Detreville v. Gurevich et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 21-cv-00638-PAB-MEH
KEVIN DETREVILLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SERGEY GUREVICH, and
JULIE WEINHEIMER,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 77] filed by Officer Sergey Gurevich and Officer Julie
Weinheimer (collectively, the “defendants”) following the mandate of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Docket No. 105, and plaintiff Kevin Detreville’s
Renewed Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of Order Denying Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 107]. The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Detreville asserts the following claims in his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: (1) unlawful arrest/failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment
against both defendants; (2) retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment
against both defendants; (3) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment
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against Officer Gurevich only; and (4) an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against both defendants. Docket No. 1 at 8-15, ¶¶ 62-130.
On March 8, 2024, defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment.
Docket No. 77. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Mr. Detreville’s unlawful
arrest claim, First Amendment retaliation claim, malicious prosecution claim, and equal
protection claim. See id. at 2. On February 6, 2024, Mr. Detreville moved for partial
summary judgment on his claims against Officer Gurevich. See Docket No. 71.
On September 30, 2024, the Court denied Mr. Detreville’s motion for partial
summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Docket No. 89 at 47. The Court found that there was arguable
probable cause for Mr. Detreville’s arrest. Id. at 34. Accordingly, the Court found that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Mr. Detreville’s unlawful
arrest claim with prejudice. Id. The Court denied defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Mr. Detreville’s First Amendment retaliation and malicious prosecution
claims. Id. at 36, 38. The Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Mr. Detreville’s equal protection claim against Officer Gurevich, but granted summary
judgment for Officer Weinheimer on the equal protection claim, dismissing that claim
with prejudice. Id. at 42-43, 46. The Court found that defendants waived their qualified
immunity defense for the retaliatory arrest, malicious prosecution, and equal protection
claims. Id. at 33 n.28.
Defendants appealed the Court’s ruling on their motion for summary judgment to
the Tenth Circuit. Docket No. 91. The Tenth Circuit held that defendants did not waive
their qualified immunity argument. Docket No. 104 at 8. The Tenth Circuit reversed the
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Court’s denial of summary judgment on the retaliatory arrest claim, finding that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity due to the existence of arguable probable
cause. Id. at 14. The Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings the
Court’s denial of summary judgment for Officer Gurevich on Mr. Detreville’s malicious
prosecution claim. Id. at 23. The Tenth Circuit also vacated and remanded for further
proceedings the Court’s denial of summary judgment for Officer Gurevich on Mr.
Detreville’s equal protection claim. Id. On remand, the Tenth Circuit instructed the
Court to address the clearly-established law prong of qualified immunity on the
malicious prosecution and equal protection claims. Id. at 18, 22.
Therefore, the remaining claims in this case are Mr. Detreville’s malicious
prosecution and equal protection claims against Officer Gurevich. The Court will
consider whether to grant summary judgment for Officer Gurevich on these claims in
accordance with the Tenth Circuit’s order.
II. 	UNDISPUTED FACTS1
On November 10, 2019, Mr. Detreville, who is Black, 2 went to the Arie P. Taylor
Municipal Center. Docket No. 71 at 2, ¶ 1. The Arie P. Taylor Municipal Center is a
large plaza that includes the Denver District 5 Police Station (the “Station”) and several
other municipal and state buildings. Id., ¶ 2. Mr. Detreville walked around the plaza,
1 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. The Tenth
Circuit’s order did not disturb the Court’s findings of fact in the September 30 Order.
See Docket No. 104 at 2 n.1. Accordingly, the Court will consider as undisputed the
same facts from the September 30 Order.
2 Neither party included the fact that Mr. Detreville is Black in the undisputed fact
sections of their briefs. However, the Court finds that the parties do not dispute that Mr.
Detreville is Black. See Docket No. 1 at 1, ¶ 1 (stating that Mr. Detreville is an “African-
American male”); Docket No. 80 at 18 (stating that plaintiff is “African-American”);
Docket No. 77 at 14 (stating that Mr. Detreville is “Black”).
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while filming with his cell phone, for approximately six minutes. Id., ¶ 3. While filming,
Mr. Detreville walked along the sidewalk and arrived at the only public entrance to the
Station. Id., ¶ 4; Docket No. 77 at 2, ¶ 3. On the sidewalk leading up to the entrance,
there were no signs prohibiting video recording. Docket No. 71 at 2, ¶ 5. 3
The public entrance to the Station has a glass entryway, 4 depicted in the
following photograph:
3 Defendants dispute this fact, arguing that “a sign was posted on one of the
windows of the entryway area prohibiting filming in the Denver District 5 station.”
Docket No. 76 at 2, ¶ 5. This response does not dispute plaintiff’s proffered fact that
there were no signs along the sidewalk leading up to the entrance. Accordingly, the
Court deems this fact undisputed.
4 The parties use different terms to refer to this area. Compare Docket No. 77 at
2, ¶ 4 (describing the area as the “entryway/vestibule”) with Docket No. 80 at 1-2, ¶ 4
(describing the area as the glass “awning”). For clarity, the Court will refer to the area
as the “entryway,” but finds no material difference between the parties’ descriptive
terms.
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Docket No. 77 at 2-3, ¶ 7. The entryway has a sign that says, “POLICE.” Id. at 2, ¶ 6.
