that the statute of limitations should have
been tolled because he did not learn the identities of the arresting officers until April 22,
2022, when he received discovery materials in connection with his underlying criminal
matter. ECF No. 49 at 5–11. Plaintiff further argues that it was not until that same April
date that he first discovered that he may have been detained rather than arrested when
he was searched. Id. The Court is not persuaded.
Plaintiff undermines his argument by admitting that he “suspect[ed] misconduct on
the part of Carrera” on the day of the search. ECF No. 49 at 7–8. He explains that, during
his encounter with Defendant Carrera, “Plaintiff was handcuffed and forcefully lead [sic]
to a nearby police vehicle. This amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
at 7. Plaintiff even complained about the search and seizure to Defendant Jenkins the
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day of the incident. ECF No. 13-1, ¶¶ 8–9. Plaintiff’s knowledge of the injury, and his
suspicion that the actions were unlawful, was enough to begin accrual on February 7,
2022, for his search and seizure claims. Smith, 149 F.3d at 1154. The Court reiterates
that Plaintiff need not know of the legality of the actions, or know all the details of the
actions; rather, the claims accrue at the time that Plaintiff learns or should have learned
of the material facts. Baker v. Bd. of Regents of State of Kan., 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th
Cir. 1993) (“A civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know
of the injury which is the basis of the action. . . . [I]t is not necessary that a claimant know
all of the evidence ultimately relied on for the cause of action to accrue.”).
Section 1983 claims have a two-year limitations period in Colorado, beginning at
the time the action accrued. Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1159–60 (10th Cir. 2010);
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (the Tenth Circuit has “made clear
that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Colorado is two years from the
time the cause of action accrued”). A civil rights action accrues “when the plaintiff knows
or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Smith v. City of Enid,
149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Baker, 991 F.2d at 632).
Plaintiff’s first three claims are directly related to the February 7, 2022 search and
arrest. Because these claims all stem from the search and arrest on February 7, 2022,
they began to accrue on that date. Thus, claims one, two, and three are barred by the
statute of limitations, as is claim six to the extent that it is premised on the first three
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claims. Thus, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections and agrees with Magistrate Judge
Starnella that Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure claims are time-barred. 2
* * *
The Court has considered Plaintiff’s objections and conducted a de novo review of
Magistrate Judge Starnella’s determinations. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections do
not warrant modification or rejection of the Recommendation. The facts as alleged in
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint clearly establish that his first three claims began to
accrue on February 7, 2022—making those claims untimely. Moreover, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s sixth claim is premised on the facts underlying claims one, two, and three, that
claim is similarly untimely. These claims are dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g.,
McGowan v. Wal-Mart Stores, 757 F. App’x 786, 788 n.3 (10th Cir. 2019) (“A dismissal
based on timeliness would ordinarily be with prejudice.”); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178,
1181 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of claims barred by the statute
of limitations). 3
B. Failure to State a Claim: Plaintiff’s Post-Arrest Claims
Plaintiff’s fourth claim concerns Defendant Carrera’s alleged false account of
Plaintiff’s search and seizure to Defendant Ambrose, who allegedly did not verify
2 Plaintiff also argues in his objection that the statute of limitations issue in this case should be an issue for
the jury. ECF No. 49 at 11. The Court disagrees. Where, as here, the accrual date is plain from the facts
alleged in the complaint, the Court may resolve the statute of limitations issue on a motion to dismiss. Sierra
Club v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 816 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2016) (“A statute of limitations defense
may be appropriately resolved on a Rule 12(b) motion when the dates given in the complaint make clear
that the right sued upon has been extinguished.” (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted)).
3 Magistrate Judge Starnella found that Plaintiff’s remaining claims—claims four, five, and six—are not
barred by the statute of limitations because they plausibly occurred after April 12, 2022. ECF No. 47 at 7–
8. No party objected to this determination.
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Defendant Carrera’s account before using it to complete a statement of probable cause.
