Diedrich v. Hurst et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS
JOHN DIEDRICH,
Plaintiff,
v.
OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, as subsidiary of Auto-Owners Insurance
Company,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Owners Insurance Company’s
Oral Motion for a Protective Order (“Motion for Protective Order”) to prevent counsel
for Plaintiff John Diedrich from examining Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness on
topics that implicate the post-litigation claim file and post-litigation handling of Plaintiff’s
claims for insurance benefits. For the reasons discussed below Defendant’s Motion for
Protective Order is denied.
I. 	Background
This diversity action arises from two motor vehicle collisions that occurred on
December 21, 2017, and February 13, 2020, and in which Plaintiff sustained injuries. See
Third Am. Compl. [#43] ¶¶ 4-9, 13-18. At the time of those accidents, Plaintiff had an
insurance policy with $250,000 in Underinsured Motorist (UIM) benefits per accident,
which Plaintiff had purchased from Defendant. Id. ¶ 27. Since those accidents, Plaintiff
has received various forms of medical treatment, and he submitted related medical
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 14

2
records to Defendant for payment of UIM benefits. See id. ¶¶ 29-30, 38-39, 45, 47-51.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant “has yet to tender the UIM policy limits owed to Plaintiff for
the second crash.” Id. ¶ 51. He further claims that Defendant “[f]ail[ed] to conduct a
reasonable investigation” and “[sought] to discover only evidence that reduced the
amount of damages attributable to Plaintiff’s claim by not investigating the medical issues
in his claim[.]” Id. ¶¶ 73(c), (e). As a result, Plaintiff filed suit and asserts the following
claims 	in 	connection 	with 	both 	accidents 	and 	his 	request 	for 	UIM 	benefits: 	(1)
“underinsured motorist claim against Defendant Owners”; (2) breach of contract; (3)
violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115(1)(A) and 10-3-1116(1); and (4) bad faith
breach of insurance contract. Id. at 6-14.
On November 25, 2024, the Court held a discovery hearing to resolve disputes
regarding various topics listed in Plaintiff’s draft Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) notice of
Defendant. See Courtroom Minutes [#68]. The Court heard argument and resolved
several disputes; however, it took under advisement the issue of whether to permit
deposition topics that implicate the post-litigation claim file and post-litigation handling of
Plaintiff’s UIM claims. Id. at 2.
II. 	Legal Standards
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to obtain “discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case,” considering factors including, “the importance of the issues at
stake in the action” and “the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 14

3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) permits “[a] party or any person from
whom discovery is sought [to] move for a protective order in the court where the action is
pending,” and, for good cause, a court may “issue an order to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” A court
may forbid the discovery, specify the terms for the disclosure or discovery, prescribe the
discovery method, and forbid or limit inquiry into certain matters, among other actions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A)-(H); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(B) (permitting a court to
limit the scope and manner of a deposition, “as provided in Rule 26(c)”). Additionally,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) calls upon a court to limit the extent of
discovery if it falls outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).
III. 	Analysis
The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter and, therefore, it must apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law. See Bise v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., No. 22-
cv-03270-REB-KAS, 2024 WL 3023549, at *2 (D. Colo. May 7, 2024) (citing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins., 469 F.3d 870, 877 (10th Cir.
2006)). “[W]hen ‘a state law excludes certain evidence in order to effect substantive policy
considerations, Rule 401 acts to exclude the evidence since the proposition for which the
evidence is submitted is not properly provable and, therefore, irrelevant to the claim.” Id.
(quoting Sims, 469 F.3d at 881).
A. 	Overview of Foundational Case Law
The Colorado Supreme Court has explained that first-party claims between an
insured and his insurer are different from third-party actions where an injured person sues
a tortfeasor’s insurer. See Silva v. Basin W., Inc., 47 P.3d 1184, 1191 (Colo. 2002).
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 14

