Sensoria, LLC et al v. Kaweske et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00942-SKC
SENSORIA, LLC, directly on its own behalf and derivatively on behalf of
CLOVER TOP HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation;
GORDON MORTON;
ROGER AND ROBIN SMITH;
DENNIS AND LAURA GRIMMER;
GREENHOUSE 5, LLC;
AARON GARRITY;
GARRETT SCHIFFMAN;
LANCE SCHIFFMAN;
KENNETH D. HOUSE; and
MARC LESSER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN D. KAWESKE;
CHRISTOPHER S. PETERSON;
CLOVER TOP HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation;
CLOVER TOP HOLDINGS, a Colorado corporation;
AJC INDUSTRIES, LLC;
DURANGO MANAGEMENT, LLC;
SUNLIFE AG, LLC;
MMJ 95, LLC;
TWEEDLEAF LLC, a Colorado limited liability company;
TWEEDLEAF, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;
LIFESTREAM HOLDINGS, LLC;
ORDWAY FARMS, LLC;
NORTH STAR HOLDINGS a/k/a NORTH STAR HOLDINGS, INC.;
MANUEL WELBY EVANGELISTA a/k/a WELBY EVANGELISTA;
DJDW, LLC;
JW COLORADO, LLC;
JW ORDWAY, LLC;
JW TRINIDAD, LLC;
BRIAN TANNENBAUM;
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TANNENBAUM & TROST, LLC, f/k/a TANNENBAUM,
TROST & BURK, LLC; and
DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Sensoria, LLC, Gordon Morton,
Roger and Robin Smith, Laura Grimmer, Greenhouse 5, LLC, Aaron Garrity, Garrett
and 	Lance 	Schiffman, 	Kenneth 	House, 	and 	Marc 	Lesser’s 	Motion 	for 	Default
Judgment. Dkt. 420. Plaintiffs seek Default Judgment against John D. Kaweske,
Clover Top Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Clover Top (Del.)”), Clover Top
Holdings, a Colorado corporation (“Clover Top (Colo.)”), AJC Industries, LLC (“AJC”),
Durango Management, LLC (“Durango”), Sunlife AG, LLC (“Sunlife”), MMJ 95, LLC
(“MMJ”), Tweadleaf, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Tweadleaf (Del.)”),
Tweadleaf, 	LLC, 	a 	Colorado 	limited 	liability 	company 	(“Tweadleaf 	(Colo.)”),
Lifestream Holdings, LLC (“Lifestream”), Ordway Farms, LLC (“Ordway Farms”),
Northstar Holdings a/k/a North Star Holdings, Inc. (“North Star”), JW Colorado, LLC
(“JW Colorado”), JW Ordway, LLC (“JW Ordway”) and JW Trinidad, LLC (“JW
Trinidad”). Id.
Plaintiffs, 	who 	were 	investors 	in 	Defendants’ 	large-scale 	marijuana
commercial enterprise, contend Defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct in the
solicitation of Plaintiffs’ financial investments and the management of the business
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ventures. Dkt. 206. The facts as alleged in the operative pleading were recounted in
exquisite detail in Retired Magistrate Judge Michael Hegarty’s Order on Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss. Dkt. 229 at pp.2-12. The Court incorporates that statement by
reference and will not repeat those allegations except as they are necessary for the
forthcoming analysis.
After Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on April 3, 2020, they began the
process of serving a summons and a copy of the pleading on the various Defendants
against whom they now seek default judgment. Dkt. 420, p.6. Plaintiffs served each
of the now Defaulted Defendants (the Defendants that are the subject of this Order)
via personal service on the individual or the entity’s registered agent, or via
substitute service as ordered by Judge Hegarty. See Dkts. 33-36, 38-39, 48, 65, 73.
Plaintiffs thereafter amended their pleadings three times, and the Third Amended
Complaint (“TAC”) became the operative complaint. See Dkts. 95, 155, 206.
