Egbune v. Baum et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 23-cv-02830-PAB
CHUCK O. EGBUNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ANDREW BAUM,
DOUGLAS COUNTY PUBLIC TRUSTEE,
ALWAYS ENTERPRISES, INC d/b/a/ A-1 BAIL BONDS, and
BRECKENRIDGE PROPERTY FUND 2016, LLC,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund
2016 LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) [Docket No. 9]. The Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Chuck O. Egbune, proceeding pro se,2 filed this case on October 27,
2023, naming the Douglas County Public Trustee (“Trustee”), Always Enterprises, Inc.
d/b/a A-1 Bail Bonds (“A-1”), Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC (“Breckenridge”),
1 The facts below are taken from plaintiff’s complaint, Docket No. 1, and the
notices of appeal filed as exhibits to defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Docket Nos. 9-1,
9-2. 2 The Court will construe Mr. Egbune’s pro se pleadings liberally without serving
as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court
will evaluate Mr. Egbune’s allegations to the extent that they are sufficiently developed
for the Court to understand them.
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and Judge Andrew Baum of the District Court of Douglas County, Colorado, as
defendants. Docket No. 1. The factual allegations in the complaint are somewhat
unclear, but it appears from the face of the complaint that Mr. Egbune is attempting to
challenge orders issued by Judge Baum in a case filed in the Douglas County District
Court concerning the foreclosure of Mr. Egbune’s “homestead/dwelling place,” located
at 4694 Briarglen Ln., Highlands Ranch, Colorado (“state foreclosure case”). Id. at 2, 8-
16, ¶¶ 8, 27-29, 36-37, 41-42, 47, 52, 57-60, 66. A-1, Breckenridge, and the Trustee
are defendants in the state foreclosure case. See Docket No. 9-1 at 1; Docket No. 9-2
at 1. Mr. Egbune’s complaint also references a bankruptcy proceeding that took place
in 2011 and decisions by a different Douglas County District Court Judge, Judge
Stevens, who was initially assigned to Mr. Egbune’s state foreclosure case. Docket No.
1 at 3-4, 6-10, ¶¶ 11, 13-14, 20, 24-26, 31, 34-40. The state foreclosure case was
reassigned to Judge Baum upon Judge Stevens’ retirement. Id. at 7-8, ¶ 26.
On October 5, 2023, Mr. Egbune filed two notices of appeal in the state
foreclosure case. Docket Nos. 9-1, 9-2; see also Docket No. 1 at 8, ¶ 29 (“Mr. Egbune
has appealed the judgment of Judge Baum to the Colorado Court of Appeals.”). The
appeals challenge orders by Judge Baum and Judge Stevens concerning the
foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings, including an order by Judge Baum “unwinding
the foreclosure,” an order by Judge Baum extending a “bankruptcy automatic stay,” and
Judge Baum’s finding that Breckenridge was a bona fide purchaser of the foreclosed
property. Docket No. 9-1 at 2-3, ¶¶ 1-2; Docket No. 9-2 at 2-3, ¶¶ 1-2. The notices of
appeal state that Judge Stevens and Judge Baum “violated Mr. Egbune [sic] due
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process and made structural errors that rendered the trial process unfair.” Docket No.
9-1 at 3, ¶ 2; Docket No. 9-2 at 3, ¶ 2.
All of the claims in Mr. Egbune’s federal complaint appear to challenge orders by
Judge Baum in the state foreclosure case. Claim one seeks a declaratory judgment
that “Judge Stevens and Judge Baum violated Mr. Egbune’s Due Process Rights”
during their handling of Mr. Egbune’s state foreclosure case. Docket No. 1 at 8-11,
¶¶ 30-42. Mr. Egbune alleges that “Judge Baum acted in [sic] arbitrary and capricious
manner in violation of Mr. Egbune’s due process rights,” claiming that (1) Judge Baum’s
“order ‘unwinding foreclosure’ is without statutory or legal authority;” (2) “the order
reversing the denial of Breckenridge’s motion for summary judgment is arbitrary and
capricious;” (3) Judge Baum “backdated his [judgment] in violation of Rule 58(a);” (4)
Judge Baum “impaired Mr. Egbune’s homestead exemption by not giving him what is
due him under Colorado law;” and (5) Judge Baum “failed to give Mr. Egbune credit for
the cost of sale.” Id. at 10-11, ¶ 41. Mr. Egbune also alleges that Judge Baum has “no
jurisdiction to extend the bankruptcy automatic stay” and “cannot order a revival of a
foreclosure proceeding that has expired under the law because that is also a violation of
Mr. Egbune’s due process.” Id. at 11, ¶ 42.