4
Specifically, “[t]hird-party personal injury tort claims involve liability investigations” that are
conducted “in anticipation of claims which, if denied will likely lead to litigation.” Id.
Whereas, “when a first-party claim between an insured and his or her insurer is at issue,
the insured is asking for payment under the terms of the insurance contract between him
and the insurance company.” Id. at 1192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the context of a first-party claim, “[t]he insurance company owes the insured a duty to
adjust his claim in good faith,” but that duty does not exist where an insurance company
is presented with a third-party personal injury claim. Id. at 1192-93. Therefore, “[t]he
scope of discovery of insurance information should . . . be broader in a first-party claim
between an insured party and his insurer than in a third-party personal injury claim.” Id.
at 1192. Based on those principles, the Silva court declined to permit discovery on the
insurance company’s reserves and settlement authority because the lawsuit concerned
a third-party personal injury tort claim. Id. at 1193.
The Colorado Supreme Court again addressed the scope of discovery in insurance
litigation—specifically underinsured motorist litigation—in Sunahara v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, 280 P.3d 649 (Colo. 2012). There, the court upheld the
exclusion from discovery of parts of an insurance claim file containing reserves and
settlement authority and underlying liability assessments and fault evaluations. 280 P.3d
at 652, 658. Sunahara concerned a first-party action brought by an insured against his
insurer for UIM benefits after the plaintiff received payment under the tortfeasor’s
insurance policy. Id. at 652, 657-58. There was no dispute that the plaintiff bore no
responsibility for the motor vehicle collision. Id. at 652. In discovery, the plaintiff requested
that the defendant, his insurance company, produce the claim file it opened when the
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 14

5
plaintiff first informed the defendant of the accident. Id. The insurance company produced
a redacted version of the claim file, and the plaintiff sought to compel production of the
unredacted version. Id. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that its Silva
decision protected the redacted information from discovery. Id. at 655-56. Although the
court acknowledged that the case before it was “factually distinguishable from Silva,”
which involved a third-party claim, it determined that Silva’s rationale applied “to protect
from discovery the liability assessments and fault evaluations that State Farm used to
develop its reserves and settlement authority.” Id. at 656. In reaching that determination,
the court reiterated Silva’s conclusions that reserves and settlement authority are
irrelevant for three reasons: “(1) they do not accurately reflect the insurer’s valuation of a
particular claim; (2) they are not admissions of liability; and (3) insurance companies
prepare them simply to satisfy statutory obligations and to establish bargaining tactics.”
Id. (citing Silva, 47 P.3d at 1188-91).
Even though Sunahara concerned a first-party claim where the plaintiff sued his
insurance company for UIM benefits, the court reasoned that “[t]he UIM context of this
case, however, places the insurance company in the ‘unique role’ of becoming almost
adversarial to its own insured.” Id. at 657 (citing Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 961 P.2d 487, 494 (Colo. 1998)). The “almost adversarial” relationship stems from
UIM coverage’s purpose: “to put a driver who is injured by an underinsured motorist in
the same position as if the underinsured motorist had liability limits in amounts equal to
the insured’s coverage.” Id. (citing USAA v. Parker, 200 P.3d 350, 358 (Colo. 2009)).
Relatedly, “the fact-finder in a UIM case must weigh the evidence presented by the
defendant insurance company, essentially standing in the shoes of the underinsured
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 14

6
motorist, against the evidence presented by the injured plaintiff.” Id. The court further
explained, that, while “[i]n bad faith and declaratory judgment actions, evidence of
reserves and settlement authority could shed light on whether the insurance company
adjusted a claim in good faith, or promptly investigated, assessed, or settled an underlying
claim[,] . . . UIM actions differ from bad faith and declaratory judgment cases because,
rather than defending its own actions, an insurance company in an UIM action must
essentially defend the tortfeasor’s behavior.” Id. at 657-58 (emphasis in original). Hence,
“evidence of the liability assessments and fault evaluations underlying reserves and
settlement authority” is not relevant. Id. at 658.
B. 	Overview of Unreasonable Delay or Denial and Common Law Bad
Faith Claims
Before the Court delves any further, it pauses to reflect on a key difference
between two claims Plaintiff has asserted in this case: a statutory claim for unreasonable
delay or denial of benefits in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115(1)(A) and 10-3-
1116(1); and bad faith breach of insurance contract. A statutory claim arises when an
“insurer delays or denies payment of an insurance benefit ‘without a reasonable basis for
that action.’” Byron-Amen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-02364-NYW, 2022 WL
1567563, at *4 (D. Colo. May 18, 2022) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1115(2); State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 418 P.3d 501, 506 (Colo. 2008)). Such a claim has two
elements: “(1) the insurer delayed or denied payment of benefits to the insured, and (2)
the delay or denial was without a reasonable basis.” Id. (citing Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Barriga, 418 P.3d 1181, 1185-86 (Colo. 2018)). To assess reasonableness, the trier of
fact will need to determine “whether the insurer’s coverage decision was unreasonable
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 14

