Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP et al v. United States Election Integrity Plan et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 22-cv-00581-PAB
COLORADO MONTANA WYOMING STATE AREA CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP,
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF COLORADO, and
MI FAMILIA VOTA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES ELECTION INTEGRITY PLAN,
SHAWN SMITH,
ASHLEY EPP, and
HOLLY KASUN,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the portion of plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 5] that requests
issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and the portion of plaintiffs’ Motion
for Expedited Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 29] that requests an expedited TRO hearing. Plaintiffs
also filed a brief in support of their motion for a TRO. See Docket No. 6. Defendants
have not responded to plaintiffs’ TRO motion.
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I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs are non-profit organizations that support, among other things, “voter
education, registration, and political participation and activism.” Id. at 2. Defendant
United States Election Integrity Plan (“USEIP”)2 has as a goal “to get a better
understanding of what happened in the 2020 election, to f ind truth, expose the truth,
and share the truth” and to find fraud, fix it, and hold people accountable. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs claim that USEIP, using voter rolls that Mr. Smith purchased from the
Colorado Secretary of State, is threatening and intimidating Colorado voters by going
door-to-door across the state to “interrogate” voters “under the pretense of seeking to
uncover ‘phantom ballots.’” Id. at 6, 14. Plaintiffs state that USEIP members are
sometimes armed and wear badges, lending them an “appearance of government
officiality.” Id. at 6, 8. Plaintiffs claim that USEIP members or agents target high-
density housing areas, where there are large numbers of registered Democrats, and
ask “voters to confirm [the voters’] addresses, whether [the voters] participated in the
2020 election, and – if so – how [the voters] cast their vote[s].” Id. at 6. According to
plaintiffs, USEIP members “tell voters . . . that their ballots were cast fraudulently or that
election fraud was committed under their name or address.” Id. at 6. Plaintiffs also
1 The following background facts are taken from plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs’
complaint is not verified, and plaintiffs have not affirmed that the factual allegations in
the complaint are true. Cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146
(10th Cir. 2013) (“given that . . . allegations were established through a verified
complaint, they are deemed admitted for preliminary injunction purposes”), aff’d sub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
2 According to the complaint, defendant Shawn Smith is a member of USEIP and
was president and co-founder of the group. Docket No. 1 at 6, ¶ 17. Defendants
Ashley Epp and Holly Kasun are members of USEIP. Id., ¶¶ 18–19.
2
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state that USEIP is “build[ing] a database” of photographs of voters’ homes. Id. at 7.
Plaintiffs claim that USEIP and its agents intimidate voters who plan or had
planned to vote, and voters of color particularly are intimidated because of the history of
“racial and ethnic discrimination” and efforts to “suppress voters of color.” Id. at 9.
These actions, plaintiffs state, have affected plaintiffs’ missions, which include “ensuring
that young, new, vulnerable minority voters in Colorado are safely able to participate in
the political process,” because plaintiffs have had to divert their resources to counteract
USEIP’s efforts, instead of supporting plaintiffs’ other priorities. Id. at 9–10.
Plaintiffs bring three claims for relief: (1) “intimidating voters and potential voters
in violation of Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,” (2) “attempting to
intimidate voters and potential voters in violation of Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,” and (3) “violation of the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 U.S.C. § 1985).” Docket No.
1 at 12–13, ¶¶ 39–51. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendants from “engaging in
[defendants’] door-to-door voter intimidation campaign or from engaging in other
actions that may intimidate voters or interfere with voter access to the polls.” Docket
No. 6 at 27.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To succeed on a motion for a temporary restraining order, the moving party must
show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips
in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. RoDa Drilling
Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
3
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Council, Inc., 555 US. 7, 20 (2008)); see Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir.
2010). “[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief
must be clear and unequivocal.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib.,
LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v.
Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Granting such “drastic relief,” United States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla. v. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886, 888–89 (10th Cir. 1989),
“is the exception rather than the rule.” GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th
Cir. 1984). The same considerations apply to the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980).
III. ANALYSIS
The Local Rules require a party seeking a TRO to provide notice, or attempt to
provide notice, of its motion to the opposing party. Local Rule 65.1 states, in part,
A [TRO] shall be requested by motion filed separately from the complaint.
