Forbes v. Best Buy Co., Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
Civil Action No. 23–cv–01574–CNS–MDB
COREY CURTIS FORBES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEST BUY CO., INC.,
Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
This matter is before the Court on three motions. First, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. ([“Defendant’s MSJ”], Doc. No. 31.)1 Second, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law. ([“Plaintiff’s JMOL Motion”], Doc. No. 33.) Third, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. ([“Plaintiff’s MSJ”], Doc. No. 35.)2 After reviewing the motions, briefing,
and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s MSJ be GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s MSJ and Plaintiff’s JMOL Motion be DENIED as MOOT.3
1 Plaintiff has filed a Response to Defendant’s MSJ, to which Defendant has replied.
([“Plaintiff’s Response”], Doc. No. 37; [“Defendant’s Reply”], Doc. No. 41.)
2 Defendant has filed a Response to Plaintiff’s MSJ, to which Plaintiff has replied.
([“Defendant’s Response”], Doc. No. 38; [“Plaintiff’s Reply”], Doc. No. 42.)
3 Plaintiff’s JMOL Motion is moot because Plaintiff admitted it was superseded by his Motion
for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. No. 35 at 1.)
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SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFF
The Court is recommending that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted
and your claims be dismissed. The record does not support a claim under either statute because
even though you testified you were sick between December 20-22, 2021, there is no evidence
that you communicated that to Defendant, or that you were approved to take sick leave, or that
you were retaliated against for taking sick leave, or that you were retaliated against for raising
any concerns about health or safety in the workplace. Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment. And because Defendant is entitled to summary judgment, your motion for summary
judgment—along with your superseded motion for judgment as a matter of law—must be denied
as moot. This is only a high-level summary of the Court’s Recommendation. The complete
Recommendation, including information about your right to object to it, is set forth below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following facts are undisputed4 unless otherwise noted.
Background
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant Best Buy.
([“Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” or “Def. SOF”], Doc. No. 31 at ¶ 2.) In
4 Defendant’s MSJ includes a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (See Doc. No. 31 at 2-
10.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s facts, (see Doc. No. 37 at 5-8), and added eleven
additional facts. (See id. at 3-5.) Defendant replied. (See Doc. No. 41 at 2-8.) Plaintiff also
includes a Separate Statement of Facts in his MSJ, (see Doc. No. 35-1 at 6-9), to which
Defendant responded. (See Doc. No. 38 at 3-9.) Many of these facts are overlapping. For ease of
reference, the Court will primarily cite to the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in
Defendant’s MSJ, and unless otherwise noted the facts are accepted as undisputed across all
statements of facts.
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November 2021, Plaintiff took two weeks of paid time off (“PTO”), from November 14-
November 27, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 15; see also [“Forbes Depo.”], Doc. No. 31-1 at 66:18-20.) Plaintiff
reportedly began feeling sick on or around November 25, 2021. (Def. SOF at ¶ 16.) In
accordance with Defendant’s sick leave policy, Plaintiff took and failed an online health
screening questionnaire, and soon thereafter received a COVID-19 testing kit from Everlywell,
Defendant’s COVID-19 testing partner. (Id. at ¶¶ 11; 17-18.) Plaintiff administered the COVID-
19 test on December 8, 2021, and tested positive. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) On December 17, 2021,
Plaintiff received 80.08 hours of COVID-19 testing and sick pay, per Defendant’s policy.5 (Id. at
¶¶ 20; 24-25.) Plaintiff was told the earliest he could end isolation and return to work was ten
days after he took the sample that tested positive, and because he tested positive on December 8,
2021, the earliest he could return to work would have been December 18, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff’s Absences and Termination of Employment
Though Plaintiff argues he was not scheduled to work on December 20-22, 2021 and was
instead on approved sick leave and/or PTO during that time, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 37 at 5; id. at 6-
7; Doc. No. 35-1 at ¶¶ 5-7; 16; Doc. No. 42 at 13 ¶ 6), the record supports the following.
First, on December 14, 2021, Plaintiff’s supervisor Anthony Rugg texted Plaintiff to
inquire when Plaintiff would be returning to work. (See Doc. No. 31-10 at 2.) Mr. Rugg stated
Plaintiff could return to work once he was clear of symptoms, but he could also take more time
off if needed. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff responded the next day, indicating he would be clear of
5 Employees who received a COVID-19 testing kit were given 40.04 hours of testing pay. If the
test came back positive, the employees were given an additional 40.04 hours of sick pay. (Doc.
No. 31 at ¶¶ 11-12.)
