USA v. Anderson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Criminal Action No. 22-cr-00321-NYW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
1. 	TIMOTHY BENJAMIN ANDERSON,
Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF PROBATION
This matter is before the Court on the letter submitted by Timothy Benjamin
Anderson (“Mr. Anderson”) wherein he requests early termination of his probationary
sentence (the “Motion” or “Motion for Early Termination of Probation”). [Doc. 6]. For the
reasons set forth in this Order, the Motion for Early Termination of Probation is respectfully
DENIED without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On September 1, 2020, Mr. Anderson was charged in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa with one count of possession of firearms by a drug
user in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2). [Doc. 3-1 at 1–2]. Mr. Anderson
pleaded guilty to that offense. 	[Doc. 1-1 at 1]. 	On June 29, 2022, Mr. Anderson was
sentenced by the Honorable C.J. Williams to a five-year term of probation, [id. at 1–2],
and he has since completed approximately half of his sentence. 	Jurisdiction over Mr.
Anderson’s probation was transferred to this District on October 17, 2022. [Doc. 1 at 1].
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On October 30, 2024, Mr. Anderson filed his Motion for Early Termination of
Probation, asking the Court to terminate the remainder of his sentence. 	See [Doc. 6].
The United States Probation Office does not oppose Mr. Anderson’s request, see [Doc.
11 at 2], but the Government opposes early termination, see generally [Doc. 10].
Mr. Anderson did not file a reply brief and the time to do so has expired.
LEGAL STANDARD
By statute, a court may “terminate a term of probation previously ordered and
discharge the defendant . . . at any time after the expiration of one year of probation in
the case of a felony, if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c). In so doing, the court must
“consider[] the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are
applicable.” Id. Stated differently, a court may terminate a probationer’s term early “only
if the following three requirements are met: 	(1) early termination is warranted by ‘the
interest of justice;’ (2) early termination is warranted by ‘the conduct of the defendant;’
and (3) early termination would be consistent with the applicable § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Rader, No. 22-cr-00057-RCL, 2024 WL 474535, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 7,
2024) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Haley, 500 F. Supp. 3d 6, 7 (W.D.N.Y.
2020) (“[P]ursuant to the express terms of § 3564(c), . . . the applicable factors set forth
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) must be considered, and the court must be satisfied that the early
termination of probation ‘is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the interest of
justice.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c)) (emphasis added)).
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Under § 3553(a), a court must “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing, considering the following factors,
among others:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed--
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.
[and]
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for--
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines--
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . subject to any
amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress . . .; and
(ii) that . . . are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Whether to grant a motion to terminate probation is within the trial
court’s discretion. United States v. Hartley, 34 F.4th 919, 928 (10th Cir. 2022).
ANALYSIS
As mentioned above, Mr. Anderson has completed approximately half of his five-
year probationary sentence and now asks the Court to terminate the remainder of the
sentence. [Doc. 6 at 3]. In his Motion, Mr. Anderson first details the circumstances that
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led to his arrest and conviction. 	[Id. at 1–2]. 	Then, he explains the reasons behind his
request for early termination. Specifically, he explains that he is the primary caregiver of
his disabled adult son and that his probationary sentence, and all of the attendant
requirements, have caused great stress in his life and his son’s life. [Id.]. He asserts that
if his probation is terminated, such that he is no longer subject to home visits from the
Probation Office and his location is no longer tracked by the Probation Office, then a
substantial amount of stress will be eliminated from his and his son’s lives. 	[Id. at 3].
Mr. Anderson also represents that he wishes to move to California, where his employer
is located, with his son. [Id. at 2–3]. He asks the Court to terminate his probation “so [he]
may ultimately move to Southern California without the added stress of transferring [his]
probation to California.” [Id. at 3].
The Government opposes early termination. 	See [Doc. 10]. 	It asserts that “it is
significant that the defendant’s entire sentence was a term of probation, with no term of
custody,” and argues that this Court should not disturb the sentence that was deemed
sufficient and appropriate by the sentencing judge. 	[Id. at 3]. 	In addition, noting that
Mr. Anderson was convicted of a state DUI offense in October 2022, it argues that “[t]he
fact that the defendant drove under the influence a mere 11 days after transferring his
federal supervision to Colorado” is “alarming.” 	[Id.]. 	Conversely, the Probation Office
supports Mr. Anderson’s request for early termination. 	See [Doc. 11]. 	The Probation
Office represents that Mr. Anderson’s Post-Conviction Risk Assessment category is “Low
Moderate” and that offenders in this category “have a seventeen percent re-arrest rate
and a six percent revocation rate in the next twelve months of supervision.” 	[Id.].
However, the Probation Office also notes Mr. Anderson’s positive conduct while on
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supervision and his lack of other criminal history. [Id. at 1]. The Probation Office states
that since his state conviction, Mr. Anderson has been a law-abiding citizen and is
motivated not to return to prison. [Id.].