The entryway is enclosed on the top, the sides, and the front, except an area the size of
a double door in the front, which is open. Id., ¶ 5; Docket No. 80-10. 5
Mr. Detreville walked into the entryway and continued filming. Docket No. 77 at
2, ¶ 4; Docket No. 80 at 1-2, ¶ 4. There is only one door at the public entrance to the
Station. Docket No. 80 at 4, ¶ 2. Mr. Detreville remained outside of that door until after
he was arrested. Id. A sign posted on the inside of the window next to the door said,
“No video recording is allowed in the Denver Police District 5 Station without prior
permission from the Chief of Police.” Docket No. 71 at 3, ¶¶ 14-15; Docket No. 77 at 4,
¶ 10; Docket No. 80 at 4, ¶ 3. The sign cites to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-117 as the legal
authority for the directive. Docket No. 77 at 3, ¶ 9.
Officer Weinheimer opened the door and asked Mr. Detreville if he needed
assistance. Docket No. 71 at 3, ¶ 8. Mr. Detreville asked Officer Weinheimer where to
find a complaint form and then asked for her name and badge number. Id., ¶ 9. Officer
Weinheimer radioed for assistance. Id., ¶ 10. Officer Gurevich then entered the lobby
of the Station from an interior door. Id. Mr. Detreville was standing approximately two
to three feet from the door when Officer Gurevich arrived. Id., ¶ 11. Mr. Detreville
greeted Officer Gurevich and asked for his name and badge number. Id., ¶ 12. Officer
Gurevich told Mr. Detreville, “We do not allow recording on our property. If you do not
5 Plaintiff’s response to this fact states, “DENY. The glass ‘awning’ outside of the
door to the Station is not fully enclosed on all sides.” Docket No. 80 at 2, ¶ 5 (citing
Docket No. 80-5 at 1; Docket No. 80-10). This response does not refute defendants’
proffered fact that the entryway is enclosed on most sides, except that the entryway
does not have a physical door. Plaintiff’s cited exhibit depicts an entryway that is
enclosed by glass on most sides and is partially open at the front. See Docket No. 80-
10. Accordingly, the Court deems this fact undisputed.
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stop recording, we will have to arrest you.” Id., ¶ 13; Docket No. 77 at 4, ¶ 12. Officer
Weinheimer then pointed to the sign and said, “It’s actually written right there.” Docket
No. 77 at 4, ¶ 13.
Officer Gurevich told Mr. Detreville that he was on property owned by the City
and County of Denver and ordered Mr. Detreville to stop recording. Docket No. 71 at 4,
¶ 18. Officer Gurevich told Mr. Detreville, “Please stop recording, and we can help you
out.” Id., ¶ 19. Mr. Detreville stated, “this is my First Amendment right.” Docket No. 71
at 4, ¶ 21; Docket No. 76 at 5, ¶ 21; see also Docket No. 71-1 at 07:53-07:57. In
response to Mr. Detreville’s assertion of his First Amendment right to record, Officer
Weinheimer said, “It’s not actually.” Docket No. 71 at 4, ¶ 22. Defendants did not
inform Mr. Detreville that he could continue recording further away from the door. Id.,
¶ 20. Throughout the encounter, Mr. Detreville never blocked the entrance of the
Station. Id. at 5, ¶ 29. 6
Defendants arrested Mr. Detreville for “Unlawful Conduct on Private Property” in
violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-117 because Mr. Detreville would not stop recording.
Docket No. 80 at 4, ¶ 7; see also Docket No. 80-5 at 1. Mr. Detreville was arrested
approximately two minutes after his initial contact with Officer Weinheimer. Docket No.
6 Defendants’ response to this fact states, “DENY.” Docket No. 76 at 5, ¶ 29
(citing Docket No. 76-3 at 13, 104:8-105:12; Docket No. 76-6). This Court’s Practice
Standards provide that if the nonmovant denies any asserted undisputed material facts
set forth by the movant, “[a]ny denial shall be accompanied by a brief factual
explanation of the reason(s) for the denial and a specific reference to material in the
record supporting the denial.” See Practice Standards (Civil Cases), Chief Judge Philip
A. Brimmer, § III.F.3.b.iv. Defendants provide no explanation of the reason for their
denial. Accordingly, the Court deems this fact admitted. See id., § III.F.3.b.ix. (“Failure
to follow these procedures may result in an order striking or denying the motion or brief
or may cause the Court to deem certain facts as admitted.”).
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71 at 4, ¶ 25. Defendants were performing their official duties at the time of plaintiff’s
arrest. Id. at 4-5, ¶ 28. Mr. Detreville spent three days in jail. Id. at 5, ¶ 31. 7 On March
2, 2020, Mr. Detreville’s criminal case was dismissed. Id., ¶ 32.
Prior to Mr. Detreville’s arrest, Officer Gurevich received specific training on the
First Amendment and procedures for encountering First Amendment auditors. Id., ¶ 33.
The training bulletin instructed that, “all individuals have the right to record police
officers and public employees in public places. Additionally, unless recording is
specifically prohibited, individuals may not be prevented from recording in public places
or within government buildings.” Id. at 5, ¶¶ 34, 36; Docket No. 76 at 6, ¶ 34; Docket
No. 71-11 at 1. Officer Gurevich and Officer Weinheimer’s supervisor was Sergeant
Kenneth Morrill. Docket No. 77 at 4, ¶ 18.
Officer Weinheimer did not work on November 13 or November 14, 2019. Id. at
4-5, ¶¶ 19-20. Officer Gurevich did not work on November 14, 2019. Id. at 5, ¶ 21.
