Snyder v. Beam Technologies, Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Civil Action No. 20-cv-03255-NYW
JOHN SNYDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order on Motion to Exclude Adamy Under Rule 59(e) filed on August 28, 2023 by Plaintiff
John Snyder (the “Motion” or “Motion for Reconsideration”). 	[Doc. 133]. 	The Motion is
fully briefed, and the Court finds that oral argument would not materially assist in the
resolution of this matter. 	For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Motion for
Reconsideration is respectfully DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case has been set forth in this Court’s prior Orders,
see [Doc. 46; Doc. 123], and the Court reiterates it here only as necessary for purposes
of this Order. 	Plaintiff John Snyder (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Snyder”) began working for
Defendant Beam Technologies, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Beam”) in August 2018. 	[Doc. 98
at ¶ 23; Doc. 105 at ¶ 23]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made various promises to him
to entice him to move from Arizona to Colorado to work for Beam and that he relied on
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those promises when he accepted Beam’s offer of employment. 	See, e.g., [Doc. 23 at
¶¶ 1, 115]. According to Mr. Snyder, Beam did not follow through on its promises. [Id. at
¶¶ 185, 187–88]. 	Beam terminated Mr. Snyder’s employment on November 16, 2018.
[Doc. 98 at ¶ 29; Doc. 105 at ¶ 29].
Mr. Snyder initiated this lawsuit against Beam on October 30, 2020, [Doc. 1], and
filed an Amended Complaint on February 9, 2021, asserting six claims against Beam:
(1) misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1836; (2) misappropriation of trade secrets under the Colorado Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-101; (3) a claim 	for obtaining workmen by
misrepresentation under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-104; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation;
(5) negligent misrepresentation; and (6) promissory estoppel, [Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 191–255].
Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss, see [Doc. 30], which this Court granted
in part, dismissing only Plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim, see [Doc. 46 at 5,
45]. Then, on November 11, 2022, Beam filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking
judgment in its favor on each of Mr. Snyder’s remaining claims. 	[Doc. 98]. 	This Court
granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in part. 	[Doc. 123]. 	It granted summary
judgment in Defendant’s favor on Plaintiff’s two misappropriation claims, but denied
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining three claims for obtaining workmen by
misrepresentation, 	fraudulent 	misrepresentation, 	and 	promissory 	estoppel. 	See
generally [id.].
Relevant here, Defendant also filed a Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony of
John Snyder’s Expert Witness Nicholas A. Adamy (the “Motion to Exclude”), seeking to
exclude the expert testimony of Plaintiff’s damages expert, Nicholas Adamy (“Mr.
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Adamy”). See generally [Doc. 91]. Among other concerns, Defendant took issue with the
portions of Mr. Adamy’s expert report that calculated or opined about damages arising
out of “Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim.” See [id. at 1–2, 8–9]; see also, e.g., [Doc.
95-1 at 4, 13, 16]. 	Beam argued that any such testimony is irrelevant to this case and
would confuse the jury because Mr. Snyder had not asserted any claim for wrongful
termination, and because “the elements of the measure of damages Mr. Adamy analyzes
in this wrongful termination section [of Mr. Adamy’s report] are not recoverable under
other claims made in this lawsuit.” [Doc. 91 at 8].
Mr. Snyder opposed the Motion to Exclude (“Response to Motion to Exclude”).
With respect to Defendant’s argument that Mr. Adamy had opined on damages not
available under the claims in this case, he argued that Defendant’s request to exclude
these opinions was simply a “play on semantics.” 	[Doc. 97 at 4]. 	He asserted that Mr.
Adamy’s reference to the term “wrongful termination” in his report was “used to refer to
Plaintiff’s claims under Colorado’s Obtaining Workers by Misrepresentation statute, and
for fraudulent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel.” 	[Id.]. 	He also stated that
“[b]ecause the[se] . . . claims permit Plaintiff to recover lost earnings, Mr. Adamy’s opinion
regarding the same is clearly relevant and admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702.” [Id. (citing
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-107, and Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983))]. This
was the entirety of Mr. Snyder’s responsive argument on this point. See [id.].
On July 31, 2023, this Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Exclude in relevant
part, excluding Mr. Adamy’s damages testimony concerning lost wages. [Doc. 127 at 16].
At the outset of its Order, the Court noted that Defendant’s argument about availability of
damages would have been more appropriately raised at the summary-judgment stage,
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but nevertheless concluded that it could resolve the argument in the context of the Rule
702 motion. [Id. at 7–8]. The Court then went through each of Plaintiff’s remaining three
claims and explained why lost wages damages are not legally recoverable for those
claims. 	See [id. at 6–16]. 	And because these types of damages are not available for
Plaintiff’s remaining claims, the Court concluded that expert testimony about lost wages
“would not assist the jury in its fact-finding functions” and “would only serve to confuse
the jury and inject unnecessary and irrelevant issues into the trial.” [Id. at 15]. This Court
subsequently set this case for a five-day jury trial to begin on March 11, 2024. See [Doc.
