Seafood Exporters Association of India v. United States

Slip Op. 26-106
UNITED STATES
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Court No. 25-00031
SEAFOOD EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION OF INDIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE
and
AMERICAN SHRIMP PROCESSORS
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Intervenor.
Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge
OPINION
[Sustaining the International Trade Commission’s af-
firmative material-injury determination.]
Dated: September 4, 2026
Henry D. Almond, J. David Park, Lynn M. Fischer Fox,
Kang Woo Lee, and Archana Rao P. Vasa, Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, on the
briefs for Plaintiff.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 1 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 2
Margaret D. Macdonald, General Counsel; Karl von
Schriltz, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation; and
John D. Henderson, Attorney-Advisor, Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion, Washington, DC, on the brief for Defendant.
Nathaniel Maandig Rickard, Zachary J. Walker, and
Anjelika D. Jani, Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, on the brief for Defendant-Intervenor Ad Hoc
Shrimp Trade Action Committee.
Roger B. Schagrin, Elizabeth J. Drake, and Nicholas
C. Phillips, Schagrin Associates, Washington, DC, on
the brief for Defendant-Intervenor American Shrimp
Processors Association.
Baker, Judge: An Indian seafood exporters associa-
tion challenges the International Trade Commission’s
finding that domestic shrimp business suffered mate-
rial injury from cheap imports subsidized by foreign
governments. The group argues that the agency incor-
rectly defined the “domestic like product” to include
frozen cooked shrimp, rather than just the raw vari-
ety. It also contends that the imports fill a “supply gap”
that the domestic industry cannot serve, such that
there can be no harm. For the reasons explained be-
low, the court sustains the Commission’s determina-
tion.
I
To combat unfair trade practices, the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, provides a mechanism for imposing
remedial countervailing duties on imported merchan-
dise subsidized by foreign governments. 19 U.S.C.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 2 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 3
§ 1671(a). In that process, the Department of Com-
merce defines the foreign goods, “the subject merchan-
dise,” 	that 	it 	investigates. 	Hitachi 	Metals, 	Ltd. 	v.
United States, 949 F.3d 710, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
The Commission then has the task of determining
whether American producers of a “domestic like prod-
uct” suffer material injury because of those imported
goods. That term refers to “a U.S. product which is
like, or . . . most similar in characteristics and uses[,]
to the subject merchandise.” Id. (cleaned up).
Thus, the two agencies’ respective definitions of
“subject merchandise” and “domestic like product” are
“critical because they define both the scope of the in-
vestigations and the scope of any resulting trade relief,
such as the assessment of . . . duties.” Full Member
Subgrp. of Am. Inst. of Steel Constr., LLC v. United
States, 81 F.4th 1242, 1249 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cita-
tion omitted).
The statute instructs the Commission to use Com-
merce’s 	definition 	of 	“subject 	merchandise” 	as 	the
starting point for determining what the “domestic like
product” is. The former agency “then conducts a six-
factor inquiry that evaluates whether the subject mer-
chandise corresponds with a single domestic like prod-
uct or” multiple ones. Hitachi, 949 F.3d at 715.
The six factors are “(1) physical characteristics and
uses; (2) channels of distribution; (3) interchangeabil-
ity; (4) customer and producer perceptions; (5) common
manufacturing 	facilities, 	production 	processes, 	and
production 	employees; 	and 	where 	appropriate
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 3 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 4
(6) pricing.” Id. The Commission applies them on a
case-by-case basis and no single one is dispositive.
Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. United States, 567 F. Supp. 3d 1344,
1350 n.2 (CIT 2022).
Once the agency defines the domestic like product,
it must determine whether the subject imports caused
“material injury” to the relevant industry. This term
“means harm which is not inconsequential, immate-
rial, or unimportant.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A).
For that inquiry, the statute directs the Commis-
sion to consider the volume of imports of subject mer-
chandise; the effect those imports have on U.S. pricing
for domestic like products; and the impact of such im-
ports on U.S. producers of domestic like products. Id.
§ 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)–(III). For each of those three factors,
the 	statute 	enumerates 	corresponding 	criteria 	the
agency must also examine. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(i)–(iii).