Officer Gurevich was working at the desk in the Station on November 13, 2019. Docket
No. 80 at 4, ¶ 9. There were multiple computer monitors at the desk which displayed
video from internal and external security cameras. Id. at 4-5, ¶ 10; Docket No. 84 at 4,
¶ 10. A Caucasian man, John Reed, 8 was video recording on November 13, 2019 and
Officer Gurevich did not arrest the man. Docket No. 80 at 5, ¶ 11.
7 Defendants’ response to this fact states, “DENY. Plaintiff was taken into
custody around 6:30 p.m. on November 10, 2019 and was released on the morning of
November 12 after a 9:30 a.m. arraignment.” Docket No. 76 at 6, ¶ 31 (citing Docket
No. 76-7). This response does not refute plaintiff’s proffered fact that he was in custody
for three days: November 10, November 11, and November 12, 2019. Accordingly, the
Court deems this fact undisputed.
8 Neither party includes the Caucasian man’s name in the respective fact
sections of their briefs. However, the Court finds that the parties do not dispute that the
Caucasian man is named John Reed. See Docket No. 80 at 17; Docket No. 84 at 2.
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Mr. Detreville asserts the following claims in his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: (1) unlawful arrest/failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment
against both defendants; (2) retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment
against both defendants; (3) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment
against Officer Gurevich only; and (4) an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against both defendants. Docket No. 1 at 8-15, ¶¶ 62-130.
On February 6, 2024, Mr. Detreville filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on his first, second, and third claims against Officer Gurevich. Docket No. 71. Officer
Gurevich filed a response, Docket No. 76, and Mr. Detreville filed a reply. Docket No.
79. On March 8, 2024, defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all
claims. Docket No. 77. Mr. Detreville filed a response, Docket No. 80, and defendants
filed a reply. Docket No. 84.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motions for Reconsideration
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for motions for
reconsideration. See Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Converse Cnty., 52 F.3d 858,
861 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, motions for reconsideration fall within a court’s plenary
power to revisit and amend interlocutory orders as justice requires. See Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 F.2d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)); see also Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 313 F.2d 91, 92 (10th
Cir. 1962). To avoid the inefficiency that would attend the repeated re-adjudication of
interlocutory orders, judges in this district have imposed limits on their broad discretion
to revisit interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Montano v. Chao, No. 07-cv-00735-EWN-KMT,
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2008 WL 4427087, at *5–6 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2008) (applying Rule 60(b) analysis to
the reconsideration of interlocutory order); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. McCrerey &
Roberts Constr. Co., No. 06-cv-00037-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 1306484, at *1–2 (D. Colo.
May 3, 2007) (applying Rule 59(e) standard to the reconsideration of the duty-to-defend
order). Regardless of the analysis applied, the basic assessment tends to be the same:
courts consider whether new evidence or legal authority has emerged or whether the
prior ruling was clearly in error. See Echon v. Sackett, No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW,
2019 WL 8275344, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2019); Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United
States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th Cir. 2018) (“a motion for reconsideration is
appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the
controlling law”); Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”). Motions to reconsider are generally an
inappropriate vehicle to advance “new arguments, or supporting facts which were
available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at
1012.
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if,
under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim.
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Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes
over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment.
Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). A
movant who bears the burden at trial must submit evidence to establish the essential
elements of its claim. Harper v. Mancos Sch. Dist. RE-6, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217
(D. Colo. 2011).
Where “the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial,
it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of
evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.”
Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations
omitted). “Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter.” Concrete Works of
Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). The
nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead
must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quotations omitted). “To avoid summary
judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of
each element essential to the case.” Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Cross-motions for summary
judgment must be viewed separately, and the denial of one does not necessitate the
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granting of the other. United States v. Supreme Court of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906-07
(10th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
C. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Under the doctrine of
qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court should resolve
questions of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).
To overcome a qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment stage, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.
Surat v. Klamser, 52 F.4th 1261, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 2022). Courts are “permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Generally, a constitutional right is clearly
established if “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Surat, 52 F.4th at 1276.
“Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme
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Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority
from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Torres v.
Madrid, 60 F.4th 596, 603 (10th Cir. 2023); see also Irizarry v. Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282,
1293 (10th Cir. 2022). The relevant precedent is “considered on point if it involves
materially similar conduct or applies with obvious clarity to the conduct at issue.”
Irizarry, 38 F.4th at 1294 (emphasis in original); see also Shepherd v. Robbins, 55 F.4th
810, 815 (10th Cir. 2022). “To be clear, we do not require plaintiffs to engage in a
scavenger hunt for a prior case with identical facts. We ask whether the existing law
provides fair warning to a defendant.” Shepherd, 55 F.4th at 815 (citations omitted).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
A. Malicious Prosecution Claim
Mr. Detreville’s third claim asserts a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim against Officer Gurevich. Docket No. 1 at 12-14, ¶¶ 98-114. In the September
30, 2024 Order, the Court held that a reasonable jury could find for Mr. Detreville on his
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. Docket No. 89 at 37-38. Because
Officer Gurevich did not waive his qualified immunity defense, the Court will consider
the qualified immunity test. On appeal, defendants did “not challenge the district court’s
determination that a reasonable jury could find a § 1983 malicious prosecution
violation.” Docket No. 104 at 15. Thus, the Court will only consider the second prong of
the qualified immunity test, which, as the Tenth Circuit notes, requires the Court to
“determine whether [the plaintiff’s] rights were clearly established, . . . by asking whether
the officers arguably had probable cause.” Id. (citation omitted).
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To determine whether the law was clearly established in the context of Mr.
