Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MUHAMMAD AMIR NAZIR,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center
(CoreCivic), et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01378-RBM-DEB
ORDER:
(1) DENYING PETITION [Doc. 1];
(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
TO VACATE ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE [Doc. 5]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Muhammad Amir Nazir’s (“Petitioner”)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.)
For the reasons below, the Court DENIES without prejudice the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Pakistan and “beneficiary of an approved employment-
based immigrant petition (Form I-140)” with “a pending application to adjust status to
lawful permanent resident.” 	(Id. ¶ 19.) 	United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services 	approved 	Petitioner’s 	employment 	authorization 	and 	Advance 	Parole 	in
connection with those pending applications. (Id. ¶¶ 19–21.) Petitioner attempted to enter
the United States via Mexico on December 25, 2025, but Customs and Border Patrol
(“CBP”) “refused to parole Petitioner into the United States.” 	(Id. ¶ 22; Doc. 4-1 at 1.)
“After CBP refused to parole him, Petitioner attempted to return to Mexico,” but “was not
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permitted to leave and was taken into [immigration] custody.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 23.) Petitioner
was determined inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and issued an Order of
Expedited Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (Doc. 4-1 at 1; Doc. 4 at 2.)
Petitioner represents that he has not been served with a Notice to Appear or other
charging 	document 	initiating 	proceedings 	in 	immigration 	court. 	(Doc. 	1 	¶ 	24.)
Respondents represent that Petitioner is subject to a final removal order. (Doc. 4 at 3 (citing
Doc. 4-1 at 1 (December 25, 2025 Notice and Order of Expedited Removal signed by
immigration 	officers 	and 	supervisors 	and 	showing 	“REFUSED 	TO 	SIGN” 	where
Petitioner would have acknowledged receipt of the Notice and Order)).)
B. 	Procedural Background
Petitioner filed the Petition on March 4, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Shortly thereafter, the Court
set a briefing schedule and ordered Respondents not to transfer Petitioner outside of the
Southern District of California pending a ruling on the Petition. 	(Doc. 2 at 1–2.)
Respondents filed their Return to Petition (“Response”) on March 11, 2026. 	(Doc. 4.)
Petitioner was authorized to file a reply on or before March 18, 2026, but did not file one.
On March 24, 2026, Respondents also filed a Motion to Vacate Order to Show Cause,
requesting that the Court vacate the portion of its Order to Show Cause enjoining transfer
of Petitioner outside of the Southern District of California. (Doc. 5 at 1–2.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his detention without a bond hearing, and without issuance of
a Notice to Appear or other charging document, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25, 43–59.) Respondents “request the Court deny this petition
on the ground that post-removal order detention is statutorily mandated under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a) for a period of 90 days following the date that a noncitizen’s removal order
becomes final,” and Petitioner has not yet been in custody for 90 days. (Doc. 4 at 1–4.)
Congress authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to remove
certain inadmissible noncitizens through expedited removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1). In expedited removal proceedings, certain noncitizens who lack valid entry
documents or make material misrepresentations shall be “order[ed] . . . removed from the
United States without further hearing or review unless the [noncitizen] indicates either an
intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.” 	Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 	The
asylum officer’s determination is not final until reviewed by a supervisor, who signs a
Form 	I-860 	notifying 	the 	noncitizen 	of 	the 	decision. 	8 	C.F.R. 	§§ 208.30(e)(8);
235.3(b)(2)(i), (b)(7). An expedited removal order “must be reviewed and approved by the
appropriate supervisor 	before the order is considered final.” 	Alvarado-Herrera v.
Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting § 235.3(b)(7)) (emphasis added).
Here, 	Respondents 	have 	included 	as 	an 	exhibit 	the 	Form 	I-860 	signed 	by
immigration supervisors notifying Petitioner that he was “found to be inadmissible as
charged and ordered removed from the United States.” 	(Doc. 4-1 at 1.) 	Accordingly,
Petitioner’s expedited removal order appears to be final, and Petitioner’s detention became
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231 on December 25, 2025. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B);
Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Section 241(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231, authorizes the
detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the United States.”).
Petitioner’s detention is still within the 90-day mandatory removal period of § 1231,
as March 25, 2026 is the last day of the removal period. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B). The Court
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therefore must deny the Petition.
Even if Petitioner were past the 90-day removal period, the Court would not find
that he succeeds on the merits of a Zadvydas claim. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). The Supreme Court has recognized a six-month presumptively reasonable period
of detention after a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final. 	Id. at 701. After that six-
month period expires—or after Petitioner has rebutted the presumption that such time is
reasonable1—once the noncitizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
The Government has provided such evidence here. Respondents represent that ICE
“has obtained a travel document authorizing Petitioner’s travel to Pakistan. . . [,] has
scheduled Petitioner for a transfer flight to occur no sooner than April 1, 2026, and has
scheduled a removal flight to occur soon thereafter.” (Doc. 5 at 1–2.) Thus, even under
Zadvydas, there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES without prejudice the Petition.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED without prejudice. The
Motion to Vacate Order to Show Cause (Doc. 5) is DENIED as moot. The Parties SHALL
FILE a Status Report on or before April 15, 2026 indicating whether Petitioner has been
removed to Pakistan. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 25, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 See Ndandu v. Noem, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026 WL 25848, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
2026).
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