In re: Tucker

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 24-cv-304-CNS (Bankr. No. 23-12820-MER)
In Re:
RUSSEL TUCKER,
Debtor.
SIMON RODRIGUEZ, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellant,
v.
RUSSEL TUCKER,
Appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
OPINION
______________________________________________________________________
Among 	the 	essential 	components 	of 	a 	bankruptcy 	debtor’s 	meaningful
fresh start are the exemptions permitted to debtors by law, which remove property from
the bankruptcy estate (and thus from creditors). Exemptions, however, are not without
limits. Both federal and state legislatures have decided the payment of child support takes
precedence over the protection of debtors’ assets and have given domestic support
obligation creditors a green light to pursue exempt property.
Here, a chapter 7 debtor listed certain personal property as exempt on his
bankruptcy schedules, and the trustee objected asserting the debtor was not entitled to
Colorado exemptions pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-106 because of the existence
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of a domestic support obligation claim. The Bankruptcy Court overruled the objection,
concluding that such a claim does not invalidate a properly claimed exemption. In doing
so, the Bankruptcy Court interpreted Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-106 to require that exempt
personal property remains liable for domestic support obligation debts, notwithstanding
its exempt status. For the reasons that follow, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s
decision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On June 27, 2023, Appellee Russel E. Tucker (Debtor) filed a voluntary petition for
chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. Debtor listed several assets on his Schedule A/B (the Assets)
and claimed exemptions in the Assets on his Schedule C under Colorado law. 	The
scheduled value of the Assets totaled $13,330. Debtor also listed on his Schedule E a
priority unsecured claim owed to Leesa Tucker in the amount of $19,589 and indicated it
was a “domestic support obligation” (DSO).
Shortly after, the chapter 7 Trustee (the Trustee) filed an Objection by Trustee to
Exemptions (the Objection), asserting Debtor was not entitled to Colorado exemptions
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)1 and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-106 because he had a DSO
claim. On September 11, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court held a preliminary hearing and took
the matter under advisement. Shortly after that, on October 23, 2023, the Bankruptcy
Court entered its Order Denying the Trustee’s Objection (the Order Overruling Objection).
The Bankruptcy Court held Debtor’s exemptions were valid despite having a DSO debt
because the Assets were properly exempted under Colorado law. The Bankruptcy Court
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to “Section,” “§,” “Bankruptcy Code,” and “Code” refer to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., and all references to the “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure.
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further held that neither the Code nor Colorado law requires a chapter 7 trustee to object
to valid exemptions to otherwise preserve a DSO creditor’s ability to pursue a debtor’s
exempt assets, during or after a case.
On November 6, 2023, the Trustee filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying
Trustee’s Objection to Debtor’s Exemptions (the Reconsideration Motion). On January
17, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order Denying Trustee’s Motion to Reconsider
(the Order Denying Reconsideration). On January 31, 2024, the Trustee appealed the
Order Denying Objection and Order Denying Reconsideration.
II. 	JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final judgments, orders and
decrees” of the Bankruptcy Court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), and (c)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
8003, 8005. The Trustee timely filed an appeal of the Order Denying Objection and Order
Denying Reconsideration, which are final orders. In re Durability, Inc., 893 F.2d 264, 265-
66 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Brayshaw, 912 F.2d 1255, 1256 (10th Cir. 1990). Accordingly,
this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.
III. 	ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Trustee raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether the Bankruptcy Court
erred by concluding that the Trustee may not utilize Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-106 (‘§ 13-
54-106’) as the basis for objecting to the Debtor’s claims of exemptions in certain Debtor
assets.” Appellant’s Br. at 2. Orders denying objections to exemptions are reviewed de
novo. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); In re Wagers, 514 F.3d
1021, 1024 (10th Cir. 2007). “De novo review requires an independent determination of
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the issues.” In re Liehr, 439 B.R. 179, 182 (10th Cir. BAP 2010) (citing Salve Regina Coll.,
499 U.S. at 238).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Statutory Framework
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is created, which “is
comprised of . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Once a chapter 7 bankruptcy estate
is created, the chapter 7 trustee is then responsible for administration of the bankruptcy
estate for the benefit of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 704. The Code, however, allows debtors to
“exempt” certain property from the bankruptcy estate under state or federal law. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b). States are permitted to opt-out of the federal exemptions and limit a resident’s
exemptions to those allowed under state law. Id. Colorado has done so, so its debtors
claim exemptions only under Colorado state law. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-107.
A debtor seeking to claim exemptions “shall file a list of property that the debtor
claims as exempt” and, “[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as
exempt on such list is exempt.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). A party objecting to a debtor’s claims
of exemption bears “the burden of proving that an exemption was not properly claimed.”