Mr. Egbune’s second claim seeks a declaratory judgment that “there is no
mechanism for another foreclosure proceeding.” Id. at 11. In support of this claim, Mr.
Egbune appears to allege that a future foreclosure proceeding would be improper
because it would rely on “the Order ‘unwinding foreclosure’ that Judge Baum improperly
granted,” which Mr. Egbune alleges is “void because [Judge Baum] has no jurisdiction”
to enter such an order. Id. at 12, ¶ 47.
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Mr. Egbune’s third claim seeks a declaratory judgment that “A-1 cannot collect
fees and interests not disclosed in bankruptcy court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
3002.1.” Id. at 12. In connection with this claim, Mr. Egbune alleges that “Judge Baum
has refused to disallow A-1’s undisclosed fees in the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 13, ¶ 52.
Mr. Egbune’s fourth claim seeks declaratory relief for “First Amendment-right to
fair hearing- Judge Baum.” Id. at 13-14. In support of this claim, Mr. Egbune alleges
that Judge Baum “has made it structurally a quagmire for Mr. Egbune to obtain a fair
hearing.” Id. at 14, ¶ 57. He challenges Judge Baum’s order unwinding the foreclosure,
his order that reversed a previous denial of Breckenridge’s motion for summary
judgment, his order scheduling a jury trial, his order scheduling a bench trial, and his
order denying a motion by Mr. Egbune to continue the bench trial. Id. at 15, ¶¶ 58-60.
Mr. Egbune’s fifth claim seeks a declaratory judgment that “Breckenridge is not a
bona fide purchaser.” Id. at 15. Mr. Egbune alleges that Breckinridge is not a bona fide
purchaser, but that “Judge Baum does not think there is something wrong with
Breckenridge’s machinations.” 	Id. at 16, ¶ 66. However, Mr. Egbune does not appear
to have served defendants. He has filed no affidavit certifying that process had been
served on defendants and no waivers of service have been filed.3
3 On October 30, 2023, Mr. Egbune filed a “Certification Pursuant to
D.C.COLO.LCivR. 7.1” stating that he “forward[ed] drafts of the Complaint, Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and the Brief in support of same, along with a notice of intent to
seek expedited briefing to the Attorney General, Douglas County Public Trustee, and A-
1.” Docket No. 6 at 1. However, a plaintiff must serve defendants using the methods
allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Because Rule 4 does not permit service
by email without prior authorization from the Court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, Mr. Egbune
has not completed service of process on defendants by emailing them drafts of the
complaint, motion for preliminary injunction and brief in support of same, and notice of
intent to seek expedited briefing. In addition, Mr. Egbune’s certification does not
indicate that he emailed any of these pleadings to Breckenridge or Judge Baum.
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Mr. Egbune also filed a Verified Motion for Preliminary Injunction and a Request
for a Forthwith Hearing of Same on October 27, 2023, wherein Mr. Egbune asks the
Court to enter a preliminary injunction: (1) barring the Trustee and A-1 from conducting
a foreclosure sale; (2) barring Judge Baum from “enforcing the Order ‘unwinding
foreclosure’ and violating Mr. Egbune’s due process rights;” and (3) prohibiting the
Trustee from advertising or selling Mr. Egbune’s property. Docket No. 2 at 9. However,
the Court lacks jurisdiction to enter a preliminary injunction against a party that has not
yet been served. See Sangui Biotech Int’l, Inc. v. Kappes, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241
(D. Colo. 2002).