The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel or an
unrepresented party, stating: (1) that actual notice of the time of filing the
motion, and copies of all pleadings and documents filed in the action to
date or to be presented to the court at the hearing , have been provided to
opposing counsel and any unrepresented adverse party; or (2) the efforts
made by the moving party to provide the required notice and documents.
D.C.COLO.LCivR 65.1(a). Plaintiffs did not file a certificate indicating their efforts to
provide notice of the motion to defendants, which Local Rule 65.1 requires.3
3 Defendants are aware of the TRO motion and have filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See generally Docket No. 27. In that motion, defendants argue that
plaintiffs have shown no injury that could confer standing under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 2–6. Plaintiffs have not responded to the motion to dismiss;
however, the injury required for a TRO or preliminary injunction is not the same as the
4
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Although defendants have not responded to the TRO motion, the motion is
deficient and will be denied. The Court begins its analysis by considering whether
plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm. “[B]ecause a showing of probable irreparable
harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a [TRO], the moving
party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements will
be considered.” First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To constitute irreparable harm, an injury
must be certain, great, actual and not theoretical.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348
F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003). The “party seeking injunctive relief must show that
the injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need f or
equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253,
1267 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189). “Purely speculative harm
will not suffice.” RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1210; see also 11A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2948.1 (“Speculative injury is
not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant;”
“a [TRO] will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future
injury.”). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm
is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff
injury that is required for standing. Cf. Minn. RFL Republican Farmer Lab. Caucus v.
Freeman, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1311 (D. Minn. 2020) (f inding Article III standing but
not irreparable injury); Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 956 F. Supp. 2d 230, 257
(D.D.C. 2013) (same).
5
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is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer or are suffering imminent,
irreparable harm resulting from defendants’ actions if a TRO is not issued before the
Court can hold a preliminary injunction hearing. See Tijuanas Produce, Inc. v. Shorty’s
Produce, Inc., No. 18-cv-00587-PAB, 2018 WL 1952600, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018)
(“The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm if a
TRO does not issue before a preliminary injunction hearing is held.”). Plaintiffs claim
that they are irreparably harmed because defendants “have intimidated voters and are
continuing to intimidate voters,” and defendants’ “misconduct has forced [p]laintiffs to
divert resources.” Docket No. 6 at 23.4 This “misconduct,” according to plaintiffs, is that
defendants “travel door-to-door to the homes of some of Colorado’s most vulnerable
voters,” press voters for information about the voters’ participation in the 2020 election,
and take photographs of the voters’ homes. Id. at 2.
First, plaintiffs state that members of USEIP “continue to impliedly and explicitly
threaten violence against individuals whom they allege were involved in election fraud –
in other words, people involved in the election of candidates opposed by USEIP.” Id. at
5. Plaintiffs, however, do not assert that “people involved in the election of candidates”
4 Diversion of resources may be sufficient for Article III standing. See, e.g.,
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding that an
organization may have standing to sue on its own to challenge action that causes it
direct injury, when, for instance, a defendant’s conduct makes it difficult or impossible
for the organization to fulfill one of its essential purposes or goals, such as when the
organization faces a drain on its resources or when the defendant’s actions “have
perceptively impaired” the organization’s ability to carry out its mission). However,
purely financial harm is insufficient to meet the irreparable harm requirement for a
preliminary injunction. See Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189 (“It is [] well settled that simple
economic loss usually does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.”).
6
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includes voters or members of the plaintiff organizations. See id. Rather, plaintiffs refer
to death threats that Mr. Smith allegedly made to Colorado Secretary of State Jena
Griswold. Id. Alleged threats to Secretary Griswold are not relevant to the purported
harms that plaintiffs face.
Next, plaintiffs state that “USEIP is now taking its threatening and intimidating
behavior directly to the homes of Colorado voters.” Id. at 6. Plaintiffs rely on a
declaration by one of their lawyers, Casey Breese. Id. (citing “Declaration of Casey
Breese Ex. A.”).5 Mr. Breese’s declaration, however, does not support plaintiff’s
statement that USEIP is currently threatening or intimidating voters. Rather, his
declaration states that Mr. Breese directed a research librarian at his law firm to
“obtain[] the identity of individuals who had purchased voter rolls at some point during
2021 through the Colorado Secretary of State’s Election Cycle Subscription service list.”
