Slayton v. Bayfield School District et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Civil Action No. 24-cv-00930-NYW-KAS
ANNA CECILIA MARIE SLAYTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAYFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
This 	matter is 	before the Court 	on 	the Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge Kathryn A. Starnella issued on December 4, 2024. 	[Doc. 31 (the
“Recommendation”)]. 	On 	August 	2, 	2024, 	Defendant 	Bayfield 	School 	District
(“Defendant” or “Bayfield”) filed Defendants’ [sic] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF 19) (the “Motion to Dismiss”). 	[Doc. 25].
Judge Starnella recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to file within the applicable
90-day filing deadline. [Doc. 31 at 11].
Plaintiff Anna Cecilia Marie Slayton (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Slayton”) has objected to the
Recommendation, [Doc. 32], and Defendant has responded, [Doc. 33]. For the reasons
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set forth in this Order, Plaintiff’s objections are respectfully OVERRULED and the
Recommendation is ADOPTED.1
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. 	Rule 72(b)
A 	district 	court 	may 	refer 	a 	dispositive 	motion 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge 	for
recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The district court “must determine de novo
any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 	“[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review
by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop.,
73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). 	Such specific objections permit “the district judge
to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’
dispute.” Id. at 1059 (quotation omitted).
1 Although the Motion to Dismiss is filed by “Defendants Bayfield School District[], Leon
Hanhardt, Bill Hesford, Sam Hogue, Amber Connet, Willie Machallister, Jan Alderton, and
Gayle Dupree,” [Doc. 25 at 1]; concedes that the “Amended Complaint adds seven
individual Bayfield employees as defendants,” [id. at 13]; and argues that “the addition of
these new defendants is improper,” [id.], the Court also notes that the Motion asks that
the Court “find in the District’s favor and dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with
prejudice,” [id. at 2 (emphasis added)]. The Court also notes that the Recommendation
considers the Motion to Dismiss only in the context of Plaintiff’s claims against Bayfield,
insofar as Judge Starnella concludes that the “[additional] defendants are not yet proper
parties.” [Doc. 31 at 3 n.2]. The Court’s Order adopting the Recommendation, granting
Bayfield’s Motion to Dismiss; and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Bayfield with
prejudice is expressly limited to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bayfield School
District—the only properly served Defendant in this case. 	See [Doc. 8]. 	The Court
addresses the “Additional Defendants” named in the body of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint in the Court’s Order to Show Cause, infra.
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II. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and
view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 	Casanova v. Ulibarri,
595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 	The plaintiff may not rely on
mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted).
III. 	Pro Se Filings
Because Ms. Slayton proceeds pro se, the Court affords her filings a liberal
construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam). But the Court
cannot and does not act as her advocate, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991), and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Plaintiff as to
represented parties, see Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir.
2002); Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).
BACKGROUND
The background of this case is set forth in Judge Starnella’s Recommendation,
see [Doc. 31 at 2–4], and the Court repeats it here only as necessary to resolve Plaintiff’s
objections. Ms. Slayton previously worked as a paraprofessional for Bayfield during the
2022–23 school year. [Doc. 19 at 5 ¶ 1]. She claims she suffered two “episodes” relating
to her bipolar I disorder in February and May 2023, respectively. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 2–3]. 	With
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respect 	to her 	first 	episode 	in 	February 	2023, 	Ms. 	Slayton 	alleges 	that 	Bayfield
“accommodated her disability,” helped her “work through the problem” with a school
counselor, and “made room for her to get the proper help needed without incident.” [Id.
at ¶ 2]. After her second episode on May 3, 2023, however, Ms. Slayton claims that her
supervisor submitted a resignation letter on Ms. Slayton’s behalf and, by the time Ms.
Slayton informed the “district office” that “she did not intend to resign and asked for her
job back,” human resources had already processed her resignation. 	[Id. at ¶ 3]. 	A
Bayfield human resources manager informed Ms. Slayton that she was no longer a
Bayfield employee and would need to reapply for the next school year. [Id.].
