Clervoyant v. Casey et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JONACK CLERVOYANT,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Senior Warden,
Imperial Regional Detention Facility; et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-0896-GPC-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Petitioner Jonack Clervoyant (“Petitioner”) is a noncitizen currently detained at the
Imperial Regional Detention Facility. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) ¶ 3. On February 12, 2026,
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging
his continued detention and naming the Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention
Facility, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ICE”)’s Field
Office Director for the San Diego Field Office, and several other individual agency
officials as respondents (“Respondents”). 	Id. For the following reasons, the Court
GRANTS the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court VACATES the hearing set
for February 27, 2026.
/ / /
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner is a national and citizen of Haiti. Pet. ¶ 21. On November 18, 2016,
Petitioner entered the country and was apprehended by immigration officials. Id.; ECF No.
4 (“Ret.”), Ex. 1. On December 2, 2016, Respondents was released on Alternative to
Detention and was paroled into the U.S. Ret., Ex. 1; Pet. ¶ 22. About two weeks after being
released on parole, ICE removed his GPS monitoring and informed Petitioner that further
check-ins were not required. Pet. ¶ 22.
Petitioner timely filed 	an 	affirmative asylum application 	and for Temporary
Protected Status (TPS). Id. ¶ 23. He was subsequently placed in removal proceedings. Id.
Petitioner received employment authorization, a social security card, and a driver’s license
and was working as a truck driver. Id. At the time of his re-arrest, he had a scheduled
immigration court date of July 15, 2027. Id.; ECF No. 1-2. Petitioner has not violated any
of the conditions of his release since being paroled into the U.S. Pet. ¶ 26.
On January 16, 2026, Petitioner was stopped at a border patrol immigration check
point while transporting cargo from Arizona to California. Id. ¶ 24; Ret., Ex. 2. He was
questioned about his citizenship and presented both his driver’s license and employment
authorization. Id. Petitioner informed the border patrol officers that he was from Haiti and
had current TPS status. Pet. ¶ 24. The officers found negative results for criminal records
but determined Petitioner was subject to redetermination. Ret., Ex. 2. They then detained
Petitioner. Id. Petitioner did not receive written notice of the reason for his re-detention or
a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. Id. After being detained, Petitioner was informed
that his immigration court date was scheduled “too far out” and “that he must appear for
an earlier court date.” Pet. ¶ 24. Petitioner was eventually transported to and remains at the
Imperial Regional Detention Facility. Id. ¶ 25.
B. Procedural Background
On February 12, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued immigration detention.
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ECF No. 1. On February 17, 2026, Respondent filed a response to the habeas petition.
ECF No. 4 (“Ret.”). On February 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF No. 5.
Petitioner presents two claims. First, Petitioner alleges that his detention without
written notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Pet. ¶¶ 38-41. Second, Petitioner alleges that his re-detention by
ICE was a categorical revocation of his release without consideration of his individualized
facts in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Id. ¶¶ 42-47.
Petitioner requests that the Court grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
ordering his release and enjoin Respondents from adding additional requirements to
Petitioner’s original release conditions. Pet. at 12.-13 1 Petitioner also requests the award
of Petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, as well as
under any other basis justified under law. Id. at 13.
II. 	STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Standard & Expedited Removal Proceedings
An arriving noncitizen seeking admission into the United States at a U.S. Port of
Entry is “processed either through expedited removal proceedings or through regular
removal proceedings.” 	Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir.
2019). The regular removal procedure is also known as “section 240 proceedings.” 240
proceedings involve an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge and the ability
for the individual to apply for asylum if he would be persecuted upon return to his home
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Noncitizens seeking asylum are guaranteed due process under the
5 th Amendment throughout this process. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
The DHS Secretary has discretion to release a noncitizen on parole during this
process. In one procedure, an arriving asylum seeker may be paroled “for urgent
1 Page numbers reflect CM/ECF pagination.
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humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). A separate
procedure puts the immigrant in conditional parole. Id. § 1226(a). In either case, to release
a noncitizen from custody requires a case-by-case determination, where the noncitizen
must “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a
danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future
proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).