Docket No. 7 at 1, ¶ 2. On December 9, 2021, according to Mr. Breese’s declaration,
an employee of the Secretary of State’s office provided a subscription list. Id. at 1–2,
¶ 4. The attachment to Mr. Breese’s declaration indicates that someone named
“Shawn Smith” purchased the voter rolls. See Docket No. 7-1. Mr. Breese does not
state anything about USEIP, its alleged conduct, or when that conduct may have
occurred. See generally id.
Plaintiffs next state that “USEIP is going door-to-door across Colorado,
interrogating Colorado voters under the pretense of seeking to uncover ‘phantom
ballots.’” Docket No. 6 at 6. For support, plaintiffs cite an article from August 17, 2021
5 There is no “Ex. A” to Docket No. 6. Mr. Breese’s declaration is docketed
separately. See Docket No. 7.
7
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by Erick Maulbetsch in the Colorado Times Recorder, “Colorado Election Conspiracy
Group Going Door-to-Door in Search of ‘Phantom Ballots,’” https://coloradotimesrecor
der.com/2021/08/colorado-election-conspiracy-group-going-door-to-door-in-search-of-
phantom-ballots/38866/. Id. Plaintiffs also rely on this article for allegations that USEIP
volunteers wear badges and ask voters whether and how they cast ballots in the 2020
election. Id. Even assuming this article were admissible to substantiate plaintiffs’
allegations of harm,6 the article is nearly seven months old and does not indicate any
“clear and present” harm, see Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1267, or that plaintiffs will suffer
imminent, irreparable harm absent a TRO before the Court can order further relief. See
Tijuanas Produce, 2018 WL 1952600, at *1.
Plaintiffs state that USEIP has begun to target “high-density housing” areas,
where there are high numbers of registered Democrats, that “USEIP is also using its
canvassing efforts to build a database of photos of voters’ residences,” and that
USEIP’s “reach” has expanded into seventeen Colorado counties. Docket No. 6 at 6–7.
Again, plaintiffs rely on inadmissible articles by Mr. Maulbetsch. See id. (citing Erik
Maulbetsch, “Colorado Election Fraud Group is Training Conspiracists in Other States
6 The article is not admissible. See, e.g., Stine v. Lappin, No. 08-cv-00164-
WYD-KLM, 2009 WL 482630, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2009) (denying emergency
injunctive relief that was requested in reliance on hearsay and holding that, “pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 801, hearsay, i.e., an out-of-court statement offered for its
truth, is not admissible evidence. The statements contained within the article are
clearly hearsay, as they are out-of-court statements offered by [p]laintiff to prove the
truth of his claims, or that there is contamination of the ADX ventilation systems that is
causing harm to the inmates.” (citing New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 888 F.2d
646, 650 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the trial court properly excluded statements
in a newspaper article that were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted)).
None of the exceptions to hearsay appear to apply to Mr. Maulbetsch’s article. See
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1), (2); Fed. R. Evid. 803.
8
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to Knock Doors in Search of ‘Phantom Ballots,’” Colorado Times Recorder (Oct. 1,
2021), https://coloradotimesrecorder.com/2021/10/colorado- election-fraud-group-
is-training-conspiracists-in-other-states-to-knock-doors-in-search- of-phantom-
ballots/39935; Eric Maulbetsch, “Election Fraud Conspiracists Still Knocking on
Colorado Voters’ Doors,” Colorado Times Recorder (Nov. 23, 2021), https://colorado
timesrecorder2021/11/election-fraud-conspiracists-still-knocking-on-colorado-voters-
doors/41178/). Admissibility concerns aside, these articles are also months old and do
not indicate any ongoing conduct by USEIP or its members justifying emergency
injunctive relief. See Tijuanas Produce, 2018 WL 1952600, at *1.
