Davis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00444-SBP
W.D.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND DUDEK,2 Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff W.D. brings this action under Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., of the Social
Security Act (the “Act”) for review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the
“Commissioner”) final administrative decision denying his claim for supplemental security
income (“SSI”). The court has carefully considered the administrative record, ECF No. 12
(“AR”)3, Plaintiff’s brief, ECF No. 13 (“Brief”), the Commissioner’s response, ECF No. 14
(“Response”), Plaintiff’s reply, ECF No. 15 (“Reply”), and the applicable law. No hearing is
1 Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LAPR 5.2(b), “[a]n order resolving a social security appeal on the
merits shall identify the plaintiff by initials only.”
2 Leland Dudek is now the acting Commissioner of Social Security and is automatically
substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (an action
survives regardless of any change in the person occupying the office of the Commissioner of
Social Security).
3 The court uses “ECF No. ---” to refer to specific docket entries in CM/ECF and uses “AR: ---”
to refer to documents in the administrative record.
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necessary.
Because the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct legal standards and
substantial evidence supports her findings and the Commissioner’s final decision, the court
AFFIRMS.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits on December 3, 2020, alleging a disability onset date of
December 1, 2017. AR: 116. His application was denied initially and again on reconsideration.
AR: 116. He then requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held telephonically on April 24,
2023. AR: 116. The ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled, AR: 116-
29, and the appeals council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, AR: 17, leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.
SSI FRAMEWORK
A person is disabled within the meaning of the Act “only if his physical and/or mental
impairments preclude him from performing both his previous work and any other ‘substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.’” Wilson v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-00675-REB,
2011 WL 97234, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)). “However, the
mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding
that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the
claimant’s condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful
activity for at least twelve consecutive months.” Brandon v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1232
(D. Colo. 2015) (citing Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995)). “[F]inding that a
claimant is able to engage in substantial gainful activity requires more than a simple
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determination that the claimant can find employment and that he can physically perform certain
jobs; it also requires a determination that the claimant can hold whatever job he finds for a
significant period of time.” Fritz v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-00230-JLK, 2017 WL 219327, at *8 (D.
Colo. Jan. 18, 2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1442
(10th Cir. 1994)).
The Commissioner is required to follow a “five-step sequential evaluation process”
which guides the determination of whether an adult claimant meets the definition of disabled
under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1)-(4) (SSI evaluation of disability of
adults). If it can be determined that the claimant is disabled or not at a step, the Commissioner
makes the determination and does not continue to the next step. § 416.920(a)(4). However, if that
determination cannot be made, the Commissioner proceeds to the next step. Id.
Step one asks whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”
§ 416.920(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is “not disabled regardless of [ ] medical condition, . . .
age, education, and work experience.” § 416.920(b).
Step two assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or
combination of impairments under § 416.909. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not show
“any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [their] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities,” the claimant is “not disabled” regardless of “age,
education, and work experience.” § 416.920(c).
Step three tests whether the claimant's “impairment(s) meets or equals” a listed
impairment and “meets the duration requirement[.]” § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is
disabled regardless of “age, education, and work experience.” § 416.920(d). If not, the
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Commissioner analyzes the claimant's residual functional capacity, or “RFC,” which “is the most
[the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” §§ 416.902(e), 416.945(a)(1).
Step four considers whether the claimant “can still do [their] past relevant work” based
on their RFC. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(e). To be disabled, the claimant's “impairment(s)
must prevent [them] from doing [their] past relevant work.” § 416.920(f). For guidance on this
determination, “ALJs often seek the views of ‘vocational experts.’” See Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 100 (2019) (citing §§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e)). If the claimant’s severe impairment
prevents them from doing their “past relevant work” or they have no “past relevant work,” the
analysis continues to the final step. § 416.920(g)(1).
Lastly, step five considers the RFC assessment and the claimant’s vocational factors—
“age, education, and work experience.” §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g)(1). Any other work the
claimant “can adjust to must exist in significant numbers in the national economy (either in the
region where [they] live or in several regions in the country).” § 416.960(c)(1). The
Commissioner is “responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in
significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] can do, given [their] residual
functional capacity and vocational factors.” § 416.960(c)(1). If the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work,” they are “not disabled.” § 416.920(g)(1).