On January 2, 2024, Breckenridge and the Trustee entered appearances by filing
motions to dismiss. Docket Nos. 8, 9; see D.C.COLO.LAttyR 5(a)(1). The Trustee’s
motion argues that the complaint fails to state a claim because it is not clear what relief
is sought against her and because the Trustee is protected by absolute and qualified
immunity. Docket No. 8 at 3-7. Breckenridge’s motion asks the Court to dismiss the
case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the basis of Younger abstention,
see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or, in the alternative, on the basis of the
Rooker Feldman doctrine. Docket No. 9 at 9-16; see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
On January 3, 2024, the Court issued an order requiring the Trustee and
Breckenridge to respond to Mr. Egbune’s motion for preliminary injunction on or before
January 12, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. and stating that Mr. Egbune may file a reply on or before
Moreover, Rule 4 requires plaintiff to serve a summons on defendants, which Mr.
Egbune has not done. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b).
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January 17, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. Docket No. 10. On January 10, 2024, the Trustee
responded to Mr. Egbune’s motion for preliminary injunction. Docket No. 11. On
January 12, 2024, Breckenridge responded to Mr. Egbune’s motion for preliminary
injunction, arguing that the motion should be denied on the basis of Younger abstention
or, alternately, because Mr. Egbune has an adequate legal remedy available to him.
Docket No. 12 at 3-7. On February 2, 2024, Mr. Egbune filed a reply in support of his
motion for preliminary injunction. Docket No. 17. On February 8, 2024, Mr. Egbune
filed a combined response to the motions to dismiss. Docket No. 18. On February 22,
2024, Breckenridge filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. Docket No. 19.
Because the Court finds that Younger abstention precludes the Court from exercising
jurisdiction over Mr. Egbune’s claims, it will only address Breckenridge’s motion to
dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over claims for relief asserted in the complaint. Rule 12(b)(1)
challenges are generally presented in one of two forms: “[t]he moving party may (1)
facially attack the complaint’s allegations as to the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting
evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.”
Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003)). Ultimately, plaintiff
has “[t]he burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction” because it is “the party
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asserting jurisdiction.” Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1189
(10th Cir. 2008).
III. ANALYSIS
Breckenridge argues that Younger abstention applies in this case because (1)
there is an ongoing appeal in the Colorado Court of Appeals deciding the same issues
presented in Mr. Egbune’s federal complaint; (2) the state foreclosure case involves
important state interests, including the integrity of Colorado’s judicial system and
matters related to bankruptcy and foreclosure that arise under state law; and (3) the
Colorado Court of Appeals is the appropriate forum for reviewing the trial court
decisions challenged in the complaint and it provides an adequate forum for the claims
raised in the complaint. Docket No. 9 at 10-14.
In Younger, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court’s injunction of a
pending state court criminal prosecution violated “the national policy forbidding federal
courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. Younger abstention requires “that federal
courts not interfere with state court proceedings by granting equitable relief – such as
injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory judgments regarding
constitutional issues in those proceedings – when such relief could adequately be
sought before the state court.” Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir.
1999). Thus, after Younger, even when a federal court would otherwise have
jurisdiction to grant declaratory or equitable relief, the court must abstain from
exercising jurisdiction when a judgment on the claim would interfere with ongoing state
criminal or civil proceedings. D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist., 392 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (10th
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Cir. 2004); see also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (“where an injunction
would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be
denied as well”).
The Supreme Court has established a three-part analysis for abstention under
Younger. When a case filed in federal court raises the possibility of federal-court
interference with state processes, the federal court must abstain if (1) there is an
ongoing state judicial, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) which implicates important
state interests, and (3) in which there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
431-32 (1982); Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211,
1215 (10th Cir. 2003). As noted above, Younger abstention is a bar not only to claims
for injunctive relief, but also to claims requesting a declaratory judgment concerning the
constitutionality of a state law. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (“The accused should first set
up and rely u[p]on his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge
of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford
adequate protection”); Rienhardt, 164 F.3d at 1302. Moreover, Younger abstention is
not discretionary and, if abstention applies, a court must dismiss the claim without
prejudice. D.L. Unified, 392 F.3d at 1228.
