Edwards v. Creekside Meadows Apartments Inc. et al

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26-cv-01687-DMS-DDL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KENNETH GREGORY EDWARDS,
Petitioner,
v.
CREEKSIDE MEADOWS
APARTMENTS INC.; SAN DIEGO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-01687-DMS-DDL
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS; DISMISSING PETITION
SUA SPONTE
[ECF Nos. 1–2]
Petitioner Kenneth Gregory Edwards, appearing pro se, filed a petition for
emergency injunctive relief (“Petition”), (Pet., ECF No. 1), and an application to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Appl., ECF No. 2). Petitioner did not file a complaint;
thus, the Court treats the Petition as his complaint. For the foregoing reasons, the Court
grants Petitioner’s application to proceed IFP and dismisses the Petition sua sponte.
I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Civil Local Rule 3.2, any action sought to
be filed IFP “must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets
which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2. Petitioner
indicates that he receives no monthly income and is unemployed. (IFP Appl. 1–2.) He
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reports $1.60 in a checking account and no other assets. (Id. at 2–3.) He estimates $1,951
in monthly expenses. (Id. at 3–4.) The Court finds that Petitioner cannot afford to pay the
filing fee in this case and is eligible to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a). Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s IFP application.
II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF PETITION
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint (or, here, petition) must be screened
by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint
that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845,
845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
are not limited to prisoners”).
The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure
to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6)
requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the
Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not
initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
1982).
B. Discussion
Petitioner has been living at Respondent Creekside Meadows Apartment Inc.
(“Creekside”). (Pet. 1.) In May 2024, a manager at Creekside returned Petitioner’s rent
payment and refused payment for ten months. (Id. at 1–2.) In addition to rent, Petitioner
was billed a monthly maintenance fee. (Id. at 2.) A now-former office staff member told
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Petitioner to ignore the maintenance fee bill because of his Section 8 status. (Id.) However,
six months after moving in, Petitioner was told that he was responsible for this fee. (Id.)
He was then told that non-payment was not grounds for eviction, and that he would be
allowed to pay his debt incrementally. (Id.)
In June 2025, Creekside filed an unlawful detainer action in San Diego County
Superior Court, alleging Petitioner did not pay rent. (Id.) Petitioner answered the unlawful
detainer action on June 16, 2025, stating that the landlord refused to accept his rent
payments and that “the amount alleged as rent was in fact maintenance fees.” (Id.) On
June 17, 2025, Creekside filed a request for dismissal. (Id.) Despite dismissing the action,
Creekside continued to refuse Petitioner’s rent payments for seven months until Petitioner
paid his delinquent maintenance fees. (Id. at 2–3.) Petitioner began saving the monthly
rent payments and informed his Veterans Affairs Supportive Housing counselor of such.
(Id. at 2.) The counselor suggested that Petitioner contact the manager and arrange
payment of fees; however, the manager did not respond to Petitioner or his counselor. (Id.)
At an ex parte hearing on March 9, 2026, Petitioner told the state court that he could pay
rent, but the state court “still ordered the lock-out.” (Id. at 3.)
Petitioner “files this action in accordance with and pursuant to 42 USCS § 1940.8
and [California Civil] Code §2000a-3.” (Id. at 1.) The Court construes Petitioner’s claims
as causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 and California Civil Code § 1940.8.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., provides: “All
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . .
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin.” Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC, No. 24-CV-01278-TSH, 2024 WL
2971669, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)). “Section 2000a-
3 creates a private cause of action to enforce § 2000a,” of which “[o]nly injunctive and
declaratory relief (and attorney’s fees) may be awarded.” Evans v. Holiday Inns, 951 F.
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Supp. 85, 86 (Dist. Md. 1997) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner fails to establish that
Creekside is a place of public accommodation, and he has not alleged that he faced
discrimination or segregation based on his race, color, religion, or national origin from
either Respondent. Thus, Petitioner does not sufficiently assert a claim under § 2000a-3.
Additionally, § 2000a-3(c) requires plaintiffs to “give written notice of the alleged
act of discrimination to the appropriate state or local agency if the state has a law
prohibiting the alleged conduct,” which California does. Floyd, 2024 WL 2971669, at *8.
(citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52). Petitioner may not “file suit under § 2000a until 30 days
after he files written notice of the alleged discrimination.” Id. Petitioner does not allege
that he followed this jurisdictional requirement, and thus, Petitioner’s claim may be
defective. Id. (citation omitted). For these reasons, the Court DISMISSES Petitioner’s §
2000a-3 claim.
2. California Civil Code § 1940.8
The Court does not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s section 1940.8 claim—a state
law claim. Federal question jurisdiction applies only to the federal law claim, which is
now dismissed. Plaintiff has the burden to show the Court also has jurisdiction over the
section 1940.8 claim, either through supplemental or diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff fails
to sufficiently allege either.
Further, section 1940.8 provides that “[a] landlord of a residential dwelling unit shall
provide each new tenant that occupies the unit with a copy of the notice provided by a
registered structural pest control company . . . , if a contract for periodic pest control service
has been executed.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1940.8. The Petition does not allege there exists a
contract for periodic pest control service or that Creekside failed to provide notice as
required by section 1940.8. Thus, the Court also DISMISSES this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s application to proceed IFP
and DISMISSES the Petition with leave to amend. Petitioner may file a First Amended
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Petition to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21) days from the
date this Order is entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 23, 2026
_________________________________
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
United States District Judge
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