Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC v. United States

Slip Op. No. 21-116
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COLUMBIA ALUMINUM PRODUCTS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR TRADE
COMMITTEE and ENDURA PRODUCTS,
INC.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
Before: Timothy C. Stanceu, Judge
Court No. 19-00013
OPINION AND ORDER
[Remanding for reconsideration an agency decision, issued in response to court
order, interpreting the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders on
aluminum extrusions]
Dated: September 14, 2021
Jeremy W. Dutra, Squire Patton Boggs (US), LLP, of Washington, D.C., for
plaintiff. With him on the brief was Peter Koenig.
Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of
New York, New York, for defendant. With her on the brief were Brian M. Boynton,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Aimee Lee,
Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Nikki Kalbing, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of
Washington, D.C.
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 1 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 2
Robert E. DeFrancesco, III, Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington, D.C., for defendant-
intervenors. With him on the brief were Alan H. Price and Elizabeth S. Lee.
Stanceu, Judge: Plaintiff Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC (“Columbia”)
brought this action to contest a decision by the International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or the “Department”) that its imported
products, “door thresholds” containing aluminum extrusions among other components,
are within the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum
extrusions from the People’s Republic of China (the “Orders”). Before the court is the
decision Commerce has submitted in response to the court’s opinion and order in
Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC v. United States, 44 CIT __, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (2020)
(“Columbia I”), which remanded the contested determination to Commerce for
reconsideration.
The court again issues an order of remand, concluding that the decision now
before the court relies on a finding or inference pertaining to Columbia’s door
thresholds that is contradicted by certain record evidence and is unsupported by any
specific evidence Commerce cited in that decision. The court directs Commerce to
reconsider the impermissible finding or inference and then determine anew whether
Columbia’s door thresholds qualify for a specific exclusion (the “finished merchandise
exclusion”) set forth in the scope language of the Orders.
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 2 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 3
I. BACKGROUND
Background on this litigation is presented in the court’s previous opinion and
summarized and supplemented herein. See id. at __, 470 F. Supp. at 1354–56.
Contested in this litigation (the “Scope Ruling”) is Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders on Aluminum Extrusions From the People’s Republic of China:
Final Scope Rulings on Worldwide Door Components Inc., MJB Wood Group, Inc., and
Columbia Aluminum Products Door Thresholds (Int’l Trade Admin. Dec. 19, 2018) (Rem.
P.R. Doc. 39) (“Scope Ruling”). 1
Commerce issued the antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders
pertinent to this litigation (the “Orders”) in May 2011. Aluminum Extrusions from the
People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Int’l Trade
Admin. May 26, 2011) (“AD Order”); Aluminum Extrusions From the People’s Republic of
China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011)
(“CVD Order”).
Columbia submitted a “Scope Ruling Request” to Commerce on March 14, 2018,
describing therein, and in a supplemental response to Commerce, ten models of door
1 All citations to documents from the administrative record are to public
documents. References cited as “P.R. Doc. __” are to documents on the original agency
record; references cited as “Rem. P.R. Doc. __” are to documents placed on the record
during the Department’s redetermination proceeding.
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 3 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 4
thresholds. Letter from Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A. to Sec’y of Commerce re:
Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Scope Ruling Request for Columbia
Aluminum Products, LLC (Mar. 14, 2018) (Rem. P.R. Doc. 1) (“Scope Ruling Request”);
Letter from Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A. to Sec’y of Commerce re: Aluminum Extrusions
from the People’s Republic of China: Supplement to Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC’s Scope
Ruling Request 4–6 (July 10, 2018) (Rem. P.R. Doc. 10) (“Supplement to Scope Ruling
Request”). As described in the Scope Ruling Request, each door threshold is an
assembly consisting of various components, including a component fabricated from an
aluminum extrusion and various components that are not made of aluminum, e.g.,
components made of plastic or wood. Scope Ruling Request 1–3.
Commerce issued the Scope Ruling on December 19, 2018, in response to
Columbia’s Scope Ruling Request, and the requests of Worldwide Door Components,
Inc. and MJB Wood Group, Inc., each of which also sought a scope ruling on assembled
door thresholds. Scope Ruling 1. The Scope Ruling concluded that the aluminum
extrusion component within each of Columbia’s door thresholds, and within those of
the other two requestors, are subject to the Orders but that the non-aluminum
components are not. Id. at 37–38.