7
when it occurred,” and the trier of fact must consider “the information that was before the
insurer at the time it made its coverage decision.” Id. at *7 (emphasis in original).
In contrast, “a common law claim for bad faith breach of insurance contract arises
out of an insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing” because of “the ‘special nature of
the insurance contract and the relationship which exists between the insurer and the
insured[.]’” Id. at *4 (quoting Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 89 P.3d 409, 414 (Colo.
2004)). Like an unreasonable-delay-or-denial claim, a common law bad faith claim
requires “a showing of unreasonable conduct on the part of the insurer,” but a common
law bad faith claim requires more of a plaintiff. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff must sufficiently
establish “that the insurer knowingly or recklessly disregarded the validity of the insured’s
claim.” Id. (quoting Butman Fam. Inv. Ltd. P’ship Owners Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-016380-
KLM, 2020 WL 1470801, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2020) (additional citations omitted)). Put
differently, the plaintiff must show “that the insurer subjectively knew of, or recklessly
disregarded, the unreasonableness of its conduct,” i.e., that the insurer “intentionally
denied, failed to process, or failed to pay a claim without a reasonable basis.’” Id. (quoting
Zolman v. Pinnacol Assurance, 261 P.3d 490, 497 (Colo. App. 2011)) (emphasis omitted).
There is no question that an “[insurer’s] duty of good faith and fair dealing continues
unabated during the life of the insurer-insured relationship”—even through a lawsuit—
"although 	the 	adversarial 	nature 	of 	such 	proceedings 	may 	suspend 	the 	insurer’s
obligation to negotiate as a reflection of good faith.” Sanderson v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,
251 P.3d 1213, 1217 (Colo. App. 2010); see also Bucholtz v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 773
P.2d 590, 592-93 (Colo. App. 1988) (noting that “any obligation to negotiate as a reflection
of good faith may be suspended temporarily by collateral circumstances.”); cf. Silva, 47
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 14

8
P.3d at 1193 (stating, “[i]n a first-party claim, the insurance company owes a duty to its
insured to adjust a claim in good faith that the insurance company does not owe [in third-
party claims]”). However, a question exists as to whether that continued duty of good faith
and fair dealing renders evidence regarding post-litigation claim handling relevant.
C. 	Discoverability of Post-Litigation Claim Handling
Whether post-litigation claim files are discoverable in a first-party UIM case was
recently addressed in this District in Lynn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2024 WL 4180731 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2024). Like the matter
now before the Court, Lynn involved claims for breach of contract, statutory unreasonable
delay and denial of insurance benefits, and bad faith breach of insurance contract. See
Compl. [#5], Case No. 23-cv-03222-MDB. Additionally, like Plaintiff in this case, the Lynn
plaintiff alleged that the insurer “fail[ed] to reasonably investigate [the plaintiff’s] claim in
good faith[.]” Id. ¶ 84(a). In Lynn, the plaintiff sought discovery of post-litigation claim
evaluation materials because of the insurer’s unabated duty of good faith and fair dealing
and the materials’ purported relevance to the plaintiff’s claim that the insurer failed to
conduct a reasonable investigation and had unreasonably delayed and denied benefits.
Lynn, 2024 WL 4180731, at *1. Because the parties had agreed that the tortfeasor’s
negligence caused the accident, the tortfeasor’s conduct was a non-issue in that case
and only the insurer’s conduct was at issue. Id. at *3. Thus, the court distinguished the
situation before it from the situation presented in Sunahara and reasoned that because
the situation before it “arises in the context of a first-party UIM claim where only the
insurer’s conduct is at issue, the scope of discovery into the insurer’s conduct is
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 8 of 14

