Industrial Pesquera Santa Priscila S.A. et al v. United States International Trade Commission

Slip Op. 26-105
UNITED STATES
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Court No. 25-00029
INDUSTRIAL PESQUERA SANTA PRISCILA, S.A.,
and
SOCIEDAD NACIONAL DE GALAPAGOS, C.A.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
AD HOC SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE
and
AMERICAN SHRIMP PROCESSORS
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Intervenors.
Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge
OPINION
[Sustaining the International Trade Commission’s af-
firmative material-injury determination.]
Dated: September 4, 2026
Warren E. Connelly, Jarrod M. Goldfeder, and Ken-
neth N. Hammer, Trade Pacific PLLC, Washington,
DC, on the briefs for Plaintiffs.
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Margaret D. Macdonald, General Counsel; Karl von
Schriltz, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation; and
John D. Henderson, Attorney-Advisor, Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion, Washington, DC, on the brief for Defendant.
Nathaniel Maandig Rickard, Zachary J. Walker, and
Anjelika D. Jani, Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, on the brief for Defendant-Intervenor Ad Hoc
Shrimp Trade Action Committee.
Roger B. Schagrin, Elizabeth J. Drake, and Nicholas
C. Phillips, Schagrin Associates, Washington, DC, on
the brief for Defendant-Intervenor American Shrimp
Processors Association.
Baker, Judge: Two Ecuadorian exporters challenge
the International Trade Commission’s finding that the
domestic 	shrimp 	business 	suffered material injury
from 	cheap 	imports 	subsidized 	by 	foreign 	govern-
ments. They contend that the record shows that rising
fuel costs, not foreign competition, is what hurt U.S.
fishermen. For the reasons stated below, the court sus-
tains the agency’s determination.
I
To combat unfair trade practices, the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, provides a mechanism for levying
remedial countervailing duties on imported products
subsidized 	by 	foreign 	governments. 	19 	U.S.C.
§ 1671(a). Before issuing such relief, the statute re-
quires the Commission to find that a domestic indus-
try is “materially injured . . . by reason of imports of
that merchandise.” Id.
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“The term ‘material injury’ means harm which is
not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.” Id.
§ 1677(7)(A). The statute directs the Commission to
consider the volume of imports of subject merchandise;
the effect those imports have on U.S. pricing for do-
mestic like products; and the impact of such imports
on 	U.S. 	producers 	of 	domestic 	like 	products. 	Id.
§ 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)–(III). For each of those three factors,
the 	statute 	enumerates 	corresponding 	criteria 	the
agency must also examine. Id. § 1677(7)(C)(i)–(iii).
The statutory command that the Commission con-
sider whether material injury is “by reason of im-
ports,” id. § 1677(7)(B)(ii), “requires, at the least, but-
for causation.” Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 879 F.3d 1377, 1381–82
(Fed. Cir. 2018). That means they must be a “substan-
tial factor” in causing the harm. Nippon Steel Corp. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
Thus, the Commission need not “isolate the injury
caused by unfair imports nor demonstrate that [they]
are the principal cause of injury.” Swiff-Train Co. v.
United States, 793 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(cleaned up). Rather, its task is to “ensure that it is not
attributing injury from other sources to the subject im-
ports.” Trina, 879 F.3d at 1382. The key is that “how
the standard is best applied in particular circum-
stances may vary with the facts.” Id. at 1383 (empha-
sis in original). It is “[t]he substance of the Commis-
sion’s analysis, not the specific formulation employed,
[that] 	determines 	whether 	[it] 	has 	adequately 	an-
swered the question.” Id.
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II
This is one of a trilogy of cases in which foreign
plaintiffs challenge the Commission’s finding that sub-
sidized exports from Ecuador, India, and Vietnam ma-
terially injured the domestic shrimp industry. 1 See 89
Fed. Reg. 102,163, Appx001354. The period of investi-
gation was January 1, 2021, to March 31, 2024. Id.
A U.S. trade group, the American Shrimp Pro-
cessing Association, filed the agency petitions in 2023,
supported by two other domestic trade associations,
the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee and the
U.S. Shrimpers Coalition. Appx001265. The Commis-
sion received evidence and briefing from the parties
before it. Appx001265–001268. It then found that im-
ports inflicted material harm on American fishermen.
Appx001265–001353.
III
Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction conferred by
28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), two Ecuadorian producers 2 filed
this suit to challenge the Commission’s material-in-
jury determination. They seek relief under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i). Two domestic industry petitioners 3
intervened 	to 	defend 	the 	agency’s 	decision. 	The
1 The Commission “defined a single domestic industry con-
sisting of all domestic harvesters of fresh warmwater
shrimp 	and 	processors 	of 	frozen 	warmwater 	shrimp.”