Columbia brought this action to contest the Scope Ruling on January 18, 2019.
Summons, ECF No. 1; Compl., ECF No. 3. The Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 4 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 5
Committee, which was the petitioner in the antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations resulting in the Orders, and Endura Products, Inc., a domestic producer
of door thresholds, are defendant-intervenors. Order (Feb. 19, 2019), ECF No. 16.
In response to Columbia’s motion for judgment on the agency record, the court
issued its Opinion and Order remanding the Scope Ruling to Commerce for
reconsideration. Columbia I, 44 CIT at __, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1362. Commerce filed its
decision upon remand (“Remand Redetermination”) on December 23, 2020. Final
Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand (Dec. 23, 2020), ECF No. 48-1 (“Remand
Redetermination”). Columbia filed comments in opposition. Pl. Columbia Alum. Prods.,
LLC’s Comments on Commerce’s Final Remand Redetermination (Feb. 1, 2021), ECF
No. 52 (“Columbia’s Comments”). Defendant-Intervenors filed comments in support of
the Remand Redetermination. Def.-Int.’s Comments on Final Results of
Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand (Feb. 1, 2021), ECF No. 53 (“Def.-Int.’s
Comments”). Defendant responded to the comment submissions. Def.’s Resp. to
Comments on Remand Redetermination (Feb. 18, 2021), ECF No. 55 (“Def.’s Resp.”).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction under section 201 of the Customs
Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grants jurisdiction over civil actions
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 5 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 6
brought under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Tariff Act”), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.2
Among the decisions that may be contested according to Section 516A is a
determination of “whether a particular type of merchandise is within the class or kind
of merchandise described in an . . . antidumping or countervailing duty order.” Id.
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi). In reviewing the Scope Ruling, the court must set aside any
determination, finding, or conclusion found “to be unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
B. Methodology for Scope Determinations
The Department’s regulations provide that “in considering whether a particular
product is included within the scope of an order . . . the Secretary [of Commerce] will
take into account the following: (1) the descriptions of the merchandise contained in the
petition, the initial investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including
prior scope determinations) and the [International Trade] Commission.” 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.225(k)(1).3 The provision is not properly read to identify the only sources of
2 Citations to the United States Code are to the 2012 edition. Citations to the
Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2020 edition unless otherwise noted.
3 If the “criteria” of § 351.225(k)(1) “are not dispositive, the Secretary will further
consider: (i) The physical characteristics of the product; (ii) The expectations of the
ultimate purchasers; (iii) The ultimate use of the product; (iv) The channels of trade in
which the product is sold; and (v) The manner in which the product is advertised and
displayed.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2).
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 6 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 7
information Commerce is permitted to consider. As a fundamental matter, the
Department’s inquiry must center on the scope language of the antidumping or
countervailing duty order, for the Department’s role in issuing a scope ruling is to
interpret, not modify, the scope language. Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1087, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Duferco”) (“Commerce cannot interpret an antidumping
order so as to change the scope of that order, nor can Commerce interpret an order in a
manner contrary to its terms.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Moreover, to be sustained upon judicial review, the determination must be supported
by the record evidence considered on the whole. This necessarily requires
consideration of the record information contained in the scope ruling request, which
ordinarily will include, inter alia, “[a] detailed description of the product, including its
technical characteristics and uses.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c)(1)(i).
C. The Scope Language of the Orders and the Court’s Decision in Columbia I
The relevant scope language, which is the same in both Orders, applies generally
to “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion
process, made from aluminum alloys having metallic elements corresponding to the
alloy series designations published by The Aluminum Association commencing with
the numbers 1, 3, and 6 (or proprietary equivalents or other certifying body
equivalents).” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653. Such
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 7 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 8
extrusions may be “produced and imported in a wide variety of shapes and forms,”
and, after extrusion, may be subjected to drawing and to further fabrication and
finishing. AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. It is
uncontested that the component in each of Columbia’s door thresholds that is fabricated
from an aluminum extrusion is made of an aluminum alloy identified in the scope
language of the Orders. See Remand Redetermination 22. The scope language also
provides that:
[S]ubject extrusions may be identified with reference to their end use, such
as fence posts, electrical conduits, door thresholds, carpet trim, or heat
sinks (that do not meet the finished heat sink exclusionary language
below). Such goods are subject merchandise if they otherwise meet the
scope definition, regardless of whether they are ready for use at the time
of importation.
AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. In addition to a
good that is itself an aluminum extrusion, the scope language of the Orders, by
operation of a “subassemblies” provision, potentially brings within the scope of the
Orders an assembled good that contains one or more aluminum extrusions as parts.
The pertinent scope language and context are as follows:
Subject aluminum extrusions may be described at the time of importation
as parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation,
including, but not limited to, window frames, door frames, solar panels,
curtain walls, or furniture. Such parts that otherwise meet the definition
of aluminum extrusions are included in the scope. The scope includes the
aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., by welding or
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 8 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 9
fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise
unless imported as part of the finished goods ‘kit’ defined further below.[4]
The scope does not include the non-aluminum extrusion components of
subassemblies or subject kits.
AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650–51; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The scope also
contains a “finished merchandise” exclusion for “finished merchandise containing
aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed
at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl,
picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels.” AD Order, 76
Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. In the Scope Ruling, Commerce
concluded that it was unnecessary for it to consider whether Columbia’s door
4 The “finished goods kit exclusion” reads as follows:
The scope also excludes finished goods containing aluminum extrusions
that are entered unassembled in a “finished goods kit.” A finished goods
kit is understood to mean a packaged combination of parts that contains,
at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a
final finished good and requires no further finishing or fabrication, such
as cutting or punching, and is assembled “as is” into a finished product.
An imported product will not be considered a “finished goods kit” and
therefore excluded from the scope of the investigation merely by
including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an
aluminum extrusion product.
Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order, 76
Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30,651 (May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of
China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653, 30,654 (May 26, 2011). Columbia
does not argue that the finished goods kit exclusion applies to its door thresholds.
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 9 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 10
thresholds satisfied the requirements of the finished merchandise exclusion. Commerce
reasoned that Columbia’s door thresholds were expressly identified in the scope
language as “door thresholds” and as “parts for final finished products that are
assembled after importation, including, but not limited to . . . door frames.” Scope
Ruling 33.
The court held in Columbia I that Commerce misread the scope language in
concluding that the finished merchandise exclusion was irrelevant to its analysis.
44 CIT at __, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1360. Commerce decided that each of Columbia’s
imported door thresholds is “partially assembled merchandise” described by the
“subassemblies” provision because it contains an aluminum extrusion as a part and
because it is produced to be assembled into a door frame or what Commerce termed a
“door unit.” Scope Ruling 33. Commerce cited the scope language references to door
thresholds and parts of door frames in concluding that the finished merchandise
exclusion was inapplicable. See id. at 33–34. Commerce overlooked that the subject of
the sentence of the scope language referring to “door thresholds” is “subject extrusions”
and, similarly, that the subject of the sentence referring to “parts for final finished
products . . . including . . . door frames” is, similarly, “subject aluminum extrusions.” See
AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650–51; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The latter
sentence is confined specifically to extrusions “described at the time of importation as
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 10 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 11
parts for final finished products,” and the following sentence clarifies that “[s]uch parts
that otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions are included in the scope.” AD
Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650–51; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654 (emphasis added).
The scope language defines aluminum extrusions as “shapes and forms, produced by
an extrusion process.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg.
at 30,653. The extruded aluminum components in Columbia’s door thresholds are
described by these words, but the assembled door thresholds are not. Logically, an
article cannot be both an “extrusion” and an assembly containing an extrusion as one
part among several other parts that are not aluminum extrusions. As Columbia I
observed, “according to the uncontested facts, Columbia’s door thresholds are not
‘aluminum extrusions’ at the time of importation; rather, they are door thresholds that
contain an aluminum extrusion as a component in an assembly.” 44 CIT at __, 470 F.