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symptoms “this coming Monday,” referring to December 20, 2021. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff was
therefore scheduled to work on December 20, 2021. (See Doc. No. 31-11 (December 2021 work
schedule).) Plaintiff could access his work schedule through Defendant’s online portal, and he
would also receive text messages from his supervisors telling him when to report to work. (Def.
SOF at ¶¶ 30-31.) Plaintiff did not report to work on December 20, 2021—which was twenty-
five days after his symptoms began and twelve days after he administered the positive COVID-
19 test—nor did he inform Mr. Rugg that he would be absent. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.)
Plaintiff was also scheduled to work December 21, 2021, and he similarly did not report
to work or inform Mr. Rugg that he would be absent. (Doc. No. 31-11; Def. SOF at ¶¶ 36-39.)
When Mr. Rugg texted Plaintiff later that day, Plaintiff indicated he would report to work the
next day, December 22, 2021. (Doc. No. 31-10 at 4.) However, Plaintiff once again did not
report to work or inform Mr. Rugg that he would be absent. (Def. SOF at ¶¶ 43-45.) Instead,
Plaintiff texted Mr. Rugg after his shift and informed him that he did not report to work because
he learned he had an outstanding arrest warrant for unpaid traffic tickets, so he drove to Sterling,
Colorado to take care of the warrant. (Doc. No. 31-10 at 5.) Over the course of these three days,
Plaintiff never indicated that COVID-19 or any other illness was the reason for his absence from
work. (Def. SOF at ¶¶ 35; 39; 45.)
Relying on its job abandonment policy, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on
December 22, 2021.6 (Id. at ¶ 54.) Plaintiff sought review of his termination through Defendant’s
6 Under Defendant’s attendance policy, an employee will be terminated for job abandonment if
the “employee fails to follow the notification process and does not show up for 3 consecutive
scheduled shifts.” The notification process requires that “[i]f an employee is unable to report to
work for his/her shift and/or is unable to report to work on time for his/her shift, the employee
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termination review process, stating, “I had to miss coming in the morning because when I was
sick I had Court and could not make it too [sic] court for my speeding tickets due to Covid. I had
a warrant to clear and needed to take care of that.” (Id. at ¶¶ 55-57.) Defendant upheld the
decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. at ¶ 58.)
Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 21, 2023, alleging Defendant terminated his
employment in retaliation for using paid sick leave. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff brings his claims
under the Colorado Healthy Families and Workplaces Act (“HFWA”), C.R.S. § 8-13.3-401 et
seq., and Colorado’s Public Health Emergency Whistleblower Law (“PHEW”), C.R.S. § 8-14.4-
101 et seq.7 (Id.) Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on June 20, 2024, arguing
Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons unrelated to his use
of paid sick leave. (Doc. No. 31 at 2.) That same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, which was later superseded by his Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Docs.
No. 33; 35.)8
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Summary Judgment
must notify management at least one (1) hour prior to the start of the scheduled shift.” (Def. SOF
at ¶¶ 8-9; see also Doc. No. 31-3.)
7 Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies before filing suit in court, as required by the
statutes. See C.R.S § 8-14.4-104(2); C.R.S. § 8-13.3-411(4)(d). In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts
he submitted his claim to the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, and that it issued
him a Notice of Right to Sue. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.)
8 Defendant’s MSJ and Plaintiff’s MSJ are essentially the inverse of one another. Thus, the Court
will analyze Defendant’s MSJ first, and if Plaintiff survives that challenge, that Court will
consider whether Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on some or all of his claims.
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Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 325. “Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter.” Concrete Works, Inc. v. City &
County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The
non-moving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings but instead must
designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“A ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan v.
Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury,” or conversely,
whether the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Carey v.
U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
A disputed fact is “material” if “under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition
of the claim.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.1998) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “Where the record
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taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is
no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court may only consider admissible
evidence. See Johnson v. Weld Cty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2010). The factual
record and reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1517. However, this standard does not
require the Court to make unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Carney v.
City & Cty. of Denver, 534 F.3d 1269, 1276 (10th Cir. 2008). The non-movant must establish, at
a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case. Hulsey v. Kmart,
Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994).
II. Pro Se Plaintiff
The Court is mindful that Plaintiff proceeds pro se and thus affords his papers and filings
a liberal construction. Smith v. Allbaugh, 921 F.3d 1261, 1268 F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir.
2019). But the Court cannot and does not act as his advocate, United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d
855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019), and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to
Plaintiff as to a represented party. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018);
Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Colo. 2012).
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ANALYSIS
As noted above, Plaintiff brings claims under the HFWA and PHEW.9 The Court
considers each in turn.
I. Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s HFWA Claim.