Appx001287.
2 Industrial Pesquera Santa Priscila, S.A., and Sociedad
Nacional de Galapagos, C.A.
3 The Association and the Committee.
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plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the agency record is
fully briefed and ripe for decision.
In § 1516a(a)(2) actions, “[t]he court shall hold un-
lawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found
. . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, 	or 	otherwise 	not 	in 	accordance 	with 	law.”
19 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 	The 	question 	is 	not
whether the court would have reached the same deci-
sion on the same record. Rather, it is whether the ad-
ministrative record as a whole permits the Commis-
sion’s conclusion:
Substantial evidence has been defined as more
than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. To determine if substan-
tial evidence exists, we review the record as a
whole, including evidence that supports as well
as evidence that fairly detracts from the sub-
stantiality of the evidence.
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up); see also SSIH
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365,
382 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (if agency makes a choice between
“two fairly conflicting views,” the court may not sub-
stitute its judgment even if its view would have been
different “had the matter been before it de novo”)
(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951)).
The court also reviews to ensure the agency en-
gaged 	in 	“reasoned 	decisionmaking,” 	meaning 	its
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result must be “within the scope” of its authority and
“the process” it uses to reach that outcome “must be
logical and rational.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,
750 (2015). The agency must “examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation . . . in-
cluding a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (cleaned up). But courts will “uphold a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path
may reasonably be discerned.” Id.
IV
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs frame their case as rais-
ing “a single challenge,” which is whether substantial
evidence supports the Commission’s finding that im-
ports 	materially 	injured 	U.S. 	shrimp 	fishermen.
ECF 36, at 2. They present two questions.
First, they ask whether the agency abused its dis-
cretion “by failing to request that domestic shrimp
fishermen provide the volume of the diesel fuel that
they purchased during each of the five periods com-
prising the period of investigation.” Id. Second, in an
issue framed to presuppose the answer, they question
whether substantial evidence supported the Commis-
sion’s conclusion that the U.S fishermen suffered ma-
terial injury from imported shrimp “despite the fact
that diesel fuel price increases during the period of in-
vestigation were the sole cause of any deterioration in
their financial condition during the period of investi-
gation.” Id.
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A
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs argue that the Commis-
sion should have required that U.S. fishermen report
the quantity of their diesel fuel purchases. Id. at 28.
They assert that they “repeatedly asked the agency to
request 	this 	single 	piece 	of 	information 	from 	the
shrimpers” but that it “brushed off” their requests. Id.
at 28–29. They contend that substantial evidence does
not support the agency’s explanations. And they assert
that the Commission “was biased against” them. Id. at
31.
The court begins with the last point because if the
plaintiffs are correct, that alone would require a re-
mand. The charge of “bias” is effectively a claim that
the Commission acted in bad faith. But an administra-
tive agency is entitled to the presumption of regular-
ity, which “supports official acts of public officers. In
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the doc-
trine presumes that public officers have properly dis-
charged 	their 	official 	duties.” 	Jazz 	Photo 	Corp. 	v.
United States, 439 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(cleaned up) (quoting Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d
795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); cf. Am-Pro Prot. Agency, Inc.
v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239–40 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (discussing presumption that government offi-
cials act in good faith and requiring clear and convinc-
ing evidence to show otherwise).
The 	Ecuadorian 	plaintiffs 	have 	offered 	no 	evi-
dence—much less clear and convincing evidence—of
bias or bad faith. Perhaps recognizing that omission,
in their reply brief they back away from the “bias”
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charge and instead argue that because the Commis-
sion “made eight changes to the fishermen’s question-
naire” based on the domestic industry’s comments,
“while denying the single request posed by the Ecua-
dorian Respondents,” its action “was arbitrary, capri-
cious, and an abuse of discretion.” ECF 50, at 14–15
(emphasis in original). But they offer no citation to any
authority requiring the agency to make changes pro-
posed by other parties simply because it accepts one
party’s suggestions. And while they also argue that
their proposal to request diesel purchase volumes was
unopposed, see ECF 36-2, at 31, they have likewise of-
fered no authority suggesting that lack of opposition
obligates an agency to include a proposed question.