Supp. 3d at 1357. The court ordered Commerce to reconsider its decision and
specifically to consider whether the finished merchandise exclusion applies in this case.
D. The Remand Redetermination Reaches a Finding or Inference that Is Contradicted
by Record Evidence
In the Remand Redetermination, Commerce disagreed that the finished
merchandise exclusion was relevant to its analysis. Under protest, Commerce
proceeded to address the issue of whether the finished merchandise exclusion applied
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 11 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 12
to Columbia’s imported door thresholds. 5 Commerce concluded that Columbia’s door
thresholds are an “intermediate product” and “partially assembled merchandise” for
purposes of the subassemblies provision in the Orders. Remand Redetermination 43.
It concluded, further, that the articles did not qualify for the finished merchandise
exclusion, considering them to be parts of what it termed “door units” (containing
“additional parts, such as door jambs, a door panel, glass, hinges, weatherstripping, and
other hardware parts”) rather than finished merchandise. Id. at 44 (explaining that
“[t]he record evidence submitted by the petitioner and Endura indicates that door ‘pre-
hangers’ obtain all of the components necessary to assemble an entire door unit that is
subsequently installed in a building.”) (footnote omitted).
5 In disagreeing with, and protesting, the court’s ruling, Commerce relies upon
certain judicial decisions, none of which involved the products at issue in this case.
Commerce states in the Remand Redetermination that “we believe that the Federal
Circuit’s holdings in Meridian and Whirlpool (which were not addressed by the Court in
the Remand Order) are instructive and support Commerce’s Final Scope Ruling.” Final
Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand 11 (Dec. 23, 2020), ECF No. 48-1
(“Remand Redetermination”) (citing Meridian Prods., LLC v. United States, 890 F.3d 1272
(Fed. Cir. 2018) and Whirlpool Corp. v. United States, 890 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
These decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit do not support the
Department’s position that it need not consider the finished merchandise exclusion if it
deems the good at issue to be a “subassembly.” See Remand Redetermination 15 (in which
Commerce reasons that “because we find the door thresholds are subassemblies under
the general scope language, we also find that they do not meet the exclusion criteria for
‘finished merchandise’ and are therefore covered by the scope of the Orders.”).
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 12 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 13
In the Remand Redetermination, Commerce reasoned that goods falling within
the subassemblies provision of the Orders cannot also be considered goods qualifying
for the finished merchandise exclusion, i.e., Commerce considers these two categories to
be mutually exclusive. See Remand Redetermination 17–22. Thus, Commerce employed
an analysis under which any goods it deems to be described by the subassemblies
provision are, per se, ineligible for the finished merchandise exclusion. The court need
not decide whether this analysis is a correct interpretation of the scope language, for
even if it is, the Department’s decision still must be remanded to Commerce because it
relies upon an impermissible finding or inference. Specifically, in rejecting the
argument that the finished merchandise exclusion described Columbia’s door
thresholds, Commerce impermissibly relied on certain other record evidence submitted
by the petitioner and Endura, as follows:
Moreover, the record evidence submitted by the petitioner and
Endura indicates that the completed door unit is highly customizable, and
may require additional cutting and machining of the door threshold.
Door pre-hangers may further customize door thresholds, along with
other door unit components, before final assembly of the door unit.
Although door thresholds are available in a variety of standard lengths,
they are generally manufactured to a longer length that is cut or machined
to meet the requirements of a specific order. The evidence submitted by
the petitioner and Endura also indicates that in the remodeling market
segment for door thresholds, thresholds can be sold as parts of pre-hung
door units or as replacement parts for finished door assemblies.
Thresholds sold by retailers in the remodeling segment often require
further cutting and sizing to meet the specific requirements of the door
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 13 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 14
assembly into which the thresholds are incorporated. Thus, we find that
the information submitted by the petitioner and Endura is consistent with
and supports our continued determination that Columbia’s door
thresholds are not, in and of themselves, a final finished product, but
rather, an intermediate product that is meant to be incorporated into a
larger downstream product, which is the finished merchandise.