The HFWA requires employers to provide paid sick leave to employees. See C.R.S. § 8-
13.3-403(1)(a). In addition to providing at least forty-eight hours (48) of paid sick leave each
year, “on the date a public health emergency is declared, each employer in the state shall
supplement each employee’s accrued paid sick leave as necessary to ensure” that employees who
normally work forty or more hours in a week receive at least eighty hours of paid sick leave.
C.R.S. § 8-13.3-405(1)(a). Furthermore, the HFWA prohibits employers from (1) retaliating or
discriminating against any employee “because the person has exercised, attempted to exercise, or
supported the exercise of rights protected under the [HFWA], including the right to request or
use paid sick leave,” or (2) “count[ing] paid sick leave taken by an employee . . . as an absence
9 No Colorado state court has interpreted the HFWA or PHEW, and only a few courts in this
District have addressed retaliation under the HFWA or PHEW. See Schlagel v. Disc. Tire Co. of
Colorado, Inc., No. 23-cv-02909-NYW-CYC, 2025 WL 316549, at *13 (D. Colo. Jan. 28,
2025); Mitchell v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Colo. 2023);
Littlewood v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 21-cv-02559-CMA-SKC, 2022 WL 3081919, at *7
(D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2022). Indeed, the courts in Schlagel and Littlewood declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ PHEW claims because “[t]he Colorado Supreme Court
has not yet issued any controlling authority on the issue, nor has the Colorado Court of Appeals
provided any persuasive guidance.” Schlagel, 2025 WL 316549, at *13; see also Littlewood,
2022 WL 3081919, at *7. Only the Mitchell court went on to provide an analysis framework and
hold that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s PHEW claim. See Mitchell,
699 F. Supp. 3d at 1158-62. And though Schlagel is the only other Colorado court to have
addressed an HFWA retaliation claim, the court noted it “need not reach any novel state law
questions to resolve the [motion to dismiss] . . . because the Court agrees with Defendant that
Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that he is entitled to HFWA protection in the first place.”
Schlagel, 2025 WL 316549, at *13.
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that may lead to or result in discipline, discharge, demotion, suspension, or any other retaliatory
personnel action against the employee.” C.R.S. § 8-13.3-407(2)(a)-(b).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant provided him with all HFWA-mandated sick
leave to which he was entitled. (Def. SOF at ¶ 25; see also Doc. No. 37 at 6 ¶ 25.) Instead,
Plaintiff appears to claim Defendant violated the HFWA by (1) counting days he was on paid
sick leave as unexcused absences for purposes of job abandonment and (2) retaliating against
him for using paid sick leave.10 (See Doc. No. 1 at 5.)
As to the first claim, Defendant argues Plaintiff was not on approved sick leave
December 20-22, 2021, and Plaintiff’s absences were not counted toward job abandonment until
after Plaintiff informed Defendant he would be returning to work. (See Doc. No. 4 at 10; Doc.
No. 31 at 12.) As to the second claim, Defendant argues it did not retaliate against Plaintiff for
using his HFWA-mandated sick leave, but instead terminated Plaintiff for his failure to report to
work three days in a row without prior notice. (Doc. No. 31 at 12.)
On careful review of the record, the Court finds Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s HFWA claim.
10 It is unclear based on Plaintiff’s filings whether he claims he was on sick leave or PTO
December 20-22, 2021. (See Doc. No. 37 at 6 ¶ 34 (“On 12/20/2021 I was no longer on my covid
leave but rather my 3 days of PTO.”); but see Doc. No. 42 at 13 ¶ 6 (Plaintiff stating he was on
sick leave December 20-21 and PTO December 22).) To bring a claim under the HFWA, an
employee must have been retaliated against for exercising their right to request or use paid sick
leave, not PTO. See C.R.S. § 8-13.3-407(2)(a). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff asserts he was on
PTO December 20-22, 202, his claim would fail as a matter of law. See Schlagel, 2025 WL
316549, at *13 (noting “a generic PTO request, with no mention of sick leave” was not protected
by the HFWA). However, in construing Plaintiff’s filings liberally, the Court considers
Plaintiff’s argument that he was on sick leave.
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First, the record does not support Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant counted paid sick leave
as an absence. Specifically, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was actually on paid sick leave
December 20-22, 2021. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows Plaintiff was cleared to
return to work on December 18, 2021, and agreed to return to work on December 20, 2021. (See,
e.g., Doc. No. 31-10 at 3-4 (Plaintiff stating he would be ready to return to work December 20,
2021); Doc. No. 31-11 (December 2021 work schedule); Doc. No. 37-6 (Plaintiff’s paycheck
showing no sick leave taken December 12-25, 2021); Doc. No. 31-10 at 5 (Plaintiff stating he
missed work December 22, 2021 because he had to take care of a warrant); Doc. No. 31-18 at 12
(Defendant’s policy stating employees can return to work ten days after testing positive).) And
while Plaintiff’s self-serving deposition and affidavit testimony suggest he was sick those days,
(see Forbes Depo. at 112:17-113:5 (stating he was too sick to return to work December 20-22,
2021); id. at 124:6-126:8 (stating he was “not mentally right” when he told Mr. Ruggs he could
work); see also Doc. No. 37-15 (letter from Plaintiff’s mom confirming he was sick)), it is
insufficient to establish he was actually on approved sick leave. Indeed, he could not have been
on sick leave because he expressly stated he was ready to return to work December 20, 2021.