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c); In re Lampe, 331 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2003). Property that
is “exempt” is removed from the bankruptcy estate. See 11. U.S.C. § 522(b)(1); Owen v.
Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991). Such property is further protected by § 522(c), which
states in relevant part that “property exempted under this section is not liable during or
after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose . . . before the commencement of the
case[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 522(c). Section 522(c), however, provides for various exceptions
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including an exception for DSO debts. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1). In other words, under
§ 522(c)(1), exempt property remains liable during or after the case for any DSO debt.
Colorado exemptions are primarily set forth in Article 54 of Title 13 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes (Article 54). Additionally, § 13-54-106 provides:
The exemptions provided by [Article 54] shall extend and
apply to writs of attachment, execution, and garnishment
issued out of any court of record and by municipal courts,
except those writs which are the result of a judgment taken for
arrearages for child support or for child support debt which are
subject to the exemptions set forth in [ ] § 13-54-104(3).
The Tenth Circuit has not addressed if a debtor with a DSO can claim Colorado
exemptions pursuant to § 13-54-106. The Colorado Court of Appeals, however, has
interpreted this statute in Drachmeister v. Brassert and held that § 13-54-106 “clearly
permits the garnishment of otherwise exempt property or income for collection of child
support arrearages.” 93 P.3d 566, 568 (Colo. App. 2004).
In Drachmeister, the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered the debtor to make child
support 	payments. 	Years 	later, 	the 	debtor 	received 	a 	personal 	injury 	award.
Subsequently, a creditor filed and served two writs of garnishment for child support
arrearages seeking the proceeds of the personal injury award. The debtor attempted to
stop the garnishment, arguing that the personal injury award was exempt under a
Colorado exemption that protects personal injury awards and the trial court disagreed.
On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed whether the personal injury award
exemption protected the debtor’s personal injury judgment from garnishment for his child
support obligation and concluded it did not. In doing so, the court analyzed § 13-54-106
and determined that it “limits the application of [Article 54 exemptions].” Id. More
specifically, the court explained § 13-54-106 was “unambiguous” and “the legislative
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intent [wa]s evident from its plain wording, . . . [which] clearly permits the garnishment of
otherwise exempt property or income for collection of child support arrearages.” Id. at
568. Lastly, the court concluded that, based on the plain language of § 13-54-106, “the
General Assembly did not intend to limit the personal injury award assets subject to
garnishment for child support arrearages.” Id.
B. 	Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred by overruling the Objection
The Trustee presses four points on appeal: (1) the Bankruptcy Court erred in its
interpretation of § 13-54-106; (2) the Bankruptcy Court erred in its reliance and application
of § 522(c)(1); (3) the Bankruptcy Court misconstrued the case law relied upon by the
Trustee to support his standing argument; and (4) the Bankruptcy Court erred in
concluding the Objection was improper because of the administrative costs and equitable
considerations.
i. 	Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in its interpretation of § 13-54-106
In the Order Overruling Objection, the Bankruptcy Court held that § 13-54-106
does not invalidate an exemption to the extent that the debtor owes a DSO—only a DSO
creditor is entitled to pursue collection of exempt assets, not the chapter 7 trustee or other
creditors. Additionally, in the Order Denying Reconsideration, the Bankruptcy Court
reiterated that § 13-54-106:
does not limit a debtor’s right to claim the exemption, nor does
property exempted under [Article 54] lose its exempt status
with respect to, or even to the extent of, DSO claims. Rather,
. 	. 	. 	§ 	13-54-106 	should 	be 	interpreted 	to 	mean 	that,
notwithstanding 	its 	exempt 	status, 	personal 	property
exempted under Colorado law remains liable for DSO debts.
The Trustee asserts that the Bankruptcy Court erred because, to the extent a DSO
claim exists, there is no exemption available to a debtor under Colorado law in personal
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property. In support, the Trustee contends that the word “except” is defined as “with the
exclusion of” or “excluding”—meaning that § 13-54-106 excludes DSO obligors from
claiming any Colorado exemptions in relation to a DSO claimant (other than those set
forth in an exemption not relevant here). The Trustee contends that, because there is no
exemption in personal property that exists for a DSO obligor in relation to a DSO obligee,
the personal property was never “exempt in the first instance.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. The
Trustee also relies on the holding in Drachmeister that the plain language of § 13-54-106
excludes child support arrearages from Article 54 exemptions, and argues that this
pronouncement means that the Colorado Court of Appeals shares his interpretation of
§ 13-54-106—i.e., if an exemption is excluded it must be eliminated or invalidated.
