Prince v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

1:24-cv-00218CodMar 27, 2025

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00218-CNS
J.A.P.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff J.A.P. 1 brings this appeal of a denial of supplemental security income
(SSI). ECF No. 10 (Opening Br.); ECF No. 1. The ALJ denied the claims, and Plaintiff
went through the appeals process. For the reasons explained below, the Court affirms the
denial of benefits.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed for SSI under Title II of the Social Security Act in December 2021,
alleging a disability onset date of November 15, 2021. A.R. at 147–52. The claim was
denied both initially and on rehearing. A.R. at 88–97, 99–104. Plaintiff timely filed a
Request for Hearing, and the hearing was held on May 10, 2023. A.R. at 36–62. The ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision on August 14, 2023. A.R. at 1–34. The Appeals Council
1 Pursuant to D.C.COLO.L.APR 5.2(b), Plaintiff J.A.P. is identified by her initials only.
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declined to review the case, rendering the August 14 decision the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security. A.R. at 1–34. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. ECF No.
1.
Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from depression, digestive problems, colitis,
GERD, Crohn’s disease, unexpected bladder frequency, and problems with her right foot
due to a cystic legion. A.R. at 174, 299–303, 676, 748.
The ALJ 	conducted 	the 	five-step 	sequential 	analysis 	to 	determine 	whether
Petitioner was disabled for purposes of the Act. At step one, the ALJ found that Petitioner
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 7, 2021. A.R. at 19. At
step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of diverticulosis,
residuals from removal of a ganglion cyst on the right foot, mild degenerative changes of
bilateral feet, and major depressive disorder. A.R. at 19. At step three, the ALJ found that
the impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments. A.R. at 20.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform relevant past work. A.R. at
2433. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC)
to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) with
the following limitations: she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; and she can no more than frequently climb ramps
and stairs. She can have no exposure to moving mechanical
parts, heavy machinery, or unprotected heights. She can
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. She
requires a bathroom on site.
A.R. at 25. At step five, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. A.R. at 28–30. Thus, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled. A.R. at 30.
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on two bases, arguing that the ALJ improperly
considered the various medical opinions and that the ALJ improperly determined
Plaintiff’s RFC.
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
An individual is considered disabled under the Social Security Act if they are unable
to do “any substantial gainful activity” due to any medically determinable physical and/or
mental impairment that can be expected “to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
416.905(a)). An individual bears the initial burden of establishing their disability. See id.
at 1062. To determine whether an individual is disabled, ALJs use a five-step, sequential
analysis that considers whether the individual:
(1) is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity”;
(2) has a “severe” impairment or impairments;
(3) the impairment or impairments equals one of the impairments listed in the
appendix of the relevant disability regulation;
(4) the impairment or impairments prevent the individual from doing their past
work; and
(5) has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform other work in the
national economy.
Allen 	v. 	Barnhart, 	357 	F.3d 	1140, 	1142 	(10th 	Cir. 	2004) 	(citing 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
404.1520(a)(4)). The burden to prove elements one through four falls on the plaintiff.
Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). However, if Plaintiff “is not
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considered disabled at step three, but has satisfied their burden at steps one, two, and
four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner” to show that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform
other work in the national economy, taking into consideration their age, education, and
work experience. Id. Prior to step four, the ALJ must formulate an RFC finding,
considering 	the 	limiting 	effects 	of 	all 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	impairments. 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
404.1520(e); Henrie v. United States Department of Health and Human Servs., 13 F.3d
359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993).
Exercising 	jurisdiction 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	405(g), 	the 	Court 	reviews 	the
Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Pisciotta
v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1075 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court must evaluate the agency’s
decision “solely by the grounds invoked by the agency,” and may not “affirm the
administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence that is sufficient, based on the entire record, to
support the ALJ’s factual determinations. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03
(2022). A district court must “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including
anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the
substantiality test has been met,” but will “not reweigh the evidence or retry the case.”