Id. at 44–45 (footnotes omitted). The quoted language infers (but does not state
unambiguously) that the specific door thresholds at issue in this proceeding are so
designed and manufactured as to require cutting or machining prior to incorporation
into a door frame or other structure. But whether the court considers this language to
be a finding or an inference does not matter: in either case, it is contradicted by the
record evidence contained in the Scope Ruling Request and the supplement thereto.
Commerce does not cite any record evidence to support a finding or inference that
Columbia’s imported door thresholds, in particular, are so designed and produced as to
require cutting or machining prior to incorporation into a door frame or other structure.
In its comments to the court, Columbia states that “[e]vidence that Columbia
submitted during the original scope ruling, including videos, demonstrate[s] that
Columbia’s assembled thresholds cannot be cut to custom sizes because doing so
destroys the assembled thresholds, rendering them unuseable [sic].” Columbia’s
Comments 8 (citing Supplement to Scope Ruling Request 11–12 & Ex. 11). In the cited
supplement to its Scope Ruling Request, Columbia stated that the thresholds at issue
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 14 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 15
“are made for standard size doors” and that “[t]o be explicitly clear, Columbia’s
thresholds in this Scope Request cannot be cut to be utilized for different standard door
sizes. The threshold would not be functional if cut.” Supplement to Scope Ruling
Request 11. Citing a video attached as an exhibit to the submission showing the effects
of cutting, Columbia stated that “[o]nce cut, the nailing block within the threshold is
gone. Without a nailing block, the threshold has no way to be utilized in a door.” Id. at
11–12 (citing id. at Ex. 11). Columbia added that “once cut Columbia’s finished
thresholds no longer seal against water or insulate air.” Id. at 12. In another exhibit to
that submission, Columbia attached letters from two of its customers to support its
statement that its thresholds are ready for use without further processing. Id. at 7
(citing id. at Ex. 6).
In its supplement to its Scope Ruling Request, Columbia also stated that it
manufactures in the United States “certain thresholds that are manufactured intended
to be cut by the end user.” Id. at 8 n.23, see id. at 11 (explaining that these “cuttable
thresholds,” which it describes as similar to Endura’s sills, “give end-users
customizable options and excess materials. As a result, these thresholds are more
expensive due to their ability to fit multiple sized standard door sizes and use of more
materials.”). Columbia contrasted these with the thresholds at issue. Id. at 11
(“However, the finished merchandise subject to Columbia’s Scope Request cannot
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 15 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 16
undergo any cutting or fabrication after importation without losing the functionality of
the product.”).
In their comments on the Remand Redetermination, defendant-intervenors state
that “[w]hile door thresholds are available in a variety of standard lengths, they are
generally manufactured to a longer length that is cut or machined once the order-specific
requirements are known.” Def.-Int.’s Comments 10 (emphasis added) (citing their own
submissions on the record). Defendant-intervenors conclude from this statement that
“[b]ecause of the need to customize the threshold to match the many specific
requirements of the particular door assembly, it would not make economic sense as an
import model to finish the customization of the threshold prior to importation and it is
likely that imported door thresholds products generally are further cut to size either at
importers’ domestic facilities or at pre-hangers’ facilities.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing
their own submissions on the record).
The evidence from the petitioner and Endura that door thresholds “generally”
are further cut or machined to size does not address the critical question of fact the
court has identified, which pertains to the door thresholds at issue in this litigation.
That issue bears on the language in the finished merchandise exclusion referring to
“finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 16 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 17
permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at
30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654 (emphasis added).
In summary, the court is not aware of any evidence on the administrative record
supporting a finding or inference that the specific door thresholds at issue in this
litigation are so designed and produced as to require cutting or machining prior to
incorporation into a door frame or other structure. Moreover, Commerce has not
brought any such evidence to the court’s attention in the Remand Redetermination and
appears to disregard record evidence to the contrary. In the second remand
proceeding, Commerce must make a factual determination to resolve this issue based
on a consideration of the record evidence, viewed in the entirety.