II
This is one of a trilogy of cases in which foreign
plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s finding that sub-
sidized imports from Ecuador, India, and Vietnam ma-
terially injured the domestic shrimp industry. See 89
Fed. Reg. 102,163, Appx001354. The period of investi-
gation was January 1, 2021, to March 31, 2024. Id.
Two aspects of the agency’s decision are relevant
here: First, its definition of the domestic like product.
Second, its rejection of the contention that imports
filled a “supply gap” that U.S. fishermen could not sat-
isfy.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 4 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 5
A
The Commission stated that its first task was to de-
fine the domestic like product and, relatedly, the rele-
vant industry. Appx001268. It acknowledged that it
must accept Commerce’s definition of “subject mer-
chandise” (the imports under investigation) without
modification. Appx001269 & n.11. Even so, it observed
that description does not control the Commission’s
like-product determination. Appx001268 & nn.11–13
(citing cases).
Here, Commerce’s definition of the subject mer-
chandise was lengthy. See Appx001270–001272 (quot-
ing 89 Fed. Reg. 85,498, 85,499–500). Suffice it to say
that the Department’s investigation covered frozen
warmwater shrimp, both wild-caught and farmed, and
both cooked and raw. Appx001270–001271.
The domestic industry groups and the Indian ex-
porters disagreed over whether the Commission’s do-
mestic 	like 	product 	should 	include 	frozen 	cooked
shrimp. Appx001273. The former advocated treating
all frozen shrimp—cooked or raw—as a single domes-
tic 	like 	product, 	while 	the 	latter 	favored 	defining
cooked shrimp as something separate from raw. Id.
After reciting the parties’ arguments, the agency
defined a single domestic like product that included
the cooked variety. Appx001277. It considered the six
factors as follows:
x 	As to physical characteristics and uses, it found that
all in-scope frozen shrimp have similar physical
characteristics, even if they are cooked, and have
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 5 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 6
“the same predominant end use,” i.e., they are food.
Appx001278. “Although frozen cooked shrimp is
sold already cooked and ready to eat (once thawed),
as Indian Respondents emphasize, this does not es-
tablish a significant difference in physical charac-
teristics 	or 	end 	uses 	from 	frozen 	raw 	shrimp.”
Appx001278–001279.
x 	For manufacturing facilities, production processes,
and employees, the Commission stated that the rec-
ord showed a substantial overlap in the production
processes for raw and cooked shrimp because they
both undergo “the same initial processing steps.”
Appx001279. But it found that production of cooked
shrimp requires expensive specialized equipment,
and it noted the Indian exporters’ evidence that
cooked-shrimp producers need FDA approval and
must adhere to strict hygiene standards. Id. The do-
mestic industry, meanwhile, contended that some
U.S. producers could prepare both cooked and raw
frozen shrimp at the same facilities. Appx001279–
001280.
x 	The Commission said the record lacked specific ev-
idence about channels of distribution. It noted that
while 	the 	Indian 	exporters 	argued 	that 	cooked
shrimp’s sale to retailers and grocery chains was a
“distinct” channel, they also admitted that raw
shrimp may be sold to the same channel, and the
domestic petitioners presented evidence that retail-
ers and major food service distributors carry both
types. “Thus, there appears to be some overlap in
channels of distribution between cooked shrimp
and raw shrimp, and no evidence of a ‘distinct’
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 6 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 7
channel for cooked shrimp that does not include
raw shrimp as well.” Appx001280.
x 	The agency cited questionnaire responses from 20
shrimp buyers, 15 of whom stated that raw and
cooked shrimp are never interchangeable. But it ob-
served that the domestic petitioners argued that
other evidence showed some degree of interchange-
ability because the two varieties “are processed in
the same forms and used in the same applications,
and are marketed side-by-side by retailers in near-
identical packaging.” Id.
x 	The agency cited that same evidence about side-by-
side marketing and packaging in considering pro-
ducer and customer perceptions. It compared that
evidence to the Indian exporters’ argument that
people view frozen cooked shrimp as “ready to eat”
and 	frozen 	raw 	shrimp 	as 	“ready 	to 	cook.”