Detreville’s malicious prosecution claim, the Court must “ask if a defendant had
‘arguable probable cause’ to pursue a plaintiff.’” Moses-El v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
2022 WL 1741944, at *14 (10th Cir. May 31, 2022). “Arguable probable cause” is
another way of saying that the officers’ conclusions about whether probable cause
existed rested on a reasonable but mistaken belief. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d
1108, 1120-21(10th Cir. 2007); see also Jordan v. Jenkins, 73 F.4th 1162, 1170 (10th
Cir. 2023). The “protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the
government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on
mixed questions of law and fact.” Deutsch v. Jordan, 618 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir.
2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231); see also Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813
F.3d 912, 922 (10th Cir. 2015); Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 879
n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (although “an officer’s mistake of law cannot serve as a basis for
probable cause,” the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis “protects officials
from civil liability for mistakes of law if reasonably made”).
The Tenth Circuit held that “[w]hether there was probable cause or arguable
probable cause for purposes of Mr. Detreville’s malicious prosecution claim depended
on the evidence presented at [his] arraignment” on November 12, 2019. Docket No.
104 at 17. 9 Therefore, the Court must “answer whether Officer Gurevich’s probable
9 In the September 30 Order, the Court found that “the evidence does not
indicate that Officer Gurevich knowingly falsified any information in the probable cause
statement.” Docket No. 89 at 32 n.26. The Tenth Circuit observed that, while the Court
considered whether Officer Gurevich knowingly falsified information in the probable
cause statement, the Court “did not address whether any material, exculpatory facts
were omitted from the statement.” Docket No. 104 at 17.
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cause statement – or other evidence at Mr. Detreville’s arraignment – established
arguable probable cause that would defeat Mr. Detreville’s malicious prosecution claim
based on qualified immunity.” See id. To do so, the Court must consider material,
exculpatory information that was omitted from the probable cause statement, disregard
the false statements, and determine whether the probable cause statement still gives
rise to arguable probable cause. See Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 615 (10th Cir.
2022); see also Docket No. 104 at 17-18 n.10 (“An officer has qualified immunity on a
malicious prosecution claim arising from an arrest affidavit when the court, having
considered the omitted information, finds the affidavit still gives rise to arguable
probable cause.”).
As the Court found in the September 30 Order, “Mr. Detreville did not include any
proffered facts about the probable cause statement in the appropriate fact section of his
brief.” Docket No. 89 at 32 n.26. Rather, Mr. Detreville, along with defendants, violated
the Court’s Practice Standards by raising facts – including facts related to the probable
cause statement – in the analysis sections of their briefs, rather than the fact section of
their briefs, meaning that the opposing party had no obligation to admit or deny such
facts. See id. at 11 (“In their analysis sections of the briefing, both parties raise
numerous facts, including portions of deposition testimony, that were not included in the
respective fact sections of their briefs.”). Accordingly, the Court held that that it would
“not consider such evidence either to establish an undisputed fact or to raise a dispute
of material fact.” See id. at 11-12.
Therefore, Mr. Detreville – in both his response to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and in his own motion for summary judgment – fails to set forth facts
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indicating that Officer Gurevich included knowingly falsified statements or omitted
material exculpatory facts in his probable cause statement. 10 As observed by the Tenth
Circuit, “[w]hether there was probable cause or arguable probable cause . . . depended
on the evidence presented at the arraignment.” Docket No. 104 at 17. Yet, neither
party provided any undisputed facts regarding evidence presented at Mr. Detreville’s
10 The Tenth Circuit referenced the following arguments made by Mr. Detreville
on appeal concerning the probable cause statement and noted that “[w]hether and how
Mr. Detreville’s arguments on malicious prosecution affect the arguable probable cause
issue is better left for the district court to consider,” Docket No. 104 at 17-18:
Moreover, although this issue has never been raised prior to this
appeal, Defendant Gurevich’s arrest affidavit includes the following false
statements: (1) Mr. Detreville was “pointing a cell phone into Ofc
Weinheimer’s face;” (2) “the suspect was recording into the lobby of the
District 5 station, clearly filming into the building;” and (3) “I informed him
that it is illegal to video tape inside the District 5 police station.” App. Vol. I
at 99.
. . .
Similarly, Defendant Gurevich omitted the following material facts
from his arrest affidavit: (1) Defendant Gurevich told Mr. Detreville that
video recording was prohibited on “our property;” (2) Defendant Gurevich
did not tell Mr. Detreville that he could continue video recording from a
different location; (3) there were no non-police officers (e.g., witness,
victims) in the lobby of the station or near the awning when Mr. Detreville
was recording; and (4) Mr. Detreville was not blocking the entrance to the
station.
Detreville v. Gurevich, No. 24-1427, Docket No. 29 at 44-45. As discussed above, the
Court finds that Mr. Detreville failed to assert facts related to the probable cause
statement and therefore the Court will not consider these arguments, which lack support
from the undisputed facts. Moreover, the Court finds that, even if these facts were
falsified or omitted, they are not material to the arguable probable cause determination.
As discussed below, the probable cause statement indicated that Mr. Detreville was
standing in the entryway while filming. Disregarding allegedly falsified facts or
considering omitted ones does not change the fact that an officer could have reasonably
believed that Mr. Detreville’s location while recording, as described in the probable
cause statement, violated the sign’s directive.
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arraignment. Mr. Detreville has the burden to demonstrate that Officer Gurevich lacked
arguable probable cause to pursue charges against him. See Surat, 52 F.4th at 1270-
71. Because Mr. Detreville has failed to do so, the Court finds that Officer Gurevich is
entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Detreville’s malicious prosecution claim.