The “scope and application” of Colorado exemptions are defined by the state
courts, and this Court is bound by their interpretations. Belcher v. Turner, 579 F.2d 73,
74 (10th Cir. 1978). The Colorado courts, however, have not explicitly addressed whether
§ 13-54-106 eliminates Article 54 exemptions for those debtors who have a DSO. Under
Colorado law, a court interpreting a Colorado statute must “ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature,” and that task begins with “the language of the statute itself.”
People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Colo. 1994).
Here, the Court determines that the plain language of § 13-54-106, which
unambiguously permits the garnishment of otherwise exempt property for collection of
child support arrearages, does not eliminate Article 54 exemptions for those with a DSO.
The Court also rejects the Trustee’s argument that the Assets were never exempt in the
first instance because no exemption in personal property exists for a DSO obligor.
Section 13-54-106 does not provide that DSO obligors are not entitled to claim any
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exemptions. Rather, the statute provides that all the Article 54 exemptions extend and
apply to collection process, except collection of DSO debts. “When the legislature could
have chosen to restrict the application of a statute, but chose not to, the Court need “not
read additional restrictions into the statute.” McDonnell v. The Colo. Real Est. Comm’n,
361 P.3d 1138, 1146 (Colo. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
Further, the pronouncements by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Drachmeister
do not alter the statutory interpretation analysis. That case supports the interpretation
that, under § 13-54-106, otherwise exempt property does not lose its exempt status but
is nonetheless available to DSO creditors. Drachmeister, 93 P.3d at 568 (§ 13-54-106
“clearly permits the garnishment of otherwise exempt property for collection of child
support arrearages.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the Court interprets § 13-54-106 to protect
exempt property from garnishment and create an exception permitting the garnishment
of “otherwise exempt property” for collection of DSO debt. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the Bankruptcy Court did not err when it held § 13-54-106 does not preclude the
Debtor from using Colorado exemptions to protect the Assets.
ii. 	Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in its reliance and application of
§ 522(c)(1)
The Bankruptcy Court noted “[t]he purpose of discussing § 522(c)(1) was to
highlight how other courts have ruled based on language this Court finds is similar to”
§ 13-54-106 and apply that reasoning to assist in interpreting § 13-54-106. Order
Overruling Objection at 3. The Bankruptcy Court then relied on a series of decisions
interpreting § 522(c)(1) from sister courts. See, e.g., In re Fontana, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS
3771 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. Nov. 4, 2015); In re Bozeman, 376 B.R. 813 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
2007); In re Duggan, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2750 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2007); In re
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Waters, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2184 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. June 25, 2007); In re Vandeventer,
368 B.R. 50 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); In re Quezada, 368 B.R. 44 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007);
In re Ruppel, 368 B.R. 42 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); In re Covington, 368 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2006). See also Order Denying Reconsideration at 7–9 (summarizing cases). Based
on those cases, the Bankruptcy Court determined that § 522(c)(1) does not bar DSO
creditors from pursuing exempt assets to satisfy their claims, nor does it limit a debtor’s
right to claim the exemption. Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court interpreted § 13-54-
106 to “narrow the scope of the exemptions, so that property which is exempt from
process by other creditors is still liable to and subject to process of DSO claimants.” Id.
at 11.
The Trustee contends that the Bankruptcy Court’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced because § 522(c)(1) and § 13-54-106 are not similar—“the use of the word
‘except’ in § 522(c)(1) is very different than the use of the word in C.R.S. § 13-54-106.”
Appellant’s Br. at 16. The Trustee further asserts that, “in C.R.S. § 13-54-106, as held in
Drachmeister, the word ‘except’ excludes child support arrearages from article 54
exemptions,” whereas the word “except” in § 522(c)(1) refers to the phrase “liable . . . for
any debt,” not to whether the property is exempt. Id.
It is common practice for courts to rely on authority by analogy where there is no
authority directly on point. See, e.g., Bonbeck Parker, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of
Am., 14 F.4th 1169 (10th Cir. 2021) (using analogous decisions to interpret disputed
policy language; noting that such decisions provide a framework for resolving issues
when direct precedent is unavailable). And it was not error for the Bankruptcy Court to
have done so here because § 522(c)(1) and § 13-54-106 appear to be sufficiently similar.