129].
Then, on August 28, 2023, Mr. Snyder filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration.
[Doc. 133]. He argues that the question presented in the Motion to Exclude was “whether
the claims presented permit Mr. Snyder to recover lost wages as a matter of law, not
whether the facts of this case permit the recovery of lost wages.” 	[Id. at 1 (emphasis
omitted)]. 	He contends that the Court erroneously engaged in a sua sponte factual
analysis in its Order, without briefing from the Parties, and that his due process rights
were therefore violated. [Id. at 2, 6–8]. Beam has responded in opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration, [Doc. 134], and Mr. Snyder has replied, [Doc. 137]. 	The Court
addresses the Parties’ arguments below.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly contemplate motions for
reconsideration. See Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff’s Motion is filed under Rule 59(e), which states that “[a] motion to alter or amend
a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 59(e). 	However, no judgment has been entered in this case. 	Accordingly, the
Court will construe the Motion as having been filed under Rule 60(b). 	See Marotta v.
Cortez, No. 08-cv-02421-CMA-CBS, 2010 WL 1258022, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2010)
(construing motion filed under Rule 59(e) as Rule 60(b) motion where judgment had not
yet been entered), aff’d, 480 F. App’x 480 (10th Cir. 2012). 	Under Rule 60(b), a court
may grant relief from a court order for the following reasons:
(1) 	mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) 	newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) 	fraud 	(whether 	previously 	called 	intrinsic 	or 	extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) 	the judgment is void;
(5) 	the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying
it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) 	any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)–(6).
As a general principle, courts grant motions to reconsider where there is “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, [or]
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of the Paraclete
v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). “Motions to reconsider are generally an
inappropriate vehicle to advance ‘new arguments, or supporting facts which were
available at the time of the original motion.’” Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess
Bakken Inv. II, LLC, No. 14-cv-00134-PAB-KMT, 2015 WL 3542699, at *2 (D. Colo. June
5, 2015) (quoting Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012). And “[t]he Tenth Circuit
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has made it abundantly clear that a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for a losing
party to revisit issues already addressed.” 	Seabron v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 11-
cv-01096-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 3028224, at *1 (D. Colo. July 24, 2012) (citing Servants
of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012). “[T]he decision to grant reconsideration is committed
to the sound discretion of the district court.” 	Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57
F.3d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1995).
ANALYSIS
First, Plaintiff contends that he was deprived of the opportunity to brief the issue of
whether future lost wages are available for his remaining three claims in this case. See
[Doc. 133 at 4–8]. The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. In the Motion to Exclude,
Beam expressly argued that Mr. Adamy’s opinions about lost wages were not relevant to
the claims in this case. See, e.g., [Doc. 91 at 1 (“the associated measure of damage [i.e.,
lost wages] is not available for the causes of action alleged”); id. at 2 (“Beam is unaware
of any case that permits wrongful termination damages for the claims that are alleged in
this lawsuit. 	If Mr. Adamy is permitted to testify, he should at least be precluded from
testifying on wrongful termination and his related analysis because any testimony is
facially irrelevant in the absence of a claim for wrongful termination and would prejudice
Beam.”); id. at 8 (arguing that calculations of lost wages are “irrelevant to this suit” and
“not recoverable under other claims made in this lawsuit”); id. at 9 (“[L]ost earnings are
only recoverable when there is a wrongful termination or personal injury claim. Beam is
unaware of any case that permits lost earnings for a misrepresentation claim.” (citation
omitted)); id. (“[A]lthough Mr. Adamy opines that Beam owes Plaintiff a significant sum in
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lost earnings relating to wrongful termination, such calculations are irrelevant and should
not be introduced.”)].
Plaintiff was plainly on notice of Defendant’s argument that lost wages are not
available for the claims in this case and that, as a result, Mr. Adamy’s testimony about
lost wages should be excluded as irrelevant. But instead of explaining to the Court why
Mr. Adamy’s testimony was relevant to the specific claims remaining in this case, Mr.