The second, more streamlined process is expedited removal, governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. Under these proceedings, noncitizens can be ordered removed by an immigration
officer “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Because of the
truncated 	procedure, 	expedited 	removal 	is 	limited 	to 	noncitizens 	meeting 	several
requirements. First, a noncitizen is potentially eligible for expedited removal if he (1)
sought to procure immigration status or citizenship via fraud or false representations or
(2) “at the time of application for admission,” failed to satisfy certain documentation
requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), 1182(a)(7).
Second, expedited removal is further cabined to noncitizens who 1) are categorized as
“arriving in the United States,” or 2) have “not been admitted or paroled into the United
States” and cannot affirmatively show they have been “physically present in the United
States 	continuously 	for 	the 	2-year 	period 	immediately 	prior 	to 	the 	date 	of 	the
determination 	of 	inadmissibility.” 	Id. 	§ 	1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 	Within 	that 	second
requirement, the Attorney General can designate the population of noncitizens subject to
expedited removal. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
Once detained under expedited removal, if the noncitizen indicates an intention to
apply for asylum and the asylum officer finds the fear to return to be credible, the
applicant’s claim will be fully considered in a standard removal hearing. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 110 (2020).
B. 2025 Designation for Expedited Removal
The Attorney General has delegated the office’s expedited removal designation
power to the DHS Secretary. Before January 2025, DHS had only designated noncitizens
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as eligible for expedited removal if they were identified as “arriving,” had arrived by sea
within the last two years, or had been apprehended within 14 days of entry and 100 miles
of the border. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924, 68924
(Nov. 13, 2002); Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, 48879
(Aug. 11, 2004). In January 2025, DHS published the 2025 Designation, authorizing
expedited removal to be exercised to the “full scope of its statutory authority.” Designating
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139, 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025). DHS has stated
that this full scope applies to noncitizens “who are encountered anywhere in the United
States more than 100 air miles from a U.S. international land border, and who have been
continuously present in the United States for at least 14 days but for less than two years.”
Id.
In its implementation of the 2025 Designation, “the Government began targeting
for expedited removal people already in section 240 removal proceedings, many of whom
are pursuing asylum and other collateral relief.” Make the Rd. New York v. Noem, 805 F.
Supp. 3d 139, 152 (D.D.C. 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction: Section 1252(g) – Decisions by Attorney General
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) states that, with limited exceptions, “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders against any alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added); Reno
v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). In that light, §
1252(g) is a narrow statutory provision that concentrates on those three discrete actions.
Reno, 525 U.S. at 482. Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful
practices merely because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-
Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2025).
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Respondents argue that the § 1252(g) bar applies because Petitioner’s claims arise
“from the decision or action by the [the government] to commence proceedings.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(g). However, unlike Respondents’ characterization, Petitioner does not
challenge the decision to commence proceedings or even the legitimacy of the removal
proceedings, which had begun before his re-detainment. Instead, Petitioner challenges the
legality of detention during removal proceedings. Pet. ¶¶ 38-47.
Further, a decision to detain Petitioner does not fall within the three discrete
actions identified in § 1252(g) and, thus, would not deprive the Court’s jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Aditya W. H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 704 (D. Minn. 2025) (finding a claim
against detention did not fall under Section 1252(g)); Mahdawi v. Trump, 781 F. Supp. 3d
214, 224-26 (D. Vt. 2025) (same); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 901 (D.
Minn. 2020) (“Although the court may not review discretionary decisions made by
immigration authorities, it may review immigration-related detentions to determine if
they comport with the demands of the Constitution.”).
Thus, § 1252(g) does not present a jurisdictional bar to the instant petition.
B. Merits
Petitioner claims his detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
and the APA. Pet. ¶¶ 38-47. Respondents maintain that Petitioner is mandatorily detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that his detainment does not violate due process. Ret. at
5-10.
i. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process
1. Entitlement to Due Process Rights
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Though
noncitizens do not enjoy constitutional protections outside our borders, once a noncitizen
“enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
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Under this wide umbrella, “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens
to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993).
Here, Petitioner has “passed through our gates” and “may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process
of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). Because
Petitioner has developed an interest in remaining during his time here, “the procedures
used to remove [him] must adequately protect” that interest. Make the Rd. New York v.
Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 139, 159 (D.D.C. 2025).
The Respondents, however, rely heavily on Thuraissigiam and contend that the
Petitioner is only afforded the due process rights statutorily afforded by Congress. Pet. at
7. Thus, in their view, Petitioner’s detention does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause because the statutory authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which they assert
Petitioner has been detained under, does not afford him a right to a determination by this
Court as to whether his release is warranted nor a right to a bond hearing before an
immigration judge. Id. at 7-8.