While the Federal Circuit has observed that “it is
clear that all information that is ‘accessible or may be
obtained,’ from whatever its source may be, must be
reasonably 	sought 	by 	the 	Commission,” 	Allegheny
Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 287 F.3d 1365, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Budd Co. Ry. Div. v. United
States, 507 F. Supp. 997, 1003–04 (CIT 1980)), that
court has also emphasized that “[t]he Commission
does indeed enjoy discretion to conduct its investiga-
tion and gather data it deems relevant” as long as it
makes “active, reasonable efforts to obtain relevant
data,” Full Member Subgrp. of Am. Inst. of Steel Con-
str., LLC v. United States, 81 F.4th 1242, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2023) (emphasis added).
The words “it deems relevant” are crucial. “There is
no statutorily designated minimum standard that re-
quires a particular degree of thoroughness in the Com-
mission’s 	investigation.” 	Id. 	(brackets 	omitted)
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(quoting LG Elecs., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 26
F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1348 (CIT 2014)). Rather, “[o]nce the
Commission satisfies its obligation to conduct investi-
gative activities under 19 C.F.R. § 207.20(b), a decision
not to collect additional information does not alone
render [its] final determination unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence.” 4 Id. (footnote omitted).
“As long as the agency’s methodology and proce-
dures are reasonable means of effectuating the statu-
tory purpose, and there is substantial evidence in the
record supporting the agency’s conclusions, the court
will not impose its own views as to the sufficiency of
the agency’s investigation or question the agency’s
methodology.” Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 276
F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (CIT 2003) (quoting Ceramica
Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 961,
966 (CIT 1986), aff’d, 810 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
It is the agency’s responsibility to seek comments on
“the best method” for obtaining the information it
needs, and it has the discretion to determine that ad-
ditional evidence proposed by a party “would not pro-
vide better clarity.” Full Member Subgrp., 81 F.4th
at 1258.
For its part, the Commission observed that diesel
prices in the Gulf Coast region initially increased dur-
ing the first 18 months of the period of investigation,
then decreased for the next 12 months, and subse-
4 As relevant here, the regulation requires that, if the Com-
mission preliminarily finds material injury, the agency cir-
culate draft questionnaires to parties to the investigation
for comment. 19 C.F.R. § 207.20(b).
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quently fluctuated, with an overall increase over the
entire period. Appx001314. It also found that if—as
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs contend—“the fuel and oil
cost [were] the most important driver of any injury to
the fishermen, then there should have been a major
improvement in their financial condition in 2023 given
the 	sharp 	decline 	in 	their 	fuel 	and 	oil 	cost.”
Appx001348. Instead, they suffered operating losses.
Id. The court can reasonably discern from the agency’s
explanation that an analysis of the specific number of
gallons of diesel fuel the fishermen purchased would
have made no difference in the conclusion. Cf. State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. That is sufficient reason to sus-
tain the Commission’s decision not to ask for that in-
formation. 5
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs also disagree with the
agency’s finding, see Appx001351, that they were able
to present their argument based on the data in the rec-
ord. They call that statement “nonsense,” noting that
their administrative briefing “continued to criticize
5 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs contend that the agency’s con-
clusion that reporting the number of gallons would be bur-
densome is “specious.” ECF 50, at 10. They argue that “[i]t
was impossible for fishermen to report their total annual
or quarterly expenditures on diesel without first compiling
the volume and per gallon price listed on each individual
invoice that they had to pay when they filled their fuel
tanks.” Id. at 11. But that theory is speculation because it
assumes, without evidence, that the fishermen necessarily
reviewed each invoice—rather than, for example, using an
annual or quarterly aggregate amount from accounting
software—to report the cost figures.
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the Commission’s failure to request the diesel fuel vol-
umes that shrimpers purchased.” ECF 36-2, at 32.
But they did effectively present their argument. In
their agency posthearing brief, they stated that “[o]ur
analysis above does exactly what the petitioners said
we should do, i.e., we ‘figured out’ the prices of diesel
fuel during the [period of investigation], and we then
calculated the impact of the significant price increases
in 	2022 	and 	2023 	on 	shrimper 	profitability.”
Appx045163.
“Of course,” they also said, “our analysis could have
been further refined 	had the Commission required
each shrimp fisherman to report the diesel fuel gallons
that [he] purchased during the” period of investiga-
tion. Id. (emphasis added). And in their reply brief be-
fore this court, they acknowledge that they “were able
to isolate the effect of soaring diesel prices” as part of
their analysis. ECF 50, at 23. That amounts to an ad-
mission that the agency correctly found that they were
able to present their argument based on the existing
record. Viewed differently, any additional evidence
would have been cumulative. An agency decision to ex-
clude, or not to collect, cumulative evidence is not an
abuse of discretion. Veneziano v. Dep’t of Energy, 189
F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The court therefore sustains the Commission’s de-
cision not to ask the domestic shrimp fishermen to re-
port the quantity of diesel fuel they bought during the
period of investigation.