In the alternative, even if the Court reviews the probable cause statement in light
of the evidence the Court found was not properly before it on summary judgment, the
Court finds that Officer Gurevich is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. The only
facts related to the probable cause statement concerned statements Officer Gurevich
made to Mr. Detreville. See Docket No. 71 at 19. Mr. Detreville states that, on the day
of his arrest, Officer Gurevich informed Mr. Detreville that “[w]e do not allow video
recording on our property.” Id. (citing Docket No. 71-1 at 07:06-07:41). In Officer
Gurevich’s probable cause statement, Officer Gurevich represented that he told Mr.
Detreville “it is illegal to video tape inside the District 5 police station.” Id. (quoting
Docket No. 71-5 at 1). Mr. Detreville argues that this discrepancy between what Officer
Gurevich told Mr. Deterville in the station and what Officer Gurevich included in the
probable cause statement demonstrates that Officer Gurevich’s motive to arrest Mr.
Detreville was not driven by a legitimate purpose, but instead was driven by a reckless,
retaliatory purpose which proves the malice element of his malicious prosecution claim.
As addressed in the Court’s September 30 Order, this evidence does not indicate
that Officer Gurevich knowingly falsified information in the probable cause statement.
Docket No. 89 at 32 n.26. Moreover, Mr. Detreville does not explain how, and the Court
does not find that, Officer Gurevich’s statement to Mr. Detreville is material as to
whether Officer Gurevich possessed arguable probable cause that Mr. Detreville had
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violated the sign’s directive. Whether Officer Gurevich subjectively believed that being
in the entryway constituted being “on the property,” “inside the station,” or both is
immaterial to the arguable probable cause determination. See Cronick v. Pryor, 99
F.4th 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2024) (a court does “not consider an arresting officer’s
subjective intentions” in determining whether arguable probable cause existed). The
probable cause statement indicates that Officer Gurevich “could see that there was an
individual standing approximately two to three feet from the entrance into the station,
underneath the awning for the entrance.” See Docket No. 71-5 at 1. Regardless of
what Officer Gurevich said to Mr. Detreville, the probable cause statement indicated that
Mr. Detreville was standing in the entryway while recording, which the Court finds
supplied arguable probable cause to believe that Mr. Detreville was violating the sign’s
directive. Thus, the Court would find arguable probable cause even if the allegedly
falsified statement was omitted from Officer Gurevich’s probable cause statement.
The Tenth Circuit also directed the Court to “address whether any material,
exculpatory facts were omitted from the statement.” See Docket No. 104 at 17. The
only fact provided by Mr. Detreville concerning the probable cause statement was the
discrepancy between Officer Gurevich telling Mr. Detreville that recording is prohibited
on the property and the probable cause statement indicating that Officer Gurevich said
recording is prohibited inside the Station. As noted above, the Court finds that Officer
Gurevich omitting that he told Mr. Detreville recording was prohibited on the property is
immaterial as to whether Officer Gurevich possessed arguable probable cause that Mr.
Detreville violated the sign’s directive.
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The Tenth Circuit held that “[w]hether there was probable cause or arguable
probable cause for purposes of Mr. Detreville’s malicious prosecution claim depended
on the evidence presented at that arraignment.” Docket No. 104 at 17. Even in the
portions of Mr. Detreville’s briefing that discussed facts not properly before the Court,
Mr. Detreville offered no facts about what happened at the arraignment hearing. See
Docket No. 71 at 19. Thus, Mr. Detreville fails to show that Officer Gurevich lacked
arguable probable cause concerning anything that happened at the arraignment.
In summary, Mr. Detreville does not set forth facts indicating that Officer
Gurevich’s probable cause statement, or any other evidence presented at Mr.
Detreville’s arraignment, included knowingly falsified statements or omitted material
exculpatory information. Therefore, Officer Gurevich had arguable probable cause to
pursue Mr. Detreville’s prosecution based on the evidence at Mr. Detreville’s
arraignment, such that Officer Gurevich is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court will
grant this portion of Officer Gurevich’s motion and dismiss the malicious prosecution
claim with prejudice.
B. Equal Protection Claim
Mr. Detreville’s fourth claim alleges that defendants’ decision to arrest him was
motivated by Mr. Detreville’s race in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Docket No. 1 at 14-15, ¶¶ 115-130. The Court granted summary judgment for Officer
Weinheimer on this claim based on qualified immunity, but held that a reasonable jury
could find that Mr. Detreville’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Officer
Gurevich. Docket No. 89 at 42-43, 46. The Tenth Circuit affirmed this finding;
therefore, Mr. Detreville has satisfied his burden as to the first prong of the qualified
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immunity defense. Docket No. 104 at 20-21. Accordingly, the Court will consider the
second prong of the qualified immunity defense: whether Mr. Detreville’s right to equal
protection against racially selective law enforcement was clearly established when
Officer Gurevich arrested him.
“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
“Racially selective law enforcement violates this nation’s constitutional values at the
most fundamental level; indeed, unequal application of criminal law to white and black
persons was one of the central evils addressed by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1167 (10th Cir.
2003); see also Docket No. 104 at 22 n.14 (“We note the Supreme Court and this court
have recognized that selective law enforcement based on race violates equal
protection.”). While the Supreme Court has warned lower courts against defining the
clearly established right at too high of a level of generality, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 742 (2011), the Court does not believe that a more specific formulation of the
right applies here. Therefore, the Court finds that, at the time of Mr. Detreville’s arrest,
Mr. Detreville’s right against racially selective law enforcement was clearly established.
