Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
26-cv-1015-RSH-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PEDRO SIMON-JUAN,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1015-RSH-JLB
ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF Nos. 2, 3]
On February 11, 2026, petitioner Pedro Simon-Juan, an immigration detainee
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. See ECF No. 1. Petitioner has also moved for a temporary restraining order
and for appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 2, 3. Respondents have filed a return. ECF No.
8.
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Case 3:26-cv-01015-RSH-JLB Document 9 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 3

2
26-cv-1015-RSH-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, states in the Petition that he “has a final order of
removal since 9-14-23 by [an] Immigration Judge”; that he “has remained in ICE custody
since 7-9-2025”; and that “ICE has not been able to secure travel documents or deport
Petitioner to Guatemala due to the lack of diplomatic cooperation or practical ability to
carry out removals to Guatemala for Petitioner.” ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner argues, “[u]nder
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), post-final order detention beyond six months is
presumptively unreasonable if there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 2. Petitioner claims that this is the case here, and that
his continued detention violates due process. Id. He requests his immediate release. Id.
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statutory
provision authorizing detention of a noncitizen subject to a final order of removal beyond
the 	90-day 	removal 	period, 	and 	concluded 	that 	the 	“statute, 	read 	in 	light 	of 	the
Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period
reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” 533 U.S.
at 689. The Court held that after a six-month “presumptively reasonable period of
detention,” “once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond
with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701.
Here, the record reflects that Petitioner’s removal order of September 14, 2023 was
not final as of that date, because Petitioner appealed that removal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. See ECF No. 8-1, Ex. 3 (briefing schedule dated Mar. 31, 2025 for
appeal of Petitioner’s order of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(d) (“An order of removal made
by the immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the Act
shall become final … [i]f certified to the Board or Attorney General, upon the date of the
subsequent decision ordering removal.”). His appeal remained pending at the time of his
arrest 	on 	July 	9, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	8-1, 	Ex. 	1 	at 	3 	(Form 	I-213, 	Record 	of
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien: “SIMON will be remanded to Otay Mesa Detention
Facility pending his BIA appeal”). Petitioner does not mention his BIA appeal or provide
Case 3:26-cv-01015-RSH-JLB Document 9 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 3

3
26-cv-1015-RSH-JLB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
any information regarding its timing or status. Petitioner has therefore not established that
he is entitled to relief under 	Zadvydas, under which the six-month presumptively
reasonable period of detention begins when his order of removal becomes final.
Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED without prejudice. The motion for a temporary
restraining order [ECF No. 3] is DENIED. The Court likewise DENIES Petitioner’s
motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 2]. See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390
F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the decision to appoint counsel under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is within “the sound discretion of the trial court and is granted only in
exceptional circumstances”). The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
Case 3:26-cv-01015-RSH-JLB Document 9 Filed 03/12/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 3