ECF No. 13-1 at 1–2. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carrera, when he
arrived at the police headquarters, “intentionally gave [Defendant] Ambrose a materially
false 	account, 	of 	his 	search 	and 	seizure 	of 	[Plaintiff’s] 	person, 	containing
misrepresentations and omissions.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ambrose “did
not witness, nor have any first-hand knowledge of [Defendant] Carrera’s search and
seizure of [Plaintiff’s] person,” and yet he “did not verify [Defendant] Carrera’s account”
before using the account “to complete a statement of probable cause, for the warrantless
arrest of [Plaintiff], which [Defendant Ambrose] then swore was true and correct” before
submitting the statement to a judicial officer. Id. at 1–2.
Magistrate Judge Starnella recommends dismissing this claim without prejudice
because Plaintiff provided no authority that an officer cannot rely on another officer’s word
when drafting a probable cause statement for a court, particularly where there are no
allegations showing that Defendant Ambrose should have had reason to doubt Defendant
Carrera’s version of events. ECF No 47 at 9. She also determined that Plaintiff has not
adequately pleaded such violations here. Id. at 9–10.
Similarly, Magistrate Judge Starnella recommends dismissing without prejudice
Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims. Id. at 10–11. Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims both concern
the customs and policies of Defendant City and County of Denver, and thus Plaintiff is
asserting municipal liability claims. ECF No. 13-1 at 2–3. Magistrate Judge Starnella
correctly explains that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant City and County of Denver are
all directly premised on the actions of its employees: Defendants Carrera, Jenkins, and
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Ambrose. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation against
any of these officers, she determined that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the first element of a
municipal liability claim—the existence of an underlying constitutional violation. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Starnella’s determination that his fourth, fifth,
and sixth claims be dismissed without prejudice. ECF No. 49 at 11. But he points to no
facts or law that Magistrate Judge Starnella erred in finding that he failed to state a claim
with respect to these claims. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Starnella
erred in not permitting him to amend his third amended complaint. Id. at 12. However, the
issue of whether Plaintiff should be permitted to amend his complaint is still pending
before the Court. ECF No. 43. 4 Plaintiff’s objection is thus premature. It also is not specific
to a finding that Magistrate Judge Starnella made in her Recommendation, so it does not
trigger de novo review. 2121 East 30th St., 73 F.3d at 1060 (holding that a “party’s
objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and
specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection with respect to claims four, five, and six are
overruled.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, the Court makes the following rulings:
(1) 	Plaintiff’s objection, ECF No. 49, is OVERRULED;
4 The Court referred that issue to Magistrate Judge Starnella. ECF No. 44. However, Plaintiff’s motion was
not ripe until March 21, 2025—after Magistrate Judge Starnella issued her instant Recommendation. See
ECF No. 51 (reply to motion for leave to amend).
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(2) 	The 	Court 	AFFIRMS 	and 	ADOPTS 	Magistrate 	Judge
Starnella’s Recommendation, ECF No. 47, as an order of this
Court;
(3) 	Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 22, is GRANTED;
(4) 	Plaintiff’s first three claims are dismissed with prejudice;
(5) 	Plaintiff’s 	fourth 	and 	fifth 	claims 	are 	dismissed 	without
prejudice;
(6) 	Plaintiff’s sixth claim, to the extent premised on his first three
claims, is dismissed with prejudice; and
(7) 	Plaintiff’s case will remain open pending resolution of his motion
for leave to amend his third amended complaint, ECF No. 43,
which the Court referred to Magistrate Judge Starnella, ECF
No. 44.
DATED this 31st day of March 2025.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
Y THE COURT:
______	__	__	________	__	__	__	________ __	__	__	_________	_ ________	___	____
Charlotte N.	N	N	N	N Swe	we	we	weeney
nited Staate	te	te	teesss District JJJJud	ud	ud	u ge
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