Cruz v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-03448-SBP
L.C.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND DUDEK,2 Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff L.C. brings this action under Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., of the Social
Security Act (the “Act”) for review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the
“Commissioner”) final administrative decision denying her claim for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”). The court has carefully considered the administrative record, ECF No. 7
(“AR”)3, Plaintiff’s brief, ECF No. 8 (“Brief”), the Commissioner’s response, ECF No. 10
(“Response”), Plaintiff’s reply, ECF No. 11 (“Reply”), and the applicable law. No hearing is
1 Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LAPR 5.2(b), “[a]n order resolving a social security appeal on the
merits shall identify the plaintiff by initials only.”
2 Leland Dudek is now the acting Commissioner of Social Security and is automatically
substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (an action
survives regardless of any change in the person occupying the office of the Commissioner of
Social Security).
3 The court uses “ECF No. ---” to refer to specific docket entries in CM/ECF and uses “AR: ---”
to refer to documents in the administrative record.
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necessary.
For the reasons below, the court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and
REMANDS this case for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits in 2020, alleging disability as of April
20, 2018, due to left elbow issues, bilateral arm weakness, rheumatoid arthritis affecting her feet
and hands, a bilateral mastectomy, left knee issues, and migraine headaches. AR: 41-42, 294.
Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and again on reconsideration. AR: 76. She then sought a
hearing, which was held before the ALJ on April 25, 2023. AR: 76. The ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision, AR: 76-92, and the Appeals Council denied review, AR: 76, rendering the
ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner.
DIB FRAMEWORK
A person is disabled within the meaning of the Act “only if his physical and/or mental
impairments preclude him from performing both his previous work and any other ‘substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.’” Wilson v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-00675-REB,
2011 WL 97234, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)). “However, the
mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding
that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the
claimant’s condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful
activity for at least twelve consecutive months.” Brandon v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1232
(D. Colo. 2015) (citing Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995)). “[F]inding that a
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claimant is able to engage in substantial gainful activity requires more than a simple
determination that the claimant can find employment and that he can physically perform certain
jobs; it also requires a determination that the claimant can hold whatever job he finds for a
significant period of time.” Fritz v. Colvin, No. 15-cv-00230-JLK, 2017 WL 219327, at *8 (D.
Colo. Jan. 18, 2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1442
(10th Cir. 1994)).
The Commissioner is required to follow a “five-step sequential evaluation process”
which guides the determination of whether an adult claimant meets the definition of disabled
under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(i)-(v) (DIB evaluation of disability of
adults). If it can determine if the claimant is disabled or not at a step, the Commissioner makes
the determination and does not continue to the next step. § 404.1520(a)(4). However, if that
determination cannot be made, the Commissioner proceeds to the next step. Id.
Step one asks whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is “not disabled regardless of [ ] medical condition, . . .
age, education, and work experience.” §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 404.1520(b).
Step two assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or
combination of impairments under § 404.1509. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not
show “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [their] physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the claimant is “not disabled” regardless of “age,
education, and work experience.” § 404.1520(c).
Step three tests whether the claimant’s “impairment(s) meets or equals” a listed
impairment and “meets the duration requirement[.]” § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is
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disabled regardless of “age, education, and work experience.” § 404.1520(d). If not, the
Commissioner analyzes the claimant’s residual functional capacity, or “RFC,” which “is the most
[the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1).
Step four considers whether the claimant “can still do [their] past relevant work” based
on their RFC. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(e). To be disabled, the claimant’s “impairment(s)
must prevent [them] from doing [their] past relevant work.” § 404.1520(f). For guidance on this
determination, “ALJs often seek the views of ‘vocational experts.’” See Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 100 (2019) (citing §§ 404.1566(e), 416.966(e)). If the claimant’s “severe
impairment” prevents them from doing their “past relevant work” or they have no “past relevant
work,” the analysis continues to the final step. § 404.1520(g).
Lastly, step five considers the RFC assessment and the claimant’s vocational factors—
“age, education, and work experience.” §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g)(1). Any other work
the claimant “can adjust to must exist in significant numbers in the national economy (either in
the region where [they] live or in several regions in the country).” § 404.1560(c)(1). The
Commissioner is “responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in
significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] can do, given [their] residual
functional capacity and vocational factors.” § 404.1560(c)(2). If the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work,” they are “not disabled.” § 404.1520(g).