However, this is a misreading of Thuraissigiam. As Respondents acknowledge in
their return, Thuraissigiam “addressed the due process rights of…inadmissible arriving
noncitizens.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). In that case, the respondent was a noncitizen
detained close to the border and shortly after unlawful entry, and keeping those
characteristics in mind, the Supreme Court held that those “in respondent's position ha[ve]
only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep't of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (emphasis added). This
holding only reinforced the precedent that noncitizens “on the threshold of initial entry
stand[ ] on a different footing” than those who have “passed through our gates.” Mezei,
345 U.S. 212.
In this case, Petitioner is not an “arriving” noncitizen but one that has present in our
country for over nine years. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the
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Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86, 87 (1903) (finding a noncitizen was entitled to due process before removal despite
having spent only four days in the US).
2. Government’s Adherence to Due Process
Generally, due process protections depend on the situation and must account for (1)
the private interest at issue, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, and (3) the Government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334–35 (1976). Here, Petitioner alleges that he was detained while his asylum
application was pending and while on parole without any opportunity to be heard prior to
being arrested and detained. Pet. ¶¶ 38-41.
First, Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, which developed over the
more than nine years he resided in the United States. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482-483 (1972); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from
imprisonment—from 	government 	custody, 	detention, 	or 	other 	forms 	of 	physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). This
liberty interest applies to Petitioner, even in his parole status. For example, Morrissey—
though analyzing the criminal parole context—found that “the liberty of a parolee,
although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee and often others…[thus it] must be seen
within the protection of the [Fifth] Amendment.” 408 U.S. at 482.
In the deportation context, detention has minimum due process protections.
Generally, detention is seen “as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,”
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003), and the government holds the discretion to
detain an immigrant pending removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, that discretion is not
unbounded. Detention pending 	removal proceedings has “two regulatory goals”—
ensuring future appearances and preventing danger to the community. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This logically also extends to the granting of parole and its
revocation. Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[Petitioner’s]
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release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the
government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and
[Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those
criteria.”). These primary goals provide guidance for the floor of due process afforded to
noncitizens for detention and parole.
Further, Petitioner has a Fifth Amendment right to due process of law in
deportation proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Here, Petitioner was
initially provided due process for his removal proceedings following his entry into the
United States on November 18, 2016. Pet. ¶ 1. He was released on parole three weeks after
being originally detained, and approximately two weeks after his release, his GPS
monitoring was removed. Id. Petitioner was also informed that no additional ICE check-
ins would be required. Id. He has timely applied for asylum, received TPS, and obtained
a work permit, social security card, and a driver’s license. Id. ¶ 2. He has also appeared
before the immigration court at his scheduled hearings. Id. The proceedings have created
a protectable expectation of his due process rights in his removal proceedings and the fair
procedures this country guarantees. Thus, Petitioner was entitled to due process in his
parole revocation and detainment. Particularly, he was entitled to both notification of
revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to be heard and
contest the determination.
Second, the procedures used present a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of
those interests and are not outweighed by the Government’s interest. In Make the Rd. New
York v. Noem, which considers the application of the 2025 Designation, the court
determined that “[b]efore removing someone through expedited removal, the Government
must make several threshold determinations: whether the individual has been continually
present in the United States for two years; whether they have previously been admitted or
paroled; whether they are inadmissible on one of the grounds that make them eligible for
expedited removal; whether they have a credible fear of persecution; and whether they are
a citizen, lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee.” 805 F. Supp. 3d 139, 163 (D.D.C.
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2025). Each of these determinations present a substantial risk of error and harm to
Petitioner’s interests in remaining at liberty. This is especially true in regard to the credible
fear interview—where individuals might not be appropriately referred for the interview or
not 	afforded 	an 	effective 	opportunity 	to 	be 	heard—and 	the 	continual 	presence
determination. Id. at 163-65.
