Rich v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Regina M. Rodriguez
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-03401-RMR
P.R.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
ORDER
This civil action arises under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381–83(c), for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, denying Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”). For the reasons stated below, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the
Commissioner.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a 56-year-old woman with a tenth-grade education who alleges that she
became disabled on December 1, 2019 as a result of back pain, neck pain, arthritis in
arms, hands, legs, feet, and PTSD. See ECF No. 9 at (Administrative Record) [hereinafter
1 Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LAPR 5.2(b), this order identifies the Plaintiff by initials only.
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R. 83, 203, 211].2 She was previously employed as a waitress and worked on the kitchen
line in prison. Id. at 23.
Plaintiff applied for SSI under Title XVI of the Act on January 19, 2021. Id. Plaintiff’s
application was denied on initial review and on reconsideration. Id. at 81, 117-21. Plaintiff
then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id. at 123. The
hearing was held on August 8, 2023. Id. at 14-35. The ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff
and Vocational Expert Ashley Bryars. Id. at 36-69. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued
a decision denying Plaintiff’s application for SSI. Id. at 14-35. The ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff “has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act
since January 15, 2021, the date the application was filed.” Id. at 17. The ALJ determined
that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments that significantly limit the ability to
perform 	basic 	work 	activities: 	Bilateral 	Dupuytren’s 	contracture 	with 	ulnar 	nerve
entrapment; mild carpal tunnel syndrome; mild degenerative changes of the spine; post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); depression and acute grief reaction; ongoing substance
use; and inflammatory arthritis (20 CFR 416.920(c)). Id. at 19. After considering the entire
record, the ALJ found that:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work
as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except she can lift and carry no more than
fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently; climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds occasionally; bilateral handling and fingering frequently;
occasional exposure to environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dust,
and 	gases; 	occasional 	use 	of 	moving 	hazardous 	machinery; 	can
understand, 	remember, 	and 	carry 	out 	simple 	instructions; 	occasional
2 When citing to the Administrative Record (“R.”), the Court uses the page number found in the bottom right-
hand corner of the page. For all other documents, the court cites to the document and page number
generated by the Electronic Court Filing (“ECF”) system.
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interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the public; and can adapt to
occasional changes in a routine work setting.
Id. at 22. The ALJ concluded that although Plaintiff was unable to perform past
relevant work, “[c]onsidering the [Plaintiff]’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the [Plaintiff] can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969a). The Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision final. Id. at 1;
see also Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The Appeals Council
denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes
of review.”). Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision on
December 22, 2023, invoking this Court’s jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
“To qualify for SSI, a claimant must be disabled and must be eligible based on his
income and resources.” Jimenez v. Berryhill, 300 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1299 (D. Colo. 2018)
(Kane, J.) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1381a). “[T]he first month for which [a claimant] may receive
SSI benefits is the month after the month in which” he shows in his application that he
“meet[s] the[] eligibility requirements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.200; id. § 416.335;3 see also id.
§ 416.912(b)(1) (“Before we make a determination that you are not disabled, we will
3 	When you file an application in the month that you meet all the other requirements for
eligibility, the earliest month for which we can pay you benefits is the month following the
month you filed the application. If you file an application after the month you first meet all
the other requirements for eligibility, we cannot pay you for the month in which your
application is filed or any months before that month.
20 C.F.R. § 416.335.
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develop your complete medical history for at least the 12 months preceding the month in
which you file your application.”).
An individual is determined to be “disabled,” as defined in the Act, if “he is unable
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant’s physical or mental impairment or impairments
must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
In determining whether an individual’s physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or
impairments could be the basis of eligibility . . . , the Commissioner of Social
Security 	shall 	consider 	the 	combined 	effect 	of 	all 	of 	the 	individual’s
impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered
separately, would be of such severity. If the Commissioner of Social
Security does find a medically severe combination of impairments, the
combined impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the
disability determination process.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(G). Further, there is a “duration requirement” for the disabling
impairment, that is, it must “ha[ve] lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 214–15 (2002) (“[T]he ‘inability’ (to engage in any substantial gainful activity) must
last, or must be expected to last, for at least 12 months.”) (emphasis in original); see also