Appx001280–001281.
x 	Finally, as to price, the Indian exporters argued
that frozen cooked shrimp commands a higher price
than the raw variety, while the domestic petition-
ers argued otherwise. The Commission found that
because the record contained only two quarters’
data 	showing 	sales 	of 	domestic 	frozen 	cooked
shrimp, there was insufficient evidence to allow for
a comparison of U.S.-produced cooked and raw fro-
zen shrimp prices. It stated that prices of imports
“are not relevant to the inquiry of whether a clear
dividing line exists between domestically produced”
cooked and raw frozen shrimp. Appx001281.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 7 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 8
The agency concluded that there was no “clear di-
viding 	line” 	between 	the 	cooked 	and 	raw 	shrimp.
Appx001282–001283. It found they have the same
physical characteristics and end use, and undergo
largely the same processing steps before freezing, and
the only significant difference is that raw shrimp must
be cooked before consumption. Appx001281. It deter-
mined that while some U.S. producers made both raw
and 	cooked 	shrimp, 	the 	record 	was 	unclear 	as 	to
whether any of them were also producing both types
in 	the 	same 	facilities 	with 	the 	same 	employees.
Appx001282. And while most purchasers reported that
raw and cooked frozen shrimp are never interchange-
able, the Commission found that packaging materials
and websites suggest that processors and retailers
market them as though they are substitutable. Id.
As a result, the agency recognized that there were
“some limits to interchangeability between the two,”
and that producing cooked shrimp requires additional
processing and equipment. Appx001283. But it found
that as an overall matter, the “substantial similari-
ties” in physical characteristics and uses, coupled with
the “overlap” in manufacturing and production, chan-
nels of distribution, and producer and customer per-
ception, 	meant 	there 	was 	no 	clear 	dividing 	line.
Appx001282–001283. The result was that the Com-
mission defined a single domestic like product consis-
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 8 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 9
ting of all frozen shrimp, rather than excluding cooked
crustaceans from that definition. 1 Appx001284.
B
The Commission observed that the Indian export-
ers argued that “biological limits” on domestic wild
shrimp mean that imports, and the prices charged for
them, cannot cause any injury to the U.S. industry be-
cause 	the 	home-grown 	supply 	is 	“largely 	fixed.”
Appx001340.
The agency determined that any such limit is “un-
defined” and found it “irrelevant” because there was
no evidence that it either constrained supply or pre-
vented an increase in production. Id. Indeed, 91.4 per-
cent of fishermen responding to the questionnaire said
the availability of shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico and the
Atlantic Ocean did not affect supply. Appx001340–
001341. The majority of domestic processors likewise
reported no problems with availability of raw shrimp.
Appx001341.
The Commission found that even if there is a limit
on the amount of harvestable shrimp in U.S. waters,
the amount the domestic fishermen catch is ultimately
determined by “the financial incentives” for them to do
so. Id. It cited findings from earlier in its analysis that
many shrimpers were “reducing their fishing efforts or
abandoning them entirely” because competition from
lower-priced 	imports 	meant 	the 	processors 	were
1 The agency also included out-of-scope fresh warmwater
shrimp within the domestic like product. Appx001287. No
party disputes that decision.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 9 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 10
paying the fishermen lower amounts, such that it was
“no longer viable for many of them to continue.” Id.
But the Indian exporters relied on an economic
analysis—the ION Report—as evidence of a biological
limit controlling the domestic supply. The Commission
found the report unpersuasive both because it lacked
data about the Atlantic harvest and because it had
“methodological flaws.” Appx001342. The agency also
regarded the report’s focus on 2012 through June 2024
to be inadequate because imported shrimp dominated
the market for that entire period, meaning the report
lacked a comparative analysis of supply conditions
when 	imports 	were 	less 	pervasive. 	Appx001342–
001343.
The Commission therefore elected not to rely on the
ION Report. Appx001343. It also disagreed with the
Indian exporters that “an eventual unknown limit” on
harvestable domestic crustaceans “should supersede
other record evidence indicating that there was avail-
able supply of wild warmwater shrimp throughout
the” period of investigation. Id. It concluded, again,
that the fishermen reduced their output, and limited
the number of days on which they fished, because of
cheap imports, not because U.S. waters lacked suffi-
cient shrimp. Id.