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four. The Commissioner bears
the burden at step five to prove there is other work the claimant can perform. Lax v. Astrue,
489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). The burden-shifting at step five, however, does not shift
the plaintiff’s burden to prove his RFC. § 416.960(c)(2) (“We are not responsible for providing
additional evidence about your residual functional capacity because we will use the same
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residual functional capacity assessment that we used to determine if you can do your past
relevant work.”).
ALJ’S DECISION
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease status post L4-5 fusion; cervical spine degenerative disc disease with
radiculopathy status post foraminotomy; persistent depressive disorder with anxious distress; and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). AR: 119. At step three, the ALJ concluded that these
impairments, alone and in the aggregate, did not medically equal a listing. AR: 120-22. The ALJ
then calculated Plaintiff’s RFC, finding that he could perform light work as defined in
§ 416.967(b), with additional limitations not relevant to this appeal. AR: 122. The ALJ concluded
as step four that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work but then determined as
step five that Plaintiff could find work in jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy. AR: 128-29.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court “is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the agency’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence.” Knight ex rel. P.K. v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 1171, 1175
(10th Cir. 2014). “The phrase ‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art,’ used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding.” Biestek, 587 U.S.
at 102 (quoting T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 301 (2015)). In applying the
substantial-evidence standard,
a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains
sufficient evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. And whatever
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the meaning of “substantial” in other contacts, the threshold for such evidentiary
sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a
mere scintilla. It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Id. at 102-103 (cleaned up); see also Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”) (quoting
U.S. Cellular Tel., L.L.C., v. City of Broken Arrow, Okla., 340 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir. 2003)).
“The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.” Zoltanski,
372 F.3d at 1200 (quoting U.S. Cellular, 340 F.3d at 1133).
The court “may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the
agency.” Knight, 756 F.3d at 1175 (citation omitted); see also Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200 (the
court may not displace the Commissioner’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even if
the court would have made a different choice if the matter had been before it de novo). Even so,
this court must “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may
undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has
been met.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Flaherty v. Astrue,
515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007)). “A reviewing court must uphold even a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Garland v. Dai, 593 U.S.
357, 369 (2021) (cleaned up).
In addition, this court’s review is guided by the harmless error doctrine, which the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals applies to social security disability cases. See Allen v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004). A court “may apply harmless error in the social security
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context ‘where, based on material the ALJ did at least consider (just not properly), [it] could
confidently say that no reasonable administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could
have resolved the factual matter in any other way.’” Armijo v. Astrue, 385 F. App’x 789, 792
(10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Allen, 357 F.3d at 1145).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate a letter from Dr. Stacie Daniels,
AR: 1204 (“Letter”), as a medical opinion. Brief at 6. He also asserts that the ALJ should have
incorporated Plaintiff’s need for an emotional support animal (“ESA”) when calculating
Plaintiff’s RFC but did not do so. Id. The court will take each argument in turn.
I. 	Dr. Daniels’s Letter
An ALJ must “give consideration to all the medical opinions in the record,” Keyes-
Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012), and articulate how persuasive she finds
each medical source’s opinion. § 416.920c. At a minimum, an ALJ must address the
supportability and consistency of a medical opinion.4 See § 416.920c(b)(2) (“[W]e will explain
how we considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical
4 The supportability factor considers whether the medical source’s opinion is supported by
“objective medical evidence” and “supporting explanations;” “the more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion, the more persuasive the medical opinion will be.” § 416.920c(c)(1)
(cleaned up). The consistency factor compares the medical source’s opinion and “the evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources” in the record. § 416.920c(c)(2). “The more
consistent a medical opinion is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion will be.” Id. (cleaned up).
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opinions or prior administrative medical findings in your determination or decision.”).5
At issue here is the Letter written by Dr. Daniels, the exact date of which is unclear,
where she stated:
The ALJ acknowledged the Letter in her decision, writing:
As for the [Letter] from Stacie Daniels, MD, that an emotional support animal is
medically necessary for treatment of the claimant’s ongoing psychiatric diagnoses,
the undersigned is neither persuaded nor unpersuaded given its lack of context as it
relates to a Social Security Administration disability determination (Ex. 20F).
AR: 127. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to treat the Letter as a medical opinion and
articulate the supportability and consistency of the opinions contained within it.