Ms. Slayton also alleges that Bayfield subsequently “retaliated against her” through
her children and fiancé by “faking a photo of [her] nine year old son, a child with an autism
diagnosis,” and submitting this photo “as an abuse allegation against [her] fiancé.” [Id. at
¶ 4]. According to Ms. Slayton, this occurred too close in proximity to her termination “to
be anything other than retaliation as there never was any basis for a claim [of abuse].”
[Id.].2
On December 13, 2023, Ms. Slayton filed a charge of discrimination with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).3 	[Id. at 9]. 	The EEOC
issued Ms. Slayton a “right to sue” letter two weeks later. [Id. at 12]. On March 21, 2024—
i.e., within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s right to sue letter—Ms. Slayton mailed a copy
2 	Consistent 	with 	the 	principle 	of 	construing 	a pro se litigant’s 	filings 	liberally, 	the
court quotes from Ms. Slayton’s filings without the use of [sic] or the correction of spelling
or syntax.
3 While Ms. Slayton’s Amended Complaint asserts claims for both discrimination and
retaliation, her charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC addresses only the former.
See [Doc. 19 at 9].
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of her initial complaint to the District Court for Denver County, Colorado. [Id. at 7]. The
Denver District Court rejected the filing and instructed Ms. Slayton to file in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. 	[Id. at 13]. 	The Clerk of Court for this
District received and docketed Ms. Slayton’s initial complaint on April 5, 2024, more than
90 days after the EEOC issued Ms. Slayton’s right to sue letter. [Id.]; see also [Doc. 1].
Ms. Slayton asserts two Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims against
Bayfield for discrimination and retaliation, respectively. 	[Doc. 19 at 5–6]. 	On August 2,
2024, Bayfield moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing that Ms. Slayton filed
her original complaint more than 90 days after receiving her right to sue letter from the
EEOC and fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 	See generally [Doc. 25]. 	Judge
Starnella recommends that this Court grant the Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 31 at 1], and
Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation, [Doc. 32]. On December 20, 2024, Defendant
responded to Plaintiff’s objections. [Doc. 33].
ANALYSIS
Judge Starnella recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted because the
untimeliness of Ms. Slayton’s filing is apparent from the face of her Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff admits that she filed this lawsuit outside of the applicable 90-day filing deadline,
and Plaintiff fails to show that equitable tolling of that deadline is warranted. [Doc. 31 at
7–11].
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 	An individual who seeks to bring
claims against an employer for discrimination or retaliation in the workplace in violation of
the ADA must exhaust their administrative remedies. 	Cf. Smith v. Cheyenne Ret. Invs.
L.P., 904 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 2018); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
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285 (2002) (stating that, in the context of the EEOC’s enforcement of the ADA’s
prohibitions against employment discrimination on the basis of disability, “Congress has
directed the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures
that are set forth in Title VII”). Once a plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies
and received a right to sue letter, she must file suit within 90 days by statute. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1); Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 (1984); Hewlett
v. McCauley Constrs. Inc., No. 18-cv-02766-NYW, 2019 WL 1897641, at *2–3 (D. Colo.
Apr. 26, 2019). This provision, equivalent to a statute of limitations, is “strictly enforced”
absent equitable tolling, waiver, or other affirmative defense to enforcement, and even a
relatively trivial delay will justify dismissal. 	Mosley v. Pena, 100 F.3d 1515, 1518 (10th
Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment on complaint filed four days after 90-day
window); Stapleton v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., No. 10-cv-00806-CVE-FHM, 2011 WL
4608329, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2011) (granting summary judgment on complaint
filed seven days after 90-day window).
Equitable Tolling. 	The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
(“Tenth 	Circuit”) 	endorses 	equitable 	tolling 	of 	procedural 	deadlines 	only 	where
circumstances “rise to the level of active deception which might invoke the powers of
equity to toll the limitations period,” or where “a plaintiff is actively misled, or has in some
extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights.” 	Montoya v. Chao,
296 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted); see also [Doc. 31 at 8–10 (citing
and applying Montoya, 296 F.3d at 957)].