III
Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction conferred on
the court by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), the Seafood Exporters
Association of India brought this suit under 19 U.S.C.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 10 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 11
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i). Two domestic industry groups 2 in-
tervened to support the agency decision. The parties
have fully briefed the plaintiffs’ Rule 56.2 motion for
judgment on the agency record, which is ripe for dis-
position.
In § 1516a(a)(2) actions, “[t]he court shall hold un-
lawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found
. . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, 	or 	otherwise 	not 	in 	accordance 	with 	law.”
19 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 	The 	question 	is 	not
whether the court would have reached the same deci-
sion on the same record. Rather, it is whether the ad-
ministrative record as a whole permits the Commis-
sion’s conclusion:
Substantial evidence has been defined as more
than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. To determine if substan-
tial evidence exists, we review the record as a
whole, including evidence that supports as well
as evidence that fairly detracts from the sub-
stantiality of the evidence.
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up); see also SSIH
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365,
382 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (if the agency makes a choice be-
tween “two fairly conflicting views,” the court may not
substitute its judgment even if its view would have
2 The American Shrimp Processing Association and the Ad
Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 11 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 12
been different “had the matter been before it de novo”)
(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951)).
The court also reviews to ensure the agency en-
gaged in “reasoned decisionmaking,” meaning its re-
sult must be “within the scope” of its authority and
“the process” it uses to reach that outcome “must be
logical and rational.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,
750 (2015). The agency must “examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation . . . in-
cluding a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (cleaned up). But courts will “uphold a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path
may reasonably be discerned.” Id.
IV
A
The Indian exporters acknowledge that in defining
the domestic like product, the Commission followed its
practice of looking to the six factors discussed above.
ECF 64, at 43–44. Even so, they contend that it “over-
looked evidence confirming a clear dividing line be-
tween cooked and raw frozen shrimp.” Id. at 44. In so
arguing, the plaintiffs accuse the agency of “not ade-
quately consider[ing] the record evidence showing that
channels of trade, purchaser perceptions, and produc-
tion equipment and methods are substantially differ-
ent between the cooked and raw shrimp.” Id. at 44 (em-
phasis added).
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 12 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 13
To the extent the exporters’ charge that the Com-
mission inadequately reviewed the record invites the
court to reweigh that material, that argument fails.
The court, of course, does not second-guess the Com-
mission’s factual findings. See, e.g., OCP S.A. v. United
States, Slip Op. 26-75, at 10, 2026 WL 2269141, at *3
(CIT 2026). Insofar as the exporters instead contend
that 	substantial 	evidence 	would 	have 	allowed 	the
Commission to find “a clear dividing line,” the question
becomes whether substantial evidence supported its
finding that there was no such line. See Assan Alu-
minyum Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, Slip
Op. 24-56, at 37, 2024 WL 2044061, at *13 (CIT 2024)
(observing that the substantial-evidence standard of
review allows the court to sustain “even if the record
also supports a different outcome,” as long as the
agency justifies its conclusion by citing substantial ev-
idence).
The exporters call the Commission’s finding that
cooked and raw shrimp share “substantial similari-
ties” an “overly simplistic view.” ECF 64, at 44–45.
They emphasize that 15 of 20 responding purchasers
stated that raw and cooked shrimp are never inter-
changeable. Id. at 45 (citing Appx001042).
The agency, however, acknowledged that point and
distinguished it: “Although a majority of purchasers
reported that frozen cooked shrimp and frozen raw
shrimp were never interchangeable, packaging mate-
rials and websites suggest that processors and retail-
ers market [the two types] as if they were interchange-
able.” Appx001282; see also Appx001280 (noting that
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 13 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 14
15 of 20 purchasers said the types are not interchange-
able).
The Indian exporters also object that “[t]he Com-
mission cited no evidence that ‘processors’ market
cooked and raw as interchangeable.” ECF 64, at 46.
They then argue that it doesn’t matter anyway be-
cause “they are marketed as a different product in re-
tail packaging.” Id.
The agency, though, cited the domestic petitioners’
evidence that the two types “are processed in the same
forms and used in the same applications, and are mar-
keted side-by-side by retailers in near-identical pack-
aging.” Appx001280 (citing Appx045302–045303 (peti-
tioners’ agency brief), Appx045407–045432 (Exh. 11 to
that brief), Appx045434–045435 (Exh. 12)).