20 C.F.R. § 416.905.
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The Commissioner “has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled” under the Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The process involves the following five
inquiries:
1. 	Whether 	the 	claimant 	is 	“doing 	substantial 	gainful 	activity,” 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(i);
2. 	Whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment 	that 	meets 	the 	duration 	requirement” 	or 	a 	“combination 	of
impairments 	that 	is 	severe 	and 	meets 	the 	duration 	requirement,” 	id.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii);
3. 	Whether the claimant has “an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of [the]
listings in” Title 20, Chapter III, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Code of
Federal 	Regulations, 	and 	that 	“meets 	the 	duration 	requirement,” 	id.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii);
4. 	Whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC” or “residual
functional capacity”) to “do [her] past relevant work,” id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv); and
5. 	Whether, considering the claimant’s RFC and her “age, education, and work
experience,” 	the 	claimant 	“can 	make 	an 	adjustment 	to 	other 	work,” 	id.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), that “exists in significant numbers in the national economy,”
id. § 416.960(c)(1)–(2).
See also, e.g., Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750–52 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing the
five steps). “The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of the analysis[,]”
while “[a]t step five, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that a claimant can
perform work that exists in the national economy.” Neilson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118,
1120 (10th Cir. 1993). “If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant
is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.” Lax v. Astrue,
489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Williams, 844 F.2d at 750).
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“Judicial review of the [Commissioner’s] decision is limited to a determination
whether [his] factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether []he
applied the correct legal standards.” Nguyen v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1400, 1402 (10th Cir.
1994). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaherty v.
Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257,
1261 (10th Cir. 2005)). “Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence
in the record or constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374
(10th Cir. 1992). “[I]n making this determination, [the Court] cannot reweigh the evidence
or substitute [its] judgment for the administrative law judge’s.” Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d
1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2016).
III. 	ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff argues (1) the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the
evidence regarding Plaintiff’s hand limitations when determining her residual functional
capacity and (2) the ALJ lacked substantial evidence in finding that Plaintiff could perform
any of the three jobs cited by the Vocational Expert at the hearing. The Court considers
each argument in turn.
A. 	Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity
As described above, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity to do medium work and can frequently perform bilateral handling and fingering.
See R. at 22. Plaintiff takes issue with this conclusion, arguing that the record is clear that
Plaintiff “could not perform frequent handling and even occasional fingering.” ECF No. 14
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at 	13. 	Upon 	review, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	residual 	functional 	capacity
determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff’s arguments
amount to a dispute with how the ALJ weighed the evidence. However, the Court cannot
substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s and concludes that the ALJ’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence and she applied the correct legal standards.
1. 	Consideration of the Record
Plaintiff first asserts that the record shows she has objective medical evidence for
her hand conditions, referencing treatment records and her own subjective statements.
However, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s factual findings regarding Plaintiff’s hand
limitations are supported by substantial evidence.
As stated above, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity to perform medium work with only frequent handling and fingering and that she
can lift and carry no more than fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds
frequently. R. at 22. In assessing a claimant's RFC, “the ALJ must consider the combined
effect of all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments, whether severe or not
severe.” Wells v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). The
ALJ did so here. In determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ gave
“careful consideration to the entire record.” R. at 22. The ALJ specifically stated that she
“considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based
on the requirements of 20 CFR 416.929 and SSR 16-3p.” Id. at 22. The ALJ “also
considered 	the 	medical 	opinion(s) 	and 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	finding(s) 	in
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accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR 416.920c.” Id. The ALJ’s decision carefully
considered Plaintiff’s disability report, her testimony, her treatment records, the opinion
evidence of Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) consultants Susan Posey, Psy.D.,
Javier 	Torres, 	M.D., 	Patrice 	Solomon, 	Ph.D., 	and 	Meghana 	Karande, 	M.D., 	the
consultative examination report and opinions of Ryan Parsons, M.D., the opinions of
Elizabeth Chandler, Psy.D, and the opinions of Christina Mulkey, AGNP-C. Id. at 22-28.