Plaintiff’s Objections. 	Plaintiff objects to Judge Starnella’s Recommendation
and appears to assert two arguments in support of equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline.
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[Doc. 32 at 1]. 	First, Ms. Slayton argues that she was not able to timely file her initial
complaint for medical reasons. 	[Id.]. 	As Bayfield points out, however, Ms. Slayton did
not raise this argument before Judge Starnella. See generally [Doc. 29]; see also [Doc.
33 at 3]. Arguments that are raised for the first time in an objection to a magistrate judge’s
recommendation—like Ms. Slayton’s argument that medical treatments contributed to the
untimeliness of her initial complaint—are generally deemed waived, and the Court will not
address them. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). In addition, the
Uniform Civil Practice Standards make clear that the Court disfavors the consideration of
arguments not made to the magistrate judge. 	NYW Civ. Practice Standard 72.3(b).
Where the objecting party seeks to make arguments or introduce exhibits that were not
raised before the magistrate judge, such party must expressly identify those arguments
and/or exhibits and explain why such omitted arguments and/or exhibits should be
considered, in the first instance, upon objection. 	See id. 	Ms. Slayton does not comply
with this Uniform Civil Practice Standard, and this Court cannot make arguments on her
behalf, see Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, or excuse her from complying with procedural
requirements simply because she proceeds without an attorney, see Murray, 312 F.3d at
1199 n.3.
Second, Ms. Slayton repeats her argument that she was unable to comply with the
90-day deadline because she misdirected her first filing to the Denver District Court on
the advice of a clerk. 	[Doc. 32 at 1]. 	Judge Starnella considered and rejected this
argument in the Recommendation. See [Doc. 31 at 9 (“Plaintiff’s mistake in sending her
Complaint . . . to the wrong court—when the correct court was clearly identified on the
very first page of the document—was not caused by active deception or extraordinary
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circumstances.”); id. at 10 (“Plaintiff has not shown that her conversations with . . . Denver
District Court staff . . . involved active deception, lulled her into inaction, or actively misled
her in some extraordinary way.” (citing Montoya, 296 F.3d at 957))]. Having considered
the issue de novo, the Court respectfully concurs with the Recommendation’s substantive
analysis and overrules the objection. Ms. Slayton has not shown that equitable tolling of
her deadline to initiate this lawsuit is warranted under the circumstances.
In sum, the Court agrees with Judge Starnella that Plaintiff’s initial complaint was
filed beyond the applicable 90-day deadline and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
equitable 	tolling 	is 	warranted. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	will 	OVERRULE 	Plaintiff’s
objections, ADOPT Judge Starnella’s Recommendation, GRANT the Motion to Dismiss,
and DISMISS Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as asserted against Defendant Bayfield
School District with prejudice. 	See, e.g., VanHorn v. USPS, No. 21-cv-01067-DDC-
GEB, 2022 WL 226276, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 26, 2022) (claims filed after 90-day deadline
properly dismissed with prejudice “[b]ecause those claims are untimely and plaintiff can’t
assert them again”); Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.
2001) (finding that dismissal of a claim as untimely filed is effectively a dismissal with
prejudice because “any attempt by [the plaintiff] to refile her claims . . . would be out of
time”).
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Finally, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s lack of objection on the issue, the Court
considers Judge Starnella’s conclusion that the “Additional Defendants” listed in Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint are “not yet proper parties” because Plaintiff (1) “did not add these
putative defendants to the case caption,” and (2) failed to clearly allege “what each
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individual defendant did.” 	See [Doc. 31 at 3 n.2]. 	Considering the Court’s liberal
construction of a pro se party’s filings, the Court respectfully disagrees that Plaintiff’s
failure to identify the putative Additional Defendants in the caption of her Amended
Complaint and/or the fact that Plaintiff’s “allegations render unclear what each individual
did,” [id.], necessarily means that these Additional Defendants are not proper parties in
this case, see, e.g., Trackwell v. U.S. Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n a
pro se case when . . . the identity of the defendants is unclear from the caption, courts
may look to the body of the complaint to determine who the intended and proper
defendants are.”); Sheridan v. United States, 214 F. App’x 857, 859 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he district court should have construed Mr. Sheridan’s pro se complaint as he
appears to have intended it: as an action against the New Mexico state and county
officials described in the complaint.”). “It has been held a party not properly named in the
caption of a complaint may still be properly before the court if the allegations in the body
of the complaint make it plain the party is intended as a defendant.” 	Mitchell v.
Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996).
Here, in the “Additional Defendants” portion of the “Statement of Claims” section
of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the
following individuals are being added to this complaint in their individual and
professional capacities[:] 	Leon Handhardt (Superintendent), Bill Hesford
(Vice Superintendent), Sam Hogue (Director of Human Resources), Amber
Connet (Intermediate School Principal), Willie Machallister (Intermediate
School Vice Principal)[,] Jan Aldereton (Primary School Principal)[,] Gayle
Dupree (Exceptional Student Services Teacher)[.] 	[Additional Defendants
Handhardt, Hesford, and Hogue] were responsible for resigning my position
with the school. 	[Additional Defendants Connet and Machallister] worked
for youngest son’s school that was behind the falsified photo handed over
to human services. 	[Additional Defendant] Dupree typed up a resignation
letter in the presence of [Additional Defendant] Aldereton, who was there
when the resignation took place.
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[Doc. 19 at 4 ¶ 5 (emphasis added)]. 	Reading this contention liberally, the Court finds
that the foregoing allegations “make it plain” that the Additional Defendants are “intended
as . . . defendant[s].” See Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1441; see also Eller v. Tonche, No. 15-cv-
02693-REB-MEH, 2018 WL 1316978, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2018) (“[T]he body of the
Complaint asserts claims against [two individuals]. Indeed, [plaintiff] refers to [these two
individuals] 	as 	‘[d]efendants.’ 	This 	is 	sufficient 	to 	allege 	claims 	against 	[the 	two
individuals].” (citing Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1441)).
However, individual defendants may not be held liable for discrimination or
retaliation in violation of the ADA. See Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., Kan., 172 F.3d 736,
744 (10th Cir. 1999). 	And to the extent that these individuals are sued in their official
capacities, the real party of interest is the Bayfield School District. See Lewis v. Four B
Corp., 211 F. App’x 663, 665 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005). Finally, there is no indication that there
are any claims against these individuals that are distinct from Ms. Slayton’s claims against
Bayfield School District. 	See generally [Doc. 19]. 	Indeed, these individuals are not
expressly identified in Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination. [Id. at 9]. Instead, it appears
that these individuals are being added based on their alleged involvement in the “chain
of command and structure of the Bayfield School District.” [Id. at 6 ¶ 5].4
Accordingly, on or before April 5, 2025, Plaintiff is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE
in writing as to why her claims against the Additional Defendants named in her Amended
4 Even if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint could be read to assert viable claims against the
individual Additional Defendants separate from those against Bayfield School District, it
does not appear that any of the individual Additional Defendants have been served as
required by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a
defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion
or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.”).
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Complaint, see [Doc. 19 at 4 ¶ 5], should not be dismissed with prejudice. 	If Plaintiff
does not respond to this Order to Show Cause, the Court will close this case
without further warning.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) 	Plaintiff’s 	“Resonse 	to 	Report 	and 	Recommendations” 	[Doc. 	32] 	is
OVERRULED;
(2) 	The Recommendation of 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Kathryn 	A.
Starnella [Doc. 31] is ADOPTED;
(3) 	Defendant Bayfield School District’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF 19) [Doc. 25] is GRANTED;
(4) 	Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 19], as asserted against Defendant
Bayfield School District, is DISMISSED with prejudice, and Defendant
Bayfield School District is DISMISSED from this case;
(5) 	On or before April 5, 2025, Plaintiff shall SHOW CAUSE as to why her claims
against the Additional Defendants named in her Amended Complaint should
not be dismissed with prejudice; and
(6) 	The Clerk of Court shall MAIL a copy of this Order to:
Anna Cecilia Marie Slayton
1635 Foxfire Road
Bayfield, Colorado 81122
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DATED: March 17, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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