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four. The Commissioner bears
the burden of proof at step five to prove there is other work the claimant can perform. Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). The burden-shifting at step five, however, does not
shift the plaintiff’s burden to prove his RFC. § 404.1560(c)(2) (“We are not responsible for
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providing additional evidence about your residual functional capacity because we will use the
same residual functional capacity assessment that we used to determine if you can do your past
relevant work.”).
ALJ’S DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was insured for DIB through September 30,
2019, AR: 78, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability
onset date of April 20, 2018. AR: 78. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis; left elbow arthroscopy; arthropathy of the
right foot; and status-post bilateral mastectomy and reconstruction. AR: 78. The ALJ also found
that the following impairments were non-severe and did not cause more than mild limitations in
work-related functioning: gastric ulcer, biliary dyskinesia, osteopenia, gastroesophageal reflux
disease (GERD), and obesity.4 AR: 78-79. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listing.
AR: 80-82.
The ALJ then proceeded to assess Plaintiff’s RFC and found that Plaintiff could perform
a range of light work with the following additional restrictions:
she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds but can occasionally climb ramps
or stairs, and kneel. She can frequently stoop and crouch but never crawl. The
claimant can occasionally reach overhead with the left upper extremity.
AR: 82. At steps four and five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any relevant
past work, AR: 89-90, but could perform other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
4 The ALJ did not address whether Plaintiff’s migraine headaches were a severe impairment or
not. See AR: 78-79.
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national economy, and thus was not disabled. AR: 90-91.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court “is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the agency’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence.” Knight ex rel. P.K. v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 1171, 1175
(10th Cir. 2014). “The phrase ‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art,’ used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding.” Biestek, 587 U.S.
at 102 (quoting T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 301 (2015)). In applying the
substantial-evidence standard,
a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains
sufficient evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. And whatever
the meaning of “substantial” in other contacts, the threshold for such evidentiary
sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a
mere scintilla. It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Id. at 102-103 (cleaned up); see also Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”) (quoting
U.S. Cellular Tel., L.L.C., v. City of Broken Arrow, Okla., 340 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir. 2003)).
“The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.” Zoltanski,
372 F.3d at 1200 (quoting U.S. Cellular, 340 F.3d at 1133).
The court “may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the
agency.” Knight, 756 F.3d at 1175 (citation omitted); see also Zoltanski, 372 F.3d at 1200 (the
court may not displace the Commissioner’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even if
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the court would have made a different choice if the matter had been before it de novo). Even so,
this court must “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may
undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has
been met.” Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Flaherty v. Astrue,
515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007)). “A reviewing court must uphold even a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Garland v. Dai, 593 U.S.
357, 369 (2021) (cleaned up).
In addition, this court’s review is guided by the harmless error doctrine, which the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals applies to social security disability cases. See Allen v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004). A court “may apply harmless error in the social security
context ‘where, based on material the ALJ did at least consider (just not properly), [it] could
confidently say that no reasonable administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could
have resolved the factual matter in any other way.’” Armijo v. Astrue, 385 F. App’x 789, 792
(10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Allen, 357 F.3d at 1145).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on several grounds. She first argues that the ALJ
failed to address her migraines. Brief at 11-15. Second, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ should
have afforded more weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Steven Seiler. Id.
at 16-18. Third, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was capable of standing or
walking for at least six hours a day lacked the requisite support.5 Id. at 18. Finally, Plaintiff
5 In other words, Plaintiff contests the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could meet the standing and
walking requirements of light work. See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (“[T]he full range of
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argues that the ALJ erred when she discredited Plaintiff’s subjective statements. Id. at 19-23. The
court will take each in turn.