Flaherty 	v. Astrue, 	515 	F.3d 	1067, 	1070 	(10th 	Cir. 	2007). The 	threshold 	for 	this
“evidentiary sufficiency is not high”; the evidence required is “more than a mere scintilla
and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
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a conclusion.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. Nonetheless, a decision is not based on
substantial evidence if it is “overwhelmed by other evidence in the record.” Wall, 561 F.3d
at 1052 (internal quotations omitted). A decision not supported by substantial evidence
must be reversed. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that two of the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Medical Opinions
Social Security regulations require ALJs to evaluate medical opinion evidence
based on (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4)
specialization; and (5) other factors, such as familiarity with the other evidence in the
claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 404.1520(c); see also C.M.D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 	1:22-CV-01005-DDD, 	2022 	WL 	18141574, 	at 	*1 	(D. 	Colo. 	Dec. 	9, 	2022).
Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and ALJs must explain how
they considered those factors in the decision. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(b). An ALJ
cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent
without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. Woods v. Kijakazi,
32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff 	challenges 	the ALJ’s 	finding 	that 	Christine 	Pacheco’s 	opinion 	was
unpersuasive. Ms. Pacheco was Plaintiff’s mental health therapist who had treated
Plaintiff since November 2020 for major depressive disorder. A.R. at 28, 682.
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The ALJ found her opinion unpersuasive in part because it was unsupported,
finding that she “did not present sufficient objective medical evidence or relevant
explanation to support her opinion” that Plaintiff’s depression was disabling. A.R. at 28.
Ms. Pacheco’s treatment notes did not document objective findings about Plaintiff’s
mental functioning and did not specify the areas of functioning that Plaintiff would be
unable to perform. A.R. at 28. The ALJ also noted that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion was based
on Plaintiff’s remote work history and physical conditions, which are outside her purview.
A.R. at 28.
The ALJ also found Ms. Pacheco’s opinion inconsistent with the record, in part
because it conflicted with the opinion of Dr. Besses, the consultative psychological
examiner. A.R. at 28. Plaintiff argues that this conclusion is contradictory because the ALJ
found Dr. Besses’s opinion partially not persuasive. Plaintiff also argues that Ms.
Pacheco’s opinion was supported by additional medical evidence about Plaintiff’s
depression. ECF No. 10 at 10. However, the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Besses’s opinion is
partly not persuasive does not contradict the finding that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion is not
persuasive. The portion of Dr. Besses’s opinion that the ALJ found unpersuasive was that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment in complex or detailed instructions. A.R. at 28. The
ALJ explained that Dr. Besses’s observation that Plaintiff exhibited some concentration
and memory issues was not consistent with the opinion that Plaintiff had no impairment
with 	complex 	or 	detailed 	instructions 	and 	only 	mild 	impairment 	in 	concentration,
persistence, and pace. A.R. at 28. However, the ALJ did not discount Dr. Besses’s opinion
as a whole, just those specific findings. The ALJ found the remainder of Dr. Besses’s
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opinion persuasive because it was supported by her thorough and evidence-based
examination of Plaintiff and explanations of her opinions, and was consistent with other
evidence in the record. A.R. at 28. The finding that this part of Dr. Besses’s opinion was
not persuasive was, in fact, beneficial to Plaintiff because it caused the ALJ to adopt a
more limited mental function RFC than Dr. Besses recommended. The ALJ properly found
that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion conflicted with Dr. Besses’s and found Dr. Besses’s opinion
more persuasive, and this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ also found that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion was inconsistent with evidence of
Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities, including managing her finances, doing laundry
and household chores, spending time with others, and performing self care. A.R. at 28. A
reasonable fact finder could come to that same conclusion.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider evidence in the record
that supported Ms. Pacheco’s opinion. However, the Court will not reweigh evidence;
instead, the only consideration is whether a reasonable factfinder could reach the same
conclusion about the evidence that the ALJ came to. Here, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s reasons for finding Ms. Pacheco’s opinions unpersuasive, regardless of the
evidence that arguably supported her opinions.
B. Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination that Plaintiff is able to do
work at the medium level of exertion, arguing that he failed to properly account for
Plaintiff’s problems with her feet and frequent need for a bathroom. The Court finds no
reversible error.
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Medium work is defined at 20 CFR 416.967(c) as lifting no more than 50 pounds
at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. It also
involves standing or walking for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Ruling 83-
10. Plaintiff argues that the objective medical evidence indicates that she cannot stand or
walk the requisite six hours a day, and so the medium work RFC was improper.