Snyder 	dedicated 	a 	single 	paragraph 	to 	Defendant’s 	argument, 	asserting 	that
Defendant’s position was simply a “play on semantics,” that Mr. Adamy’s reference to
“wrongful 	termination” 	in 	his 	expert 	report 	was 	really 	a 	reference 	to 	Plaintiff’s
misrepresentation claims, and concluding, without supporting argument, that his “claims
permit Plaintiff to recover lost earnings.” [Doc. 97 at 4]. But as noted by the Court several
times in its Order, see, e.g., [Doc. 127 at 10–12, 14], Plaintiff did not advance any
substantive argument explaining why Mr. Adamy’s lost wages opinions are relevant to the
claims in this case. Nor did he, at any time, suggest that Defendant was actually seeking
summary judgment—rather than a ruling pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure—on any demand for lost wages. 	See generally [Doc. 97]. 	He cannot
now use his Motion for Reconsideration to raise arguments that were previously available
to him but not raised in his Response to the Motion to Exclude. Servants of the Paraclete,
204 F.3d at 1012.
Similarly, the Court respectfully disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that this Court
improperly made factual determinations, or made a “summary judgment” ruling, in
deciding the Motion to Exclude. See [Doc. 133 at 2, 5, 7]; see also [Doc. 137 at 1–2 (in
his Reply, Plaintiff arguing that this Court “held that damages for lost wages are available
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in this case” but “sua sponte analyzed the facts to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support a claim for lost earnings”)]. 	The Court did not hold that lost wages
are available in this case, make factual findings, or weigh evidence in its Order on the
Motion to Exclude. 	Instead, this Court set out a brief recitation of Plaintiff’s allegations,
see [Doc. 127 at 8], and then set out the law governing the availability of lost earnings
damages, recognizing that although lost wages are typically not available after a plaintiff’s
termination, there are some limited circumstances in which they may be available, such
as when an employee was promised employment for a certain period of time, see [id. at
8–10]. Then, in the course of highlighting Plaintiff’s abbreviated argument concerning the
relevancy of Mr. Adamy’s opinions, the Court explained that not only had Plaintiff not
provided any support for his position in his Response to the Motion to Exclude, but the
Court observed no other support for Plaintiff’s position elsewhere in the case record. See
[id. at 10]. 	The Court was not required to search the record for support for Plaintiff’s
position, see Eateries, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 346 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 2003), or
perform legal research or make arguments on behalf of Plaintiff, see United States v.
Davis, 622 F. App’x 758, 759 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is not this court’s duty, after all, to
make arguments for a litigant that he has not made for himself.”); Phillips v. Hillcrest Med.
Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that the court has no obligation
to make arguments or perform research on behalf of litigants), and it did not make factual
or evidentiary findings or rely on other documents in the record in ruling on the Motion to
Exclude.
The Court then analyzed the availability of lost-wages damages, as a matter of
law, for each of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. 	Turning first to the obtaining-workmen-by-
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misrepresentation claim, after again noting Plaintiff’s lack of argument explaining why lost
wages are recoverable in this context, the Court concluded that lost wages are not
available for this claim. 	[Doc. 127 at 11]. 	The Court noted that the statute permits
recovery 	of 	damages 	sustained 	“in 	consequence 	of 	. . . 	false 	or 	deceptive
representations,” see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-107 (emphasis added), and concluded that,
as a matter of law, any lost wages would not be a “consequence of” Defendant’s alleged
misrepresentations, but instead Plaintiff’s termination from Beam, [Doc. 127 at 11].
Notably, while Plaintiff had cited § 8-2-107 in his Response to the Motion to Exclude, he
had raised no argument interpreting the statute or explaining why lost wages are
recoverable in this case. See [Doc. 97 at 4]. The Court’s passing reference to the Parties’
summary judgment briefing in its Order, see [Doc. 127 at 11 (“[I]t is undisputed that Mr.
Snyder was unemployed from August 2016 until his employment with Beam. . . . Mr.
Snyder has not directed the Court to any evidence that he somehow lost wages from
other employment, or lost out on other opportunities, due to Beam’s alleged inducement
of his move to Colorado.”)], does not amount to a factual finding, but instead emphasized
that even if Plaintiff could argue that he lost wages because he lost out on other
employment opportunities by accepting Beam’s offer—an argument that he did not
make—the Court was not aware of any basis for such a contention.
Then, as to Mr. Snyder’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the Court concluded
that lost wages were also not recoverable for this claim because damages must be
traceable to Defendant’s alleged conduct, see Clark v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 69 F.
Supp. 3d 1203, 1223 (D. Colo. 2014), and because “Mr. Snyder ma[de] no argument
explaining why his future lost wages are a ‘natural and proximate’ cause of Beam’s
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alleged misrepresentations,” [Doc. 127 at 12]. 	Insofar as the Court stated that “there is
no indication that had Beam’s representations been true, Plaintiff would still be employed
by Beam,” [id.], this was again a reference to Plaintiff’s failure to present any argument
explaining 	why 	he 	could 	recover 	lost 	wages 	if 	successful 	on 	his 	fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. 	And finally, as for Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim, the
Court again noted that Plaintiff “ma[de] no argument explaining why these damages are
available for this claim” and “[did] not explain[] how his future lost wages fit within his
promissory estoppel claim.” 	[Id. at 13–14]. 	Plaintiff had provided only an undeveloped
citation to Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983), which this Court explained is
distinguishable from this matter. See [Doc. 127 at 13]. While the Court did refer back to
allegations in the Amended Complaint, it did not make factual findings or weigh evidence,
but simply emphasized again that there was no support for Plaintiff’s position from the
Court’s review of the record—a review it was not required to do. See Eateries, 346 F.3d
at 1232.