See Pittman v. City of Aurora, No. 19-cv-02209-PAB-NRN, 2020 WL 6586638, at *7 (D.
Colo. Oct. 23, 2020) (“The right not to be subjected to racially selective law enforcement
is clearly established.”). Officer Gurevich is not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr.
Detreville’s equal protection claim and the Court will deny that portion of Officer
Gurevich’s motion.
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C. Mr. Detreville’s Motion for Reconsideration
First, Mr. Detreville asks the Court to reconsider its finding that Officer Gurevich
had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Detreville. See Docket No. 107 at 5-9. Mr.
Detreville contends that, under both a mistake of law and mistake of fact theory, Officer
Gurevich lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Detreville. See id. Specifically,
he argues that Officer Gurevich did not make a reasonable mistake of law because the
sign prohibiting recording was not “genuinely ambiguous.” Id. at 6. Mr. Detreville
contends that Officer Gurevich did not make a reasonable mistake of fact because his
mistake was not “objectively reasonable.” Id. at 7.
Officer Gurevich responds that Mr. Detreville’s motion is improper because it
“simply rehashes arguments he made at summary judgment” and is a “substitute for an
appeal.” Docket No. 108 at 6. He contends that Mr. Detreville points to no change in
law, new evidence, or any manifest injustice. Id. Officer Gurevich argues that Mr.
Detreville waived or forfeited his ability to challenge the Court’s arguable probable
cause determination because Mr. Detreville did not raise the issue in his original motion
for reconsideration and failed to file a cross-appeal challenging the Court’s finding on
arguable probable cause. See id. at 8-9. Officer Gurevich argues, moreover, that Mr.
Detreville fails to show that the Court’s arguable probable cause determination was in
error. See id. at 10-12.
“[A]s courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly found, a motion to reconsider is
not a motion to reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the
way the original motion was resolved.” Supreme Auto Transp. v. Athena Assur. Co.,
No. 04-cv-02323-EWN-PAC, 2006 WL 1149148, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2006) (internal
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quotations and citation omitted). As Officer Gurevich notes, Mr. Detreville’s argument
that Officer Gurevich did not make a reasonable mistake of law, because the sign was
unambiguous, was already raised. See Docket No. 71 at 10; Docket No. 79 at 4-5. The
Court rejected this argument and found in the September 30 Order that Officer Gurevich
made a reasonable mistake of law because “an officer could have reasonably believed
that the sign prohibited recording in the entryway.” Docket No. 89 at 21. “[A] motion to
reconsider is not a second opportunity for the losing party to make its strongest case, to
rehash arguments, or to dress up arguments that previously failed.” Floyd v. Zavaras,
No. 81-cv-01754, 2010 WL 1241048, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 23, 2010). The Court declines
to reconsider its arguable probable cause finding given that Mr. Detreville fails to
provide an intervening change in law, new evidence, or show that the Court’s ruling was
in clear error or resulted in manifest injustice.
Moreover, Mr. Detreville’s cited authority, which does not constitute intervening
changes in law and thus cannot support reconsideration, does not support his argument
that Officer Gurevich made no reasonable mistake of law. Mr. Detreville relies on
Mocek, Docket No. 107 at 5, where the Tenth Circuit held that an officer had arguable
probable cause to arrest plaintiff under a New Mexico statute, N.M. Stat. § 30-22-3,
which prohibited a person from “concealing one’s true name or identity,” because an
officer reasonably “could have believed that an investigative stop for disorderly conduct
at an airport security checkpoint required the production of some physical proof of
identity” under the statute. Mocek, 813 F.3d at 925, 927. In the September 30 Order,
the Court found that Mocek supports the conclusion that Officer Gurevich made a
reasonable mistake of law. See Docket No. 89 at 23. In his motion for reconsideration,
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Mr. Detreville argues that Mocek is inapposite because, in Mocek, the “court surveyed
cases from New Mexico courts to reach this conclusion,” while “Colorado courts had not
provided ambiguous interpretations of the sign at issue in Plaintiff’s case.” Docket No.
107 at 6. In Mocek, the Tenth Circuit held that the officer had arguable probable cause
to arrest plaintiff because New Mexico courts had not “precisely defined what it means
to furnish ‘identity.’” See Mocek, 813 F.3d at 925; see also Mglej v. Gardner, 974 F.3d
1151, 1165 (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing Mocek, and noting that, “[b]ecause New Mexico
courts had not addressed what the statute meant by ‘identity,’ the Tenth Circuit held that
an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to
arrest Mocek under that statute when Mocek failed to produce his ID upon request,
even though this Court doubted the state statute made it a crime not to produce an ID”).
Such is the case here: at the time of Mr. Detreville’s arrest, no Colorado court had
interpreted the sign to determine what constitutes being “in” the Station and thus an
objectively reasonable, but mistaken, officer could believe that he had probable cause
to arrest Mr. Detreville for violating the sign’s directive. See Docket No. 89 at 21 n.17.
Therefore, the Court finds that its reliance on Mocek was not in error.
Mr. Detreville also cites Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2008).
See Docket No. 107 at 6-7. In Fogarty, the Tenth Circuit held that the officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity, in connection to plaintiff’s arrest for disorderly conduct,
because “New Mexico cases resolving the scope of the disorderly conduct statute”
would have put a reasonable officer on notice that plaintiff “peacefully drumming a
samba at a reasonable volume” did not create probable cause for the arrest. Fogarty,
523 F.3d at 1159. Here, there was no such case law putting Officer Gurevich on notice
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that he lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Detreville for violating the sign’s directive.
