USA v. Ridgeway

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Regina M. Rodriguez
Criminal Action No. 22-cr-00329-RMR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEWIS BURTON RIDGEWAY,
Defendant.
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Lewis Burton Ridgeway’s Motion for
Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), ECF No. 85. The Government
filed a response, ECF No. 87. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 16, 2023, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a
machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea
Agreement, the parties agreed to a sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment and 3 years
supervised release, concurrent to Jefferson County Combined Court, Case Numbers
10CR1118, 10CR561, 10CR1005, 10CR2603, and 10CR2031; Denver County District
Court, Case Numbers 10CR562, 10CR690, 10CR649, and 10CR1106; and Boulder
County Combined Court, Case Number 10CR812. ECF No. 63. On November 29, 2023,
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Defendant was sentenced to 93 months’ imprisonment, concurrent to his state sentences,
followed by 3 years of supervised release. ECF No. 80-82.
On November 8, 2024, Defendant filed the present motion to reduce his sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons
require a sentence reduction. ECF No. 85 at 1-2. He asserts that in the recent past he
has been sexually assaulted by correctional officers, leaving him with extreme PTSD. Id.
He also asserts he is not being given adequate care concerning the mental anguish he is
experiencing and has used his time in incarceration to rehabilitate himself. Id.
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), known as the “compassionate release”
provision, a district court may grant a motion by the defendant or the director of the Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”) for a reduction of sentence if three requirements are met. See United
States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021). The requirements are that “(1)
the district court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction; (2) the district court finds that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) the district court
considers the factors set forth in § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. A
court need not address all of the steps if one of them demonstrates that a defendant is
not entitled to compassionate release. Id. at 1043.
The Sentencing Commission has identified several categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons that may warrant a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).
These reasons include: certain medical circumstances; age of the defendant; family
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circumstances; sexual or physical abuse by a correctional officer, BOP employee or
contractor, or any other individual who had custody or control over the defendant; an
unusually long sentence; or other reasons similar in gravity to the enumerated reasons.
Id. It is within the Court's discretion to determine whether extraordinary and compelling
reasons justify compassionate release. See McGee, 992 F.3d at 1050.
Additionally, a district court may grant a sentence reduction upon motion of the
defendant only “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal
a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse
of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility,
whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion
requirement is a mandatory “claim-processing rule,” not a jurisdictional rule. United States
v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding that the government
waived 	exhaustion 	argument 	by 	failing 	to 	raise 	it 	on 	appeal). 	“[T]he 	exhaustion
requirement, though nonjurisdictional, remains a mandatory claim-processing rule that
the court must enforce when the government invokes it.” United States v. Gieswein, 2021
WL 4852420, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (unpublished); see also United States v.
Johnson, 849 F. App'x 750, 753 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“In this circuit, however,
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory, rather than judicially waivable.”).
Here, 	Defendant 	alleges 	he 	has 	satisfied 	the 	exhaustion 	requirement 	and 	the
Government does not dispute it. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of the
motion.
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III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
When evaluating a motion filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the Court must first
determine whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.”
United 	States 	v. 	McGee, 	992 	F.3d 	1035, 	1045 	(10th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(quoting 	§
3592(c)(1)(A)(i)). In exercising this authority, however, a court must also find that the
reduction “is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . . .” Id.
Here, Defendant argues extraordinary and compelling reasons exist because he
has been sexually assaulted by corrections officers, which has left him with extreme
PTSD. He also asserts he is not being given adequate care for his mental health issues.
Mr. Ridgeway cites to USSG § 1B1.13(b)(4), which provides that extraordinary and
compelling reasons exist if:
The defendant, while in custody serving the term of imprisonment sought to
be reduced, was a victim of: sexual abuse involving a ‘sexual act,’ as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) . . . that was committed by, or at the direction
of, a correctional officer, an employee or contractor of the Bureau of
Prisons, or any other individual who had custody or control over the
defendant.
The Guidelines explain that “[f]or purposes of this provision, the misconduct must be
established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil
case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding, unless such proceedings are unduly
delayed or the defendant is in imminent danger.” Id.
Mr. 	Ridgeway 	alleges 	he 	has 	been 	sexually 	assaulted 	by 	three 	different
correctional officers while in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections,
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which are documented. ECF No. 85 at 5. He further alleges these assaults have left him
with PTSD. Id. He alleges the assault by Correctional Officer Christa Lunog resulted in
her pregnancy, and that he now has a child with her. Id. Mr. Ridgeway claims he is not
allowed visitation rights with Ms. Lunog to visit his minor child, which compounds his
mental health issues. Id.
