Lawrence v. Cherry Creek School District No. 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-00678-DDD-KAS
MICHAEL LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHERRY CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court sua sponte. Although Plaintiff proceeds in this
matter pro se, he is a former attorney who was disbarred from the practice of law in
December 2010 based on his convictions for three felonies: attempting to influence a
public servant, forgery, and offering a false instrument for recording. See People v.
Lawrence, No. 19PDJ061, 2019 WL 8503308, at *1 (Colo. O.P.D.J. Oct. 2, 2019)
(denying 	this 	Plaintiff’s 	petition 	for 	readmission 	and 	describing 	the 	basis 	for 	his
disbarment).
A. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)
Rule 11(b) states that, by virtue of “signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating”
a 	court 	filing, 	i.e., 	“a 	pleading, 	written 	motion, 	or 	other 	paper,” 	“an 	attorney 	or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” the filing “(1) is not
being presented for any improper purpose”; (2) “the claims, defenses, and other legal
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contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”; (3) “the factual
contentions have evidentiary support”; and (4) “the denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief
or a lack of information.”
Rule 11 serves to “deter baseless [court] filings” in and district courts have “broad
discretion to impose Rule 11 sanctions[.]” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
393, 407 (1990). Rule 11(c)(3) allows a court to sanction a litigant sua sponte for violating
Rule 11(b), provided that certain procedures are followed. Namely, a court can “issu[e] a
show cause order specifically describing the conduct implicating the rule, followed by a
reasonable opportunity for the party/attorney so advised to demonstrate how [he] has not
violated the rule.” Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000).
To impose Rule 11 sanctions, a court must first find that a court filing violates Rule
11. Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir. 2019). To avoid sanctions, a
litigant’s conduct must be objectively reasonable. Id. at 1320 (citing Adamson v. Bowen,
855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1988)). The objective reasonableness standard “applies
whether the person against whom sanctions are sought is an attorney, a pro se litigant,
or both.” McCormick v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 218 F.R.D. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing
Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D. Kan. 1998)). For a legally trained
litigant, the standard is “whether a reasonable and competent attorney would believe in
the merit of an argument.” Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152,
1155 (10th Cir. 1991). However, “Rule 11 is not designed to frighten parties or attorneys
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away from pursuing lawsuits or articulating creative theories of recovery.” Duprey v.
Twelfth Judicial Dist. Ct., 760 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1226 (D.N.M. 2009).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Conduct
Here, the Court has numerous concerns with Plaintiff’s conduct and his filings in
this case that warrant a show cause order. First, his Statement of Claims [#1-2] appears
to include factual allegations that not only lack evidentiary support but are directly
contradicted by information Plaintiff already knew when he filed his Complaint [#1].
Plaintiff alleges that “[b]ecause [he] refused to explain the arrests to the defendant, the
defendant school district withdrew its offer of employment to [him].” Statement of Claims
[#1-2], ¶ 11. This was plainly false.
On 	February 	2, 	2024, 	Linda 	M. 	Shamlin, 	Defendant’s 	Director 	of 	Human
Resources, emailed Plaintiff explaining that they were not moving forward because of his
felony convictions and because he had lied on his application. See Shamlin-Lawrence
Email [#12-14] at 1. In particular, she noted that Plaintiff had responded to the question
“Have ever [sic] been convicted of any law violation?” by saying “No.” Id. She had
“reviewed [his] background report and found [his] response . . . to be inaccurate. Due to
the felony charges, guilty dispositions, and application falsification [Defendant] will not be
able to move forward with [Plaintiff’s] hire.” Id.; see also Lawrence App. – Prescreening
Questions [#12-9] at 2 (Q. “Have you ever been convicted of any law violation? (Include
any plea of ‘guilty’ or ‘no contest.’ Exclude minor traffic violations).” A. “No”). As part of
his application to work for Defendant, Plaintiff also signed and notarized an “Oath” under
penalty of perjury, in which he certified that “I HAVE NEVER BEEN convicted of
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committing any felony *or misdemeanor* (other than a misdemeanor traffic offense or
traffic infraction).” See Oath [#12-10] at 1.
Plaintiff knew that Defendant’s reason for rescinding his employment offer was not
his refusal to explain his arrests, but the fact that they resulted in three felony convictions,
which he had lied about under oath. Despite knowing why his job offer was being
rescinded, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant “apparently has an employment policy that
bars employment to anyone who has ever been arrested.” Statement of Claims [#1-2], ¶
14. This contention is apparently based on the false allegation that Plaintiff was not hired
because he refused to explain his arrest, and this allegation is otherwise completely
unsupported. Yet Plaintiff’s entire lawsuit hinges upon this false representation about why
Defendant rescinded its employment offer, which has needlessly caused Defendant to
incur attorney fees and the Court to expend time.
