USA v. Simpson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Criminal Case No. 14-cr-00265-PAB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL EUGENE SIMPSON,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on multiple filings by defendant Michael Eugene
Simpson. In light of Mr. Simpson’s pro se status, the Court construes his filings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1991).
I. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss for the Want of Jurisdiction
Mr. Simpson argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
case. Docket No. 205 at 1. Mr. Simpson has raised, and the Court has ruled on, this
issue multiple times. See, e.g., Docket No. 168 at 1, 6; Docket No. 169 at 7. Mr.
Simpson’s motion and supporting document entitled Affidavit of Facts [and] Writ of
Discovery do not provide any legitimate basis for the Court to revisit its prior rulings.
Mr. Simpson’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction [Docket No. 205] is therefore
denied. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (“The district courts of the United States shall have
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original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws
of the United States.”); see also United States v. Tony, 637 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir.
2011) (“18 U.S.C. § 3231 [is] the beginning and the end of the ‘jurisdictional’ inquiry”
(quotations omitted)); United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1990)
(“[A]rticle I, section 8 of the United States Constitution . . . empowers Congress to
create, define and punish crimes, irrespective of where they are committed.”).
B. Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33(b)(1)
Mr. Simpson argues that he is entitled to a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence, namely, an affidavit dated July 30, 2015 from Mr. Simpson’s wife
Jamee Davis, which states that the firearms found in Mr. Simpson’s home belonged to
her. Docket No. 206 at 1.
“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a
new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Rule 33(b)(1)
states that a “motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence must be
filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty.” “Although a trial court is
afforded discretion in ruling on such a motion, and is free to weigh the evidence and
assess witness credibility, a motion for new trial is regarded with disfavor and should
only be granted with great caution.” United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1146
(10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Simpson has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief for two
reasons. First, although Mr. Simpson’s motion asserts that Ms. Davis’ affidavit is new
evidence, the information contained in Ms. Davis’ affidavit, namely, Ms. Davis’ assertion
that the firearms at issue belonged to her, does not constitute newly discovered
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evidence. As cohabitants in the house where the firearms and ammunition at issue
were recovered, Mr. Simpson knew or had the means to learn prior to trial whether the
firearms at issue in fact belonged to Ms. Davis. As Ms. Davis’ affidavit indicates, she
was prepared to testify to this fact at trial. Docket No. 206 at 3. Moreover, even taking
as true Ms. Davis’ statement that the firearms at issue belonged to her, such a fact is
not a complete defense to an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) charge, which prohibits the
possession – not the ownership – of a firearm. Thus, Mr. Simpson fails to establish that
he is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
Second, notwithstanding his claim that Ms. Davis’ affidavit constitutes newly
discovered evidence, Mr. Simpson’s motion, in essence, asserts that he is entitled to a
new trial because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Ms. Davis to testify
that the firearms at issue were hers. Docket No. 206 at 1. Ms. Davis was on Mr.
Simpson’s witness list, Docket No. 124-1, but was not called to testify. Ms. Davis states
that “Mr. Stuckey should have called on me as a key witness, (he was asked repeatedly
by myself and Michael Eugene Simpson BEY to do so). As a result, important facts
that would have been trial changing, were not brought to the jury’s attention for this
case.” Docket No. 206 at 3. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims should generally
be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. United States v. Galloway,
56 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Battles, 745 F.3d 436, 457
(10th Cir. 2014). Thus, criminal defendants alleging ineffective assistance of counsel
must ordinarily “obtain a ruling by a district court on their argument by way of a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th
Cir. 1998). Mr. Simpson has not established a compelling reason for the Court to
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depart from the ordinary practice and decide his claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel at this time. Cf. United States v. Carbajal-Moreno, 136 F. App’x 163, 165 (10th
Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon “longstanding precedent
holding that ineffective assistance claims should be brought in collateral proceedings
and not on direct review.”); United States v. Avelar, 80 F.3d 430, 431 (10th Cir. 1996)
(upholding district court’s denial of motion for new trial based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to attend defendant’s
post-indictment meeting with law enforcement). Mr. Simpson’s motion for a new trial is
therefore denied.
C. Motion to Dismiss for No Legal Standing by Offering Party(ies)
Plaintiff’s motion argues that this case should be dismissed because there “is no
injured party in these charges. If there is no injured party there can be no criminal
charge.” Docket No. 207 at 1. Plaintiff is incorrect. Mr. Simpson was convicted of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), none
of which require the government to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused injury to
a third party. Thus, the indictment and superseding indictment were not deficient for
failing to allege that Mr. Simpson’s conduct caused injury to a third party. Mr.
Simpson’s memorandum of law in support of his motion does not provide any relevant
legal authority to the contrary. Mr. Simpson’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing will
therefore be denied.
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II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Mr. Simpson’s Motion to Dismiss for the Want of Jurisdiction
[Docket No. 205], Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33(b)(1) [Docket No. 206], and
Motion to Dismiss for No Legal Standing by Offering Party(ies) [Docket No. 207] are
DENIED.
DATED September 22, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
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