Geiger v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS
DAWN GEIGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHUBB GROUP,
CHUBB,
GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY, doing business as Chubb,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court on Former Defendants Chubb Indemnity Insurance
Company, Federal Insurance Company, Chubb INA Holdings Inc., and Chubb Group
Holdings Inc.’s Unopposed Attorneys’ Fee Request in Connection with Order
Granting Sanctions Motion [#128] (the “Motion”). No Response has been filed. The
Motion [#128] has been referred to the undersigned for a Recommendation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1), and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1(c)(3).1 See
[#129]. The Court has reviewed the Motion [#128], the entire case file, and the applicable
law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the
Motion [#128] be GRANTED.
1 Except where otherwise permitted, a magistrate judge must issue a recommendation on a
motion for attorneys’ fees. See, e.g., Ditirro v. Sando, No. 21-cv-01840-CNS-STV, 2023 WL
8531837 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2023) (magistrate judge issuing a recommendation on a motion for
attorney’s fees filed pursuant to previously allowed sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11).
Case No. 1:23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS Document 130 filed 11/01/24 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 6

2
On June 20, 2024, the undersigned granted two Motions for Sanctions [#75, #78],
allowing the Former Defendants to obtain fees relating to those motions but reserving the
issue of determining the precise amount of fees to be awarded. Minutes [#125]. In the
present Motion [#128], the Former Defendants seek $15,224.50 in fees for their two
attorneys, Christopher S. Clemenson (“Clemenson”) and Joseph E. Okon (“Okon”).
Motion [#128] at 2.
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3(b)(1) requires a motion seeking fees to include a summary
of relevant qualifications and experience for each person for whom fees are claimed.
Attorney Clemenson obtained his Juris Doctor in 1997 from the University of Washington
and has practiced law since that time, primarily representing insurance companies in legal
disputes. Decl. of Clemenson [#128-1] ¶ 4. He is AV-rated by Martindale-Hubbell and has
been recognized by Chambers USA in 2023 and 2024 in the area of insurance law. Id.
He is admitted to practice law and is in good standing in the jurisdictions of the State of
Washington, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, the State of Colorado,
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Id. ¶ 5. Attorney Okon is an associate attorney who
obtained his Juris Doctor in 2016 from Southern Illinois University School of Law and has
been practicing civil litigation since that time. Id. ¶ 7. He is admitted to practice law and is
in good standing in the jurisdictions of the State of Illinois, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, the State of Colorado, and the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado. Id. The Court finds that Attorneys Clemenson and Okon
have supplied adequate information to meet the requirements of Local Rule 54.3(b)(1).
Case No. 1:23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS Document 130 filed 11/01/24 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 6

3
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3(b)(2) requires “a detailed description of the services
rendered, the amount of time spent, the hourly rate charged, and the total amount
claimed.” Here, the Former Defendants seek a total of $15,224.50 in fees for Attorney
Clemenson and Attorney Okon. Motion [#128] at 2. The fees are based on Attorney
Clemenson’s 	hourly 	rate 	of 	$335.00 	for 	34.7 	hours 	expended, 	which 	equates 	to
$11,624.50, and Attorney Okon’s hourly rate of $250.00 for 14.4 hours expended, which
equates to $3,600.00. Id. They have also provided a detailed description of their services
in connection with the Motions for Sanctions [#75, #78]. See Exs. 1-9 [#128-2 through
#128-10]. The Court finds that Attorneys Clemenson and Okon have supplied adequate
information to meet the requirements of Local Rule 54.3(b)(2).
In deciding the reasonableness of a fee request, the Court conducts a “lodestar
calculation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This calculation consists of
multiplying a reasonable hourly billing rate by the number of hours expended, both of
which are reviewed by the Court to ensure that proper billing judgment was exercised.
Reg’l Dist. Council v. Mile High Rodbusters, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1241 (D. Colo.
2015). The lodestar number may then be adjusted “upward or downward to account for
the particularities” of the completed work. Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th
Cir. 1997).
Regarding the reasonableness of Attorney Clemenson’s $335.00 hourly billing rate
and Attorney Okon’s $250.00 hourly billing rate, per a Colorado Bar Association survey
from seven years ago, “the statewide hourly billing rates in the field of civil/commercial
litigation ranged from a median of $300 per hour to $473 in the 75th percentile.” Peterson
v. Pickering, No. 22-cv-00320-WJM-KLM, 2023 WL 5153757, at *2 (D. Colo. July 18,
Case No. 1:23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS Document 130 filed 11/01/24 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 6

