Salama et al v. City of Pueblo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01663-CNS-MDB
DAVID V. SALAMA and NANCY M. SALAMA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF PUEBLO, a municipal corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case arises from a bus accident that occurred on June 25, 2022, when a bus
belonging to Defendant City of Pueblo (the Bus) crashed into the home of Plaintiffs David
Salama and Nancy Salama after being hit by a third-party vehicle. On April 10, 2026, at
the conclusion of a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. See ECF
Nos. 128, 129.
Now before the Court are the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Pre-
Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest, ECF No. 130; (2) Defendant’s Motion for Stay of
Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Security, ECF No. 135; and (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Order for Defendant to Pay Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Court’s March
12, 2026, Order, ECF No. 131. The Court addresses each of the motions below.
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I. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest, ECF No. 130
The Court first considers Plaintiffs’ Motion for Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment
Interest. See ECF No. 130. In the motion, Plaintiffs contend that since the jury returned a
verdict in their favor, they are entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest under Colorado
law, which they explicitly requested in their complaint, id. at 2–3, even though such relief
was omitted from the final judgment entered by the Court, see ECF No. 129. Plaintiffs’
requested relief includes pre-judgment interest pursuant to C.R.S. § 5-12-102(1) in the
amount of $8,080.93, id. at 2, 5, and post-judgment interest from April 10, 2026, until paid
pursuant to C.R.S. § 5-12-102(4) at a rate of 8% per annum compounding annually on:
(1) their $353,030.00 damages, (2) the $8,080.93 pre-judgment interest that has accrued
on their damages, and (3) their recoverable litigation costs, which shall be taxed in
accordance with the Court’s Final Judgment, id. at 5.
In response to Plaintiffs’ request for pre-judgment interest, Defendant states that it
does not dispute that “if the Judgment is upheld, [Plaintiffs] are entitled to [pre-judgment]
interest at the rate set forth in C.R.S. § 5-12-102” and that it “does not dispute the pre-
judgment interest calculations” offered in Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 140 at 2. However,
with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for post-judgment interest, Defendant states that any
such request is premature because “an appeal is currently pending before the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals” and “[t]he outcome of the appeal may affect the underlying
judgment and any ultimate award of interest.” Id.
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Considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to
pre-judgment interest pursuant to C.R.S. § 5-12-102(1) in the amount of $8,080.93 and
post-judgment interest at the 8% rate set forth in C.R.S. § 5-12-102(4) in an amount to be
calculated pending final resolution of Defendants’ appeal, should the judgment be upheld.
Accordingly, the Court will enter an Amended Final Judgment to include the foregoing.
B. 	Defendant’s Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment and Waiver of
Security, ECF No. 135
The Court next turns to the parties’ briefing on Defendant’s Motion for Stay of
Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Security. See ECF Nos. 135, 141, 144.
In the motion, Defendant asks the Court to stay execution of the judgment in this
matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) without requiring that Defendant
post a supersedeas bond or other security. ECF No. 135; see also ECF No. 144.
Defendant’s request arises from the fact that it has sufficient funds to pay the judgment
either through its own funding or through the Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing
Agency (CIRSA), which would ultimately satisfy the judgment in this case. Id. Defendant’s
assertions are supported by an affidavit from Carla Sikes, the City Attorney for the
Defendant City of Pueblo. See ECF No. 135-1 (Sikes Aff.). In response, Plaintiffs argue
that such relief is improper because Defendant fails to meet its burden of showing that
waiver of security is warranted. See ECF No. 141. For the reasons explained below,
Defendant’s motion is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Rule 62(b) provides that:
At any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing
a bond or other security. The stay takes effect when the court approves the
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bond or other security and remains in effect for the time specified in the
bond or other security.
As the Tenth Circuit has explained, the purpose of a supersedeas bond, like that
required by Rule 62(b), “is to secure an appellee from loss resulting from the stay of
execution.” Miami Int’l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 807 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1986)
(collecting cases). “[A] full supersedeas bond should be the requirement in normal
circumstances,” id., with the general rule being that the bond be equal to the “full amount
of the judgment,” Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006). And while
“[d]istrict courts . . . have inherent discretionary authority” to depart from that rule when
setting supersedeas bonds, Miami Int’l Realty, 807 F.2d at 873; see also Strong, 443 F.3d
at 1299 (“the district court has discretion in setting the [bond] amount”), such departures
are generally limited to “unusual circumstances,” Vreeland v. Schwartz, No. 13-cv-03515-
PAB-KMT, 2019 WL 5623307, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 30, 2019) (citing Farm Bureau Life Ins.
Co. v. American Nat. Ins. Co., No. 2:03 CV 646 (TC), 2009 WL 961171, at *1 (D. Utah
Apr. 8, 2009)).
The party seeking to stay execution of a judgment without posting a security has
the burden to (1) “demonstrate objectively that posting a full bond is impossible or
impractical” and (2) “‘propose a plan that will provide adequate (or as adequate as
possible) security for the appellee.’” Miami Int’l Realty, 807 F.2d at 873–74 (citing United
States v. Kurtz, 528 F.Supp. 1113, 1115 (D. Pa.1981)); Valenzuela v. Coleman, No. 18-
cv-00329-CMA-STV, 2022 WL 1120506, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2022) (“The party
seeking to reduce or waive the bond requirement must demonstrate that such a departure
is warranted and ‘present the court with a financially secure plan that will provide
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adequate security for the judgment creditor, in lieu of posting a supersedeas bond.’”)
