Bellinsky v. Galan et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Case No. 23-cv-03163-PAB-STV
JACOB BELLINSKY,
Plaintiff,
v.
RACHEL ZINNA GALAN, individually,
STEVEN JAMES LAZAR, individually,
ANDREW NEWTON HART, individually,
TERRI MEREDITH, individually,
RYAN PAUL LOEWER, individually,
BRYCE DAVID ALLEN, individually,
JEFFREY RALPH PILKINGTON, individually,
BRIAN DALE BOATRIGHT, individually, and
STATE OF COLORADO, corporately,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion & Demand for Recusals &
Other Due Relief [Docket No. 67]. Plaintiff Jacob Bellinsky requests that I recuse myself
and order the recusal of Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak from all of plaintiff’s cases,
including this case, Case No. 23-cv-01799-PAB-STV, and Case No. 23-cv-03461,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Docket No. 67 at 1. Mr. Bellinsky additionally requests
the “self-disqualification” of Magistrate Judge Varholak. Id. I will rule only on that
portion of the motion requesting that I recuse myself and Magistrate Judge Varholak.
Mr. Bellinsky states that Magistrate Judge Varholak and I “are aiding the
Defendants in their ongoing ‘Relocation Crime Spree,’ which is the subject matter of this
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suit.” Id. at 2. Mr. Bellinsky argues that Magistrate Judge Varholak has “entered
several known-void orders in this case . . . in obvious aid to the Defendants/suspects in
their never-ending crimes.” Id. (footnote omitted). Mr. Bellinsky also claims that Judge
Varholak and I have failed to take “action” on Mr. Bellinsky’s “criminal complaints” and
his petition for a special grand jury investigation. Id. at 3. Furthermore, Mr. Bellinsky
“accuses [Judge] Brimmer and [Magistrate Judge] Varholak of misprision of felony (18
U.S.C. § 4) and misprision of treason (18 U.S.C. § 2382).” Id. Accordingly, Mr.
Bellinsky requests that I transfer this case to “an impartial senior federal district court
judge” and enter an order recusing myself and Magistrate Judge Varholak. Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a federal judge is required to recuse himself “[w]here he
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party” or “in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a)-(b)(1). However,
“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also Lammle v. Ball
Aerospace & Techs. Corp., 589 F. App’x 846, 849 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished)
(“Unfavorable judicial rulings and ordinary efforts at courtroom administration are
insufficient grounds for recusal.”). Rather, recusal based on a judge’s decisions,
opinions, or remarks “is necessary when a judge’s actions or comments ‘reveal such a
high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’” United
States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
Adverse rulings that do not evidence such favoritism or antagonism “are grounds for
appeal, not recusal.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Although Mr. Bellinsky argues that Magistrate Judge Varholak has entered
“several known-void orders” in this case to aid the defendants, see Docket No. 67 at 2,
the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Varholak’s orders do not reveal any bias or
prejudice towards any party. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to recuse Magistrate
Judge Varholak on this ground. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
Mr. Bellinsky appears to argue that Magistrate Judge Varholak and I have
demonstrated bias by failing to take any “action” on Mr. Bellinsky’s “criminal
complaints.” Docket No. 67 at 3. This is a civil case. Mr. Bellinsky cites no authority
suggesting that a federal judge has a duty or, in these circumstances, the ability to
initiate criminal cases. As the Court explained in one of Mr. Bellinsky’s other cases,
“[I]t is well-settled that a private citizen does not have a constitutional right to
bring a criminal complaint against another individual.” Maehr v. United States,
No. 18-cv-02273-PAB-NRN, 2019 WL 3940931, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2019)
(quoting Price v. Hasly, 2004 WL 1305744, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004) (citing
Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981)); Keyter v. 535 Members of 110th
Cong., 277 F. App’x 825, 827 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“a private citizen[ ]
has no standing to initiate federal criminal prosecutions”)).
Galan v. Bellinsky, No. 23-cv-01799-PAB, 2023 WL 8075634, at *4-5 (D. Colo. Nov. 21,
2023). Ultimately, Mr. Bellinsky has identified no decisions, opinions, or remarks by
Magistrate Judge Varholak or myself revealing such a “high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’” See Nickl, 427 F.3d at 1298.
It is therefore
ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff’s Motion & Demand for Recusals & Other
Due Relief [Docket No. 67] seeking that I recuse myself and that I order the recusal of
Magistrate Judge Varholak is DENIED. It is further
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ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff’s motion [Docket No. 67] requesting that I
take action on Mr. Bellinsky’s purported criminal complaints is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff’s motion [Docket No. 67] seeking that
Magistrate Judge Varholak voluntarily disqualify himself is referred to Magistrate Judge
Varholak.
DATED March 1, 2024.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
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