Respondents have also failed to demonstrate a significant interest in Petitioner’s
detention. Respondents did not provide Petitioner individualized notice or reasoning prior
to his arrest and detention on January 16, 2026, and Respondent has presented no
legitimate reason for why those decisions were made. Petitioner does not have a criminal
record, complied with the conditions of his parole, and appeared for his immigration court
hearings prior to detention. Pet. ¶¶ 1-2, 26. There is no indication that he is a flight risk or
presents a danger to the community, which strike at the core, guiding goals for parole, and
Respondent has not supplied any additional information to the contrary. Denying
Petitioner notice and reasoning on revocation of his parole took away a meaningful
opportunity to contest and violated due process. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032-35;
Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146-47 (D. Or. 2025) (D. Or. July 9, 2025).
Finally, “[t]he Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and
repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 	U.S. 	244, 	267 	(1994). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	limited 	retroactivity 	under
the Due Process Clause under its “prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation.”
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)). Abiding to this principle, “administrative
rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
The 2025 Designation’s language does not clearly require that it be applied to
individuals who entered the United States prior to its effective date. Therefore, executing
the Designation over Petitioner who entered the country before the Designation’s effective
date violated the Due Process Clause.
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For those reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s due process rights have been
violated.
ii. 	Administrative Procedure Act
Under the APA, an agency action may be set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
An action is an abuse of discretion if the agency “entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). For a challenged agency action
to be upheld, the agency “must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 52 (1983) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
Petitioner argues Respondent violated APA when they detained him without notice
or explanation. Pet. ¶ 47.
1. Legal Standards under the APA
“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704;
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61–62 (2004). Reviewable agency
action includes “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Agency action is deemed
final if it (1) “impose[s] an obligation, den[ies] a right or fix[es] some legal relationship as
a consummation of the administrative process,” Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948), and (2) is an action “by which ‘rights or obligations have
been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow,’” Bennett v. Spear, 520
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U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
2. Failure to Abide by APA
In general, “[r]elease reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen
is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137
(9th Cir. 2018). Following this, a noncitizen should not be returned to custody unless the
purposes of the parole have been served. Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1144-
45 (D. Or. 2025). Additionally, under regulation, parole must be terminated upon written
notice after an individualized determination that the purposes no longer apply. 8 C.F.R. §
212.5(e)(2)(i); see, e.g., Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1146-47 (finding parolee must receive
written notice of impending revocation with reasons for revocation); Castellon v. Kaiser,
No. 1:25-CV-00968 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2373425, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025)
(finding a case-by-case analysis is needed to revoke parole); but see Doe v. Noem, No. 25-
1384, 2025 WL 2630395, at *9 (1st Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding an individualized
termination 	of 	parole 	is 	not 	required). 	In 	sum, 	to 	meet 	statutory 	and 	regulatory
requirements, revocation should only occur when the parole’s purpose is served, and the
noncitizen is provided written notice. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1144-46.
However, neither of the other two conditions were met here. First, Petitioner was
not provided any notice as to the termination of his parole. Second, Respondent must
provide at minimum some reasoning explaining why the Petitioner would now be
considered a flight risk or danger to the community. See Castellon, 2025 WL 2373425, at
*12; Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032-35 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). Given
Respondent has not attempted to justify the revocation for Petitioner, this Court holds the
Respondent has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA.
3. Initiation of Expedited Removal Proceedings
The application of expedited removal is limited to noncitizens who meet several
requirements. One of those requirements cabins initiation of expedited removal to
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noncitizens who (1) are categorized as “arriving in the United States,” or (2) have “not
been admitted or paroled into the United States” and cannot affirmatively show they have
been 	“physically present in 	the United States continuously for the 2-year period
immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii); see also Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights v. Noem, No. 25
Civ. 872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *30 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025).
Petitioner is no longer an “arriving” noncitizen after having resided here for over
nine years. In addition, beyond the fact that he has been present in this country for a 9-
year period, he also has been paroled into the United States. Therefore, the Court finds
that Petitioner could not be subject to § 1225.
In sum, Respondent’s actions are arbitrary, fail to adhere to the law, and therefore,
violate the APA.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning above, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within 72 hours of this
Order’s filing, confirming Petitioner’s release on his original parole conditions. Further, in
aid of the Court’s jurisdiction, which is hereby retained, the Court ORDERS pursuant to
the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, that Respondent shall not cause Petitioner to be re-
detained during the pendency of his removal proceedings without prior leave of this Court.
The Clerk of Court SHALL enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close this case.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 19, 2026
2 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees. Pet. at 13. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate EAJA fee application
within 30 days of the issuance of this Order.
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