Second, the arguments Plaintiff made in his Motion for Sanctions [#25] were not
objectively reasonable and he misstates the case law he cites. He cites Green v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) and Gregory v. Litton Systems,
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) for the proposition that “employers who use
criminal background checks without a time limit are in violation of Title VII.” See Motion
for Sanctions [#25] at 2. However, that was not the challenged policy in either Green or
Gregory. In Green, the employer’s challenged policy was to “disqualify[] for employment
any applicant with a conviction for any crime other than a minor traffic offense.” Green,
523 F.2d at 1293. In Gregory, the challenged policy was to ‘exclud[e] from employment
persons who have suffered a number of arrests without any convictions[.]” Gregory, 316
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F. Supp. at 403. Neither case discussed a time limit (or lack thereof) on use of criminal
background checks.
In the same Motion for Sanctions [#25], Plaintiff also misrepresented two of his
previous cases, Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock, No. 22-cv-01143-WJM-KLM
(D. Colo. 2022), and Lawrence v. Nightingale Management, Inc., 24-cv-00237-DDD-KAS
(D. Colo. 2024), as though they stood for the proposition that “[t]he EEOC has concluded
on multiple occasions that employers such as the defendant who use open-ended
criminal background checks are in violation of Title VII.” See Motion for Sanctions [#25]
at 2. In both cases, the EEOC made no such findings; rather, it issued Plaintiff a right to
sue letter, which he then filed into both cases. See Notice of Right to Sue [#1-6], filed in
Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock, No. 22-cv-01143-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. May 9,
2022); Determination and Notice of Right to Sue [#1-5], filed in Lawrence v. Nightingale
Management, Inc., No. 24-cv-00237-DDD-KAS (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2024). In fact, in
Bonaventure, both the Magistrate Judge and District Judge expressly rejected Plaintiff’s
argument that “the EEOC concluded that his claim falls within Title VII’s protection and
issued a notice of right to sue letter based on that finding[.]” See Lawrence v. Bonaventure
of Castle Rock, No. 22-cv-01143-WJM-KLM, 2023 WL 6976050, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 23,
2023) (Bonaventure II). Instead, the EEOC had “issued the letter at Plaintiff’s request and
did not intend to suggest that it believed that his claim has merit.” Id. Here again, Plaintiff
knows better. The EEOC did not conclude that the employers in Bonaventure or
Nightingale violated Title VII, it merely issued him right to sue letters.
In his Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [#14], Plaintiff also misstated
the holding in Green and misstated Defendant’s policy. He asserted that “[b]ackground
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checks must have a time limit. This criterion comes to the EEOC Guidelines from Green
v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1975).”). Response to Motion to Dismiss
[#14] at 3. Again, Green said nothing of the sort. Plaintiff described the Defendant’s
alleged policy as “disqualif[ying] from employment anyone with an arrest from anytime
previously. There is no time limit on when the offense or arrest occurred, no limit on the
crime at issue, and no effort made to ascertain whether the offense has any connection
to the job at issue.” Id. at 4. As previously noted, Plaintiff was told exactly why Defendant
was rescinding its job offer—he had lied on his application and was convicted of three
felonies, not merely arrested—and he knows that his three felony convictions involved
dishonest or fraudulent conduct. Given all these observations, the Court questions
whether an objectively reasonable, legally trained litigant would have filed the Complaint
[#1], Response to Motion to Dismiss [#14] and Motion for Sanctions [#25 that Plaintiff
filed.
Finally, in addition to the lack of legal and factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims, the
Court is concerned that his filing of the Complaint [#1] in this matter may have been
motivated by an improper purpose, i.e. to harass Defendant, to needlessly increase the
cost of litigation, and to pressure it to pay him a settlement. The Court takes note of
Plaintiff’s lengthy list of federal cases, many of which involved virtually identical disparate
impact claims. See Litigation List [#12-1]. At least the following cases involved nearly
identical causes of action:
• 	Lawrence v. Sodexo, Inc., No. 19-cv-03057-DDD-SKC (D. Colo. Oct. 25,
2019) (alleging invasion of privacy and disparate impact claims based on
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the defendant terminating Plaintiff’s job as a cook after it conducted criminal
background check);
• 	Lawrence v. Bonaventure of Castle Rock, No. 22-cv-01143-WJM-KLM (D.
Colo. 	May 	29, 	2022) 	(alleging 	disparate 	impact 	claim 	based 	on 	the
defendant rescinding a job offer as a line cook that was contingent on
passing a criminal background check);1
• 	Lawrence v. Nightingale Management, Inc., No. 24-cv-00237-DDD-KAS (D.