(quoting Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., No. Civ.A.01 PC 2163 OES, 2003 WL
25265871, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2003)).
Here, 	Defendant offers 	evidence 	to 	demonstrate that 	the 	judgment 	will 	be
protected for Plaintiffs; in fact, the entire basis of Defendant’s request is that it has
sufficient funds to satisfy a judgment, either through itself or through its membership in
CIRSA. ECF No. 135 at 3. However, as Defendant concedes, it offers no facts to show
that posting bond is impossible, impractical, or would lead it to suffer irreparable harm.
See ECF No. 144 at 1–2 (conceding that rather than addressing “irreparable harm,”
Defendant “seeks relief based on the other available factors for the Court to consider,”
including “that there are funds available to pay the judgment and that the City’s ability to
pay is such that posting a bond would be unnecessary and a waste of money”). Even
considering the factors set forth in Defendant’s briefing, see ECF No. 135 at 3 (citing
Wilmer v. Bd. of Cnty. Commrs., 844 F. Supp. 1414, 1419 (D. Kan. 1993)), that some
courts have waived the bond requirement where a defendant has made clear their ability
to satisfy a judgment does not convince the Court that it must do the same here.1 This is
particularly so given that other courts have reached a contrary conclusion and found
waiver or modification of the bond requirement to be improper despite the liable party’s
demonstrated ability to satisfy a judgment. See, e.g., Perez v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., No.
1 See, e.g., Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., F.R.D. 342, 345–46 (D. Kan. 2017) (determining that it was
appropriate to waive the bond requirement where the party requesting the stay represented that there were
“funds sufficient to cover [the] judgment following the post-trial motions and subsequent appeal if one is
taken” in a sworn statement); Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, 884 F.Supp.
431, 435 (D. Kan. 1995) (waiving bond requirement after taking judicial notice that the defendant
municipality demonstrated its ability to pay the judgment and that the collection process would be simple).
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21-cv-01915-PAB-KAS, 2026 WL 1145558, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2026) (denying
defendants’ request to stay execution of judgment with only a partial bond posting
because “[p]er defendants’ own representations, they have sufficient money to do so
without it being an undue burden”); Cocona, Inc. v. VF Outdoor, LLC, No. 16-cv-02703-
CMA-SKC, 2025 WL 1617234, at *1 (D. Colo. May 23, 2025) (denying motion to post no
or partial bond where liable party “made it abundantly clear that it has the funds to post
the full supersedeas bond”). Absent authority otherwise, the Court opts to follow the Tenth
Circuit’s guidance which provides that modification or waiver of a supersedeas bond is
appropriate when a defendant has demonstrated that they are “unable to post a full bond”
or that “that execution on the judgment would place [the defendant] in insolvency.” Miami
Int’l, 807 F.2d at 874.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for stay of execution and waiver of security, ECF
No. 135, is DENIED without prejudice. It is further ORDERED that, Defendant has 14
days from the entry of this Order to confer with Plaintiffs and move for a stay of execution
pursuant to Rule 62(b) in accordance with the foregoing.
C. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for Defendant to Pay Attorney Fees and Costs, ECF No. 131
Last, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ motion requesting that the Court enter an order
requiring Defendant to pay the sanctions ordered by the Court on March 12, 2026. See
ECF No. 131 at 3 (citing ECF No. 102). In its response filed on May 15, 2026, Defendant
states that it “does not dispute the amount sought by Plaintiffs” in connection with this
motion and that after “locating funds within the City of Pueblo’s budget,” “Defendant
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anticipates paying the requested amount of $26,771.50 in attorney fees and $1,714.64 in
costs within 30 days from the date of this response.” ECF No. 139 at 2.2
As more than 30 days have now passed since Defendant filed its response, the
Court understands that Defendant has paid the ordered sanction. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
Motion for Order for Defendant to Pay Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Court’s
March 12, 2026, Order, ECF No. 131, is DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice. In the
event that Defendant still has not paid the ordered sanction as of the day this Order is
entered, Plaintiff is granted leave to refile its motion with the Court.
D. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS the following:
(1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest, ECF No. 130,
is GRANTED, and an Amended Final Judgment shall issue to include pre-
judgment interest in the amount of $8,080.93 pursuant to C.R.S. § 5-12-102(1),
and post-judgment interest pursuant C.R.S. § 5-12-102(4) in an amount to be
calculated pending final resolution of this matter;
(2) Defendant’s Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment and Waiver of Security,
ECF No. 135, is DENIED, and Defendant has 14 days from the entry of this
Order to move for a stay of execution pursuant to Rule 62(b) in accordance
with the foregoing; and
2 Defendant made a similar representation in another filing which stated that “the City anticipates making
the payment [ordered by the Court’s sanctions motion] within 30 days from the date of the Response (May
15, 2026) and further anticipates that a check will be mailed to Plaintiffs’ counsel by the end of May, 2026.”
ECF No. 144 at 3.
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(3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order for Defendant to Pay Attorney Fees and Costs
Pursuant to the Court’s March 12, 2026, Order, ECF No. 131, is DENIED AS
MOOT.
DATED this 18th day of August 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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