The plaintiffs respond that “[s]imilar (yet distinct)
packaging and shelf placement do not negate key pur-
chaser 	testimony 	that 	the 	products 	are 	not 	inter-
changeable.” ECF 50, at 26. But that argument disre-
gards the standard of review. The Commission is enti-
tled to conclude that other evidence in the record does
“negate” testimony. The plaintiffs ask the court to re-
weigh the evidence. 3
Next, the Indian exporters complain that “the Com-
mission appears to have drawn no conclusion” about
whether the cooking equipment and process are signif-
icant, “instead demurring that ‘the record was unclear’
3 Their reply brief makes this plain by arguing that evi-
dence gleaned from questionnaire responses “weighs heav-
ily in a like-product analysis.” Id.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 14 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 15
regarding whether ‘U.S. producers of frozen cooked
shrimp have been producing such shrimp in the same
facility with the same employees used to produce fro-
zen 	raw 	shrimp.’୻” 	ECF 	64, 	at 	46–47 	(quoting
Appx001282).
But the agency’s task was to determine whether
there is a “clear dividing line” between the two types
of frozen shrimp. See Cleo Inc. v. United States, 501
F.3d 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Finding that “the rec-
ord was unclear” supports a conclusion of “no clear
line.” 4 And the case law establishes that the Commis-
sion is to consider the six “domestic like product” fac-
tors. See Hitachi, 949 F.3d at 715. When an agency’s
obligation consists of “considering” something, it com-
plies with its duty by doing just that. The court cannot
“ask more of the Commission than required.” Altx, Inc.
v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Although 	the 	exporters 	argue 	that 	the 	agency
“overlooked significant evidence,” the Commission’s
discussion shows otherwise. For example, the plain-
tiffs complain that the agency “completely ignore[d]
the significant equipment and investment necessary
to process cooked shrimp at commercial scale.” ECF
64, at 47. But the Commission said that “[t]he record
also indicates that specialized cooking equipment is
necessary to produce cooked shrimp. The parties agree
4 The exporters’ complaint that the Commission found the
two quarters’ worth of cooked-shrimp sales data on the rec-
ord to be an inadequate basis for comparing prices, see ECF
64, at 48–49 (citing Appx001281), fails for the same reason.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 15 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 16
that this equipment is expensive . . . .” 5 Appx001279.
And although the exporters seek to dictate what con-
clusion the agency must draw from evidence about
U.S. production capacity and capabilities, see ECF 64,
at 48 (arguing what the evidence “confirms”), “weigh-
ing the evidence is a task for [the Commission], not
this court.” Coal. of Am. Mfrs. of Mobile Access Equip.
v. United States, Slip Op. 25-150, at 7, 2025 WL
3555132, at *3 (CIT 2025).
Finally, the Indian plaintiffs cite a 2004 investiga-
tion 	in 	which 	the 	Commission 	“determined 	that
canned and frozen shrimp constitute a distinct like
product.” ECF 64, at 49–50 (citing Certain Frozen or
Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns from Brazil,
China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-1063 to -68, USITC Pub. 3748 (Jan. 2005)
(Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns)). They admit that
this decision is not controlling, but they call it “instruc-
tive” and argue that “many of the same considerations
the Commission examined in that case support the
conclusion that cooked shrimp is a separate like prod-
uct in this investigation.” Id. at 50.
The agency distinguished Warmwater Shrimp and
Prawns. It observed that canned shrimp in that pro-
ceeding exhibited “several clear” differences from the
5 Both the Indian exporters and the Commission treat the
estimated expense as confidential. While the court is skep-
tical of that view, the exact figure is unimportant here. The
figures cited in the plaintiffs’ confidential brief, ECF 63,
at 47, reflect the same dollar range as the sealed version of
the agency’s decision, Appx001279, which means they both
addressed the same cost evidence.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 16 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 17
frozen variety. Appx001283 n.58. Among other things,
it was prepared by a single U.S. company that did not
produce frozen shrimp, and was used for different pur-
poses, such that there was a “clear dividing line.” Id.
The Commission observed that here, both types of
shrimp at issue are frozen, are used for the same pur-
poses, and are made by the same U.S. producers in at
least some instances. Id. It thus provided a reasonable
explanation for not following its prior determination.