The Tenth Circuit has held that the first prong of the Younger abstention analysis,
whether there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, is determined based on the time
when the federal action was filed. Dauwe v. Miller, 364 F. App’x 435, 437 (10th Cir.
2010) (unpublished) (citing Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 2006)). State
proceedings end, and are therefore no longer ongoing, when a lower state court issues
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a judgment and the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire. Bear, 451 F.3d at
642 (citing Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo
de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24-25 (1st Cir.2005)). Mr. Egbune filed two appeals in his
state foreclosure case with the Colorado Court of Appeals on October 5, 2023, 22 days
before Mr. Egbune filed this case on October 27, 2023. Docket Nos. 1, 9-1, 9-2. The
Colorado Court of Appeals did not resolve Mr. Egbune’s appeals in his state foreclosure
case before Mr. Egbune filed his case in federal court.4 Therefore, the first prong of the
Younger abstention analysis is satisfied because there was an ongoing state
proceeding at the time that Mr. Egbune filed this case.
The Court will next consider the second prong of the Younger abstention
analysis, whether the state foreclosure case implicates important state interests. All five
of the claims asserted in Mr. Egbune’s federal complaint, including the ones alleging
violations of the U.S. Constitution, are claims challenging decisions that Judge Baum
made during the course of Mr. Egbune’s foreclosure case in state court. Docket No. 1
at 8-16, ¶¶ 30-66, see Dauwe, 364 F. App’x at 436-37 (affirming Younger abstention
where plaintiff alleged that state judges’ adverse rulings violated his right to due
process, equal protection, and access to the courts under the U.S. Constitution because
plaintiff’s “pleadings clearly reflect[ed] an attempt to have the federal courts review and
invalidate rulings made in his state cases”). Here, Mr. Egbune seeks declaratory
judgments that would contravene Judge Baum’s judgments in the state foreclosure
case. See Docket No. 1 at 8-16, ¶¶ 30-66. The Supreme Court has held it to be
4 A review of the docket in Mr. Egbune’s case before the Colorado Court of
Appeals on March 29, 2024 indicates that the parties had not yet begun briefing the
appeal.
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“beyond question” that crafting and enforcing the laws governing the foreclosure
process is “an essential state interest.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,
544 (1994) (rejecting interpretation of bankruptcy code provision that would place the
“title of every piece of realty purchased at foreclosure . . . under a federally created
cloud”); see also DCR Fund I, LLC v. TS Family Ltd. P’ship, 261 F. App’x, 139, 145-46
(10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“We also fail to see how any claims challenging a
foreclosure sale that the state court allowed to proceed could pass muster under . . . the
Younger abstention . . . doctrine[ ].”). Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Egbune’s state
foreclosure case implicates an important state interest and satisfies the second prong of
the Younger abstention analysis.
As to the third prong of the Younger abstention analysis, whether there is
adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state proceedings, the Tenth Circuit has
noted that, “[a]s a general matter, ‘Colorado law does not bar [federal constitutional]
claims,’” finding abstention appropriate where “no particular reason appears why the
objections advanced [in federal court] could not be given fully adequate consideration in
the state courts.” Dauwe, 364 F. App’x at 437 (quoting Crown Point I, L.L.C. v.
Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)); see also Moore
v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979) (“Certainly, [Younger] abstention is appropriate
unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the Constitutional claims.”). Here, the
constitutional claims in Mr. Egbune’s complaint ask the Court to review and invalidate
Judge Baum’s orders in the state foreclosure case for essentially the same reasons he
cited for appealing them to the Colorado Court of Appeals: that Judge Baum violated
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Mr. Egbune’s right to due process5 and made errors that rendered the trial process
unfair. See Docket No. 9-1 at 3, ¶ 2; Docket No. 9-2 at 3, ¶ 2. Thus, not only is there
adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state proceedings as a general matter,
but Mr. Egbune has actually done so in the state proceedings. The Court finds that the
third prong of the Younger abstention analysis is satisfied.