While 	these 	are 	serious 	allegations, 	Mr. 	Ridgeway 	does 	not 	provide 	any
corroboration or documentation of the sexual assaults or how, if true, they impact his
mental health. He claims that the correctional officers were charged with and/or admitted
their sexual misconduct, but provides no documentation of any criminal case, civil case,
or administrative proceeding to support these claims. Nor does he allege that the
proceedings are unduly delayed or that he is in imminent danger. And the Government
represents that it could not identify any criminal cases against the correctional officers.
See ECF No. 87 at 3 n.2. Further, Mr. Ridgeway claims he was assaulted by Ms. Lunog
and her actions are causing him mental anguish but then represents that he would be
living with her and his son if released. ECF No. 85 at 13. This undermines his claim that
the alleged assault left him with severe PTSD. His assertions of mental health struggles
are also bare allegations without any documentation or evidentiary support, and the Court
does not find that he has established extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant
a sentence reduction.
B. 	Rehabilitation
Mr. Ridgeway also argues that his rehabilitative efforts in prison warrant a
sentence reduction. Rehabilitation alone is not an extraordinary and compelling reason
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warranting a reduction. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); see also USSG §1B1.13(d). “However,
rehabilitation 	of 	the defendant 	while 	serving 	the 	sentence may 	be 	considered 	in
combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a
reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted.” USSG §1B1.13(d). Here,
Mr. Ridgeway lists the programs he has participated in and states that he has “used his
time very productively while incarcerated.” ECF No. 85 at 8. But he does not identify
programming 	he 	has 	completed 	while 	in 	BOP 	custody, 	and 	his 	bare 	claims 	of
rehabilitation and that he has “aged out of crime” are insufficient. And even if Mr.
Ridgeway were able to demonstrate successful rehabilitation, that alone would not be
enough to warrant a reduction in the absence of other extraordinary and compelling
reasons. See United States v. Mata-Soto, 861 F. App'x 251, 255 (10th Cir. 2021)
(affirming denial of motion for compassionate release and reasoning that even where
defendant cited successful rehabilitation efforts, “the district court correctly determined
that rehabilitation alone could not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason
warranting release.”).
C. 	Section 3553(a) Factors
Because the Court finds that Mr. Ridgeway has not presented extraordinary and
compelling circumstances, it need not consider the applicable 3553(a) factors. See
McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043 (districts courts may deny compassionate release motion when
any of the “prerequisites listed in 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the
others.”). 	However, 	even 	if 	the 	Court 	reached 	this 	step, 	it 	would 	not 	find 	that
compassionate release is warranted.
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As an initial matter, Mr. Ridgeway pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), wherein he agreed that an eight-year sentence was
appropriate. See ECF No. 63; United States v. Sanders, 2020 WL 6460224, 9 (M.D. Tenn.
Nov. 3, 2020 (denying motion for compassionate release based on § 3553(a) factors in
part because the defendant agreed through Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that his
sentence was appropriate).
But even without that agreement, the Court would not find a sentence reduction
appropriate in light of the 3553(a) factors. The Court considered these factors at his
original sentencing, and does not find that there have been any significant changes that
would warrant a reduction. See United States v. Krowner, No. 20-2175, 2021 WL
5968659, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2021) (unpublished) (noting that judge who denied
compassionate release motion was the same as the judge who imposed the original
sentence and reasoning that “[s]ince there is no challenge to the original sentence, it is
enough if the district court explained why the new circumstances raised by the defendant
did not warrant a sentence reduction.”); United States v. Wilson, No. 20-1324, 2021 WL
4859690, at *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (unpublished) (noting that the judge who ordered
the defendant’s original sentence also denied his compassionate-release motion and
inferring “that the district court's view of the § 3553 factors had not changed by the time
of 	[the 	defendant's] 	motion 	for 	compassionate 	release” 	(internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted)). Mr. Ridgeway has a long history of recidivism, 16 felony convictions, and has
been undeterred by numerous substantial prison sentences. Indeed, he was serving a
term of state parole when he committed the instant offense. And the instant offense was
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a serious crime involving possession of a ghost gun with an auto-sear while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. There is no reason to believe Mr. Ridgeway would not
reoffend if released back into the community, as he has a lengthy history of possessing
firearms during the commission of crimes. This history shows that there is a serious risk
to the safety of the community if he is released. Thus, the Court finds that a reduction in
his sentence would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, provide just punishment, or afford deterrence.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Lewis Burton Ridgeway’s Motion for
Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), ECF No. 85, is DENIED. To
the 	extent 	Mr. 	Ridgeway 	requests 	counsel 	for 	assistance 	with 	his 	request 	for
compassionate release, that request is DENIED, because “there is no constitutional right
to counsel to aid in a defendant’s request for compassionate release.” United States v.
Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2021).
DATED: April 24, 2025
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
REGINA M. RODRIGUEZ
United States District Judge
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