Second, to the extent Plaintiff suggests he was terminated because he took COVID-19
sick leave between December 8 and 19, 2021, (see Doc. No. 1 at 5), there is no evidence of that.
The evidence shows Defendant was ready and willing to have Plaintiff return to work after his
COVID-19 leave ended. (See Doc. No. 31-10 at 4; Doc. No. 31-11.) It also shows Defendant was
supportive of Plaintiff taking time off to recover from COVID-19. (See Doc. No. 31-10 at 4 (Mr.
Ruggs stating “if you’d like to take a couple extra days, I’m ok with that”).) There is no evidence
that Defendant took issue with Plaintiff’s time off, and certainly no evidence that Defendant
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terminated Plaintiff because of any protected conduct. It was Plaintiff himself who determined he
could return to work on December 20, 2021, (see id. at 3-4 (Plaintiff stating “Im [sic] cleared this
coming Monday”)), and when Plaintiff did not return to work, and did not communicate his
reasons for failing to report to work, Defendant terminated him pursuant to the attendance policy,
not because of the prior COVID-19 leave. (See Doc. No. 31-15 at 2 (employment relations case
demonstrating Plaintiff was terminated for job abandonment).)
At best, the record reflects a disconnect between Plaintiff and Defendant as to whether
Plaintiff was ready to return to work, but such confusion does not give rise to a claim of
retaliation. See generally Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 179 P.3d 246, 248 (Colo. App.
2007) (noting plaintiff must prove his protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor”
for the disciplinary action taken against him). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s HFWA claim must be
dismissed as a matter of law.
II. Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s PHEW Claim.
PHEW prohibits employers from discriminating, taking adverse action, or retaliating
against any worker “based on the worker, in good faith, raising any reasonable concern about
workplace violations of government health or safety rules, or about an otherwise significant
workplace threat to health or safety.” C.R.S § 8-14.4-102(1). This District has held that “the
statutory and regulatory scheme of PHEW, as a whistleblower law, requires an employee to
engage in a protected activity of either raising a reasonable concern, or opposing a violation of
the law, in order to bring a claim.” Mitchell v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1156 (D. Colo. 2023).
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Defendant argues Plaintiff did not engage in activity protected by PHEW. (Doc. No. 31 at
13.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff does not allege, nor does the record show, that Plaintiff raised a
concern about, or opposed any alleged violations of, health or safety rules during his
employment with Defendant. Cf. Mitchell, 699 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (finding plaintiff engaged in
activity protected by PHEW when she raised concerns to her supervisors about coworkers not
wearing masks or social distancing at work). Indeed, Plaintiff appears to agree that Defendant
followed its sick leave policy and did not force Plaintiff to return to work before he was ready.
(See, e.g., Doc. No. 37 at 6 ¶ 25 (undisputed that Plaintiff received 80.08 hours of paid sick
leave); id. at ¶ 28 (undisputed that Mr. Ruggs told Plaintiff he could take more time off if
needed).) Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s PHEW
claim fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 31) be GRANTED, and as such, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 35) should be DENIED as MOOT. Additionally, because
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 33) was superseded by Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, it too should be DENIED as MOOT. The Court further
RECOMMENDS that the case be DISMISSED.
ADVISEMENT TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen days after service of a copy of the Recommendation, any party may
serve and file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
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28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995). A
general objection that does not put the district court on notice of the basis for the objection will
not preserve the objection for de novo review. “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo
review by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop.
Known As 2121 East 30th Street, Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Failure to
make timely objections may bar de novo review by the district judge of the magistrate judge’s
proposed findings and recommendations and will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a
judgment of the district court based on the proposed findings and recommendations of the
magistrate judge. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1999) (a district court’s
decision to review a magistrate judge’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection
does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at
1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both
timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate
review); Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyo. Coal Ref. Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.
1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate judge’s order, cross-claimant had
waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342,
1352 (10th Cir. 1992) (by their failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal
the magistrate judge’s ruling); but see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th
Cir. 2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review).
Dated this 26th day of February, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
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___________________________
Maritza Dominguez Braswell
United States Magistrate Judge
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