A “medical opinion” is a statement from a medical source about what a claimant can still
5 The ALJ “may, but [is] not required to, explain how we considered the factors in paragraphs
(c)(3) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate, when we articulate how we consider medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings in your case record.” § 416.1520c(b)(2).
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do despite his impairments and whether the claimant has one or more impairment-related
limitations or restrictions in his ability to: (1) perform physical demands of work activities;
(2) perform mental demands of work activities; (3) perform other demands of work, such as
seeing, hearing, or using other senses; and (4) adapt to environmental conditions.
§ 416.913(a)(2); see also Staheli v. Comm’r, SSA, 84 F.4th 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2023). There is no
dispute that, as a medical doctor, Dr. Daniels qualifies as a medical source. Rather, the issue
before the court is whether Dr. Daniels opined as to Plaintiff’s abilities in the areas described in
§ 416.913(a)(2) despite his impairments.
The court finds that the Letter’s vague and wholly unparticularized statements do not
address Plaintiff’s abilities despite his impairments, and thus the Letter is not a medical opinion.
For example, Dr. Daniels does not identify Plaintiff’s “debilitating psychiatric illness” that she
cites as the basis for the Letter, nor does she reference a particular prescription6 for an ESA or
explain why an ESA is “medically necessary for [Plaintiff’s] treatment.” Although Dr. Daniels
suggests that an ESA may “help[] mitigate the debilitating medical symptoms [Plaintiff] suffers
from” when Plaintiff is traveling or at home, she never explains how an ESA would do so, the
symptoms an ESA would address, or what Plaintiff is capable of doing despite his impairments
and supposed need for an ESA.
In Angela H. v. Commissioner of Social Security, a case with remarkably similar facts to
those here, the court confronted whether a nurse’s letter describing a claimant’s need for an ESA
was a medical opinion. No. 2:22-cv-4461, 2024 WL 1259875, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2024),
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1257213 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2024). Similar to the Letter
6 As the court will touch on below, Plaintiff also has not pointed to a prescription for an ESA.
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here, the nurse in that case wrote:
My client meets the definition of disability under the Fair Housing Act and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Due to this emotional disability, my client has certain
limitations related to social interaction, coping with stress and anxiety. In order to
help alleviate these difficulties, and to fully use and enjoy the dwelling unit you
own and/or administer, I have recommended my client to obtain a pet or emotional
support animal. The presence of this animal is necessary for the emotional and
mental health of my client, because its presence will mitigate the symptoms my
client is currently experiencing.
Id. (footnote omitted). In concluding that the nurse did not offer a medical opinion, the court
pointed out that the nurse did not explain “how an emotional support animal would help
[claimant] perform the mental demands of work activities,” highlighting too that the letter
“makes no mention of work at all.” Id. Ultimately, though, the court rested its conclusion that the
letter was not a medical opinion on the fact that nowhere did the nurse “describe what [claimant]
is able to do despite her mental-impairment limitations or restrictions.” Id.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has found general statements that do not address a claimant’s
ability to perform the specific demands of work activities are not medical opinions. In Staheli,
the doctor stated, “[claimant’s] prognosis for completing on-the-job training and maintaining
full-time, gainful employment is fair to good as long as the job tasks are within her ability level,
she receives adequate supervision/training/accommodations, and she is provided sufficient time
to perform her tasks.” 84 F.4th at 906 (quotation omitted). The doctor also recommended that the
claimant “receive extensive supervision and support while at work. This support can include
tutoring, extended time to complete tasks, and any other support/accommodations available at
the work site.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit found neither set of statements qualified as medical opinions.
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Regarding those concerning the claimant’s prognosis, the Tenth Circuit found that “[t]hese broad
statements did not meet the regulatory criteria for a medical opinion” because they “did not
provide evidence concerning [claimant’s] ability to perform the specific demands of work
activities[,]” but instead merely “described in broadly applicable terms what she would likely
need to hold down a job.” Id. at 907 (citing § 404.1513(a)(2)). Likewise, the court rejected the
notion that the doctor’s recommendations were a medical opinion because those statements were
“too general” and did not address “what [claimant] could still do despite her impairments.” Id.