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s reported symptoms were inconsistent with
other evidence in the record, including objective medical evidence, and were not as
severe as she claimed. Her reported activities and treatment history, which was limited
and conservative, also undermine the reported severity of her symptoms. The Court finds
that these conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ noted that the objective medical evidence undermined the severity of
Plaintiff’s reported foot symptoms. Plaintiff’s physical examinations during the relevant
period showed that she ambulated with a normal gait, even when she had foot calluses
in March 2023. A.R. at 24. Bilateral foot imaging taken in March 2023 showed only mild
arthritic changes. Plaintiff had foot surgery in May 2021 to excise a cystic legion, and after
the surgery she was “doing well with only mild pain.” A.R. at 24. In June 2021, she had
no pain and normal vascular, neurologic, and musculoskeletal examination findings of the
foot in question, and she did not seek further treatment for her foot until March 2023. A.R.
at 24. In March 2023, she complained of right foot pain and tenderness in her IT band,
but physical examination showed a normal gait and the provider attributed her pain largely
to the IT band. A.R. at 24. X-rays of her feet showed only mild degenerative changes of
the interphalangeal joints and metatarsophalangeal joints, bilateral osnavicularis, no
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ankle effusion, and normal alignment. A.R. at 24. Based on this evidence, the ALJ
concluded that her mild foot arthritis and the associated pain would not limit her ability to
work beyond the medium work with limited climbing restrictions. A.R. at 24. The Court
finds that this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, as a reasonable factfinder
could come to the same conclusion based on the cited evidence in the record.
As to Plaintiff’s reported pain, the ALJ concluded that her statements concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain were not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. This conclusion is supported by
substantial evidence. As discussed above, her foot issues had largely resolved after
surgery, and she reported having no pain at multiple follow-up appointments. Plaintiff also
showed normal ambulation and gait, and full range of motion in a physical examination
from 2022. Additionally, Plaintiff only sought limited and conservative treatment for her
foot pain, which is inconsistent with the reported severity of her pain. A.R. at 24. After the
March 2023 examination, for example, the doctor only recommended Tylenol and
physical therapy to resolve her foot pain and IT band soreness. A.R. at 2161–62. In sum,
the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision
denying Plaintiff’s SSI benefits.
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case No. 1:24-cv-00218-CNS Document13 _ filed 03/27/25 USDC Colorado pgi
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00218-CNS
J.A.P.,
Plaintiff,
V.

COMMISSIONER, Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff J.A.P.’ brings this appeal of a denial of supplemental security income
(SSI). ECF No. 10 (Opening Br.); ECF No. 1. The ALJ denied the claims, and Plaintiff
went through the appeals process. For the reasons explained below, the Court affirms the
denial of benefits.

|. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed for SSI under Title Il of the Social Security Act in December 2021,
alleging a disability onset date of November 15, 2021. A.R. at 147-52. The claim was
denied both initially and on rehearing. A.R. at 88-97, 99-104. Plaintiff timely filed a
Request for Hearing, and the hearing was held on May 10, 2023. A.R. at 36-62. The ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision on August 14, 2023. A.R. at 1-34. The Appeals Council

1 Pursuant to D.C.COLO.L.APR 5.2(b), Plaintiff J.A.P. is identified by her initials only.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
declined to review the case, rendering the August 14 decision the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security. A.R. at 1–34. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. ECF No.
1.
Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from depression, digestive problems, colitis,
GERD, Crohn’s disease, unexpected bladder frequency, and problems with her right foot
due to a cystic legion. A.R. at 174, 299–303, 676, 748.
The ALJ 	conducted 	the 	five-step 	sequential 	analysis 	to 	determine 	whether
Petitioner was disabled for purposes of the Act. At step one, the ALJ found that Petitioner
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 7, 2021. A.R. at 19. At
step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of diverticulosis,
residuals from removal of a ganglion cyst on the right foot, mild degenerative changes of
bilateral feet, and major depressive disorder. A.R. at 19. At step three, the ALJ found that
the impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments. A.R. at 20.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform relevant past work. A.R. at
2433. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC)
to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) with
the following limitations: she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; and she can no more than frequently climb ramps
and stairs. She can have no exposure to moving mechanical
parts, heavy machinery, or unprotected heights. She can
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. She
requires a bathroom on site.
A.R. at 25. At step five, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. A.R. at 28–30. Thus, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled. A.R. at 30.
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on two bases, arguing that the ALJ improperly
considered the various medical opinions and that the ALJ improperly determined
Plaintiff’s RFC.
