Saunders v. Albertsons/Safeway, LLC. et al

1:24-cv-00814CodDec 10, 2025

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00814-PAB-SBP
JAMIE LEE SAUNDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALBERTSONS/SAFEWAY, LLC, and UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
UNION, LOCAL #7,
Defendants.
ORDER
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff Jamie Lee Saunders (“Plaintiff”)’s Motion
to Vacate (“Motion”). ECF No. 63. The undersigned considers the Motion pursuant to the Order
of Reference, ECF No. 64, the memorandum referring the Motion, ECF No. 65, and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). The court has reviewed the Motion, the related filings, and the applicable law. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	ANALYSIS
The court assumes familiarity with the underlying allegations and procedural history in
this matter, which is largely irrelevant for the purpose of ruling upon the Motion except as
addressed below.
Plaintiff has moved to, inter alia, vacate the court’s order granting her former attorney’s
motion to withdraw. See ECF No. 55. The Motion is denied for the following reasons.
First, Plaintiff argues that the court should vacate the order permitting Plaintiff’s former
counsel to withdraw, clarify that Plaintiff did not request to proceed pro se, and appoint pro bono
counsel. Plaintiff has not stated any reason to reconsider the court’s order granting her attorney’s
motion to withdraw; in fact, Plaintiff continues to argue in her Motion that her attorney had
Case No. 1:24-cv-00814-PAB-SBP Document 102 filed 12/10/25 USDC Colorado
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engaged in “clearly unethical behavior,” see Motion at 5, which lends support to her former
counsel’s position that Plaintiff and former counsel had an irreconcilable conflict. The court
agrees that Plaintiff assumed pro se status because her attorney moved to withdraw, not because
she requested to. Upon review of the Motion and the docket in this case, the court does not find
that the legal issues presented in Plaintiff’s claims are so uniquely complex as to justify
appointed counsel. “[T]he right to counsel in a civil case is not a matter of constitutional right
under the Sixth Amendment.” MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff also requests that the court order “the return of Plaintiff’s complete case file,
including original digital documents, communications, disclosures, metadata, and expert
materials.” However, Plaintiff does not actually appear to allege that she lacks access to her
entire file. Instead, she states that she received “disorganized paper copies” and “a USB drive
that lacks essential organizational elements” while noting that she was not provided with “an
accounting of contents and access to the Team Dropbox platform.” Plaintiff has not argued or
shown that she is entitled to a specific accounting of her file’s contents, nor has she alleged that
the paper copies she was provided did not adequately comprise her complete case file. To the
extent that Plaintiff believes she is missing specific material from her case file and can articulate
what material is missing with specificity to the court, she may request that material within a
renewed motion. Requests that fail to identify specific material missing from Plaintiff’s case file
will not be granted.
Finally, Plaintiff requests that the court order “a full financial accounting of all funds paid
and expended” and that the court issue “appropriate protective relief” to prevent retaliation or
“procedural disadvantage” from her former attorney. Plaintiff does not explain these requests
with specificity or otherwise address why the court’s intervention to order “a full financial
accounting of all funds paid and expended” would be necessary or justified here. Plaintiff also
does not address how or why she believes her former attorney will “retaliate” against her, nor
does she specify the “appropriate protective relief” she believes she is entitled to. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied in its entirety.
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II. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate.1
DATED: December 10, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
1 Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that within fourteen (14) days after
service of a Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation, any party may serve and file written
objections with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 636(b)(1)(A), (B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b). Failure to make any such objection will result in
a waiver of the right to appeal the Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation. See Sinclair Wyo.
Ref. Co. v. A & B Builders, Ltd., 989 F.3d 747, 783 (10th Cir. 2021) (firm waiver rule applies to
non-dispositive orders); but see Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1122 (10th Cir.
2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review, including when
a “pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of
failing to object”).
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