See Youbyoung Park v. Gaitan, 680 F. App’x 724, 737 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)
(holding that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff under N.M. Stat.
§ 30-22-1(A), in part, because there was “no controlling decision” that “squarely
govern[ed]” whether defendants lacked probable cause under that “specific provision” of
the obstruction statute). The Court’s finding that the plain language of the sign prohibits
video recording in the Station, and but not in the entryway, see Docket No. 89 at 17,
does not preclude a finding that an officer could have reasonably but mistakenly
believed otherwise, especially with there being a lack of case law interpreting the sign.
Mocek, 813 F.3d at 926 (holding that the officer had arguable probable cause despite
“doubt[ing] that § 30–22–3 criminalizes the mere failure to produce documentation
during a stop for suspicion of disorderly conduct”).
Furthermore, Mr. Detreville contends that the Court erred because the
“reasonableness analysis is different for mistakes of law and mistakes of fact” and
“[a]pplying the legal standards pertaining to each demonstrates that Defendants should
not be granted qualified immunity.” Docket No. 107 at 2-3. Mr. Detreville points to the
Court’s finding in the September 30 Order that “this issue is more analogous to a
mistake of law; however, the same reasonableness analysis would apply if the officer’s
belief was a ‘mistake of fact’ or a ‘mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’”
Docket at 107 at 2 (citing Docket No. 89 at 21 n.18). Even if the Court were to accept
Mr. Detreville’s argument that a mistake of fact analysis is distinct from a mistake of law
analysis, such an argument is irrelevant because the Court did not find that Officer
Gurevich made a mistake of fact. Rather, the Court found that Officer Gurevich made a
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mistake of law, and noted that, even if it were to consider whether there was a mistake
of fact, the same reasonableness analysis would apply. See Docket No. 89 at 21 n.18.
But again, the Court did not perform a reasonableness analysis under a mistake of fact
theory, and Mr. Detreville provides no new evidence, authority, or argues that it was
clear error for the Court to treat Officer Gurevich’s mistake as one of law rather than
fact.
Mr. Detreville’s reliance on Bustillos v. City of Artesia, 98 F.4th 1022 (10th Cir.
2024), is unavailing. See Docket No. 107 at 7-9. In Bustillos, the plaintiff was arrested
by an officer for concealing his identity in violation of N.M. Stat. § 30-22-23. Bustillos,
98 F.4th at 1026. The Tenth Circuit noted that “an officer may not lawfully arrest
someone for concealing identity without reasonable suspicion of some predicate,
underlying crime.” Id. at 1027-28 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Tenth
Circuit first determined whether the officer possessed reasonable suspicion that plaintiff
had committed a predicate crime. Id. at 1028. Trespassing is one of the predicate
crimes for which the officer contended he had reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1029-1031.
The Tenth Circuit held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that
plaintiff had committed trespass. Id. at 1030-31. The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact
that the officer mistakenly understood the property being trespassed upon to extend all
the way to the “curb,” but the officer “provided no specific, articulable facts to support his
understanding.” Id. at 1030 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Furthermore,
when the officer encountered plaintiff, plaintiff was “nowhere near the area” that the
officer “believed to be private property.” Id.
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Bustillos does not support reconsideration of the Court’s arguable probable
cause determination. Bustillos, while treating the officer’s mistake as one of fact, did not
discuss whether the officer’s mistake could have been one of law. Bustillos therefore
does not support a finding that the Court erred when it analyzed whether Officer
Gurevich had arguable probable cause under a mistake of law analysis. Even if the
Court did conduct a mistake of fact analysis, Bustillos is inapposite because the relevant
holding that Mr. Detreville relies upon concerned whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion to believe that plaintiff committed trespass. Here, Mr. Detreville was not
arrested for trespass, but rather for violation of the sign’s directive and Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-9-117. Thus, the issue here is not whether Officer Gurevich possessed arguable
probable cause that Mr. Detreville was on private property, but whether Officer Gurevich
possessed arguable probable cause that Mr. Detreville was recording from an area that
was prohibited by the sign. Moreover, while the Bustillos officer encountered plaintiff
nowhere near the area that the officer purported was private property, it is undisputed
that Mr. Detreville was filming in the entryway when confronted by Officer Gurevich.
And as the Court found in the September 30 Order, “an officer could have made a
reasonable mistake that the phrase ‘in’ the Station included the mostly enclosed
physical structure attached to the front of the building” that constitutes the entryway.
Docket No. 89 at 22. 11
11 For the first time in reply, Mr. Detreville argues that Love v. Grashorn, 134
F.4th 1109, 1110 (10th Cir. 2025), is new legal authority that supports reconsideration of
the Court’s arguable probable cause finding. See Docket No. 109 at 1-2. Mr. Detreville
contends that Love stands for the proposition that, “for a defendant to be entitled to
qualified immunity under a reasonable-mistake-fact theory, their conduct must be
objectively reasonable.” Id. at 2. Mr. Detreville waived this argument by raising it for
the first time in reply. See Gutierrez v. Cobos, 841 F.3d 895, 902 (10th Cir. 2016) (“a
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Second, Mr. Detreville asks the Court to reconsider its decision not to hold that
the elements of his First Amendment retaliation and malicious prosecution claims, other
than retaliatory animus, have been established through summary judgment briefing as a
matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). See Docket No. 107 at 9-13. Rule
56(g) provides as follows:
If the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may enter an
order stating any material fact — including an item of damages or other relief —
that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). Specifically, Mr. Detreville requests that the Court find, as a
matter of law, that Mr. Detreville was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity and
that Officer Gurevich caused Mr. Detreville to suffer an injury that would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity. See Docket No. 107 at 10.
