Geiger v. Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Case No. 23-cv-01080-PAB-KAS
DAWN GEIGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHUBB INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY,
CHUBB LIMITED,
CHUBB GROUP,
CHUBB,
GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE GROUP d/b/a/ CHUBB,
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
CHUBB INA HOLDINGS INC., and
CHUBB GROUP HOLDINGS INC.,
Defendants.
____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Chubb Limited’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [Docket No. 66], filed
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiff Dawn Geiger responded, Docket No. 68,
and defendant Chubb Limited filed a reply. Docket No. 73. The Court has subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
Ms. Geiger brings this case against defendants Chubb Indemnity Insurance
Company (“Chubb Indemnity”); Great Northern Insurance Company (“Great Northern”);
Chubb Limited; Chubb Group; Chubb; Great Northern Insurance Group; Federal
Insurance Company (“FIC”); Chubb INA Holdings, Inc. (“Chubb INA Holdings”); and
Chubb Group Holdings, Inc. (“Chubb Group Holdings”) (collectively the “defendants”).
Docket No. 22. Great Northern is a subsidiary of Chubb Limited. Id. at 2, ¶ 15. Great
Northern is a licensed insurance company doing business in Colorado. Id. at 1, ¶ 3.
On December 8, 2018, Ms. Geiger was involved in a motor vehicle collision with
Emma Roberts. Id. at 2, ¶ 14. On April 27, 2020, Ms. Geiger sent a formal written
request to Ms. Roberts’ insurer, pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1117(2)(a), to
obtain a copy of Ms. Roberts’ insurance policies. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 19-20.
On April 7, 2023, Ms. Geiger filed the present lawsuit against defendant Chubb
Indemnity in the District Court for Denver County, Colorado. Docket No. 5 at 2. On
April 28, 2023, Chubb Indemnity removed the case to this Court. Docket No. 1. On
May 24, 2023, Ms. Geiger filed an amended complaint, adding the following defendants:
Great Northern, Chubb Limited, Chubb Group, Chubb, Great Northern Insurance Group,
FIC, Chubb INA Holdings, and Chubb Group Holdings. Docket No. 22. Ms. Geiger
asserts one claim against defendants, pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1117, for
failing to provide the required insurance policy disclosures within the statutory
1 These facts are taken from plaintiff’s amended complaint, Docket No. 22, and
are presumed to be true for the purposes of this order.
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timeframe. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 23-29. Ms. Geiger requests $82,000 in penalties, in addition to
attorneys’ fees and costs. Id., ¶ 29.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD2
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) is to determine whether
the Court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing personal jurisdiction. Rambo v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th
Cir. 1988). Plaintiff can satisfy her burden by making a prima facie showing. Dudnikov,
514 F.3d at 1070. A court will accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true
in determining whether plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that personal
jurisdiction exists. Ditter v. Subaru Corp., No. 20-cv-02908-PAB-MEH, 2022 WL
889102, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF Distribution
Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 2008)). If the presence or absence of personal
jurisdiction can be established by reference to the complaint, the court need not look
further. Id.
2 The Tenth Circuit has noted that the extent of a plaintiff’s burden to establish
personal jurisdiction and the scope of a court’s review “depend in part on the nature of
the district court’s response to defendants’ motion seeking dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction.” Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th
Cir. 2008). “A district court has discretion to resolve such a motion in a variety of ways
– including by reference to the complaint and affidavits, a pre-trial evidentiary hearing,
or sometimes at trial itself.” Id. Here, neither party requests an evidentiary hearing;
however, both parties submit evidence in support of their positions. The Court therefore
will exercise its discretion to resolve Chubb Limited’s motion based on the documents
submitted by the parties. This decision dictates the standard of review applied. Id. at
1070. When, as here, personal jurisdiction is reviewed on the basis of the complaint
and affidavits, the court “tak[es] as true all well-pled (that is, plausible, non-conclusory,
and non-speculative) facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–62 (2007)). “Similarly, any factual disputes in the parties’
affidavits must be resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.” Id. (citing FDIC v. Oaklawn Apartments,
959 F.2d 170, 174 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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However, “[t]he plaintiff has the duty to support jurisdictional allegations in a
complaint by competent proof of the supporting facts if the jurisdictional allegations are
challenged by an appropriate pleading.” Tompkins v. Exec. Comm. of S. Baptist
Convention, 2015 WL 1568944, at *4 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Tompkins
v. Lifeway Christian Res. of the S. Baptist Convention, 671 F. App’x 1034 (10th Cir.
2016) (unpublished) (quoting Pytlik v. Pro. Res., Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.
1989)). “The plaintiff may make this prima facie showing by demonstrating, via affidavit
or other written materials, facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the
defendant.” AST Sports Sci., 514 F.3d at 1057; see also Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070.
“[A]ny factual disputes in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.”
Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070.
III. 	ANALYSIS
“In determining whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the court must determine (1) whether the applicable statute potentially
confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on the defendant and (2) whether
the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d
1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d
1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)). The Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-
124, has been construed to extend jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the
Constitution, so the jurisdictional analysis here reduces to a single inquiry of whether
jurisdiction offends due process. See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070; Archangel Diamond
Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 2005); Hood v. Am. Auto Care, LLC, 21
F.4th 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2021). Personal jurisdiction comports with due process
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where a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state and where those
contacts are such that assuming jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Minimum contacts may be established under the doctrines of general jurisdiction or
specific jurisdiction. Ditter, 2022 WL 889102, at *2.
Chubb Limited argues that it is not subject to general jurisdiction or specific
jurisdiction in Colorado. Docket No. 66 at 7-14. In support of its argument, Chubb
Limited submits an affidavit from Samantha Froud,3 the Chief Administration Officer of
Chubb Limited, Docket No. 66-1 at 1, ¶ 3, as well as Chubb Limited’s Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Form 10-K. Docket No. 66-3.
A. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction extends to “any and all claims” brought against a defendant,
including claims that have no relation to the forum state. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citation omitted). A court may
exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant is “essentially at home” in the state.
3 Ms. Geiger argues that the Court cannot rely on Ms. Froud’s affidavit because it
was executed outside of the United States in Bermuda “with an illegible, foreign notarial
seal” and “does not comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746.” Docket No. 68
at 6. Section 1746 of Title 28 “authorizes parties to submit unsworn declarations in lieu
of affidavits, provided that the declarations state that they are ‘true and correct’ and are
made ‘under the penalty of perjury,’ among other things. But § 1746 does not apply to
sworn affidavits.” Vazirabadi v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 782 F. App’x 681, 687
(10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (citation omitted). Ms. Froud submitted a sworn affidavit,
notarized in Bermuda by Notary Public, Karen E. King. Docket No. 66-1 at 3-4. Ms.
Froud states that she “declare[s] under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.” Id. at 3, ¶ 24. The Court accordingly rejects plaintiff’s argument. See
Vazirabadi, 782 F. App’x at 687 (“regardless whether the notary’s commission had
expired, [the affiant] swore to the affidavit’s contents ‘upon oath,’ and the district court
properly considered it.”).
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Id. A corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in “its place of incorporation and
principal place of business.” Id.; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137
(2014) (for corporations, “the place of incorporation and principal place of business are
‘paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.’” (citation and alterations omitted)).
Chubb Limited argues that it is not subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado
because Chubb Limited is incorporated in Switzerland, with a principal place of
business in Switzerland. Docket No. 66 at 7; see also Docket No. 66-3 at 2 (Chubb
Limited’s SEC Form 10-K stating that Chubb Limited is a “Swiss-incorporated holding
company,” which is “headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland”); Docket No. 66-1 at 2, ¶ 5
(Ms. Froud’s affidavit stating that “Chubb Ltd. is a Swiss holding company organized
under the laws of Switzerland, with its principal place of business in Zurich,
Switzerland”). Ms. Gieger does not contest Chubb Limited’s evidence or argue that
Chubb Limited is subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado. The Court finds that Chubb
Limited is not subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado because it is incorporated in
and has a principal place of business in Switzerland. See Docket No. 66-3 at 2; Docket
No. 66-1 at 2, ¶ 5; see also Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024.
B. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction is present only if the lawsuit “aris[es] out of or relat[es] to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 582
U.S. 255, 262 (2017). That is, “[a] plaintiff’s injury must ‘arise out of or relate to’ the
defendant’s forum contacts.” Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles, S.A. v. Grupo
Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., 970 F.3d 1269, 1284 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985)); see also Hood, 21
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F.4th at 1221–22. In other words, “there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and
the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in
the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’” Bristol-Myers, 582
U.S. at 262 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011)). The “common formulation of the rule demands that the suit ‘arise out of or
relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026
(quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262). This rule does not require “proof of causation”
between “a plaintiff’s suit and a defendant’s activities.” Id. “Specific jurisdiction . . . is
premised on something of a quid pro quo: in exchange for ‘benefitting’ from some
purposive conduct directed at the forum state, a party is deemed to consent to the
exercise of jurisdiction for claims related to those contacts.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at
1078.
The specific jurisdiction analysis is two-fold. First, the Court must determine
whether a defendant has such minimum contacts with Colorado that the defendant
“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” here. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Within this inquiry, the Court must
determine whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents of the
forum, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, and whether plaintiff’s claim arises out of or results
from “actions by . . . defendant . . . that create a substantial connection with the forum
State.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (internal
quotations omitted). “The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the
name ‘purposeful availment.’” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Burger King,
471 U.S. at 475); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (defendant
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must take “some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State”). “The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice
and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). “They must show that the
defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home – by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a
market’ in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Id.
(quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
Second, if a defendant’s actions create sufficient minimum contacts, the court
must consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant offends
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. The
court considers several factors as part of this analysis, including: (1) the burden on the
defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared
interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger King,
471 U.S. at 477; see also Hood, 21 F.4th at 1224 (“the forum State can exercise
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant that has injured a resident plaintiff in
the forum State if (1) the defendant has purposefully directed activity to market a
product or service at residents of the forum State and (2) the plaintiff’s claim arises from
essentially the same type of activity, even if the activity that gave rise to the claim was
not directed at forum residents.” (citing Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028–29 & n.5)).
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1) Minimum Contacts
Chubb Limited argues that Ms. Geiger cannot establish that Chubb Limited
purposefully directed its activities at the state of Colorado or that Ms. Geiger’s claim
arises out of or is related to those activities. Docket No. 66 at 9, 14. Chubb Limited
argues that it is a Swiss holding company that does not maintain an office in Colorado;
is not licensed to do business in Colorado; does not pay taxes in Colorado; does not
advertise in Colorado; does not own property in Colorado; and has no employees in
Colorado. Id. at 4 (citing Docket No. 66-1 at 3, ¶¶ 19-21). Chubb Limited asserts that it
“does not issue insurance policies at all,” but rather holds shares of various insurance
company subsidiaries. Id. (citing Docket No. 66-1 at 2, ¶¶ 6-7; Docket No. 66-3). Ms.
Froud states that Chubb Limited “played no role in the negotiation, administration, or
underwriting” of the insurance policies in this case and “had no involvement in the
handling of Plaintiff’s request for a copy of those policies.” Docket No. 66-1 at 3, ¶ 17.
Chubb Limited argues that Ms. Roberts’ insurance policies list the insuring company as
“Great Northern Insurance Company.” Docket No. 66 at 10. Ms. Froud states that
Chubb Limited indirectly owns Great Northern as a subsidiary. Docket No. 66-1 at 2,
¶ 8. Finally, Chubb Limited argues that Ms. Geiger does not plausibly allege that Great
Northern is an “alter-ego” of Chubb Limited or that the Court should pierce the corporate
veil. Docket No. 66 at 12-13.
Principally, Ms. Geiger argues that Chubb Limited purposely availed itself of
personal jurisdiction in Colorado by “insuring an individual [who] drove a vehicle” in
Colorado. Docket No. 68 at 8. Ms. Geiger claims that Ms. Roberts was insured under
“Chubb Limited’s insurance policies.” Id. (citing Docket Nos. 68-7, 68-10). Ms. Geiger
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further argues that Chubb Limited employees, Romeo Antonuccio and Alicen Ronan,
responded in writing to Ms. Geiger’s statutory request under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-
1117(2)(a). Id. at 3, 8 (citing Docket Nos. 68-6, 68-7, 68-8). Additionally, Ms. Geiger
contends that Chubb Limited issued and signed the settlement check in the underlying
motor vehicle lawsuit between Ms. Roberts and Ms. Geiger. Id. at 9 (citing Docket No.
68-11). In reply, Chubb Limited argues that Ms. Geiger falsely equates the “Chubb”
trademark logo with Chubb Limited, a separate legal entity. Docket No. 73 at 2-3.
Chubb Limited argues that plaintiff’s exhibits merely show that the trademark term
“Chubb” was used on various documents, yet the term “Chubb” is a marketing name
that refers to the group of companies that are “subsidiaries of Chubb Limited.” Id. at 3
(citing Docket No. 66-3; Docket No. 73-1 at 3, ¶ 22).
The Court finds that Ms. Geiger has failed to make a prima facie showing that
Chubb Limited has minimal contacts with Colorado sufficient to establish specific
jurisdiction over Chubb Limited. Ms. Geiger’s exhibits do not establish that Chubb
Limited issued insurance policies to Ms. Roberts. Although the insurance policy exhibits
contain a “CHUBB” logo in the corner, the exhibits state that the policies are “Issued by
Great Northern Insurance Company.” Docket No. 68-7 at 10; Docket No. 68-10 at 5.
The policy confirms that “Chubb is the marketing name used to refer to subsidiaries of
Chubb Limited providing insurance and related services.” Docket No. 68-10 at 5, 13,
16; see also Krum v. Chubb Ltd., No. 20-cv-03616-RM-GPG, 2022 WL 1558885, at *4
(D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2022) (dismissing breach of contract claims against Chubb Limited
and other entities because the insurance policy clearly stated it was “[i]ssued by Great
Northern Insurance Company” and the policy stated that “Chubb is the marketing name
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used to refer to subsidiaries of Chubb Limited providing insurance and related
services”). In light of the policy’s clear language, Ms. Geiger’s argument is insufficient
to establish that Chubb Limited insured Ms. Roberts and therefore purposely availed
itself of personal jurisdiction in Colorado.
