Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LUISVIC GABRIEL IBARRAS
VIZCAINO,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Petitioner 	Luisvic 	Gabriel 	Ibarras 	Vizcaino’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Doc. 1.) On March 9, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to the Petition (“Response”).
(Doc. 4.) 	Petitioner filed a Traverse (“Reply”) on March 13, 2026. 	(Doc. 5.) 	For the
reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, was paroled into the United States on
December 6, 2024, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 16; see Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at
2.) 1 Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that same day. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.)
1 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination for filings unless otherwise noted.
Case 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP Document 6 Filed 03/19/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 5

2
3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
On May 23, 2025, during Petitioner’s third court date, the United States Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “moved to terminate proceedings against Petitioner to
place him in expedited removal proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Petitioner was then “detained by
ICE officers when he exited the courtroom.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Petitioner alleges that he did not
receive notice, information on why he was being re-detained, or an individualized hearing
to assess whether his re-detention was warranted due to danger or flight risk. (Id. ¶¶ 20–
22.) 	While in detention, Petitioner received a credible fear interview before an asylum
officer “to assess whether he presented a credible fear of return to Venezuela.” (Id. ¶ 23.)
On July 17, 2025, after he received a positive credible fear determination, Petitioner
was issued a second NTA. 	(Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) 	The second NTA charged Petitioner as
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an “arriving alien” not in possession of
valid travel documents. 	(Id. ¶ 24.) 	On October 6, 2025, Petitioner filed an asylum
application, which remains pending. 	(Id. ¶ 25.) 	Since his arrest on May 23, 2025,
Petitioner has been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 20.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that Respondents revoked his release on humanitarian parole and
re-detained him without notice, a pre-deprivation hearing, or an opportunity to be heard in
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act
Case 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP Document 6 Filed 03/19/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 5

3
3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(“APA”), and the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 37, 40–65.) Respondents contend that
“Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) In support,
Respondents attempt to incorporate by reference arguments regarding the government’s
authority for mandatory detention under § 1225(b) made in similar cases. (See id. at 2–3
& n.2.) 2 Respondents, however, do not substantively address Petitioner’s due process
claims. 3
This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners
who were released from ICE detention on humanitarian parole and later re-detained. 	In
Perez v. LaRose, the Court applied the due process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) and found that “all three factors support a finding that Respondents'
revocation of Petitioner’s parole [under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)] without reasoning or an
opportunity to be heard deprived Petitioner of his due process rights.” Case No.: 3:25-cv-
02620-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025); see also Faizyan v.
Casey, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2025) (reaching the same conclusion as to the revocation of a petitioner’s release on his
own recognizance). The Court concluded the petitioner’s detention was unlawful “because
2 “Generally, courts do not allow incorporation by reference of arguments or ‘substantive
materials’ not contained within the relevant motions’ briefs.” 	Flores v. Bennett, 635 F.
Supp. 3d 1020, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-16762, 2023 WL 4946605 (9th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2023) (collecting cases); see Williams v. Cnty. of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925,
947 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to consider arguments plaintiff “improperly [sought] to
incorporate by reference”).
3 Respondents “request[ ] an opportunity to submit [a more formal response] within a
reasonable timeframe” (Doc. 3 at 2 n.1), but notably failed to properly request an extension
of time. See also Sosa Inzuna v. Warden of Adelanto Det. Facility, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026
WL 233211, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (noting “the current volume of habeas petitions . . .
being filed can be attributed to Respondents’ deliberate choice to continue defying the final
judgment entered in Bautista”).
Case 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP Document 6 Filed 03/19/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 5

4
3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Respondents detained [the petitioner] by revoking his parole in violation of the Due Process
Clause.” Perez, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5.
The Court reached the same conclusion in Velazquez-Chinga v. Noem, finding the
revocation of the petitioner’s parole without an individualized determination or an
opportunity to be heard “was neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) nor the
demands of due process.” Case No.: 3:26-cv-00105-RBM-KSC, 2026 WL 311507, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (citing Araujo, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2.) 	As the Court noted,
“[d]ue process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate official on
whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for the
termination; and (3) an opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the termination.” 	Id.
(quoting Araujo v. LaRose, No. 25cv2942-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 24, 2025)); see Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164–66 (S.D. Cal. 2025)
(analyzing Mathews factors).
Like in Perez and Velasquez-Chinga, Petitioner was released from his initial
detention on humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Doc. 1 ¶ 2;
Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at 2.) Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner was not provided with an
individualized determination or an opportunity to be heard before his parole was
terminated. 	(See Doc. 1 ¶ 22; see generally Doc. 4.) 	Although Petitioner’s I-94 form
shows an “admit until date” of April 18, 2025, (see Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at 2), “numerous courts
in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is paroled under [8 C.F.R § 212.5],
[his] ‘liberty interest does not expire along with [his] parole.’” 	Velasquez-Chinga, 2026
WL 311507, at *3 (quoting D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC), 2026
WL 145646, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026)); see Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp.
3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the express terms of the [§ 1182] parole notice
allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not somehow obviate the need for
the Government to provide [an] individualized hearing prior to re-detaining the parolee.”).
The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Perez and Velasquez-Chinga applies it
here. 	For those same reasons, the revocation of Petitioner’s humanitarian parole and his
Case 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP Document 6 Filed 03/19/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 5

5
3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
subsequent re-detention violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
rendered his detention unlawful.
IV. 	CONCLUSION 4
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole and Form I-94.
2. Respondents MAY NOT re-detain Petitioner without compliance with 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and the Due Process Clause.
3. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any such re-detention, Petitioner is entitled to
notice of the reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before an
immigration judge to determine whether detention is warranted. 	Respondents
shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 19, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining
grounds for relief.
Case 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP Document 6 Filed 03/19/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 5