B
The Indian exporters assert that “[s]upply con-
straints . . . sever the causal link between subject im-
ports and any injury to the domestic industry.” ECF
64, at 16. They characterize this limitation as a “key
‘condition of competition’୻” and acknowledge that the
agency considered it in connection with “the adverse
impact of imports on domestic industry.” Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)). But they
contend that the Commission should also have exam-
ined it for purposes of its volume and price analysis.
Id.
This argument veers off statutory course. Each of
§ 1677(7)(C)’s first three clauses corresponds to one of
the tripartite factors enumerated in § 1677(7)(B)(i):
volume of imports, see id. § 1677(7)(B)(i)(I); effects of
imports on U.S. prices, see id. § 1677(7)(B)(i)(II); and
the impact of imports on domestic producers, see id.
§ 1677(7)(B)(i)(III).
Subparagraph (C)’s clause (i) identifies the criteria
that must be considered “[i]n evaluating the volume of
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 17 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 18
imports.” Id. § 1677(7)(C)(i) (emphasis added). 6 Clause
(ii) does the same for the agency’s “evaluation of the
effect of imports . . . on prices.” Id. § 1677(7)(C)(ii) (em-
phasis added). And clause (iii) is correspondingly lim-
ited to the Commission’s examination of “the impact
required 	to 	be 	considered 	under 	subparagraph
(B)(i)(III).” Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (emphasis added).
Clause (iii) further directs that the agency “shall
evaluate all relevant economic factors described in this
clause[7] within the context of the business cycle and
conditions of competition that are distinctive to the
6 “Congress ordinarily adheres to a hierarchical scheme in
subdividing statutory sections.” Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004). Both the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate follow drafting manuals di-
recting that sections be divided into subsections denoted
with lowercase letters ((a), (b), etc.), paragraphs designated
with Arabic numerals ((1), (2), etc.), subparagraphs that
use uppercase letters ((A), (B), etc.), and clauses indicated
with lowercase Roman numerals ((i), (ii), etc.). Id. at 60–61
(citing House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting
Style, HLC No. 104–1, at 24 (1995), and Senate Office of
the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual 10
(1997)). Here, that means 1677 is the section, (7) is the par-
agraph, (C) is the subparagraph, and (i) is the clause.
7 In what might be characterized as the “ellipsis dixit”
canon of construction, the Indian exporters substitute an
ellipsis for the words “described in this clause” when quot-
ing § 1677(7)(C)(iii). See ECF 64, at 17. Making this omis-
sion even more egregious, their citation to § 1677(7)(C) mis-
leadingly leaves out clause (iii), see id., thereby implying
that the phrase “conditions of competition” applies to the
entirety of subparagraph (C) rather than just clause (iii).
Such pettifoggery is less than helpful to the court.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 18 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 19
affected industry.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (empha-
sis added). Thus, clause (iii) requires the Commission
to take the “conditions of competition” into account
only for purposes of its evaluation of the “relevant eco-
nomic factors,” which in turn inform only the agency’s
examination of “the impact required to be considered
under subparagraph (B)(i)(III).” Id. (emphasis added).
In short, the Commission committed no legal error
by limiting its consideration of the “conditions of com-
petition,” including supply, to its examination of “the
impact” of foreign shrimp on U.S. industry “under sub-
paragraph (B)(i)(III).” Id. § 1677(7)(C)(iii). The ques-
tion, then, is whether the result of that examination is
supported by substantial evidence.
The agency identified “supply considerations” as a
“condition of competition” that “inform[ed its] analy-
sis” of material injury. Appx001303–001304. It found
that U.S. processors were not using all their practical
capacity during the period of investigation and that
most of them reported that they did not experience any
supply 	constraints 	during 	the 	relevant 	period.
Appx001305. A few, however, did state that the fresh
shrimp supply had declined due to low shrimp prices
and high input costs. Appx001306. A majority still
agreed 	that 	the 	availability 	of 	wild-caught 	fresh
shrimp 	did 	not 	constrain 	their 	operations.
Appx001307. And the agency found that any decline in
the domestic wild-caught supply was caused not by bi-
ological 	limitations 	but 	by 	fishermen 	cutting 	back
their operations in response to declining prices caused
by cheap imports. Appx001341.