For the malicious prosecution claim, Mr. Detreville asks that the Court find as a matter
of law that: Officer Gurevich caused Mr. Detreville’s confinement; the criminal action
against Mr. Detreville terminated in his favor; Officer Gurevich lacked probable cause
for Mr. Detreville’s arrest; and Mr. Detreville sustained damages. Id. at 12. Mr.
Detreville contends that he did not waive these requests for relief because he did not
belatedly raise them in his reply brief. See id. at 3. Officer Gurevich responds that Mr.
Detreville’s request is premature until after the Court issues its second motion for
party waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” (quoting
Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011)). Love was decided on April
22, 2025 and Mr. Detreville’s renewed motion for reconsideration was filed on August
29, 2025. However, even putting waiver aside, Love does not provide support for Mr.
Detreville’s argument that the Court erred in conducting a mistake of law rather than a
mistake of fact analysis. Moreover, in Love, “the availability of qualified immunity
turn[ed] on the existence of an imminent danger” to the officer who shot plaintiff’s dog
and not the existence of arguable probable cause. See Love, 134 F.4th at 1118.
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summary judgment. Docket No 108 at 12. Furthermore, Officer Gurevich argues that
the request is improper because Mr. Detreville seeks jury instructions on dismissed
claims. Id.
Mr. Detreville misapprehends the basis of the September 30 Order’s ruling
regarding Rule 56(g). The Court found that Mr. Detreville raised his Rule 56(g) request
for the first time in his reply brief, not that he failed to discuss the elements of his
retaliation and malicious prosecution claims until his reply brief. By raising his Rule
56(g) request for the first time in his reply, he deprived defendants of the ability to
respond to that request. Mr. Detreville provides no reason for the Court to reconsider
the request. “Whether to undertake a Rule 56(g) analysis lies in the court’s sound
discretion.” Keller v. Diversicare of Council Grove, LLC, 2025 WL 764639, at *10 (D.
Kan. Mar. 11, 2025) (citing Watchous Enters., LLC v. Mournes, 87 F.4th 1170, 1178
(10th Cir. 2023)). The Court will exercise its discretion to not establish discrete
elements as a matter of law. 12
Regarding the Court’s finding that Officer Gurevich lacked probable cause for Mr.
Detreville’s arrest, Mr. Detreville seeks clarification as to “whether this purely legal issue
will be presented to the jury at trial or whether the jury will be instructed that Mr.
12 The Court dismissed Mr. Deterville’s First Amendment retaliation claim with
prejudice, Docket No. 110 at 3, and will dismiss his malicious prosecution claim with
prejudice. The Court declines to rule on elements of these dismissed claims that would
not be relevant to a jury’s finding on Mr. Detreville’s equal protection claim. See Forge
v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 2019 WL 6037352, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 14, 2019)
(declining to issue a Rule 56(g) order because “particular facts identified by defendant
are not material to the jury’s resolution of plaintiff’s claims or are inextricably intertwined
with matters that are substantially controverted by the parties”) (footnotes omitted);
Molbogot v. MarineMax E., Inc., 2022 WL 2817873, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2022)
(declining to establish facts as a matter of law where they would not “necessarily aid the
jury or save time at trial given the logistical problems that it would cause”).
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Detreville was arrested without probable cause.” Docket No. 107 at 13. Mr. Detreville
contends that he “should be permitted to rely on the Court’s legal determination in
seeking appropriate jury instructions and in preparing his case for trial.” Id. at 14.
Because the only remaining claim is Mr. Detreville’s equal protection claim against
Officer Gurevich, the Court will deny Mr. Detreville’s motion. As the Court found in its
September 30 Order, “the absence of probable cause is not the standard for an equal
protection claim.” Docket No. 89 at 46 n.32. Furthermore, Mr. Detreville does not argue
that the Court’s probable cause determination is relevant to the equal protection claim.
Rather, he argues that the jury “should be instructed that the arrest lacked probable
cause for the malicious prosecution claim,” which will be dismissed. Docket No. 107 at -
13-14. Because the Court’s probable cause determination is not relevant to the only
remaining claim, no clarification is necessary.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Mr. Detreville’s motion to reconsider and clarify
the September 30 Order.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No.
77] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. It is further
ORDERED that Kevin Detreville’s Renewed Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 107] is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiff’s third claim is DISMISSED with prejudice against
defendant Sergey Gurevich. It is further
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ORDERED that defendant Julie Weinheimer is terminated from this case. 13 It is
further
ORDERED that the parties shall contact Chambers via email
(Brimmer_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov) no later than March 24, 2026 to reschedule
the trial preparation conference and jury trial.
DATED March 13, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
13 Pursuant to the September 30 Order, the only remaining claim against Officer
Weinheimer was Mr. Detreville’s First Amendment retaliation claim. See Docket No. 89
at 47. Because the Tenth Circuit reversed that finding and the Court thus dismissed the
First Amendment claim with prejudice, all claims against Officer Weinheimer have been
dismissed. See Docket No. 104 at 23; Docket No. 110 at 3. Accordingly, Officer
Weinheimer shall be terminated from this case.
__________________________
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