Furthermore, Ms. Geiger’s other exhibits conflate the “Chubb” trademark logo
with Chubb Limited. The exhibits do not establish that the individuals who responded to
Ms. Geiger’s statutory request are Chubb Limited employees. See Docket Nos. 68-7,
68-8 at 1, 5 (exhibit containing screenshots of Mr. Antonuccio’s and Ms. Ronan’s
LinkedIn pages stating that they work for “Chubb,” not Chubb Limited). Although the
settlement check exhibit contains a “CHUBB” trademark logo, the check states “Great
Northern Insurance Company.” Docket No. 68-11. Ms. Geiger’s speculation about the
trademark logo does not refute Ms. Froud’s sworn affidavit declaring that Chubb Limited
did not issue the policy and had no involvement in responding to Ms. Geiger’s statutory
request. See Docket No. 66-1 at 3, ¶¶ 17-19.4 Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms.
Geiger has failed to demonstrate a prima facie showing that Chubb Limited purposefully
directed its activities at residents of Colorado or that Ms. Geiger’s claim arises out of or
is related to those activities. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025.5
4 Ms. Gieger submits other exhibits, but those exhibits also conflate the “Chubb”
trademark logo with Chubb Limited. See Docket No. 68-4 (screenshot of Chubb
LinkedIn page stating that “Chubb Limited” is the “[p]arent company”); Docket No. 68-12
through Docket No. 68-16 (various websites using the term “Chubb” not “Chubb
Limited”); Docket No. 68-18 (LinkedIn profiles and employment posts for “Chubb,” not
Chubb Limited); Docket No. 68-9 (email correspondence indicating that a claim
specialist and claim director had email addresses ending with “@chubb.com”).
5 Because Ms. Geiger has failed to establish that Chubb Limited has sufficient
minimal contacts, the Court does not analyze whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Chubb Limited would offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
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Alternatively, Ms. Geiger cursorily asserts that Great Northern is the “alter-ego” of
Chubb Limited. Docket No. 68 at 9. “The court will not consider . . . issues adverted to
in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.”
United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Even
if Ms. Geiger properly raised the alter ego theory, the Court finds that Ms. Geiger has
provided no basis for imputing Great Northern’s Colorado contacts to Chubb Limited
under an alter ego theory. In deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident parent corporation based on the forum contacts of its
subsidiary, courts consider a number of factors, including whether
(1) [t]he parent owns all the stock; (2) both [entities] have common directors and
officers; (3) the parent finances the subsidiary; (4) the parent causes the
subsidiary’s incorporation; (5) the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (6)
the parent pays salaries or expenses of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary has no
business except with its parent or subsidiary corporation or no assets except
those transferred by its parent or subsidiary; (8) directors and officers do not act
independently in the interests of the subsidiary; (9) formal legal requirements of
the subsidiary such as keeping corporate minutes are not observed; (10)
distinctions between the parent and subsidiary . . . are disregarded or confused;
[and] (11) subsidiaries do not have full boards of directors.
Eim v. CRF Frozen Foods LLC, No. 18-cv-01404-PAB-KLM, 2019 WL 1382790, at *4
(D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2019) (quoting Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co. LLC,
381 P.3d 308, 313 (Colo. 2016)). Ms. Geiger’s “evidence and well-pled allegations do
not address any of these factors.” See id. Accordingly, Ms. Geiger has failed to make a
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction based on an alter ego theory. See id.
Ms. Geiger has failed to satisfy her burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.
See Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1417. The Court accordingly grants Chubb Limited’s motion
and dismisses Ms. Geiger’s claim against Chubb Limited without prejudice. See
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Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is without prejudice).6
IV. 	CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendant Chubb Limited’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [Docket No. 66] is GRANTED. It
is further
ORDERED that plaintiff’s claim is dismissed against Chubb Limited without
prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Chubb Limited is terminated from this case.
DATED February 27, 2024.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
6 Alternatively, Chubb Limited argues that, even if the Court has personal
jurisdiction over Chubb Limited, Ms. Geiger’s claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. Docket No. 66 at 6 n.4. Chubb Limited joins the arguments made by Great
Northern in its motion to dismiss, Docket No. 40, regarding the statute of limitations.
Docket No. 66 at 6 n.4. Ms. Geiger did not respond to this argument, but states that
she incorporates her response to Great Northern’s motion to dismiss. Docket No. 68 at
4, ¶ 14. The Court previously granted Great Northern’s motion to dismiss, finding that
Ms. Geiger’s claim was barred under the statute of limitations. Docket No. 91 at 13.
Even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over Chubb Limited, the Court would dismiss
the claim as barred by the statute of limitations for the same reasons discussed in
regard to Great Northern. See id.
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