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 19 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 20
But, as explained above, the Indian exporters re-
spond that the Commission improperly found that a
report—the ION Report—on which they relied was “ir-
relevant.” ECF 64, at 29 (citing Appx001340). They
call the agency’s conclusion arbitrary, id., while ac-
knowledging that the report “does not quantify the ac-
tual biological limit of shrimp available in U.S. wa-
ters,” id. at 30. They contend that the ION Report es-
tablishes that the domestic industry’s growth was
hampered by the fishermen’s inability to increase their
catch, rather than by imports. Id. at 32.
The Commission, again as noted above, explained
that it found the ION Report’s “limitations” sufficient
reason not to rely on it. Appx001342–001343. The In-
dian exporters now respond that those limitations “do
not undermine” the report’s conclusions and “do not
render the structural supply evidence irrelevant to the
Commission’s statutory analysis.” ECF 50, at 15. But
those are questions for the agency, not this court, to
decide. Cf. Taizhou United Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United
States, 570 F. Supp. 3d 1358, 1364 (CIT 2022) (quoting
Commerce’s observation that it is the agency’s prerog-
ative, not the respondent’s, to determine what infor-
mation is relevant). The plaintiffs give the game away
when they argue that “even if the Court were to fully
accept each methodological criticism, those critiques
would go only to the weight of the econometric model-
ing” and “would not render irrelevant” other data in
the report. ECF 50, at 17.
The exporters also take issue with the Commis-
sion’s finding that the ION Report was inadequate be-
cause it did not “perform any multiple regression
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 20 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 21
analyses to control for the many factors simultane-
ously affecting the independent and dependent varia-
bles (e.g. diesel prices).” Appx001342. They complain
that “it did not perform or identify any competing em-
pirical analysis or articulate why a simple regression
analysis was unreliable or inaccurate.” ECF 50, at 16
(citing Appx001342–001343).
The agency, though, reasonably explained that the
simple analysis tested “the relationship between a sin-
gle independent variable (e.g., ex-vessel prices), and
the 	dependent 	variable 	(e.g., 	domestic 	landings).”
Appx001342. It termed that a “methodological flaw[ ]”
compared to a multiple regression analysis. Id. The
Commission plainly viewed the latter as superior, and
it was its prerogative to do so. In addition, it found
other flaws in the report. See Appx001342–001343.
Finally, the court observes that the Indian plain-
tiffs’ insistence that U.S. fishermen could not satisfy
the entirety of domestic demand does not respond to
the agency’s finding that the latter reduced their fish-
ing efforts and decreased the volume of shrimp caught.
Appx001343. The agency explained that even though
the 	domestic 	industry 	could 	have 	supplied 	more
shrimp than it did, it still lost market share to the im-
ports, and its performance declined by more than ap-
parent U.S. consumption. Appx001343–001344.
In effect, the Indian exporters try to change the
subject by posing a question that the Commission did
not consider—whether domestic production could sat-
isfy 100 percent of demand. They do not dispute that
the domestic industry lost market share during the
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 21 of 22

Ct. No. 25-00031 	Page 22
period of investigation—rather, they argue that the
agency defined the issue incorrectly. See ECF 50, at 11
(“The question is not whether fishermen reduced effort
during a period of low ex-vessel pricing. The question
is whether domestic production is capable of meeting
a substantially greater share of U.S. demand.”).
But the statute does not provide any guidance on
how the Commission is to determine the relevant “con-
ditions of competition.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii).
The agency therefore has “discretion to assess” those
conditions “in a particular industry.” United Steel, Pa-
per & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. &
Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. United States, 348 F.
Supp. 3d 1328, 1333 (CIT 2018). Here, it provided a
reasonable explanation for its finding that imports, ra-
ther than supply constraints, injured U.S. shrimp fish-
ermen. That conclusion being supported by substan-
tial evidence, the court sustains it.
* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, the court sustains the
Commission’s material-injury determination. A sepa-
rate judgment will issue. See USCIT R. 58(a).
Dated: 	September 4, 2026 	/s/ M. Miller Baker
New York, NY 	Judge
Case 1:25-cv-00031-MMB Document 65 Filed 09/04/26 Page 22 of 22