Plaintiffs’ other allegations are no more convincing. See Beltronics USA, 562
F.3d at 1070 (“[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right
to relief must be clear and unequivocal.”). Plaintiffs state that defendants “have
engaged in actions to intimidate, threaten, and coerce voters, and have publicly
admitted plans to continue their door-to-door voter intimidation campaign,” Docket No. 6
at 13; that “[Mr.] Smith, [Ms.] Epp, and [Ms.] Kasun have engaged in the intimidating
conduct and coordinated their activities through USEIP and its agents,” id. at 19; and
that defendants “have intimidated and threatened Colorado voters, thereby preventing
or hindering them from giving support or advocacy to candidates for public office,”
which “threaten the right to vote [and] intimidate voters.” Id. These allegations are
unsupported, and plaintiffs do not show that any of this alleged misconduct is ongoing,
such that drastic, emergency relief is necessary. See United States ex rel. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 883 F.2d at 888–89 (characterizing a
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preliminary injunction as “drastic relief”); GTE Corp., 731 F.3d at 678 (noting that
emergency relief “is the exception rather than the rule”).
Plaintiffs rely on declarations from (1) Beth Hendrix, Executive Director of the
League of Women Voters of Colorado (“LWVCO”), see Docket No. 8; (2) Portia
Prescott, State President of NAACP Colorado Montana Wyoming State-Area
Conference of the NAACP (“NAACP Colorado”), see Docket No. 9; and (3) Salvador
Hernandez, Colorado State Director of Mi Familia Vota (“MFV”). Docket No. 10. These
declarations, however, do not establish exigency. Ms. Hendrix’s declaration states that,
in August 2021, LWVCO learned that USEIP “was sending its members door-to-door”
and that LWVCO members “have reported that these USEIP agents are holding
themselves out as part of an official government organization or audit.” Docket No. 8 at
2, ¶ 5. Ms. Hendrix also states that USEIP’s actions “will intimidate individuals from
voting.” Id., ¶ 6. As a result, Ms. Hendrix asserts that “voters may question the validity
of the political process.” Id. at 3, ¶ 10. Aside from Ms. Hendrix’s statement that
LWVCO members have reported that USEIP agents are “holding themselves out” as
government officials, which is hearsay, Ms. Hendrix does not indicate that any actions
by USEIP or its agents are ongoing, or that any USEIP agent will imminently visit the
home of a LWVCO member. See RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1210 (“Purely speculative
harm will not suffice” for a preliminary injunction or TRO.). Moreover, even if that
statement were admissible, it is not sufficient to establish “clear and unequivocal”
entitlement to relief, see Beltronics USA, 562 F.3d at 1070, or imminent injury. See
Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1267.
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Ms. Prescott states in her declaration that NAACP Colorado “[r]ecently” learned
that USEIP and “individuals connected to USEIP . . . were engaging in intimidating
home visits to Colorado voters” and “w[ere] going door-to-door in Colorado ‘looking for
fraud’ . . . in connection with the November 2020 election.” Docket No. 9 at 2, ¶ 7. Ms.
Prescott also states that USEIP agents are “showing up at the homes of Black and
other voters.” Id. at 3, ¶ 10. Ms. Prescott, however, does not indicate that a USEIP
agent visited the home of any NAACP Colorado members or that one will do so soon.
See RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1210. Ms. Prescott also does not prov ide any specific
instance of USEIP agents allegedly engaging in misconduct, when that alleged
misconduct occurred, or whether it is continuing. See generally id. Ms. Prescott’s
declaration, therefore, does not show that plaintiffs are clearly and unequivocally
entitled to relief, see Beltronics USA, 562 F.3d at 1070, or that they are facing imminent
harm. See Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1267.
Mr. Hernandez states in his declaration that, in the fall of 2021, MFV learned that
USEIP and individuals connected to USEIP “were engaging in intimidating home visits
to Colorado voters,” which is threatening to the population MFV serves. Docket No. 10
at 2, ¶ 7. Mr. Hernandez, however, does not state that a USEIP agent visited the home
of any MFV member or will soon, see RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1210, and he provides
no specific instance of any USEIP agent engaging in misconduct, indication of when
USEIP’s alleged misconduct occurred, or whether it is continuing. See generally id.