I. 	Plaintiff’s Migraines
Plaintiff was diagnosed with migraines and prescribed medications as treatment for her
headaches prior to her last insured date. AR: 398, 400, 506, 639, 863-64. Plaintiff highlights, too,
that the state agency medical consultants listed Plaintiff’s migraines as a medically determinable
impairment. AR: 61, 65. Although the ALJ acknowledged that “[Plaintiff] has alleged disability
due to . . . migraines,” AR: 83, the ALJ’s decision did not address Plaintiff’s migraines at step
two to determine whether her migraines were a severe impairment, see AR: 78-80; at step three
when considering whether Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, equaled a listing, see
AR: 80-82; or when calculating Plaintiff’s RFC, see AR: 82-89.
The Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff’s migraines in
her decision; however, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff has not shown that this omission
requires remand. Response at 7 (“The Commissioner acknowledges the ALJ discussed
Plaintiff[’s] migraine headaches only one time when the ALJ found Plaintiff alleged disability
due to several impairments, including migraine headaches. This issue presents a close call
because Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing work-related limitations that exceeded
the ALJ’s RFC or that the decision lacked substantial evidentiary support.”) (citation omitted).
Thus, the question before the court is whether the ALJ’s failure to address Plaintiff’s migraines
warrants remand or whether the court can nevertheless sustain the ALJ’s findings.
light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an
8-hour workday.”).
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The court respectfully concludes that remand is necessary, and the Commissioner’s
arguments urging the court to uphold the ALJ’s decision demonstrate why. The Commissioner
begins by running through the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s migraines in an effort to
show that the migraines were relatively insignificant such that they would not have materially
affected the ALJ’s decision had they been addressed. Response at 7-9. The Commissioner then
suggests that the ALJ did consider Plaintiff’s migraines—notwithstanding her failure to mention
them more than once—because the ALJ stated that she “considered all of Plaintiff’s [medically
determinable impairments].” Id. at 9. The Commissioner also maintains that the ALJ indirectly
addressed Plaintiff’s migraines when she found persuasive the opinions of Dr. Foster, who
opined that migraines did not significantly limit Plaintiff’s work-related abilities. Id.
The problem, though, is that the ALJ did not articulate this reasoning—or, for that matter,
any reasoning—with respect to Plaintiff’s migraines. See, e.g., Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d
1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004) (instructing that an ALJ’s decision must be “evaluated based solely
on the reasons stated in the decision.”) (citation omitted). In Deardorff v. Commissioner, SSA, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed an ALJ’s decision where, like here, the claimant cited migraines as a
basis for disability, but the ALJ “did not acknowledge or discuss any of the evidence related to
[his] headaches.” 762 F. App’x 484, 489 (10th Cir. 2019). The Commissioner defended the ALJ’s
decision by arguing that “[m]edical providers believed that [claimant’s] headaches were not
migraine headaches but instead related to his neck condition, which the ALJ extensively
discussed[.]” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit rejected this
argument as a “post hoc rationale,” observing that the ALJ “never made such a finding or
statement.” Id. (citing Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The
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magistrate judge’s (and appellee’s) post hoc rationale is improper because it usurps the agency’s
function of weighing and balancing the evidence in the first instance. Judicial review is limited to
the reasons stated in the ALJ’s decision[.]”) (citation omitted)).
The facts of Deardorff are on all fours with those here. As the Commissioner concedes,
the ALJ did not acknowledge or discuss the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s migraines, nor did she
set forth how she considered Plaintiff’s migraines or the reasons why she reached the conclusion
that she did. Rather, it seems that the ALJ simply failed to incorporate Plaintiff’s migraines into
her analysis. See Spicer v. Barnhart, 64 F. App’x 173, 177 (10th Cir. 2003) (remanding because
although “the mere diagnosis of an impairment does not necessarily compel a finding of
disability, the regulations do require the ALJ to at least consider a demonstrated impairment
throughout the disability determination process. In the present case, the ALJ’s failure to even
mention plaintiff’s osteoarthritis leads us to doubt that he formed any conclusion at all regarding
plaintiff’s hands”) (citations omitted).
Therefore, the court concludes that this case must be remanded back to the Commissioner
to consider Plaintiff’s migraines. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to
consider her migraines at subsequent steps in her decision—such as at steps three and five and
when calculating Plaintiff’s RFC—the court will not address those issues as they may be affected
by the ALJ’s reconsideration on remand. See Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir.