On December 16, 2022, the Clerk of Court entered default against North Star
for failure to answer or respond to the TAC.1 Dkt. 289. On May 22, 2023, Judge
Hegarty also ordered default be entered against AJC, Durango, JW Colorado, JW
Ordway, JW Trinidad, MMJ, Lifestream, Ordway Farms, Sunlife, TweedLeaf (Colo.),
and TweedLeaf (Del.), for failure to retain counsel and defend this matter. Dkts. 327,
329. The Clerk of Court entered default against Kaweske on August 17, 2023, as a
1 At the time Plaintiffs filed the TAC, North Star was represented by counsel, and
therefore, North Star was served with the TAC electronically.
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sanction for his failure to participate in the litigation (Dkt. 347), and this Court
ordered default be entered against Clover Top (Del.) and Clover Top (Colo.) on April
17, 2025, for failure to defend or retain counsel. Dkt. 429. The Clerk of Court entered
default that same day. Dkt. 430.
Plaintiffs now seek an entry of default judgment in their favor. Dkt. 420. The
Court has reviewed the Motion and its attachments, the relevant law, and the
extensive record in this case. No hearing is necessary. For the following reasons, the
Motion for Default Judgment is granted in part as discussed below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), default judgment may enter
against a party who fails to appear or otherwise defend a case brought against them.
However, a party is not entitled to the entry of default judgment as a matter of right.
Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Daniel Law Firm, No. 07-cv-02445-LTB-MJW, 2008 WL
793606, at * 2 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2008) (quoting Cablevision of S. Conn. Ltd. P’ship v.
Smith, 141 F.Supp.2d 277, 281 (D. Conn. 2001)). Even after the entry of default, “it
remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a
legitimate basis for the entry of a judgment.” McCabe v. Campos, No. 05-cv-00846-
RPM-BNB, 2008 WL 576245, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2008) (citing Black v. Lane, 22
F.3d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1994)). “In determining whether a claim for relief has been
established, the well-pleaded facts of the complaint are deemed true.” Id. The decision
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whether to enter judgment by default is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court. Olcott v. Del. Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1124 (10th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Personal Jurisdiction & Venue
In determining whether the entry of default judgment is warranted, the Court
must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
defendants. Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772
(10th Cir. 1997); Williams v, Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir.
1986). It is well-settled that “[a] judgment is void when a court enters it lacking
subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties.” Id. at 1202.
Here, the allegations in the TAC—taken as true for purposes of default
judgment—establish the Court’s jurisdiction over this case and the parties. Plaintiffs’
second cause of action arises under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
therefore, this Court has original jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). In addition, the remaining state law claims are closely
related such that they form part of the same case and controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Consequently, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law matters.
Id.
Turning to personal jurisdiction, according to the well-pleaded allegations,
Defendant Kaweske is an individual citizen of Colorado, and all the business entity
Defendants have, at minimum, their principal places of business in Colorado. Dkt.
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206 at ¶¶11, 13-23, 26-28. And as previously noted, Plaintiffs completed valid and
effective service on these Defendants via direct or substituted service. Dkts. 33-36,
38-39, 48, 65, 73. Consequently, the Court concludes it has personal jurisdiction over
the Defaulted Defendants. Finally, venue is proper in the State and District of
Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because—based on the allegations in the
TAC—the Court concludes a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claims in the case occurred in Colorado. See e.g., Dkt. 206, ¶¶39, 40, 61, 63, 66-
67, 78, 89, 91, 109-110.
B. 	Liability
Plaintiffs seek default judgment on seven of their pending claims. The Court
need only address Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the federal and Colorado securities
laws and the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because Plaintiffs may
receive all the relief to which they are entitled under these claims alone. See Sensoria,
LLC v. Kaweske, No. 20-cv-00942-MEH, 2022 WL 17416669, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 2,
2022).
By failing to answer the TAC or retain counsel and participate as directed by
the Court, Defendants have relieved Plaintiffs of the burden of proving their factual
allegations supporting these claims. United States v. Craighead, 176 F. App’x 922,
924 	(10th 	Cir. 	2006). 	Nevertheless, 	“the 	Court 	must 	determine 	whether 	the
allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint are sufficient to state a claim for relief.”
Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No 13-cv-02210-MSK-KLM, 2014 WL 3906297, at
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*8 (D. Colo. Aug. 7, 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “To state
a claim for relief, the Complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true to show that the claim is plausible on its face.” Id. (citations omitted). “A claim
is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to reasonably
infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct.” Id.
1. 	Securities Claims
Plaintiffs assert securities claims pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as well as the Colorado Securities Act. Dkt. 206 at ¶¶155-65 (claim two), 166-72
(claim three). Because the language of the Colorado statute tracks that of the federal
law, the Court addresses the two claims together.
a. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Turning first to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “section 10(b) of [the Act]
and 	Rule 	10b–5 	promulgated 	thereunder 	‘prohibit 	making 	any 	material
misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’”
Smallen v. The W. Union Co., 950 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 267 (2014)). To establish a
violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the defendant made an untrue or misleading statement of material
fact, or failed to state a material fact necessary to make statements not
misleading; (2) the statement complained of was made in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities; (3) the defendant acted with
scienter, that is, with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) the plaintiff
relied on the misleading statements; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
damages as a result of his reliance.
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In re Zagg, Inc. Sec. Litig., 797 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
Accepting the allegations as true, the TAC satisfies each of these elements.
Plaintiffs’ 	allegations 	first 	establish 	that 	Defendants 	made 	misleading
statements of material fact. For example, Defendant Kaweske—through Clover Top
(Del.)—stated that Clover Top would be the “mother ship” for all cannabis-related
entities, technologies, and brands in Colorado and that all profits would inure to the
benefit of the Clover Top shareholders. Dkt. 206, ¶39. Kaweske and Clover Top (Del.)
also stated that the “TweedleLeaf” brand and entity were wholly owned by Clover
Top and that any benefits from the TweedleLeaf brand and companies would also
benefit the shareholders. Id. at ¶40. These statements, however, were false. Clover
Top 	(Del.) 	did 	not 	own 	any 	of 	the 	cannabis-related 	properties, 	including 	the
TweedleLeaf entities. Id. at ¶¶52(b), 54, 65. Indeed, at the time Defendants were
soliciting investments from Plaintiffs, Kaweske had already begun the process of
moving assets that purportedly were to benefit Clover Top (Del.) and its shareholders
into his own name. Dkt. 206, ¶¶63, 65, 66, 74, 79, 80, 83.
The allegations further establish that Kaweske and Clover Top (Del.) included
these false statements in materials used to solicit Plaintiffs’ investments. Id. at ¶¶37-
43, 46-47. And it was these statements, and others, that did in fact convince Plaintiffs
to purchase shares in Clover Top (Del.). Id. at ¶¶37-47. In total, the Plaintiffs
collectively invested $700,000 in Clover Top (Del.). Id. at ¶53.
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Next, considering the allegations holistically, the Court further concludes “all
of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter,”
which in the context of securities claims “consists of a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or recklessness.” Anderson v. Spirit Aerosystems
Holdings, Inc., 827 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2016), as amended (July 6, 2016)
(cleaned up). To be sure, the Court’s conclusion in this regard includes the foregoing
falsehoods regarding Clover Top (Del.)’s assets and ownership interests in the
TweedleLeaf entities.
In addition, the Court also notes that Defendants went to great lengths to
prevent Plaintiffs and other potential investors from discovering that Kaweske was
previously found to have violated federal securities laws and engaged in other conduct
involving breaches of trust and mishandling of investor’s funds. Dkt. 206, ¶¶48-49.
These 	efforts 	included 	hiring 	search 	engine 	optimization 	specialists 	to 	push
Kaweske’s sordid history to lower search page results and creating fake social media
profiles 	to 	divert 	traffic 	and 	minimize 	the 	possibility 	of 	investors 	discovering
Kaweske’s previous transgressions. Id. at ¶50. Taken together, the Court concludes
Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing a cogent inference of fraudulent
intent that is at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
the alleged facts. Smallen, 950 F.3d at 1305.
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b. Colorado Securities Act
Similar to the federal regulations, the Colorado Securities Act provides it is
unlawful for any person—in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security—“[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-51-
501(1)(b). To establish a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant
made an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the sale
of a security; (2) the plaintiff did not know of the untruth or of the omission; and (3)
the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care could have known, of the
untruth or omission.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. RBS Acceptance Inc., 611 F. Supp. 3d
1089, 1097 (D. Colo. 2020).
