Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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26-CV-04945 JAO (VET)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ARSHDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-04945 JAO (VET)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Before the Court is Petitioner Arshdeep Singh (“Petitioner”)’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is
Respondents’ Return to the Petition (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF No. 5).
For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of India. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 5. He entered the United States on
December 29, 2022. See id. Though Petitioner was apprehended, processed, and granted
conditional parole, see id. ¶ 6, Petitioner was detained at a check-in on August 11, 2026
due to numerous violations of the conditions of his prior release in the Alternatives to
Detention program, see ECF No. 4 at 2. Petitioner had allegedly missed nine biometric
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check-ins and had one instance in which he disabled the location monitoring service
between February 24, 2026 and July 14, 2026. See id.
Petitioner was initially scheduled for a bond hearing on September 4, 2025. See id.
At the hearing, Petitioner requested to withdraw the request for a bond hearing until he
could gather more evidence. See id. It does not appear that either party has requested a
bond hearing since. Petitioner now alleges, in this Court, that his detention violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 98–107.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district
of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole
judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or
removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas
v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral
issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of
indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. See
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other
grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F.
Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his detention without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing
violates his right to due process. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 98–107. Notably, Petitioner does not
ask that the Court order a bond hearing, arguing that a bond hearing would not provide
him appropriate relief. See ECF No. 5 at 8. Respondents contend that because Petitioner
violated the conditions of his prior release, Petitioner is subject to detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). See ECF No. 4 at 1–2. Respondents thus acknowledge that Petitioner
is entitled to a bond hearing. See id. at 2. Nevertheless, because Petitioner sought to
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withdraw the request for a hearing until he could gather more evidence, and because
Petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief in this Court,
Respondents state that the Court should deny the Petition as moot or, in the alternative,
stay a decision until Petitioner requests a new bond hearing. See id. at 2–3. In his
Traverse, Petitioner reiterates, alongside other arguments discussed in further detail
below, that his detention without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing violates his
constitutional rights. See generally ECF No. 5.
While the Ninth Circuit stayed the application of Bautista beyond the Central
District of California, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Vasquez v. Bostock
suggests that members of Petitioner’s class (i.e., persons present without admission who
are apprehended in the interior of the United States) are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
rather than the detention regime outlined in § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Rodriguez Vasquez,
No. 25-6842, slip op. at 10 (9th Cir. 2026). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) generally governs the
detention and release on conditional parole of noncitizens during removal proceedings,
and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) expressly permits the government to revoke such conditional
parole. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a); 1226(b). Individuals detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
may seek individualized bond determination before an immigration judge and pursue
administrative review of adverse determinations. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53
F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit generally requires exhaustion of all
available administrative remedies before a petitioner seeks habeas relief. See Leonardo v.
Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011).
Petitioner entered the United States in December 2022, was granted parole, and
subsequently had his parole revoked due to violations of the conditions of his prior
release. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6; ECF No. 4 at 2; ECF No. 4-1 at 3. Petitioner is thus
subject to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is clearly entitled to a bond hearing,
upon which the immigration judge will determine his eligibility for release. See, e.g.,
Esquival-Ipina v. LaRose, 812 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1080–81 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Garcia
Garcia v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1303159, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2026) (acknowledging
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Bautista and ordering bond hearing). But while Petitioner acknowledges that 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) applies to his situation, Petitioner maintains that a bond hearing would not
constitute appropriate relief. See ECF No. 5 at 8. Instead, Petitioner argues that he is
entitled to immediate release, as he has no criminal history, has not been determined to be
dangerous or a flight risk, and has not missed his immigration court hearings. See id.
The Court is not persuaded. The Court recognizes Petitioner’s substantial interest
in freedom from restraint. But Petitioner’s parole was revoked under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b),
and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides the process for determining whether Petitioner should
remain detained or be released, i.e., an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022).
And the Ninth Circuit generally requires exhaustion of all available administrative
remedies before a petitioner seeks habeas relief. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d
1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011).
Petitioner argues that Rodriguez Diaz does not require dismissal of his Petition, see
ECF No. 5 at 4, and that exhaustion does not bar review of his constitutional claims, see
id. at 5. But although Rodriguez Diaz does not mandate dismissal, neither does it
establish Petitioner’s entitlement to immediate release. And while the Court is permitted
to review constitutional challenges to immigration detention, Petitioner has not
established why the available administrative procedures are inadequate to address his
asserted entitlement to release. See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir.
2004). Petitioner’s conditional parole was revoked following alleged violations of his
release conditions. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6; ECF No. 4 at 2; ECF No. 4-1 at 3. Petitioner
was offered a bond hearing, requested additional time, and has not subsequently sought a
hearing. See ECF No. 4 at 2–3. In these circumstances, an individualized bond hearing
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would precisely permit consideration of whether Petitioner’s continued detention is
warranted.1
As set forth above, the Court would ordinarily grant a bond hearing in situations
like Petitioner’s, but because Petitioner has represented that he does not seek a bond
hearing, see ECF No. 5, the Court will deny the Petition without prejudice at this
juncture. Petitioner is not barred from reraising the issues presented in the Petition to
seek the appropriate relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(ECF No. 1) without prejudice.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 8, 2026
1 Indeed, an individualized bond hearing would be the appropriate avenue for
determining whether Petitioner would be, for instance, dangerous to the community or a
flight risk.
2 Petitioner requested attorney’s fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. 1 at 13. The EAJA
requires that the fee applicant be a “prevailing party.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Meza-
Vasquez v. Garland, 993 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2021). Because Petitioner has not
“prevailed” on the Petition at this juncture, Petitioner is not entitled to fees under the
EAJA and that request is denied.
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