Guided by the reasoning in Angela H. and Staheli, the court finds that Dr. Daniels’s
broad, nonspecific statements in the Letter are not medical opinions because they do not address
Plaintiff’s abilities to perform the functions described in § 416.913(a)(2)(i). Accordingly, the
court finds no error in the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Daniels’s statements.7
II. 	RFC
Plaintiff also insists that the ALJ was required to address his need for an ESA when
evaluating his RFC. Assuming without deciding that it is proper for an ALJ to consider the
7 Additionally, because the Letter is simply “other medical evidence,” see § 416.913(a)(3), and
there is no requirement that an ALJ articulate how she considered such evidence, see M.H. v.
Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-01797-CNS, 2023 WL 2401063, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2023), the court
finds the ALJ’s acknowledgment and discussion of the Letter is sufficient for the court to
conclude that the ALJ adequately considered the Letter and Dr. Daniels’s statements. Cf. T.E. v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-cv-02274-CNS, 2023 WL 2661615, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 28,
2023) (“And even though Dr. Barry’s report constitutes ‘other medical evidence,’ the ALJ erred
in failing to consider or at least note the existence of Dr. Barry’s remaining opinions contained
in the report when making his RFC assessment[.]”) (emphasis added).
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potential need for an ESA,8 the court respectfully disagrees.
The Act, agency regulations, as well as the caselaw in the Tenth Circuit and this District
do not make clear when an ALJ must address a claimant’s need for an ESA for purposes of
calculating a claimant’s RFC. See McGehee v. Berryhill, 386 F. Supp. 3d 80, 87 (D. Mass. 2019)
(noting same for the First Circuit); see also Angela H., 2024 WL 1259875, at *7 (“Plaintiff does
not cite to any authority establishing a standard for incorporating a claimant’s need for an
emotional support animal into an RFC assessment.”). In the cases that have addressed the issue,
courts have remanded when an ALJ fails to discuss a claimant’s need for an ESA and there is
evidence that an ESA is “medically necessary.” See McGehee, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (citing
Santos v. Colvin, No. 3:12-cv-05827-KLS, 2013 WL 5176846, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12,
2013); and Payano v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-00294-RFB-GWF, 2017 WL 4778593, at *4 (D. Nev.
Oct. 23, 2017)); Angela H., 2024 WL 1259875, at *7 (citing Ashley D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. CV 22-11344, 2023 WL 5266849, at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2023), recommendation
adopted, 2023 WL 5251849 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2023); and Horne v. Saul, No. 2:19-cv-013-
DCP, 2020 WL 1547068, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2020)); Duenes v. Kijakazi, 578 F. Supp. 3d
859, 869-70 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (collecting cases).
Assuming that this is the proper standard,9 Plaintiff bore the burden of establishing the
8 Several courts have entertained the notion that if a service animal or ESA is considered an
accommodation, then an ALJ is not permitted to consider any limitations posed by the need for a
service animal or ESA. See Gonzalez v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-02020-CBS, 2016 WL 8670502, at *6
(D. Colo. Oct. 14, 2016); Shue v. O’Malley, No. 23-1795, 2024 WL 2827936, at *4 (4th Cir.
June 4, 2024); see also SSR 11-2P, 2011 WL 4055665 (S.S.A. Sept. 12, 2011).
9 Plaintiff and the Commissioner appear to agree that this is the correct standard. Compare Brief
at 13-16; Reply at 2-7, with Response at 10-11.
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medical necessity of an ESA. See Ashley D., 2023 WL 5266849, at *10 (“[I]t is Plaintiff who
bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments
and that [she] has a more restrictive RFC than that assessed by the ALJ.”) (emphasis in original,
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff claims that the record contains sufficient
evidence to show that an ESA was medically necessary. Nowhere, though, does Plaintiff direct
the court to an actual prescription for an ESA during the relevant period. See McGehee, 386 F.
Supp. 3d at 87-88 (“A claimant’s use of a service dog must be considered by the ALJ when there
is evidence of a prescription from a medical provider for the dog.”) (citations omitted).