But for the need to demonstrate reliance or causation, the Colorado Securities
Act is “quite parallel” with the federal regulation. Coffey v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,
961 F.2d 922, 926 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. RBS Acceptance
Inc., 611 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1097 (D. Colo. 2020) (concluding neither reliance nor
causation 	are 	elements 	of 	Colorado’s 	securities 	law). 	Consequently, 	the 	same
allegations that serve to establish a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
also establish a violation of Colorado’s law.
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c. 	Control Person Liability
Plaintiffs seek to hold Kaweske jointly and severally liable with Clover Top
(Del.) via a theory of control person liability, which both the federal and Colorado
statutes specifically contemplate. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-51-604
(5)(b). To state a prima facie case of control person liability under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, “the plaintiff must establish (1) a primary violation of the
securities laws and (2) ‘control’ over the primary violator by the alleged controlling
person.” Adams v. Kinder–Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003). See In
re Stat-Tech Sec. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416, 1429 (D. Colo. 1995) (“The Colorado
‘controlling person’ statute is modeled after § 20(a) of the 1934 Act.”).
To demonstrate that individual defendants were control persons, “the plaintiffs
must point to facts which indicate that the defendants had possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of 	a 	person, 	whether 	through 	ownership 	of 	voting 	securities, 	by 	contract, 	or
otherwise.” Adams, 340 F.3d at 1107 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy this
burden. According to the TAC, the solicitation materials stated that Kaweske was
part of the management team for Clover Top (Del.). Dkt. 206, ¶40. In addition, he was
a signatory to the Clover Top (Del.) investor updates, and he oversaw all Clover Top
(Del.) cultivation operations, finances, taxes, license, and legal issues. Id. at ¶¶72,73.
Thus, the Court finds Kaweske was a controlling person such that he will be held
jointly and severally liable for Control Top (Del.)’s violations of the securities laws.
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2. 	Fraudulent Transfer
In their 14th cause of action, Plaintiffs seek to hold the Defaulted Defendants
liable pursuant to the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“CUFTA”), Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 38-8-101, et seq. “Fraudulent transfer occurs if the debtor made a transfer
with an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor, or, in the alternative,
without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation.” Great Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485, 491
(Colo. App. 2001) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-105(1)(a), (1)(b)). In determining
whether there is actual intent, factors to be considered include, among others,
whether:
the 	transfer 	or 	obligation 	was 	to 	an 	insider; 	the 	debtor 	retained
possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; the
transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; …the transfer was of
substantially all the debtor’s assets…
Id. (citing § 38-8-105(2)(a)-(k)). “As relevant here, an insider of a corporate debtor is
one who is a director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.” Id. (citing § 38-8-
102(8)(b)(I)–(III)).
According to the TAC, Clover Top (Del.) via Kaweske, an insider, caused the
TweedleLeaf 	trademarks 	and 	entities 	to 	be 	transferred—without 	Plaintiffs’
knowledge—to himself and the other Defaulted Defendants for whom he is also a
director, officer, or person in control. Dkt. 206, ¶¶63-65, 70-71, 73-77, 79-80, 83-84,
103-110, 130-34. In transferring these assets from one company to another, he
retained possession and control of the property after the transfer.
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In addition, the transfer of the TweedleLeaf assets constituted substantially
all of Clover Top (Del.)’s assets. Id. at ¶¶39, 40, 73, 75, 84. To be sure, following the
transfer, Kaweske told Plaintiff Morton that Clover Top (Del.) was no longer relevant
because it did not own anything. Id. at ¶¶113, 123, 124. Based on these badges of
fraud, the Court easily finds that the allegations support a claim of fraudulent
transfer.
C. 	Damages
Default judgment cannot enter under Rule 55(b)(2) until the amount of
damages is ascertained. See Herzfeld v. Parker, 100 F.R.D. 770, 773 (D. Colo. 1984).