9
necessarily broader than it might be in a third-party claim or a first-party UIM claim where
the tortfeasor’s conduct is at issue.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The court proceeded to consider two key principles in insurance cases: (1) an
insurer’s continued duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured, irrespective of
whether litigation has commenced; and (2) the suspension of an insurer’s derivative duty
to negotiate, settle, or pay an insured’s claim when an adversarial proceeding is filed and
when a genuine disagreement exists as to the amount of compensable damages. Id. With
these two principles in mind, the court noted that “litigation suspends some, but not all, of
the insurer’s duties to its insured” and reasoned that post-litigation activity “is still relevant
to an insurer’s ongoing duty of good faith and fair dealing”—"even if post-litigation activity
has no relevance to an insurer’s suspended duties[.]” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing
Bise, 2024 WL 3023549, at *5 (noting that a suspension of an insurer’s duty to negotiate
does not impact post-litigation claim handling’s relevance to claims of breach of insurance
contract, unreasonable delay or denial, and common law bad faith).
As in Bise, which also involved claims of breach of contract, bad faith breach of
contract, and statutory unreasonable delay or denial of insurance benefits,1 the Lynn
decision concluded that “[p]ost-litigation claim activity is still relevant to the separate and
unabated duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Lynn, 2024 WL 4180731, at *3. Lynn thus
departed from another case in this District, which found post-litigation claim activity
irrelevant to a first-party UIM claim because an insurer’s duty to negotiate, settle, and pay
1 See Compl. [#7], Case No. 22-cv-03270-REB-KAS. Like Plaintiff and the Lynn plaintiff, the Bise
plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of the insurer’s investigation. See id. ¶¶ 94(a) (“[f]ailing
to conduct a timely investigation”), 94(f) (“Failing to diligently search for evidence supporting Mr.
Bise’s claims”), 94(g) (“Seeking to discover only evidence that defeated Mr. Bise’s claims”).
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 9 of 14

10
was suspended even though an insurer’s “duty of good faith continues.” Johnston v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02106, 2022 WL 1225311, at *4-5 (D. Colo. Apr. 25,
2022).2 In departing from Johnston, the Lynn decision alluded to additional information
the insurer had obtained through discovery about the plaintiff’s claimed injuries and
employment and pointed to the insurer’s acknowledgment that it “continue[d] to review
information obtained post-suit.” Lynn, 2024 WL 4180731, at *4 (citation omitted). The
court thus reasoned that the plaintiff “is entitled to know whether that review has been
conducted in good faith and whether [the insurer] is adhering to its duty of good faith and
fair dealing.” Id.
Here, the Court agrees with Lynn and Bise and finds that Plaintiff Diedrich is
entitled to know whether Defendant Owners Insurance Company has continued to
operate in good faith. Simply put, discovery regarding Defendant’s post-litigation claim
handling—including 	handling 	of 	information 	received 	from 	Plaintiff—is 	relevant 	to
Plaintiff’s bad faith claim and, by extension, Plaintiff’s breach of insurance contract and
unreasonable delay or denial of benefits claims. See Bise, 2024 WL 3023549, at *5. That
discovery will shed light on whether Defendant delayed or denied payment of UIM
benefits without a reasonable basis and whether Defendant knowingly or recklessly
disregarded the validity of Plaintiff’s claim.
The 	parties’ 	court 	filings 	indicate 	that 	Defendant 	has 	continued 	to 	receive
information about Plaintiff’s injuries and insurance claims post-suit. The Third Amended
Complaint [#43] contains the following allegations:
2 During the discovery hearing, defense counsel relied upon Johnston in support of Defendant’s
Oral Motion for a Protective Order. Audio Recording, Nov. 25, 2024 Discovery Hearing, 55:01-
56:39.
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 10 of 14

11
On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel
regarding Plaintiff’s lumbar fusion procedure he needs as a result of the
second [2020] collision. Plaintiff’s counsel requested Defendant do the right
thing and tender the UIM policy limits owed to Plaintiff for the February 13,
2020 crash to cover this $400,000 procedure.
Id. ¶ 47.
On October 27, 2023, a claims adjuster for Defendant Owners responded
to the request for UIM policy limits and requested additional medical
records, bills, and provider contacts, all of which Defendant already had
authorizations for and Plaintiff had previously provided throughout the
litigation process for the first crash.
Id. ¶ 48.
Additionally, 	the 	entered 	Scheduling 	Order 	[#36] 	contains 	the 	following
representations from Plaintiff:
Plaintiff and Defendant have been in litigation in Colorado State Court since
November 25, 2022[,] for the 2017 Claim (the tortfeasor from the 2020
Collision was also a Defendant in that Action). To this point, Defendant has
done several depositions in the case of many medical providers that have
treated Plaintiff for both Collisions. Defendant requested (and received) all
of Plaintiff’s medical records from both collisions by subpoena with a signed
medical authorization. They have done a full investigation into both claims
during the Colorado State Court litigation and have had more than enough
information to fairly evaluate both of Plaintiff’s Claims.
Scheduling Order [#36] at 4.
Defendant is entitled to seek discovery regarding Defendant’s continued handling of his
claim.
The Court finds no conflict between its conclusion that, in this first-party UIM case,
Defendant’s post-litigation claim handling is relevant to Plaintiff’s bad faith claim and the
Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in Sunahara. The Sunahara holding rested on the
“almost adversarial” relationship between an insurer and its insured in the UIM context
and 	determined 	that 	“evidence 	of 	the 	liability 	assessments 	and 	fault 	evaluations
underlying reserves and settlement authority” is not relevant. Sunahara, 280 P.3d at 657-
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 11 of 14

