Liang v. Casey et al

1 26-cv-1224-AGS-SBC
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Shunsen LIANG,
Petitioner,
v.
Jeremy CASEY, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1224-AGS-SBC
ORDER REQUIRING RETURN
Petitioner Shunsen Liang seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is
sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary
dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038,
1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is
not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
On “December 3, 2023,” Liang, a “native and citizen of the People’s Republic of
China,” “entered the U.S. without inspection.” (ECF 1, at 2, 4.) The next day, he was
“released from ICE custody pursuant to an Order of Release on Recognizance.” (Id. at 4.)
Over two years later, on “December 15, 2025,” Liang “passed through a checkpoint,”
“voluntarily presented his driver’s license,” and was “taken into custody.” (id. at 5.) He
asserts that he is being detained unlawfully because respondents have “fail[ed] to provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing under [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(a)” and are instead improperly
“treating him as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” (Id. at 9.)
This challenge merits a response. The two Courts of Appeals to address this question
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2 26-cv-1224-AGS-SBC
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disagreed about how to interpret the issue. Compare Castañon-Nava v. United States Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding “on this
preliminary [motion-to-stay] record” that plaintiffs who are “unlawfully already in the
United States” are not “subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”), with
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, __ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 323330, at *1
(5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (holding that, under § 1225(b)(2)(A), petitioners who entered the
United States “illegally many years ago” must “be detained” without a bond hearing). But
most petitioners have nonetheless obtained habeas relief in functionally identical cases.
See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK),
2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362”
opinions to address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final
basis,” and these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty
different courts”).
In addition, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by
those—like petitioner—who seem to be members of the Bond Eligible Class certified in
Bautista 	v. 	Santacruz, 	No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 	__ 	F. Supp. 3d 	__, 	2025 WL
3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). So, by Wednesday, March 4, 2026, the government
is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under that authority.
If respondents do not concede, they must answer the petition by March 6, 2026.
Dated: February 27, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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