To the extent Plaintiff points to additional evidence in the record, the Court takes the ALJ
at her word that she gave “careful consideration” to the “entire record.” Id. at 22. “Such
statement is generally sufficient when the record provides no reason to question its
validity.” Cox v. Apfel, No. 99-2296-JWL, 2000 WL 1472729, at *8 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2000)
(citing Hamilton v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1498–99 (10th Cir. 1992));
see also Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[O]ur general
practice . . . is to take a lower tribunal at its word when it declares that it has considered
a matter.”).
After properly considering the entire record, the ALJ “did not find that the claimant’s
allegations that she is incapable of all work activities due to the alleged limitations to be
consistent with the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s activities of daily living, and
the totality of the other evidence of record . . . .” R. at 29. The Court finds that this opinion
is supported by substantial evidence. There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s
impairments, although causing some pain, did not cause significant functional loss. See
Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362-63 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[D]isability requires more than
mere inability to work without pain. To be disabling, pain must be so severe, by itself or
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in 	conjunction 	with 	other 	impairments, 	as 	to 	preclude 	any 	substantial 	gainful
employment.” (quotation and citation omitted)). The ALJ cited treatment records showing
that in July 2019, Plaintiff reported numbness and tingling due to carpal tunnel syndrome
and reported having a difficult time gripping things and had pain and stiffness in her hands
and fingers. R. at 24. But examination showed she was able to passively achieve full
range of motion, had intact sensation to light touch; symmetric deep tendon reflexes; and
largely full strength. Id. Further, bilateral hand x-rays at the end of December 2021
showed no acute osseous abnormality or erosion in the claimant’s hands. Id. at 25. And
at her consultative examination in the beginning of May 2022, Plaintiff had moderate bone
deformities in her hands, but “her fine motor manipulation was intact as evidenced by
normal ability to unfasten and re-fasten a button and untie and re-tie a shoelace and
unbuckle and re-buckle a buckle with a small clasp on the manipulative activities board.”
Id. at 25. This examination shows that she maintained full strength in both hands. Id. at
546. Additionally, x-rays showed arthritis of the hand and wrist, with a pattern that was
nonspecific and could be seen with osteoarthritis. Id.
Based on the entirety of the record, there is far more than a “mere scintilla” of
evidence to support the ALJ’s determination. Plaintiff is simply asking this Court to
reweigh the evidence, which it cannot do. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257–
58 (10th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent that [Plaintiff] is asking this court to reweigh the
evidence, [it] cannot do so. . . . [The Court] review[s] only the sufficiency of the evidence,
not its weight.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084); Alarid v. Colvin, 590
F. App’x 789, 795 (10th Cir. 2014) (“In citing what he contends is contrary evidence [to
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the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the severity of the claimant’s impairments], [Plaintiff] is
asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.”).
2. 	Plaintiff’s Subjective Claims
Next, Plaintiff argues that her subjective claims of her debilitating symptoms should
be considered credible. See ECF No. 14 at 16. In analyzing this argument, the Court is
mindful that, “[c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact,
and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.”
Hackett, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005).
Here, after considering the evidence, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff’s
“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the
alleged symptoms . . . the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” R. at 23-24. The ALJ then explained the
“numerous factors” supporting this conclusion. First, the ALJ noted that despite Plaintiff’s
allegations that she is unable to work, she nevertheless was able to engage in work after
the application date, suggesting she is less limited than she has alleged. Id. Next, the ALJ
referenced Plaintiff’s statements that she is able to engage in many significant activities
of daily living, and reported being able to independently do self-care activities of bathing,
washing her hair, brushing her teeth, dressing herself, caring for her fingernails, and
completing house chores of simple and advanced meal preparation and vacuuming. Id.
at 24. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i) (stating an ALJ must consider a claimant’s
activities). Moreover, despite complaints of pain, she testified that she is not taking
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prescription 	medication 	for 	pain 	at 	this 	time 	and 	instead 	uses 	marijuana 	and
methamphetamine to “self-medicate.” Id. at 28-29. Finally, the ALJ cited evidence from
the record to conclude that “the treatment records, objective evidence, and clinical
findings do not support the severity and frequency of symptoms and the degree of
functional deficits and limitations alleged.” Id. at 24. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4)
(stating 	an 	ALJ 	must 	consider 	whether 	there 	are 	conflicts 	between 	a 	claimant’s
statements and the rest of the evidence).