In sum, the Court’s Order rested not on sua sponte factual determinations, but was
primarily based on Plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden to demonstrate the relevance of
Mr. Adamy’s opinions. See [Doc. 127 at 10–14]. Shepherd v. Liberty Acquisitions, LLC,
No. 11-cv-00718-CMA-MEH, 2013 WL 1117046 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2013), on which
Plaintiff relies, is thus distinguishable from this matter. 	Even setting aside the Court’s
reference to other documents in the case record, the Court’s conclusion would remain
unchanged. 	As 	the 	proponent 	of 	expert 	testimony, 	Plaintiff 	bore 	the 	burden 	of
demonstrating that Mr. Adamy’s testimony was relevant and admissible. 	United States
v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Plaintiff elected to address
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Defendant’s relevance argument in an abbreviated fashion and cannot now raise more
substantive arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration. See Servants of the Paraclete,
204 F.3d at 1012. And to the extent that Mr. Snyder takes issue—for the first time in his
Reply—with the Court’s determination that Plaintiff would be precluded from offering “any
evidence or argument as to lost wages, regardless of the witness,” see [Doc. 127 at 16
n.6]; see also [Doc. 137 at 1], any such argument has been waived, see White v. Chafin,
862 F.3d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 2017) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief
are deemed waived).
Finally, Mr. Snyder takes issue with this Court’s reliance on Auraria Student
Housing at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, No. 10-cv-02516-
WJM-KLM, 2014 WL 4651643 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2014), when it concluded that the Court
could resolve the issue of available damages in ruling on the Rule 702 motion. See [Doc.
133 at 3–4]. 	Mr. Snyder contends that Auraria Student Housing is distinguishable
because in that case, the issue of available damages was a question of law for the court,
while in this case, the issue of available damages is a question of fact for the jury. [Id. at
4].
The Court is respectfully unpersuaded by this argument. First, as explained above,
the Court decided as a matter of law that lost wages are not available for Plaintiff’s claims
in this case, given Plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden of demonstrating the availability of
these damages and the relevancy of Mr. Adamy’s opinions. 	See Nacchio, 555 F.3d at
1241. The determination of whether the law permits certain categories of damages is for
the Court to decide, not the jury. Second, the Court cited Auraria Student Housing as an
example of “at least one other court in this district [that] ha[d] excluded expert testimony
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under Rule 702 on the basis that the type of damages opined about were not available
under the applicable statute.” 	[Doc. 127 at 7]. 	The Court did not suggest that Auraria
Student Housing is directly on point with this case, nor did the Court rely exclusively on
Auraria Student Housing; the Court also explained that it was appropriate to consider the
issue in the Rule 702 context because neither Party, including Plaintiff, had argued that
the Court could not decide the legal question in this context, see [id.], and further found
that both Parties, including Plaintiff, had had an opportunity to brief the issue, [id. at 8].
Auraria Student Housing was one case the Court chose to cite, but it is not the only case
in which a federal court has decided that expert testimony concerning an unavailable
category of damages would not be relevant or helpful to the jury. See, e.g., New Mexico
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276 (D.N.M. 2004) (“The court need not
examine the Rule 702 reliability of Dr. Brookshire’s market value replacement cost
computations or Mr. Johnson’s construction and water replacement cost estimates
because neither analysis remains relevant to the issues remaining to be tried.” (emphasis
omitted)); In re Scotts EZ Seed Litig., No. 7:12-cv-04727-VB-PED, 2017 WL 3396433, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2017) (“[B]ecause this damages model does not relate to an issue
in the case, it is not relevant or admissible.”); Venerus v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC,
No. 6:13-cv-00921-CEM-GJK, 2021 WL 9595511, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2021) (“[A]ny
opinions on this theory of damages are irrelevant to the current proceedings. Plaintiff is
not pursuing any such damages on behalf of the class, nor could she.”). 	To the extent
that Plaintiff takes issue with this Court citing a case that neither of the Parties cited, see
[Doc. 133 at 3 n.1], this Court routinely conducts independent legal research to round out
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the legal authority cited by parties and is not constrained to the parties’ provided legal
authority.
For all of these reasons, the Court does not find that reconsideration of its prior
Order is warranted. The Motion for Reconsideration is respectfully DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order on Motion to Exclude
Adamy Under Rule 59(e) [Doc. 133] is DENIED.
DATED: December 4, 2023 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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