E. Commerce Must Reconsider the Applicability of the Finished Merchandise
Exclusion Based on the Exemplars Stated Therein
The scope exclusion for finished merchandise includes exemplars. AD Order,
76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654 (excluding from the scope of
the Orders “finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are
fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished
windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and
backing material, and solar panels”). In the Remand Redetermination, Commerce
reasoned, as to the exemplars, that “[w]e find that these product examples do not
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 17 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 18
constitute subassemblies within the meaning of the general scope language, but, rather,
are examples of fully and permanently assembled and completed products.” Remand
Redetermination 18–19. Commerce added that “[a]ccordingly, an assembled aluminum
extrusion door frame without glass could be considered a subassembly, and therefore
covered by the scope, thus falling short of the final finished door with glass which
would be excluded.” Id. at 19.
After considering whether the door thresholds at issue in this case either are, or
are not, so designed and produced as to require cutting or machining prior to
incorporation into a larger structure, Commerce must decide anew whether the finished
merchandise exclusion applies in this case. It then will be necessary for Commerce to
address the effect of the exemplars, including, in particular, the exemplar for “doors
with glass or vinyl.”
As described by Commerce in the Remand Redetermination, “a final finished
door with glass,” Remand Redetermination 19, would satisfy the requirements of the
finished merchandise exclusion. The product identified in the “door” exemplar—a
door with glass or vinyl—in the finished merchandise exclusion is closely similar to a
complete, assembled door threshold consisting of an aluminum extrusion and non-
aluminum components. Both are assemblies containing one or more aluminum
extrusions, and both are components of what Commerce described in the Remand
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 18 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 19
Redetermination as a “door unit.” See Remand Redetermination 44 (describing the
various parts of a door unit). Commerce fails to provide a reasoned explanation in the
Remand Redetermination why a door threshold is a “subassembly” ineligible for the
finished merchandise exclusion but a door with glass or vinyl is not. In this regard, the
court notes that the exemplar in the finished merchandise exclusion explicitly refers to
“doors with glass or vinyl,” not “door units” or a similar such term referring to a
combination consisting of a door, a door frame, and all other parts such as hinges,
latches, jambs, and other hardware. See AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order,
76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The role of Commerce in a scope ruling proceeding is to
interpret scope language in an order, not to change it. Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1095.
Commerce reasoned, further, that “[a] subassembly is merchandise which is
designed for the sole purpose of becoming part of a larger whole,” Remand
Redetermination 24, and that each of Columbia’s assembled door thresholds, which
“must work in tandem with other components to be functional,” id. at 23 (citation
omitted), and is “a component of a larger downstream product,” id. at 24, therefore
cannot qualify for the finished merchandise exclusion. This is so, according to
Commerce, even if the article requires no further fabrication or assembly to perform its
function. Id. at 18 (“Further, the fact that the subassembly could be described in its own
right with reference to its end use, or that such subassembly requires no further
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 19 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 20
fabrication or assembly to perform its function as a subassembly, does not mean that it
will constitute finished merchandise under the exclusion.”).
Commerce fails to reconcile its analysis with certain of the exemplars the finished
merchandise exclusion specifically identifies. If an assembled door threshold
containing an aluminum extrusion is within the class of goods identified by the
reference in the scope language to “subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled
merchandise” because it is designed to become part of a larger whole, e.g., a door unit
or other structure, then so is a “door with vinyl or glass.” The same can be said for a
“finished window with glass.” Such a good is also “designed for the sole purpose” of
being incorporated into a part of a larger structure, such as a wall or a dormer, that, like
a door unit, is itself part of an even larger whole, i.e., a building.
In the Remand Redetermination, Commerce declined to consider the similarities
between assembled door thresholds and the exemplars in the finished merchandise
exclusion, including, specifically, those referring to doors and windows. Commerce
reasoned that:
[T]hese exemplars are defined by the scope as finished merchandise that,
in and of themselves, satisfy the finished merchandise exclusion. Because
they are themselves finished merchandise, they are not intermediary
products to finished merchandise that might qualify as a subassembly.