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
An individual is considered disabled under the Social Security Act if they are unable
to do “any substantial gainful activity” due to any medically determinable physical and/or
mental impairment that can be expected “to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
416.905(a)). An individual bears the initial burden of establishing their disability. See id.
at 1062. To determine whether an individual is disabled, ALJs use a five-step, sequential
analysis that considers whether the individual:
(1) is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity”;
(2) has a “severe” impairment or impairments;
(3) the impairment or impairments equals one of the impairments listed in the
appendix of the relevant disability regulation;
(4) the impairment or impairments prevent the individual from doing their past
work; and
(5) has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform other work in the
national economy.
Allen 	v. 	Barnhart, 	357 	F.3d 	1140, 	1142 	(10th 	Cir. 	2004) 	(citing 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
404.1520(a)(4)). The burden to prove elements one through four falls on the plaintiff.
Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). However, if Plaintiff “is not
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considered disabled at step three, but has satisfied their burden at steps one, two, and
four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner” to show that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform
other work in the national economy, taking into consideration their age, education, and
work experience. Id. Prior to step four, the ALJ must formulate an RFC finding,
considering 	the 	limiting 	effects 	of 	all 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	impairments. 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
404.1520(e); Henrie v. United States Department of Health and Human Servs., 13 F.3d
359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993).
Exercising 	jurisdiction 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	405(g), 	the 	Court 	reviews 	the
Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Pisciotta
v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 1074, 1075 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court must evaluate the agency’s
decision “solely by the grounds invoked by the agency,” and may not “affirm the
administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence that is sufficient, based on the entire record, to
support the ALJ’s factual determinations. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03
(2022). A district court must “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including
anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the
substantiality test has been met,” but will “not reweigh the evidence or retry the case.”
Flaherty 	v. Astrue, 	515 	F.3d 	1067, 	1070 	(10th 	Cir. 	2007). The 	threshold 	for 	this
“evidentiary sufficiency is not high”; the evidence required is “more than a mere scintilla
and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
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a conclusion.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. Nonetheless, a decision is not based on
substantial evidence if it is “overwhelmed by other evidence in the record.” Wall, 561 F.3d
at 1052 (internal quotations omitted). A decision not supported by substantial evidence
must be reversed. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that two of the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Medical Opinions
Social Security regulations require ALJs to evaluate medical opinion evidence
based on (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4)
specialization; and (5) other factors, such as familiarity with the other evidence in the
claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 404.1520(c); see also C.M.D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 	1:22-CV-01005-DDD, 	2022 	WL 	18141574, 	at 	*1 	(D. 	Colo. 	Dec. 	9, 	2022).
Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and ALJs must explain how
they considered those factors in the decision. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(b). An ALJ
cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent
without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. Woods v. Kijakazi,
32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff 	challenges 	the ALJ’s 	finding 	that 	Christine 	Pacheco’s 	opinion 	was
unpersuasive. Ms. Pacheco was Plaintiff’s mental health therapist who had treated
Plaintiff since November 2020 for major depressive disorder. A.R. at 28, 682.
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The ALJ found her opinion unpersuasive in part because it was unsupported,
finding that she “did not present sufficient objective medical evidence or relevant
explanation to support her opinion” that Plaintiff’s depression was disabling. A.R. at 28.
Ms. Pacheco’s treatment notes did not document objective findings about Plaintiff’s
mental functioning and did not specify the areas of functioning that Plaintiff would be
unable to perform. A.R. at 28. The ALJ also noted that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion was based
on Plaintiff’s remote work history and physical conditions, which are outside her purview.
A.R. at 28.
The ALJ also found Ms. Pacheco’s opinion inconsistent with the record, in part
because it conflicted with the opinion of Dr. Besses, the consultative psychological
examiner. A.R. at 28. Plaintiff argues that this conclusion is contradictory because the ALJ
found Dr. Besses’s opinion partially not persuasive. Plaintiff also argues that Ms.
