Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARIO JUAN TOMAS,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv4451-LL-DDL
ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT
TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Mario Juan Tomas’ second Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his prolonged detention since
December 28, 2025 is unlawful. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a Return. ECF
No. 6.
Petitioner filed a prior § 2241 petition in case number 26cv2112-LL-DDL, which
the Court granted, finding Petitioner wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and
ordered that he be provided with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Order Granting
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Juan-Tomas v. LaRose,
Case No. 26cv2112-LL-DDL (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2026). An immigration judge conducted
a bond hearing and issued an order on April 29, 2026 denying Petitioner bond, finding that
he is a danger to the community. ECF No. 6-2 at 2.
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Respondents argue that Petitioner’s instant Petition should be dismissed for abuse of
the writ and for failing to exhaust administrative remedies because Petitioner has not
appealed the immigration judge’s custody determination. ECF No. 6.
There is no statutory requirement under § 2241 to exhaust direct appeals before filing
a petition for habeas corpus. Acevedo-Carranza v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). However, the Ninth Circuit requires “as a prudential matter, that
habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial . . . remedies before seeking relief under
§ 2241.” Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original). “Courts may require prudential
exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a
proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would
encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative
review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need
for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The Court finds the second and third factors weigh in favor of requiring prudential
exhaustion in this case. Petitioner does not mention his first petition or that the Court
granted it and ordered the government to provide him with a bond hearing. Instead, he files
a new petition with a new argument concerning prolonged detention and stating that he
was denied bond. Pet. ¶ 23. The reason he is currently detained is because the immigration
judge denied him bond after finding he is a danger to the community. Thus, Petitioner has
been afforded due process and the fact that he is still detained after bond was denied is not
grounds for a habeas petition in this case. Ordinarily, a person in Petitioner’s situation who
is dissatisfied with the custody determination should appeal that decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Aden v. Nielsen, No. C18-1441RSL, 2019 WL 5802013, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019) (citation omitted). The Court finds this is an attempt to
overcome an unfavorable bond hearing by filing a new habeas petition instead of appealing
to the BIA and that allowing this would encourage deliberate bypass of the administrative
/ / /
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scheme. If there was error in the bond determination, appealing to the BIA will allow the
agency to correct its own mistakes.
“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court
ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until
the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” 	Leonardo v.
Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “a court may waive the
prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or not
efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury
will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872
F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir.
2004)).
Petitioner asserts that he has exhausted all administrative remedies and that
exhaustion should be waived for futility because “Respondents contend [he] is subject to
mandatory detention.” Id. ¶¶ 26–27.
The Court is not persuaded that exhaustion would be futile in this case. The
immigration judge’s denial of bond was not based on the contention that detention is
mandatory. There is no evidence that the BIA does not have the authority to review the
immigration judge’s finding that the government met its burden to show dangerousness.
Therefore, on the facts in this case, the Court declines to waive exhaustion.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Petition. The
Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 8, 2026
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