There is no need to further analyze whether the enumerated products in
the finished merchandise exclusion work in conjunction with other
products, and no requirement that, for example, a window with glass or a
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 20 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 21
door with glass or vinyl be assembled into a house to satisfy the finished
merchandise exclusion. In contrast, because door thresholds are not
specifically enumerated examples of finished merchandise, Commerce
must undertake an analysis of whether they satisfy the criteria for the
finished merchandise exclusion. As explained above, we have determined
that Columbia’s door thresholds are subassemblies meant to be
incorporated into a larger downstream product and, consequently, do not
satisfy the criteria for the finished merchandise exclusion.
Id. at 46. This reasoning is based on a serious misinterpretation of the scope language
setting forth the finished merchandise exclusion. Contrary to the express terms of that
exclusion, Commerce interprets the exemplars therein as separate, individual exclusions
rather than as what they plainly are. They are exemplars, as shown by the use of the
words “such as.” See AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654
(excluding “finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are
fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished
windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and
backing material, and solar panels” (emphasis added)). Here again, Commerce
attempts to rewrite the scope language, contrary to plain meaning and the principle
enunciated in Duferco. See 296 F.3d at 1095.
The limitation on the finished merchandise exclusion Commerce attempts to
impose is contrary to the exemplars for doors and windows that the scope language
used for the purpose of illustration. Commerce provides no convincing explanation of
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 21 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 22
why goods that are, in the Department’s words, “designed for the sole purpose of
becoming part of a larger whole,” Remand Redetermination 24, or “meant to be
incorporated into a larger downstream product,” id. at 46, must be disqualified from the
finished merchandise exclusion by that characteristic alone, despite the exemplars of
products that also are designed for the sole purpose of becoming part of a larger whole
yet are listed in the scope language as examples of products that satisfy the terms of the
finished merchandise exclusion.
Commerce attempts to justify its overly-narrow interpretation of the finished
merchandise exclusion by alluding to the intent as expressed in “the Petition and
related documents.” Remand Redetermination 19–20; see 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1).
Commerce states that “[t]hrough their explanation and revisions, the petitioners clearly
and consistently expressed their intent to exclude from the Orders certain aluminum
extrusions imported as part of a kit, but include in the Orders other aluminum
extrusions that are attached to form subassemblies that are not imported as part of a
kit.” Id. at 20. This reasoning is also unsound. The finished goods kit exclusion applies
only to goods imported in unassembled form, and the specific mention of this exclusion
in the subassemblies provision logically parallels the description of subassemblies as
“partially assembled merchandise.” AD Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order,
76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The finished merchandise exclusion, in contrast, applies only to
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 22 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 23
goods that are imported in fully assembled form. Each must be interpreted according
to the requirements stated therein. That a good be fully assembled at the time of
importation is a requirement of the finished merchandise exclusion. According to plain
meaning and logic, it cannot also be a disqualification for the finished merchandise
exclusion.
In summary, the court cannot sustain the Remand Redetermination, which relies
upon a factual finding or inference that is contradicted by the record evidence
pertaining specifically to Columbia’s imported door thresholds. The court directs that
Commerce, in a new decision, reconsider in the entirety the decision reached in the
Remand Redetermination as to the finished merchandise exclusion and reach a new
determination that complies with the instructions in this Opinion and Order. In so
doing, Commerce must address the specific factual issue the court has identified and
ensure that all of its findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record.
III. CONCLUSION AND O RDER
Upon consideration of the Remand Redetermination and all papers and
proceedings had herein, and upon due deliberation, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Remand Redetermination is remanded to Commerce for
reconsideration in light of this Opinion and Order; it is further
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 23 of 24

Court No. 19-00013 	Page 24
ORDERED that Commerce, within 90 days from the date of issuance of this
Opinion and Order, shall submit a second redetermination upon remand (“Second
Remand Redetermination”) that complies with this Opinion and Order; it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff and defendant-intervenors shall have 30 days from the
filing of the Second Remand Redetermination in which to submit comments to the
court; and it is further
ORDERED that should plaintiff or defendant-intervenors submit comments,
defendant shall have 15 days from the date of filing of the last comment to submit a
response.
/s/ Timothy C. Stanceu_____
Timothy C. Stanceu, Judge
Dated: September 14, 2021
New York, New York
Case 1:19-cv-00013-TCS Document 65 Filed 09/14/21 Page 24 of 24