Mr. Hernandez’s declaration does not show that plaintiffs are clearly and unequivocally
entitled to relief, see Beltronics USA, 562 F.3d at 1070, or that they face imminent
harm. See Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1267.
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The Court finds that plaintiffs have not shown that they are facing “certain, great,
actual and not theoretical” or speculative injury. See RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1210;
Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189. As the Tenth Circuit has stated, the “party seeking
injunctive relief must show that the injury complained of is of such imminence that there
is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Schrier,
427 F.3d at 1267. This is “the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.” DTC Energy Grp., Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 912 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th
Cir. 2018) (quoting First W. Cap. Mgmt. Co., 874 F.3d at 1141). Plaintiffs have failed to
carry their burden.
Moreover, “delay is an important consideration in the assessment of irreparable
harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction.” GTE Corp., 731 F.2d at 679; see also
A.K. by & through Moyer v. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. No. 5, No. 20-cv-00392-PAB-NRN,
2020 WL 2197920, at *3 n.1 (D. Colo. May 6, 2020) (“[T]he Court finds that the delay in
seeking injunctive relief cuts against plaintiff's assertions of imminent irreparable
harm.”); Am. Ass’n of People With Disabilities v. Herrera, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1246
(D.N.M. 2008) (finding that plaintiffs’ two-week delay from filing lawsuit to seeking
preliminary injunction “considerably undercut[ ] their allegation of irreparable harm”);
Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he party seeking
injunctive relief must show that the injury complained of is of such imminence that there
is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” (brackets,
alterations, and emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
Plaintiffs state in their motion that they learned about USEIP’s door-to-door
activities in the fall of 2021. Docket No. 6 at 8. Plaintiffs cite Mr. Breese’s declaration.
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Id. As the Court has noted, Mr. Breese declares that, on Decem ber 8, 2021, he
directed a librarian at his law firm to request a list of all individuals who had purchased
voter rolls from the Colorado Secretary of State. See Docket No. 7 at 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiffs
also rely on the declarations that the Court considered previously. In her declaration,
Ms. Hendrix states that LWVCO learned about USEIP’s door-to-door activities in
August 2021. See Docket No. 8 at 2, ¶ 5. Ms. Prescott states in her declaration that
NAACP Colorado learned about USEIP’s activities “[r]ecently,” but she does not specify
when that was. See Docket No. 9 at 2, ¶ 7. Mr. Hernandez states that MFV learned
about USEIP in “[f]all of 2021.” Docket No. 10 at 2, ¶ 7.
Plaintiffs, however, waited at least three months, from December 2021 to March
2022, to file their complaint and TRO motion.7 See Docket Nos. 1, 5–6. Waiting three
months to file this lawsuit and seek a TRO, however, is not consistent with plaintiffs’
allegations that they are facing imminent harm. See, e.g., Found. Learning LLC v.
Acad., Arts & Action Charter Acad., No. 17-cv-03182-RM-KLM, 2018 WL 3382933, at
*3 (D. Colo. May 18, 2018) (waiting three months to file motion for emergency injunctive
relief without explanation “strongly undermines plaintiff’s suggestion that the moment of
maximum harm is now at hand”).
Because the Court finds that plaintiffs have not met their burden of
demonstrating immediate irreparable harm so as to justify issuance of a temporary
restraining order, the Court need not address the remaining TRO factors and will deny
7 Plaintiffs’ declarations indicate that they likely delayed even longer than three
months, given that LWVCO and MFV learned about USEIP’s alleged conduct in late
summer or fall 2021. See Docket No. 8 at 2, ¶ 5; Docket No. 10 at 2, ¶ 7.
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that portion of plaintiffs’ motion. Cf. Big O Tires, LLC v. Felix Bros., Inc., 724 F. Supp.
2d 1107, 1121 (D. Colo. 2010) (“The Court declines to address the remaining
preliminary injunction elements, as the resolution of them will have no bearing on the
outcome.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the portion of plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 5] that requests issuance of a temporary
restraining order is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the portion of plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket
No. 29] that requests an expedited TRO hearing is DENIED as moot.
DATED April 8, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
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