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B
The Commission found that imports undersold U.S.
shrimp in most cases during the period of investiga-
tion. Appx001317. And most buyers who opted for the
former said the lower price was their primary reason.
Appx001318.
Consequently, “U.S. fishermen experienced a sharp
decline in the prices they received for the shrimp they
harvested, with their net sales average unit value de-
clining by 42.6 percent from 2021 to 2023, falling from
$3.66 per pound in 2021 to $3.05 per pound in 2022
and $2.10 per pound in 2023.” Appx001326. “As U.S.
processors had to lower their prices to compete with
subject imports in the U.S. market, they in turn were
forced to lower the prices they could pay fishermen,
and the fishermen’s prices therefore were also de-
pressed 	by 	low-priced 	subject 	import 	competition.”
Appx001329. The lower prices “reduced their incentive
to shrimp, which in turn resulted in fewer fishing
days, fewer boats in operation, fewer [production and
related workers], and lower output.” Appx001339.
In considering the Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ argument
that fuel costs were the culprit rather than imports,
the Commission observed that from 2021 to 2022, the
fishermen’s fuel and oil expenses increased 8.5 percent
(from $37.1 million to $40.3 million), but then the fol-
lowing year saw a 27.2-percent decrease (to $29.3 mil-
lion), “for an overall decrease of 21.1 percent between
2021 and 2023.” Appx001347–001348 & n.327. Yet ra-
ther than experiencing an improvement in their finan-
cial situation—which the agency observed would be
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Ct. No. 25-00029 	Page 13
the expected outcome if “the fuel and oil cost [were] the
most important driver of any injury to the fisher-
men”—they experienced an operating loss in 2023.
Appx001348.
The 	Ecuadorian 	plaintiffs 	do 	not 	challenge 	the
agency’s findings about underselling or the effects of
lower prices. Instead, they accuse the Commission of
“irrationally ignor[ing] the undisputed evidence con-
cerning diesel prices.” ECF 36-2, at 25.
They correctly observe that the record “showed
that diesel prices substantially exceeded $4.00 per gal-
lon in 10 months of 2022 and substantially exceeded
$3.50 per gallon in 11 months of 2023.” Id. (citing
Appx001572). But the agency’s finding of lower overall
diesel expenses in 2023 (compared to 2021) is not in-
consistent with per-gallon prices being higher during
that year because it explained that the lower prices re-
sulting from subject imports curtailed both the num-
ber of fishing days and the number of boats in opera-
tion from 2021 to 2023. Appx001333–001334. It’s self-
evident that fewer days underway would reduce fuel
costs.
The plaintiffs also argue that the Commission “un-
lawfully failed to respond” to their “uncontradicted
analyses” of diesel fuel prices. ECF 36-2, at 35. But the
agency did address their argument.
It observed that if the Ecuadorian plaintiffs were
correct that fuel costs inflicted any injury, the fisher-
men would have seen improved financial performance
in 2023 due to the lower amounts they spent on fuel
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Ct. No. 25-00029 	Page 14
that year. Appx001348. But, it noted, they suffered an
operating loss and saw their worst operating ratio of
the entire period of investigation “as their net sales
[average 	unit 	value] 	declined 	by 	a 	much 	greater
amount than the unit value of their fuel and oil ex-
penses. Thus, the fishermen’s injury was not caused
by their fuel and oil expenses, but rather by their fall-
ing prices as a result of subject imports.” Id. (footnotes
omitted). That analysis is certainly terse, but it does
respond to the plaintiffs’ contention that diesel fuel
costs were the culprit. See Al Ghurair Iron & Steel
LLC v. United States, 65 F.4th 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2023) (explaining that agency’s written decision need
not “address every argument raised by a party or ex-
plain every possible reason supporting its conclusion”
as long as the court can “determine that [it] at least
considered counterarguments to its position”) (cleaned
up).
The Commission viewed the record as showing that
imports, not fuel prices, caused the injury to U.S. fish-
ermen and provided a rational explanation for that
conclusion. The Ecuadorian plaintiffs see things differ-
ently. But that they can “point to evidence of record
which detracts from the evidence which supports the
Commission’s decision and can hypothesize a reasona-
ble basis for a contrary determination is neither sur-
prising nor persuasive.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
United States, 750 F.2d 927, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, the court sustains the
Commission’s material-injury determination. A sepa-
rate judgment will issue. See USCIT R. 58(a).
Dated: 	September 4, 2026 	/s/ M. Miller Baker
New York, NY 	Judge
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