4
2023) (citing Colorado Bar Association 2017 Economic Survey; Seeley Int’l Pty Ltd. v.
Maisotsenko, No. 21-cv-01350-CMA-KLM, 2023 WL 3974443, at *3 (D. Colo. May 9,
2023)). Without question, hourly rates have since increased. Regardless, based on the
undersigned’s prior experience as an attorney, Attorney Clemenson’s $335.00 hourly
billing rate and Attorney Okon’s $250.00 hourly billing rate both fall within the range of
reasonableness. Having considered the Survey; “the complexity of the case and the
expertise needed; the professional standing, reputation, ability, and experience of the
attorneys involved in this action; [and] the skill, time and labor involved,” see id., the Court
finds that the billed hourly rates are reasonable. See Raymond M. v. Beacon Health
Options, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00048-JNP-DAO, 2021 WL 764077, at *2 (D. Utah Feb. 26,
2021) (“When determining whether an hourly rate is reasonable, the court may consider
various evidence, including affidavits of counsel, non-party attorney affidavits, and the
court’s own knowledge.”).
“In determining what is a reasonable time in which to perform a given task, an
attorney submitting billing entries should consider the following factors: (1) the complexity
of the case; (2) the number of reasonable strategies pursued; (3) the responses
necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side; and (4) the potential duplication of
services caused by the presence of multiple attorneys when one would suffice.” Reg’l
Dist. Council, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1246 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Importantly,
attorneys must in good faith exclude time that is unnecessary, redundant, or excessive.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The party requesting fees has the burden of proof that its
attorney exercised proper billing judgment. Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson
Cnty., Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Counsel for the party claiming the
Case No. 1:23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS Document 130 filed 11/01/24 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 6

5
fees has the burden of proving hours to the district court by submitting meticulous,
contemporaneous time records that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are sought, all
hours for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific
tasks.”).
Regarding the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, i.e., 34.7 hours for
Attorney Clemenson and 14.4 hours for Attorney Okon, the Court has reviewed the
detailed billing records submitted by counsel. See Exs. 1-9 [#128-2 through #128-10].
The Court does not “apportion the fee award mechanically”; in other words, the Court
does not examine each claimed expense and determine whether each one is reasonable.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 438. Rather, the Court must simply exercise its “discretion in making
this equitable judgment” by making “clear that it has considered the relationship between
the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.” Id. at 437; see also White v.
GMC, Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that the amount of fees
accumulated to obtain the positive result must be reasonably related to the significance
and type of issue in dispute). Given the information provided in the Motion [#128] and
supporting Declaration [#128-1], the history of this case, including the granting of the
Motions for Sanctions [#75, #78] in favor of the Former Defendants, the Court’s review of
the billing records, and the undersigned’s years of experience as an attorney in the
Denver metropolitan area, the Court finds that the lodestar amount of $15,224.50
(consisting of $335.00 per hour multiplied by 34.7 hours of billable work for Attorney
Clemenson and $250.00 per hour multiple by 14.4 hours of billable work for Attorney
Okon) is reasonable and therefore should be awarded.
Based on the foregoing,
Case No. 1:23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS Document 130 filed 11/01/24 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 6

6
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Motion [#128] be GRANTED, and that
the Former Defendants be awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,224.50 from
Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party may file objections within 14 days of
service of this Recommendation. In relevant part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) provides that,
“within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party
may 	serve 	and 	file 	specific 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after
being served with a copy.” “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review
by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d
1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). The objection must be “sufficiently specific to focus the
district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” Id. “[A]
party who fails to make a timely objection to the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” Morales-
Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005).
Dated: November 1, 2024 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
Case No. 1:23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS Document 130 filed 11/01/24 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 6