2003) (“We will not reach the remaining issues raised by appellant because they may be affected
by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on remand.”); N.M. by & through Melrose v. Berryhill,
No. CIV-17-1073-BMJ, 2018 WL 3579481, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 24, 2018) (“Plaintiff also
asserts the ALJ did not properly analyze whether Plaintiff functionally met a Listing. The Court
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does not address this argument because the ALJ’s analysis may be affected on remand after the
ALJ properly considers the evidence.”) (citations omitted).
II. 	Dr. Seiler
A. 	Standards
For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017—as is the case here because Plaintiff filed
her application in 2020—the ALJ will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,
including controlling weight, to any medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings,
including those from a claimant’s own medical sources. § 404.1520c.
An ALJ must “give consideration to all the medical opinions in the record,” Keyes-
Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012), and articulate how persuasive she finds
each medical source’s opinion. § 404.1520c. The persuasiveness of a medical source’s opinion is
evaluated using five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) the medical source’s
relationship with the claimant, which includes the length of the treatment relationship, the
frequency of examinations, the purpose of the treatment relationship, the extent of the treatment
relationship, and whether the treatment relationship is an examining relationship; (4) the medical
source’s area of specialization; and (5) other factors tending to support or contradict a medical
opinion or prior administrative medical finding. § 404.1520c(c).
The regulations instruct that supportability and consistency “are the most important
factors,” and must be addressed. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (“[W]e will explain how we considered the
supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions or prior
administrative medical findings in your determination or decision.”) The ALJ “may, but [is] not
required to,” explain how he or she considered the other factors. Id.
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The supportability factor considers whether the medical source’s opinion is supported by
“objective medical evidence” and “supporting explanations;” “the more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion, the more persuasive the medical opinion will be.” § 404.1520c(c)(1)
(cleaned up). The consistency factor compares the medical source’s opinion and “the evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources” in the record. § 404.1520c(c)(2). “The
more consistent a medical opinion is with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion will be.” Id. (cleaned
up).
Social Security regulations do not “prescribe the depth at which the ALJ must discuss”
supportability and consistency. Harp v. Kijakazi, No. CV 1:21-0275 KRS, 2022 WL 2341740,
at *6 (D.N.M. June 29, 2022). At a minimum, though, the ALJ must “provide an explanation that
allows the reviewing court to follow [her] reasoning and communicates how [s]he considered the
factors of consistency and supportability for each medical source’s opinions.” Zambrano v.
Kijakazi, No. CV 1:20-1356 KRS, 2022 WL 1746765, at *5 (D.N.M. May 31, 2022). And so
long as the court can “trace the path of the adjudicator’s reasoning,” the ALJ has met the
articulation requirements. Nielsen v. Comm’r, SSA, No. 21-4136, 2022 WL 15570650, at *5
(10th Cir. Oct. 28, 2022)6 (quoting Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical
6 While an unpublished opinion, this court sees no reason to disagree with the analysis in this
case and finds it persuasive. The court can rely on an unpublished Tenth Circuit opinion to the
extent that its reasoned analysis is persuasive in the case before it. United States v. Austin,
426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In this circuit, unpublished orders are not binding
precedent and we have generally determined that citation to unpublished opinions is not favored.
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Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5858 (Jan. 18, 2017)).
B. 	Analysis
Dr. Seiler opined that Plaintiff has a permanent restriction of lifting no more than five
pounds with her left arm after her recent elbow replacement surgery. AR: 88. The ALJ was not
persuaded by this opinion, reasoning that Dr. Seiler did not provide any explanation to support
his prescribed restriction. AR: 88. Additionally, the ALJ observed that Dr. Seiler’s notes show
that Plaintiff no longer has pain in her left arm and that her arm remains functional even though
she has some reduced range of motion. AR: 88. Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff received a
lifting restriction only after her elbow surgery in September 2021, which was approximately two
years after the date Plaintiff was last insured. AR: 88. The ALJ posited that this temporal gap
meant that Dr. Seiler’s opinions had “little bearing” on whether Plaintiff was disabled during the
period relevant to her claim—April 20, 2018, through September 30, 2019. AR: 88.
Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ erred in several ways. First, she faults the ALJ for failing
to consider the purpose of Dr. Seiler’s treatment of Plaintiff as well as his area of specialization.
Brief at 17. Both the purpose of a provider’s treatment and his area of specialization are factors
that an ALJ “must consider . . . but is not required to explicitly discuss.” Nielsen, 2022 WL
15570650, at *2 (citing § 404.1520c(b)(2), (3)). Thus, the court detects no discernable error in
the ALJ’s failure to specifically address these factors.
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s reasoning that Dr. Seiler’s opinions were not
However, if an unpublished opinion or order and judgment has persuasive value with respect to a
material issue in a case and would assist the court in its disposition, we allow a citation to that
decision.”) (cleaned up); see also 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not
precedential, but may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
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persuasive because they came several years after Plaintiff’s last insured date. Plaintiff has not
persuaded the court that the ALJ’s logic—i.e., that opinions regarding a claimant’s functional
capacity at a time outside the relevant period—is without merit. It is the case, as Plaintiff points
out, that “evidence bearing upon an applicant’s condition subsequent to the date upon which the
earning requirement was last met is pertinent evidence in that it may disclose the severity and
continuity of impairments existing before the earning requirement date.” Brief at 18 (quoting
Baca v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 5 F.3d 476, 479 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Yet, the ALJ seemed to concede that Dr. Seiler’s opinions were at least
somewhat relevant by addressing his opinions and stating that they had “little”—as opposed to
no—bearing on whether Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant period.7 Relevance aside,
Plaintiff has not explained why it was improper for the ALJ to assign less weight to Dr. Seiler’s
opinions because they concerned Plaintiff’s functional capacity in September 2021, which was
approximately two years removed from the last date relevant to the ALJ’s review.
Moreover, the timing of Dr. Seiler’s opinion was not the only reason the ALJ found Dr.
Seiler’s opinions unpersuasive. The ALJ also pointed to Dr. Seiler’s examination notes showing
relatively normal findings as another reason for discounting his opinions. Whether another
factfinder or the court itself could have reached a different conclusion than the ALJ is not
pertinent. See White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 908 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e may neither reweigh
the evidence nor substitute our judgment for the [Commissioner’s].”) (cleaned up), as amended
7 Moreover, it was Plaintiff’s burden to establish that she was disabled during the relevant
period. See Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] date last
insured was December 31, 2002; thus she had the burden of proving that she was totally disabled
on that date or before.”) (citation omitted).
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on denial of reh’g (Apr. 5, 2002); Teresa V. N. v. Saul, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1181 (N.D. Okla.
2019) (“Even if the Court might have reached a different conclusion, the Commissioner’s
decision stands so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing White, 287 F.3d
at 908). Having carefully reviewed the ALJ’s decision, the court concludes that there is
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Seiler’s opinions were not
persuasive.
III. 	Standing and Walking
Because it is necessary to remand this case for the ALJ to reconsider Plaintiff’s claim
while taking into account Plaintiff’s migraines, the court will not address Plaintiff’s argument
that the ALJ lacks substantial evidence for her finding that Plaintiff could stand or walk for six
hours out of an eight-hour workday. It is at least conceivable that Plaintiff’s migraines could
affect her ability to stand or walk for periods at a time—an issue upon which the court expresses
no opinion—and so it is appropriate to allow the ALJ to reevaluate Plaintiff’s RFC, including her
ability to stand or walk, on remand.
IV. 	Plaintiff’s Credibility
In light of the need to remand, the court also concludes it is not proper to take up
Plaintiff’s final argument that the ALJ erred by failing to credit her statements. See Delfrate v.
Berryhill, No. 6:16-cv-01235-JTM, 2017 WL 840961, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 3, 2017) (“Because
the court finds that a remand is required . . ., the court need not address plaintiff’s additional
argument concerning evaluation of plaintiff’s credibility. The ALJ will have to reassess plaintiff’s
credibility in light of the additional findings made upon remand.”); see also Poppa v. Astrue,
569 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting “credibility and RFC determinations are inherently
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intertwined”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court respectfully REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision denying
L.C.’s application REMANDS for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order.
DATED: March 25, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
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