A default judgment for money damages must be supported by proof. Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1949). This ensures that the plaintiff is not
awarded more in damages than can be supported by the evidence. See id. Whether to
conduct a hearing for the purpose of ascertaining damages is discretionary. See Hunt
v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1985).
1. 	Monetary Damages
The Court concludes a hearing is unnecessary because in a previous Order
addressing a motion for summary judgment on damages and remedies, Judge
Hegarty determined, and the parties did not dispute, that Plaintiffs’ principal
investment—and the amount they now seek to recover—was $700,000. Sensoria,
LLC, 2022 WL 17416669, at *1 (“[T]he record already established the amount of
[Plaintiffs’] investment principal: $700,000.”). And because Plaintiffs established a
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claim pursuant to CUFTA, they are also entitled to a one and one-half damages
multiplier of $350,000. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-108(1)(c).
2. 	Attorney Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs may also recover an award of attorney fees and costs because they
have established their claim under the Colorado Securities Act. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 11-51-604(4). To determine a reasonable fee award, the Court will generally begin
with a lodestar calculation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A lodestar
calculation requires multiplying the number of attorney hours expended by a
reasonable billing rate. Id. at 433. Once the Court has determined the lodestar, it
may “adjust the lodestar upward or downward to account for particularities” of the
work performed. Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1997). The party
seeking the award of attorney fees must demonstrate that the award it seeks is
reasonable. See Dewey v. Hewlett Packard Co., No. 05-cv-01482-REB-MJW, 2007 WL
707462, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2007). In determining the reasonable number of hours
spent on the litigation, the applicant must exercise the same “billing judgment” as
would be proper in setting fees for a paying client. Hensley, 461 U.S. 436. “‘Hours that
are not properly billed to one’s client are also not properly billed to one’s adversary
pursuant to statutory authority.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d
880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)) (emphasis in Copeland).
Plaintiffs seek attorney fees in the amount of $131,371.50. Dkt. 420. The
amount represents the actual fees of attorneys James R. Farmer, Stephen K.
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Christiansen, and other legal professionals assisting them with this case. Dkt. 420-1,
420-2. For the pre-litigation investigatory period, the fees were calculated at the
standard billing rate of $360 per hour, based on the number of hours worked. Dkt.
420-1, ¶6. For litigation matters, the fees were billed at one-half the standard billing
rate: between $112.50 and $180 per hour. Id. During the period of August 3, 2023,
and October 30, 2023, Plaintiffs were billed only for costs, and since October 30, 2023,
Plaintiffs have not been billed for fees or costs. Id.
Considering this substantially reduced billing structure, and the included
billing compilation, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated
that they have incurred $131,371.50 in reasonable attorney fees. In addition,
Plaintiffs’ 	billing 	materials 	establish 	that 	they 	have 	incurred 	$20,506.83 	in
compensable 	litigation 	costs, 	which 	consist 	of 	filing 	fees, 	service 	fees, 	copies,
transcripts, and retained professional fees. Dkt. 420-2.
Plaintiffs also seek an award of statutory interest on their investment principal
pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-102(1)(b), which provides for interest at eight
percent per annum compounded annually. However, given the lapse of time between
the filing of the Motion and the date of this Order, Plaintiffs’ requested amount is no
longer accurate. Consequently, Plaintiffs shall file a Notice with the Court with the
updated damages total inclusive of the new amount of statutory interest it believes
should be awarded. Final judgment will be entered at that time.
* 	* 	*
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For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED IN
PART as to Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Colorado Securities Act, and the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The
Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Plaintiffs’ request for default judgment
as to their remaining claims against the Defaulted Defendants because Plaintiffs
have recovered the full extent of the damages available to them.
Plaintiffs shall be awarded $1,050,000 in monetary damages, inclusive of the
return of their principal investment ($700,000) and a damages multiplier ($350,000).
They are further awarded their attorney fees and costs in the amount of $151,878.33,
and statutory interest in an updated amount to be determined by Plaintiffs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED on or before the close of business on May 19, 2025,
Plaintiffs shall file a Notice with an updated damages total inclusive of the new
statutory interest amounts. Upon receipt of this Notice, the Clerk of Court shall enter
final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defaulted Defendants.
DATED: April 17, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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