Colo. 	Jan. 	25, 	2024) 	(alleging 	disparate 	impact 	claim 	based 	on 	the
defendant rescinding a job offer as a cook after it conducted background
check of Plaintiff); and
• 	Lawrence v. Jobletics Pro, Inc., No. 24-cv-00279-DDD-KAS (D. Colo. Jan.
30, 	2024) 	(alleging 	disparate 	impact 	claim 	based 	on 	the 	defendant
terminating Plaintiff’s job as a cook after it learned the results of his criminal
background check).
Plaintiff’s invocation of this very same flimsy disparate impact Title VII claim
against Defendant seems to be motivated by an improper purpose—after all, when he
learned that Defendant was rescinding the job offer, he responded just eight minutes later
with, “I guess we’ll meet again in court.” See Shamlin-Lawrence Email [#12-14] at 1.2
Sure enough, Plaintiff rushed to Court, making no effort to exhaust administrative
1 Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this matter. See Receipt [#4], filed in Lawrence v. Bonaventure of
Castle Rock, No. 22-cv-01143-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. May 9, 2022).
2 This warning echoes an email Plaintiff sent to the defendant in Nightingale, where he threatened
costly litigation and urged them to pay him. See Lawrence Email [#29-2], filed in Lawrence v.
Nightingale Management, Inc., No. 24-cv-00237-DDD-KAS (D. Colo. May 16, 2024) (“If you wish
to avoid the cost of litigating this case in court, which will be considerable, I would be amenable
to discussing a settlement of my claim.”).
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remedies—and when Defendant pointed out this failure, Plaintiff offered the “threadbare
and unsupported” contention that exhaustion would have been futile, so he did not need
to 	try. 	See 	Recommendation 	[#29] 	at 	14. 	Yet 	Plaintiff 	knows 	he 	must 	exhaust
administrative remedies with the EEOC before he can file suit—both then-Magistrate
Judge 	Mix 	and 	Senior 	District 	Judge 	Martinez 	told 	him 	so 	in 	Bonaventure. 	See
Bonaventure II, 2023 WL 6976050, at *4-5 (adopting Judge Mix’s recommendation to
dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	disparate 	impact 	claim 	with 	prejudice 	for 	failure 	to 	exhaust
administrative remedies). His knowing decision to rush to Court before following required
procedures strongly suggests an improper motive.
The Court does not issue this show cause order lightly. But Plaintiff is a disbarred
former attorney and, given the fraudulent and dishonest nature of his three felony
convictions (forgery, offering a false instrument for recording, and attempting to influence
a public servant), he should certainly know better than to misstate the facts in his
Complaint [#1], to misrepresent case law, and to use legal process for an improper
purpose. The Court takes this conduct very seriously. Cf. McNamara v. Brauchler, 570 F.
App’x 741, 743 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding “no reason to hold [a disbarred attorney] to a
less stringent standard than other legally trained individuals”). Nonetheless, Plaintiff must
be given an opportunity to explain himself. Cf. Hutchinson, 208 F.3d at 1184 (stating that
noncompliance with the procedural protections of Rule 11(c) was an abuse of discretion
requiring reversal).
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C. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that on or before March 14, 2025, Plaintiff shall
respond, in writing, showing good cause why his litigation conduct described above has
not violated Rule 11(b). Again, that litigation conduct consists of the false allegations in
his Complaint [#1]; the potentially improper purpose behind filing this lawsuit; and his
misstatement of case law and misrepresentation of his prior cases in his Response to the
Motion to Dismiss [#14] and his Motion for Sanctions [#25]. Plaintiff is warned that
failure to respond and show good cause will result in the Court recommending
sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), potentially including an order to pay a
penalty into court and attorney fees to Defendant3 and a recommendation to
impose filing restrictions.
Dated: March 3, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
3 This Order to Show Cause is issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)(A) and the Order
Referring Case [#6], which authorizes the undersigned to “hear and determine pretrial matters[.]”
Here, Plaintiff’s conduct relates to his signing and submitting pretrial filings, so non-dispositive
Rule 11 sanctions, such as monetary penalties, fall within the undersigned’s authority. See, e.g.,
Carlson v. Town of Mountain Vill., Colo., No. 17-cv-02887-PAB-STV, 2019 WL 5819971, at *1 n.1
(D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2019) (magistrate judge finding that he had authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A) to rule on a Rule 11 sanctions motion “[b]ecause the instant Motion does not seek—
nor is the Court imposing—dispositive sanctions”); Bergeson v. Dilworth, 749 F. Supp. 1555,
1561-62 (D. Kan. 1990) (concluding that Rule 11 sanctions were “a matter within the magistrate’s
general authority to ‘hear and determine’ pretrial matters” where it was “apparent that the pretrial
motion for sanctions related to conduct of counsel for the signing of pretrial filings.”).
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