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The Court rejects the Trustee’s argument to the contrary because, as discussed above,
§ 13-54-106 similarly protects exempt property from garnishment and creates an
exception permitting the garnishment of “otherwise exempt property” for collection of DSO
debt. Drachmeister supports this interpretation. In other words, exempt property remains
liable for DSO debt under § 13-54-106, just like exempt property is not liable for any debt
except DSO debt under § 522(c)(1). Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in
relying on cases interpreting § 522(c) to guide its interpretation of § 13-54-106.
iii. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred by misconstruing the case law
upon by the Trustee to support his standing argument
The Bankruptcy Court ruled that § 544(a)(2) cannot be used to defeat otherwise
valid exemptions to reach assets that are not property of the estate. The Bankruptcy Court
determined that, although the Trustee may challenge improperly claimed exemptions,
Debtor’s exemptions were not improperly claimed, and thus, the Trustee did not have
standing pursuant to § 544(a)(2) to liquidate Debtor’s validly exempted assets.
The Trustee asserts that he had standing to file the Objection and liquidate the
Assets, relying on three cases: Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir.
1990) (explaining a trustee exercising his powers under section § 544(a)(2) as a
hypothetical lien creditor may object to an improperly taken exemption); In re Duffin, 457
B.R. 820 (10th Cir. BAP 2011); and In re Murray, 506 B.R. 129 (10th Cir. BAP 2014).
In Duffin, the bankruptcy court considered the debtor’s claimed exemption for
unmatured life insurance policies. Utah law permits an individual to exempt unmatured
life insurance proceeds excluding any payments made on the contract during the one
year immediately preceding bankruptcy. The trustee objected to the exemption, which the
bankruptcy court overruled, in part, because the bankruptcy court disagreed with the
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general proposition that § 544(a), in addition to granting avoidance powers, also provides
a basis for a trustee to object to exemptions claimed by debtors.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit BAP reversed. In doing so, the BAP first determined
that the powers given to a trustee under § 544(a) are not limited to avoidance of transfers
but specifically include broader rights and powers including objecting to exemptions.
Applying this broad interpretation of § 544(a)(2), the BAP held that, because the trustee
hypothetically stands in the shoes of a judgment lien creditor holding an unsatisfied
execution, the trustee could reach the funds excepted from exemption—the premium
payments made within one year prior to filing of the petition.
In Murray, debtors claimed their earned income credit (EIC) refund as exempt
under the Kansas bankruptcy-only exemption protecting the right to receive the federal
and state EIC. The trustee objected, arguing because an individual outside of bankruptcy
is not given the exemption of the EIC from creditors as is the debtor in bankruptcy, a
judgment creditor outside of bankruptcy could gain access to an EIC. The bankruptcy
court overruled the objection, concluding that the trustee’s strong-arm rights and powers
apply to property of the estate but do not extend to specifically exempt property. The BAP
affirmed. In doing so, it distinguished Duffin noting that, in the instant case, the trustee
argued that the § 544(a)(2) powers entitled them to reach exempt assets that are not
property of the estate, i.e., the EIC refunds. Whereas, in Duffin, the assets at issue were
expressly excepted from exemption, and therefore property of the estate. In other
words, Duffin permitted the use of § 544(a)(2) to defeat an improperly claimed exemption.
The BAP emphasized that allowing the trustee to use § 544(a)(2) to defeat debtors’
properly claimed exemptions of their EIC refunds would mean that those “strong-arm
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powers 	could 	be 	used 	to 	defeat any 	exemption, whether 	improperly 	or properly
claimed by 	a 	debtor, 	including 	homestead, 	motor 	vehicle, 	and 	tools 	of 	the 	trade
exemptions.” Murray, 506 B.R. at 139.
The Trustee contends that the facts in this appeal are like the facts in Duffin. Utah
state law excepts from exemption life insurance premiums paid in the year prior to the
petition date, just like “Colorado state law excepts personal property from its exemption
scheme for the claims of DSO claimants.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. The Trustee asserts that
he invoked “§ 544(a)(2) to defeat an improperly claimed exemption” (like in Duffin) not “to
reach exempt assets that are not property of the estate” (like in Murray). Id.
The synthesis of authorities in the Tenth Circuit suggests that the powers given to
a trustee under § 544(a) are not limited to avoidance of transfers but specifically include
broader “rights and powers,” including the ability to object to exemptions. Zilkha, 920 F.2d
at 1523; In re Duffin, 457 at 828 (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has rejected a narrow interpretation
of § 544(a)[.]”). Moreover, it is clear a trustee can invoke § 544(a)(2) to defeat “an
improperly claimed exemption” but not “to reach exempt assets that are not property of
the estate.” In re Duffin, 457 at 828; Murray, 506 B.R. at 138-39.