Pacheco’s opinion was supported by additional medical evidence about Plaintiff’s
depression. ECF No. 10 at 10. However, the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Besses’s opinion is
partly not persuasive does not contradict the finding that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion is not
persuasive. The portion of Dr. Besses’s opinion that the ALJ found unpersuasive was that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment in complex or detailed instructions. A.R. at 28. The
ALJ explained that Dr. Besses’s observation that Plaintiff exhibited some concentration
and memory issues was not consistent with the opinion that Plaintiff had no impairment
with 	complex 	or 	detailed 	instructions 	and 	only 	mild 	impairment 	in 	concentration,
persistence, and pace. A.R. at 28. However, the ALJ did not discount Dr. Besses’s opinion
as a whole, just those specific findings. The ALJ found the remainder of Dr. Besses’s
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opinion persuasive because it was supported by her thorough and evidence-based
examination of Plaintiff and explanations of her opinions, and was consistent with other
evidence in the record. A.R. at 28. The finding that this part of Dr. Besses’s opinion was
not persuasive was, in fact, beneficial to Plaintiff because it caused the ALJ to adopt a
more limited mental function RFC than Dr. Besses recommended. The ALJ properly found
that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion conflicted with Dr. Besses’s and found Dr. Besses’s opinion
more persuasive, and this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ also found that Ms. Pacheco’s opinion was inconsistent with evidence of
Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities, including managing her finances, doing laundry
and household chores, spending time with others, and performing self care. A.R. at 28. A
reasonable fact finder could come to that same conclusion.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider evidence in the record
that supported Ms. Pacheco’s opinion. However, the Court will not reweigh evidence;
instead, the only consideration is whether a reasonable factfinder could reach the same
conclusion about the evidence that the ALJ came to. Here, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s reasons for finding Ms. Pacheco’s opinions unpersuasive, regardless of the
evidence that arguably supported her opinions.
B. Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination that Plaintiff is able to do
work at the medium level of exertion, arguing that he failed to properly account for
Plaintiff’s problems with her feet and frequent need for a bathroom. The Court finds no
reversible error.
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Medium work is defined at 20 CFR 416.967(c) as lifting no more than 50 pounds
at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. It also
involves standing or walking for approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Ruling 83-
10. Plaintiff argues that the objective medical evidence indicates that she cannot stand or
walk the requisite six hours a day, and so the medium work RFC was improper.
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s reported symptoms were inconsistent with
other evidence in the record, including objective medical evidence, and were not as
severe as she claimed. Her reported activities and treatment history, which was limited
and conservative, also undermine the reported severity of her symptoms. The Court finds
that these conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ noted that the objective medical evidence undermined the severity of
Plaintiff’s reported foot symptoms. Plaintiff’s physical examinations during the relevant
period showed that she ambulated with a normal gait, even when she had foot calluses
in March 2023. A.R. at 24. Bilateral foot imaging taken in March 2023 showed only mild
arthritic changes. Plaintiff had foot surgery in May 2021 to excise a cystic legion, and after
the surgery she was “doing well with only mild pain.” A.R. at 24. In June 2021, she had
no pain and normal vascular, neurologic, and musculoskeletal examination findings of the
foot in question, and she did not seek further treatment for her foot until March 2023. A.R.
at 24. In March 2023, she complained of right foot pain and tenderness in her IT band,
but physical examination showed a normal gait and the provider attributed her pain largely
to the IT band. A.R. at 24. X-rays of her feet showed only mild degenerative changes of
the interphalangeal joints and metatarsophalangeal joints, bilateral osnavicularis, no
Case No. 1:24-cv-00218-CNS Document 13 filed 03/27/25 USDC Colorado pg 8
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ankle effusion, and normal alignment. A.R. at 24. Based on this evidence, the ALJ
concluded that her mild foot arthritis and the associated pain would not limit her ability to
work beyond the medium work with limited climbing restrictions. A.R. at 24. The Court
finds that this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, as a reasonable factfinder
could come to the same conclusion based on the cited evidence in the record.
As to Plaintiff’s reported pain, the ALJ concluded that her statements concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain were not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. This conclusion is supported by
substantial evidence. As discussed above, her foot issues had largely resolved after
surgery, and she reported having no pain at multiple follow-up appointments. Plaintiff also
showed normal ambulation and gait, and full range of motion in a physical examination
from 2022. Additionally, Plaintiff only sought limited and conservative treatment for her
foot pain, which is inconsistent with the reported severity of her pain. A.R. at 24. After the
March 2023 examination, for example, the doctor only recommended Tylenol and
physical therapy to resolve her foot pain and IT band soreness. A.R. at 2161–62. In sum,
the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision
denying Plaintiff’s SSI benefits.
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Case No. 1:24-cv-00218-CNS Document13 _ filed 03/27/25 USDC Colorado pg10
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Dated this 27th day of March 2025.

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