12
58. 	Here, 	however, 	the 	parties’ 	discovery 	dispute 	does 	not 	exclusively 	concern
information about reserves and settlement authority and the related liability assessments
and fault evaluations. Thus, the “almost adversarial” relationship between Plaintiff and
Defendant does not control the outcome. What controls, however, is the quasi-fiduciary
relationship that exists between an insurer and its insured due to “the special nature of
uninsured motorists coverage[.]” Brekke, 105 P.3d at 188. The adversarial relationship
inherent in the UIM context does not “vitiate the underlying contractual and quasi-fiduciary
duty that the insurer owes its insured.” Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961
P.2d 487, 494 (Colo. 1998). Rather, because of the adversarial relationship, “public policy
mandates a higher standard of conduct for the insurance carrier, as a conflict of interest
arises” between an insurer and its insured who seeks UIM benefits. Pham v. State Farm
Auto. Ins. Co., 296 P.3d 1038, 1050 (Colo. 2013) (Hobbs, J., dissenting); see also
Sunahara, 280 P.3d at 657 (discussing the adversarial nature of the insurer “naturally
attempt[ing] to minimize the plaintiff’s damages . . . because doing so serves the
company’s financial interests.”).
One aspect of that quasi-fiduciary relationship “is the insurance provider’s duty to
investigate and adjust a claim in good faith.” Brekke, 105 P.3d at 189; see also Ortiz v.
Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 554 P.3d 537, 543 (Colo. App. 2024) (explaining, the “special
nature of U[I]M coverage . . . creates a quasi-fiduciary relationship between an insurer
and its insured,” which requires an insurer “to investigate and adjust a claim in good
faith.”). An insurance provider’s failure to “investigate and process the insured’s uninsured
motorist claim in good faith. . . [is] inconsistent with its relationship to the insured.” Brekke,
105 P.3d at 189. The adversarial nature of this UIM first party lawsuit does not suspend
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 12 of 14

13
Defendant’s duty to investigate. Cf. Sanderson, 251 P.3d at 1217 (noting that the
adversarial nature of a lawsuit “may suspend the insurer’s obligation to negotiate as a
reflection of good faith”); Rabin v. Fid. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 863 F. Supp. 2d 1107,
1113 (D. Colo. 2012) (noting the suspension of “an insurer’s derivative duty to negotiate,
settle, or pay”); Lynn, 2024 WL 4180731, at *3 (reasoning that litigation suspends only
some of an insurer’s duties to the insured).
If discovery is not permitted, Plaintiff will never know if Defendant continued to
investigate and adjust his claim in good faith and whether it delayed or denied UIM
benefits without a reasonable basis or knowingly or recklessly disregarded the validity of
Plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, “[t]he fact that a claim is fairly debatable does not mean the
position of the insurance company in that debate necessarily is correct or reasonable.”
Bise, 2024 WL 3023549, at *4. Plaintiff is permitted to examine Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ.
P. 30(b)(6) witness on topics that implicate the post-litigation claim file and post-litigation
handling of Plaintiff’s claims for insurance benefits. Cf. Lynn, 2024 WL 4180731, at *4
(finding that the plaintiff “is entitled to know whether” the insurer has reviewed in good
faith additional information provided to it “and whether [the insurer] is adhering to its duty
of good faith and fair dealing”); Bise, 2024 WL 3023549, at *5 (deeming post-litigation
claim handling discoverable evidence).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Owners Insurance Company’s Oral
Motion for a Protective Order, which was made during a November 25, 2024 Discovery
Hearing, is DENIED.
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 13 of 14

14
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff John Diedrich is permitted to examine
Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness on topics that implicate the post-litigation
claim file and post-litigation handling of Plaintiff’s claims for insurance benefits.
Dated: January 21, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
Case No. 1:23-cv-03026-CNS-KAS Document 73 filed 01/21/25 USDC Colorado
pg 14 of 14