Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MADINAKHON KHAKIMOVA,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF OTAY MESA
DETENTION CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00795-RBM-MSB
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Madinakhon Khakimova’s (“Petitioner”)
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). 	(Doc. 1.)
Petitioner claims she has been detained since September 26, 2024 without a bond hearing
in 	violation 	of 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause, 	the 	Immigration 	and
Nationality Act (“INA”), and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (Id. at 6.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kyrgyzstan, entered the United States without
authorization on September 26, 2024. 	(Doc. 6 at 2.) 	Petitioner was “processed for
expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)” and transferred into the custody of United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for removal. (Id.) Petitioner then
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expressed a fear of return to Kyrgyzstan. 	(Id.) 	After being interviewed by an asylum
officer, Petitioner received a positive credible fear determination. (Id.) On November 18,
2024, Petitioner was served a Notice to Appear and placed in removal proceedings before
an immigration judge (“IJ”). (Id.) “On August 25, 2025, the IJ ordered Petitioner removed
and granted withholding of removal under the [INA] as to Russia and Kyrgyzstan.” (Id.)
On December 19, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings,
“asking the IJ to permit her to withdraw her applications for relief and allow her to
voluntarily depart to Kyrgyzstan.” (Id. at 4 n.2; Doc. 1 at 6.) “Petitioner later withdrew
her request on” February 6, 2026. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 6 at 4 n.2.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims her “continued detention has become unreasonable because her
removal is not reasonably foreseeable.” (Doc. 7 at 6–7; see Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner also
claims that “ICE derived [sic] from its own policy by detaining [her] after withholding was
granted,” in violation of the APA. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 1
1 Petitioner does not identify any applicable policy from which ICE “deviated.” (See Doc.
7 at 3 (alleging ICE has a “long-standing policy [ ] to release non-citizens immediately
following a grant of asylum”) (emphasis added).) 	The Court declines to consider any
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Respondents argue that: (1) the Petition is not ripe for review because the
presumptively reasonable period of detention has not expired; and (2) “[e]ven if the Court
declined to deny the [P]etition on this basis, Petitioner has neither overcome the
presumption nor shown that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” (Doc. 6 at 1.) The Court agrees.
The Supreme Court has recognized a six-month presumptively reasonable period of
detention after a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 701 (2001). 	After the six-month period expires, Petitioner has the initial burden of
showing “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Id. 	Once the noncitizen meets this initial burden, the
burden shifts to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”
Id. 	If “removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen must be released. Id. at 699–700; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(3) (“If the [noncitizen] does not leave or is not removed within the [90-day]
removal period, the [noncitizen], pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”).
Section 1231’s detention authority applies during the “‘removal period’ . . . which
begins 	on 	the 	latest 	of 	three 	dates: 	(1) 	the 	date 	the 	order 	of 	removal 	becomes
administratively final; (2) if the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders
a stay of the removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court’s final order; or (3) if the
[noncitizen] is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the
[noncitizen] is released from detention or confinement.” 	Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882
F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii)) (cleaned up).
claims raised in Petitioner’s Reply that were not asserted in the Petition. 	See Cacoperdo
v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1994) (“A Traverse is not the proper pleading
to raise additional grounds for relief.”); Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose, —F. Supp. 3d—, 2025
WL 2998361, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025). 	As such, and in light of the disposition
herein, the APA claim is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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In this case, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed and granted withholding of removal to
Russia and Kyrgyzstan on August 25, 2025. 	(Doc. 6-1 at 2–5.) 	Both Petitioner and
Respondents reserved the right to appeal, which expired on September 24, 2025. (See Doc.
6-1 at 5l Doc. 7 at 2.)2 As such, Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final
on September 24, 2025, and the presumptively reasonable six-month period will expire on
March 24, 2026. See Coria v. Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2024) (“By statute,
an order of removal ‘become[s] final upon’ a decision of the BIA affirming that order or
the expiration of the period for seeking BIA review.”) (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(47)(B)). As such, Petitioner’s detention is still presumptively reasonable.
Many 	district 	courts, 	including 	this 	Court, 	have 	found 	that 	the 	six-month
presumption is rebuttable. 	See Ndandu v. Noem, —F. Supp. 3d— , 2026 WL 25848, at
*3–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (citing cases). “[W]ithin the six-month period, ‘the petitioner
must claim and prove [ ] that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable’ to overcome the
presumption.” 	Id. at *4 (quoting Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 398
(D.N.J. 2025)) (emphasis in original); see Cesar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D.
Wis. 2008) (“[T]he presumption scheme merely suggests that the burden the detainee must
carry within the first six months . . . is a heavier one than after six months has elapsed.”).
However, 	Petitioner 	fails 	to 	provide 	any 	argument 	or 	evidence 	to 	overcome 	this
presumption. Cf. Ndandu, 2026 WL 25848, at *4–6 (holding petitioner, who was detained
for less than six months, overcame presumption of reasonableness where he was granted
deferral of removal to his home country, the government has unsuccessfully tried to remove
him, and the government failed to identify any other countries willing to accept him).
2 The Court notes that portions of Petitioner’s Reply include demonstrably inaccurate and
contradictory factual assertions which lead to inapplicable arguments and assertions. For
example, Petitioner acknowledges that she was ordered removed on August 25, 2025, and
that the removal order became final on September 24, 2025 (Doc. 7 at 2), but then
incorrectly claims she was granted withholding of removal on June 7, 2025 and that
Petitioner and Respondents both waived appeal (see id. at 11).
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Even if the presumptively reasonable period passed, Petitioner raises no argument
or reason as to why her removal is not significantly likely in the foreseeable future. (See
generally Doc. 1; Doc. 7.) Petitioner therefore fails to satisfy her lesser, initial burden of
demonstrating there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	has 	not 	been
unconstitutionally prolonged under Zadvydas. 	The Court acknowledges that Petitioner’s
detention may at some point become unreasonably prolonged and due process may, at that
time, necessitate certain procedural safeguards. 	The Petition is therefore DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to allow Petitioner to seek relief in the future, if necessary.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Petition 	is 	DENIED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Petitioner may file an amended petition curing the identified deficiencies
on or before April 17, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 17, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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