Instead, Plaintiff first points to the Letter. To the extent that there is a split on the issue of
whether a letter recommending an ESA is sufficient, see Tiffany B. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-
02696-DLP-JMS, 2022 WL 224817, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2022) (noting that “[a]bsent a
prescription, courts are split on whether a letter recommending a service dog from a medical
source is sufficient to show that the dog is medically necessary” and collecting cases), the court
is persuaded by the line of cases holding that a doctor’s letter that does not specifically address
how an ESA will assist a claimant in the workplace cannot establish medical necessity.10 See
Ashley D., 2023 WL 5266849, at *10 (holding that a doctor’s “vague statement that he ‘feel[s]’
Plaintiff ‘would benefit’ from an emotional support animal and that one ‘could help with her
symptoms’ was not evidence of medical necessity); Angela H., 2024 WL 1259875, at *7 (nurse’s
statements did not provide evidence of medical necessity because they “d[id] not explain the
10 The Commissioner also emphasizes that the Letter is only valid for from October 2022
through October 2023, which is several months after the period relevant to Plaintiff’s SSI claim.
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impact that an emotional support animal would have on Plaintiff’s ability to work”).11
Plaintiff also directs the court to treatment notes that he claims show the benefits of
having an ESA. See Brief at 12-13 (citations omitted). While these records demonstrate, at most,
that having a dog provides some support or benefit to Plaintiff—as is true with many animals,
whether they be service animals or general household pets—none establish the necessity of an
ESA. Because the standard for when an ALJ must consider the need for an ESA is not clear, the
court borrows from caselaw concerning when an ALJ must address the need for a walker or
assistive device. Similar to the standard set forth above, an ALJ must address a claimant’s need
for an assistive device when there is “medical documentation establishing the need for a hand-
held assistive device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the circumstances for which it
is needed (i.e., whether all the time, periodically, or only in certain situations; distance and
terrain; and any other relevant information).” Staples v. Astrue, 329 F. App’x 189, 191 (10th Cir.
2009) (citing SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7).
As the court in Staples explained, “SSR 96-9p requires more than generalized evidence of
11 Accord Horne, 2020 WL 1547068, at *12 (Plaintiff did not establish medical necessity for
service animal, in part, because “[t]he referenced letter to Plaintiff’s apartment complex that he
requires a service animal does not detail that such an animal was medically prescribed or provide
an opinion on the impact of a service animal on Plaintiff’s ability to work.”); Christian J. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:18-cv-1004 (ATB), 2019 WL 6840130, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2019) (“While Dr. Higham opined that a ‘service dog would provide a benefit for maintaining
psychological well-being’ there is no medical opinion of record that plaintiff required the
assistance of a service animal in order to engage in substantial gainful employment.”) (citation
omitted); Fagan v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-706, 2021 WL 5566481, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 29,
2021) (“Dr. Dimkpa’s statement that Plaintiff ‘can keep his service dog . . . with him everywhere
he goes’ . . . does not indicate that Plaintiff’s mental symptoms render a service dog medically
necessary[.]”).
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a condition that might require use of a cane. It requires medical documentation establishing the
need for a hand-held assistive device to aid in walking or standing, and describing the
circumstances for which it is needed.” 329 F. App’x at 192 (cleaned up, emphasis in original);
see also Bryan v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-00031-CBS, 2016 WL 8715612, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 4,
2016) (“The Social Security regulations require more than generalized evidence of a condition
that might require use of a cane.”) (citing Staples, 329 F. App’x at 192). Adopting that same rule
here, Plaintiff cannot prevail simply by pointing to medical records suggesting that he
experiences some benefit from having an ESA.
Absent evidence that an ESA was medically necessary, the court cannot say that the ALJ
erred when she did not factor Plaintiff’s ESA into her RFC calculation. Even if she did, the court
would also find that any error was harmless. Benjamin C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-cv-
872 (ATB), 2022 WL 16571699, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2022) (holding that any failure to
address need for service dog was harmless error where there was “no medical opinion in the
record suggested that the animal’s presence was necessary for plaintiff to function in the
workplace” and “there is no evidence in the record that the dog was ever made part of a formal
treatment plan”); see also id. (“In finding harmless error in this case, this court is following the
majority of the district courts to consider this issue[,]” and collecting cases).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court respectfully finds that the Commissioner’s final
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record and applies the correct
legal standards. Accordingly, the court finds no grounds warranting reversal or remand and
therefore AFFIRMS the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. The Clerk of Court
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shall enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor and close this civil action.
DATED: March 28, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
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