Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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3:26-cv-01532-RBM-AHG
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
INES PEREZ SOLIS,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at Otay
Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01532-RBM-AHG
ORDER 	GRANTING 	PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ines Perez Solis’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the
lawfulness of her detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). (Doc. 1.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Mexican national who entered the United States in 2003 without being
admitted or paroled. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1.) On March 7, 2026, Petitioner was the passenger in a
vehicle that ICE pulled over. (Id. ¶ 2.) The driver of the vehicle told ICE officers that he
did not have immigration status and was arrested. (Id.) Petitioner was questioned by ICE
officers and, after she declined to answer, was also arrested. 	(Id.) 	Petitioner was
determined to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and placed in removal
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proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id. ¶ 9.) The immigration judge found they
did not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s bond hearing, citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (See id. ¶ 15; Doc. 5 ¶ 4.)
On March 11, 2026, Petitioner filed her Petition. (Doc. 1.) That same day, the Court
set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 2.) On March 19, 2026, Respondents filed their Return to
Petition. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed her Traverse on March 26, 2026. (Doc. 5.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that her detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act;
the court’s orders in Bautista v. Santacruz;1 the Administrative Procedure Act; the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and the Fourth Amendment. 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 49–71.)
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), but
“acknowledge[ ] that Courts in this District have repeatedly reached the opposite
conclusion,” and that “the facts are not materially distinguishable” here. (Doc. 4 at 2–3.)
1 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
2025). 	As the Court noted in its Order to Show Cause, the Ninth Circuit has stayed the
judgment of Bautista insofar as it extends beyond the Central District of California. (Doc.
2 at 1 (citations omitted).)
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The Court has granted petitions filed by similarly-situated petitioners. 	See, e.g.,
Silvestre-Mendoza v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03206-RBM-DDL, 2025 WL 3512410, at
*1–2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025). 	In that decision, the Court found that “‘a proper
understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their plain text, overall structure, and . . .
case law interpreting them, compels the conclusion that § 1225’s provisions for mandatory
detention of noncitizens seeking admission [do] not apply to someone like [the petitioner],’
who has been residing in the United States” for many years. 	Id. at *1 (quoting Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). The Court incorporates its
reasoning in Silvestre-Mendoza, and makes the same findings, here.
There is no dispute that Petitioner was detained on March 7, 2026, after having
resided in the United States for over 20 years. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1–2.) Therefore, the discretionary
detention procedures of § 1226 govern Petitioner’s detention, and the Petition must be
granted. 	The Court also finds that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing, is the
appropriate remedy. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash.
2025) (“Although the Government notes that Petitioner may request a bond hearing while
detained, such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard
because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Jorge
M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“if Petitioner is detained,
he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid”); Domingo v. Kaiser,
Case No. 25-cv-05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even
if Petitioner[] received a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and
was released at that point, he will have already suffered the harm that is the subject of his
motion; that is, his potentially erroneous detention.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION2
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly:
2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining
grounds for relief.
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1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.
2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to
determine whether detention is warranted. 	Respondents shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,3 that Petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a risk of flight.4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 26, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled
to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her
continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would
likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638
F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted
placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a
noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond”).
4 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1324;
Duong v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1043–44 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, 801
F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119–20 (E.D. Cal. 2025).
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