Nevertheless, Mr. Egbune argues that the Court should decline to abstain under
the Younger doctrine because his case does not fall within the three exceptional
circumstances that the Supreme Court recognized in Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
571 U.S. 69, 81-82 (2013). Docket No. 18 at 2-3. There, the Supreme Court cautioned
against “extend[ing] Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings . . .
where a party could identify a plausibly important state interest,” and emphasized that
Younger applies to only three “exceptional circumstances”: (1) state criminal
prosecutions; (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings;” and (3) “pending civil
proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions.” Id. at 78 (quotations and alterations omitted). In
support of his argument, Mr. Egbune cites two cases6 from outside the Tenth Circuit in
which courts declined to apply Younger abstention to foreclosure actions in light of
5 Mr. Egbune does not specify whether he invokes the right to due process
secured by the U.S. Constitution or the Colorado Constitution. See Docket No. 9-1 at 3,
¶ 2; Docket No. 9-2 at 3, ¶ 2.
6 Mr. Egbune also cites Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 83 F. Supp.
3d 635, 643-47 (D. Md. 2015), Docket No. 18 at 3, but in that case the court declined to
apply Younger abstention only because it had already determined that it lacked
jurisdiction over the declaratory action. Tucker, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 646. In fact, the court
held that the plaintiffs’ “claim for declaratory relief [was] tantamount to a request for an
injunction of the state court [foreclosure] proceedings” and may therefore “interfere with
the state court's attempt to effect [its] orders” under Sprint. Id. at 646-47.
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Sprint. Id. at 3 (citing Hernandez v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2015 WL 3386126, at *2
(D.N.J. May 26, 2015); Carrier v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2014 WL 356219, at *1 (D.N.J.
Jan. 31, 2014), aff’d, 592 F. App’x 135 (3rd Cir. 2015). However, as Breckenridge
points out, this approach is not uniform across jurisdictions. Docket No. 19 at 3 n.2.
When considering “a plaintiff’s request that the federal district court enjoin a
defendant's actions that are directly sanctioned by a state court foreclosure judgment,”
some courts have concluded that “such an injunction request might fall squarely
within Sprint's third category of ‘exceptional circumstances.’” John J. Pembroke Living
Tr. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, as Trustee for WaMu Series 2006-AR11 Tr., No. 16-cv-
00020-CMA-MEH, 2016 WL 9710025, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2016), aff'd, 732 F. App’x
678 (10th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). Accordingly, courts in this district have found
that “a complaint seeking injunctive or declaratory relief directly related to a state
foreclosure proceeding constitutes an exceptional circumstance under Sprint” because
such an request “essentially asks [the court] to enjoin, or at the very least overturn, a
state court foreclosure judgment.” Id. (alteration, quotation, and citation omitted); see
also Saanen, LLC v. Silich Constr., Inc., No. 20-cv-03165-DDD-STV, 2021 WL
4201560, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2021); Stanton v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC, No. 22-cv-
02162-DDD-MEH, 2022 WL 16650153, at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 3, 2022). This reasoning
applies to Mr. Egbune’s case since each of Mr. Egbune’s claims seeks a declaratory
judgment that would overturn Judge Baum’s judgments in the state foreclosure case.
See Docket No. 1 at 8-16, ¶¶ 30-66. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Egbune’s
state foreclosure case constitutes a “pending civil proceeding[ ] involving certain orders
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions” and
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therefore triggers Younger abstention in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sprint.
See Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (quotation and citation omitted).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Breckenridge has shown
that all three prongs of the Younger abstention analysis are satisfied, that the case
constitutes an exceptional circumstance under Sprint, and that abstention is
appropriate. Moreover, the Court finds that the same analysis applies to Mr. Egbune’s
claims against each defendant. Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise
jurisdiction over Mr. Egbune’s claims and will dismiss them without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that on Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016 LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) [Docket No. 9] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Douglas County Public Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss and
Disclaimer of Interest [Docket No. 8] and the Verified Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and a Request for a Forthwith Hearing of Same [Docket No. 2] are DENIED as moot. It
is further
ORDERED that Mr. Egbune’s claims against all defendants are DISMISSED
without prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Mr. Egbune may file an amended complaint on or before April
30, 2024.
DATED April 1, 2024.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
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