That said, the Court rejects the Trustee’s argument that he is invoking § 544(a)(2)
to defeat an improperly claimed exemption (like in Duffin) because, as discussed above,
Debtor has properly claimed exemptions in the Assets, which means that they are not
property of the estate. Accordingly, the Trustee could not administer the Assets pursuant
to § 544(a), and the Bankruptcy Court did not err in its interpretation of the cases the
Trustee relied on.
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iv. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that the Objection is
improper because of the administrative costs and other equitable
considerations
The Bankruptcy Court determined that, because the amount of the DSO exceeds
the value of the Assets, the administration of the Assets would be for the benefit of only
a single creditor—the DSO creditor—rather than unsecured creditors. The Bankruptcy
Court therefore concluded that it would be “improper” (as it would be where a chapter 7
trustee seeks to liquidate fully-encumbered property for the benefit of a single secured
creditor) to permit the Trustee to liquidate the Assets where the sole benefit to the estate
would be the recoupment of administrative costs.
The Trustee contends that the Bankruptcy Court’s analogy to a trustee’s efforts to
liquidate fully-encumbered property for the benefit of a secured creditor is misplaced
because (1) the Trustee’s Handbook provides that a trustee “must” object to an exemption
“if doing so benefits the estate;” (2) the Handbook does not prohibit the sale of fully-
encumbered property, but rather provides guidelines for when such sales may be
appropriate; and (3) the Code expressly contemplates the administration of assets solely
for the benefit of priority creditors. Appellant’s Br. at 20. The Trustee further asserts the
Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that administrative costs would be unfair to the DSO
creditor was done with no evidentiary support especially since all chapter 7 asset
administration involves accrual of administrative expenses and thus would not be a
sufficient basis to preclude potential recovery.
The Handbook supplements the guidance to trustees in §§ 704 and 554. It is a
valuable resource because it is prepared by the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee
Program, which was created “to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy
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system for the benefit of all stakeholders.” In re Bird, 577 B.R. 365, 376 (10th Cir. BAP
2017) (internal quotations omitted). The Handbook provides that a “trustee must object to
a claimed exemption if doing so benefits the estate.” Handbook at 4-4. The Handbook
also provides that “a trustee may sell assets only if the sale will result in a meaningful
distribution to creditors or provides some other significant benefit.” Id. at 4-14. Finally, the
Handbook notes that “[a] trustee shall not administer an estate or an asset in an estate
where the proceeds of liquidation will primarily benefit the trustee or the professionals[.]”
Id. at 4-1.
The Trustee is not incorrect that (i) pursuant to the Handbook a trustee is duty
bound to object to a claimed exemption if doing so benefits the estate, (ii) the Handbook
does not expressly prohibit the sale of fully-encumbered property, and (iii) the Code
permits a trustee to avoid certain penalty-based liens to pay priority claimants, including
the holders of DSO claims. That said, the Trustee fails to address whether there is a true
benefit to the estate under the facts here and that courts have “universally recognized, [ ]
that the sale of a fully encumbered asset is generally prohibited.” In re Bird, 577 B.R. at
376 (quoting In re KVN Corp., Inc., 514 B.R. 1, 5 (9th Cir. BAP 2016)).
The Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in determining that
allowing the Trustee to administer the Assets would run afoul of the Handbook’s directive
prohibiting trustees from administering an asset where the proceeds of liquidating will
primarily benefit the trustees. Further, the record supports the Bankruptcy Court’s findings
that (i) the amount of the DSO exceeds the value of the Assets, (ii) if the Objection is
sustained and the Assets liquidated, the DSO claimant will receive all proceeds net of the
Trustee’s case administration expenses, and (iii) the DSO claimant would receive neither
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the full amount of her claim nor the full value of the Assets if the Trustee liquidated the
Assets. Compare Official Form 106 at 1, with Official Form 106E/F at 13. See Trustee’s
Motion for Reconsideration at 4, in Appellant’s App. at 94 (the Trustee represents to the
Bankruptcy Court that “if the Objection is sustained and the assets liquidated, the DSO
claimant will receive all proceeds net of the Trustee’s case administration expenses”);
Order Denying Reconsideration at 2 (“Based on simple math, the DSO creditor would
receive neither the amount of her claim nor the full value of the Assets if the Trustee
liquidated the Assets.”).
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court’s discussion of administrative costs and other
equitable considerations is not essential to its determination to overrule the Objection.
Even if the Bankruptcy Court did err in concluding the Objection was improper based on
equitable considerations, any such error would be harmless since § 13-54-106 does not
eliminate Article 54 exemptions for those debtors with a DSO debt.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not
err in its interpretation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-106 and subsequent legal conclusions.
Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court.
Dated this 27th day of March 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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