The factors the ALJ considered in assessing Plaintiff's credibility were appropriate,
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (listing factors considered in evaluating intensity and
persistence 	of 	symptoms 	to 	include 	daily 	activities 	and 	treatment 	received), 	and
adequately supported the ALJ’s finding that the evidence in the record did not support
Plaintiff's statements about the severity of her symptoms and limitations. Moreover,
Plaintiff fails to provide any citations or well-reasoned argument to contradict the ALJ's
credibility assessment. The Court therefore concludes that the ALJ's analysis of Plaintiff's
credibility utilized the correct legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence.
3. 	Nurse Mulkey’s Opinions
Plaintiff next makes the conclusory argument that the ALJ erred by discrediting the
opinions of Christina Mulkey, AGNP. ECF No. 14 at 13-16. The Court disagrees.
The most important factors in evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions
are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Section 404.1527(c)(3)
provides: “The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support a medical
opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight [the ALJ] will
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give that medical opinion.” Further, “[t]he better an explanation a source provides for a
medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.” Id. And section
404.1527(c)(4) provides: “Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the
record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”
Here, Ms. Mulkey’s opinions—as noted by the ALJ—were largely based on
Plaintiff’s self-reporting and did not cite to any objective medical evidence. The record
contains a questionnaire completed by Nurse Mulkey, wherein she opined that Plaintiff
could rarely lift less than ten pounds and never more than ten pounds and that she had
significant limitations with reaching, handling, or fingering, including that she could use
her hands and fingers for grasping and fine manipulation “0%” of the time. R. at 551. The
ALJ found Nurse Mulkey’s statements were not persuasive because they were completed
after treating Plaintiff for one month and “lacked supporting objective medical evidence
and sufficient analysis and explanation.” Id. The ALJ found “the limitations appear to be
largely based on the [Plaintiff]’s self-reporting and symptoms and are an overestimation
of the [Plaintiff]’s symptoms and functional limitations and are not consistent with the
examination findings (Exs. 4F; 10F/17-20; 11F/10-11) in the record and lack of erosion
on imaging (Ex. 9F/24-26, 28).” Id. The ALJ further noted that the pain may not be as
significant as Plaintiff suggests because she did not follow up on treatment after getting
her forms completed and is not taking prescription medication for her pain. Id. at 28-29.
The Court finds that the ALJ properly relied on and cited to other evidence in the
records that contradicted the bare opinions in Ms. Mulkey’s questionnaire. The ALJ was
entitled to weigh Ms. Mulkey’s opinions against the other evidence in the record and
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resolve any discrepancies. See Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173 (credibility determinations are
peculiarly the province of the ALJ and will not be overturned if supported by substantial
evidence); Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1257 (“To the extent that [Plaintiff] is asking this court to
reweigh the evidence, [it] cannot do so . . . [The Court] review[s] only the sufficiency of
the evidence, not its weight.”) (emphasis in original). Ultimately, the Court concludes that
the ALJ’s reasons for finding Ms. Mulkey’s opinions unpersuasive are supported by
substantial evidence.
B. 	The ALJ’s Step Five Analysis
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at step five of her analysis because she “lacked
substantial evidence in finding that [Plaintiff] could perform any of the three jobs cited by
the [Vocational Expert] at the hearing. All three jobs required frequent handling, which
[Plaintiff] cannot do.” Id. at 16.
Here, the Vocational Expert testified that given Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, Plaintiff would 	be able to perform the
requirements of representative occupations such as meat clerk, night cleaner, and
laundry worker. Plaintiff argues that because she cannot frequently handle and finger,
she cannot perform those jobs. But, as explained above, the Court has concluded that
the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and ability to perform
medium work with frequent handling and fingering is supported by substantial evidence
and not in error. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument as to the ALJ’s step five anaysis is
without merit.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the
Commissioner.
DATED: February 19, 2025
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
REGINA M. RODRIGUEZ
United States District Judge
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