As explained above, to justify terminating a probationary sentence early, the Court
must find that early termination is (1) in the interest of justice; (2) warranted by
Mr. Anderson’s conduct; and (3) consistent with the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Rader,
2024 WL 474535, at *2.
The Court first considers Mr. Anderson’s conduct. 	One of the conditions of
Mr. Anderson’s probation is that he “must not commit another federal, state, or local
crime.” [Doc. 1-1 at 3]. Mr. Anderson violated this condition when he was convicted of a
state DUI offense in October 2022. See [Doc. 11 at 1]. The Court notes that Mr. Anderson
was sentenced to probation for that offense and that his state-court probationary sentence
was terminated early. See [id.]. The Court also notes that Mr. Anderson has since been
compliant with his conditions of probation. [Id.]. However, compliance with conditions of
probation is an insufficient basis to terminate that probation. 	See United States v.
Hemphill, No. 21-cr-00555-RCL, 2024 WL 578977, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2024) (“[C]ourts
have typically held that defendants seeking early termination under § 3564(c) must
demonstrate more than just compliance with the terms of probation.” (collecting cases));
United States v. Frankel, No. 2:17-cr-00242-JFC, 2022 WL 17852029, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 22, 2022) (“Compliance with the conditions of probation . . . is required behavior
while serving a term of supervised release.”). Accordingly, although the Court commends
Mr. Anderson for his compliance with his conditions over the past two years, in light of his
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DUI conviction, the Court cannot conclude that his conduct weighs strongly in favor of
early termination.
The Court next considers whether early termination is in the interest of justice.
“The ‘interest of justice’ phrase . . . ‘give[s] the district court latitude to consider a broad
range of factors in addition to an individual’s behavior in considering whether to terminate
the supervised release period,’ . . . or in this case, probation period.” Hemphill, 2024 WL
578977, at *4 (quoting United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Mr. Anderson explains 	to the 	Court the circumstances surrounding his underlying
conviction and the stress caused by his conditions of probation, including the detrimental
impact of that stress to his son’s wellbeing. 	See [Doc. 6 at 1–2]. 	The Court also
acknowledges Mr. Anderson’s desire to move to California without transferring his
jurisdiction to another state. 	[Id. at 3]. 	The Court does not doubt or discount the
inconvenience caused by Mr. Anderson’s sentence and the accompanying requirements.
However, “all defendants who are convicted of a federal felony suffer some degree of
hardship.” United States v. Cotter, No. 2:09-cr-00190-GD, 2014 WL 1653106, at *2 (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 23, 2014). 	The stressful conditions Mr. Anderson mentions—the home visits
and 	location 	tracking—are 	standard 	conditions 	of 	probation 	that 	are 	natural
consequences of committing a federal felony offense. Moreover, Mr. Anderson’s desire
to move to California is not a sufficient basis to terminate his probation early. See Frankel,
2022 WL 17852029, at *5 (finding that the defendant’s desire to relocate to California did
not justify early termination, as “[t]he probation officer w[ould] . . . be able to request the
transfer of supervision to a federal district in California to the extent [the defendant]
desire[d] to relocate”).
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It is also material to this Court’s analysis that Mr. Anderson is not serving a period
of supervised release after a period of incarceration—the five-year term of probation is
his sentence. 	See Hartley, 34 F.4th at 923 n.1 (“Unlike supervised release, which is
imposed in addition to imprisonment, probation is imposed in lieu of imprisonment.”
(quotation omitted)). In this circumstance, “[t]he interest of justice might arguably disfavor
early termination, because that would result in the defendant ultimately receiving an
amount of punishment less than what [Judge Williams] initially found appropriate under
the § 3553(a) factors.” Hemphill, 2024 WL 578977, at *4.
Finally, the Court turns to the applicable § 3553(a) factors. 	The Court does not
believe that there is any significant concern about protecting the public from Mr. Anderson
or deterring Mr. Anderson from committing additional offenses, given his general lack of
criminal history and general compliance with the terms of his probation. 	See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C). 	However, the Court must also consider the applicable sentencing
range and whether the sentence imposed reflects the seriousness of the offense. 	Id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), 	(a)(4)(A). 	The 	Presentence 	Investigation 	Report 	states 	that 	the
applicable guideline sentencing range was 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. 	[Doc. 2 at
16]. 	Mr. Anderson was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment, but to five years’
probation. 	Judge Williams, who presided over Mr. Anderson’s criminal case, clearly
decided that a five-year probationary sentence was sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to satisfy the requirements of § 3553(a)(2), and the Court is not convinced
that it should disturb that determination. 	See United States v. Pryer, No. 21-cr-00667-
RCL-2, 2024 WL 1050638, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2024) (denying motion for early
termination of probation because, among other things, “early termination would prevent
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[the defendant] from completing the punishment the Court deemed appropriate when
imposing her sentence”), appeal docketed, No. 24-3037 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2024).
For all of these reasons, the Court respectfully concludes that early termination of
Mr. Anderson’s probation is not warranted at this time. The Motion for Early Termination
of Probation is therefore DENIED without prejudice. Should Mr. Anderson successfully
complete a greater portion of his five-year sentence, he may file a renewed motion
explaining why early termination is appropriate at that time in the jurisdiction that governs
his supervision.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Motion for Early Termination of Probation [Doc. 6] is DENIED without
prejudice; and
(2) 	A copy of this Order shall be sent to:
Timothy Benjamin Anderson
870 Quail Lake Circle, Apt. 202
Colorado Springs, CO 80916
DATED: January 8, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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