Rahman v. Casey et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAHBUBUR RAHMAN,
Petitioners,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the
Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-646 JLS (MMP)
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND (2)
DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
(ECF Nos. 1, 2)
Presently before the Court are Petitioner Mahbubur Rahman’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO,” ECF No. 2). Also before the Court is Respondents’
Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 7) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF
No. 8). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Bangladesh who entered the United States on
August 17, 2024, and was briefly detained by the Department of Homeland Security. Pet.
¶ 16. Petitioner was released on parole valid through October 8, 2025. Ret. at 2. Petitioner
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complied fully with all conditions of his parole, attended all check-ins, and has no criminal
history. 	Pet. ¶¶ 19–20. 	On November 13, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained when he
appeared for his regular ICE check-up appointment. Id. ¶ 21. Petitioner was not accused
of any violation, provided any advance notice, or provided an individualized custody
determination prior to his re-detention. Id. ¶ 22.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(g). Ret.
at 5. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents claim that “Petitioner’s claims
necessarily arise from the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to commence
removal proceedings against him.” Ret. at 4 (simplified). The Court disagrees.
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Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions
that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,
2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). 	Section 1252(g) “does not
prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion
connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’
objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their
constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings
or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Traverse at 4–5. Rather, Petitioner is
challenging the legality of his parole revocation, alleged wrongful arrest, and continued
detention. Id. Petitioner is enforcing his “constitutional rights to due process in the context
of the removal proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal
order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Navarro Sanchez v. Larose et al., 25-cv-2396 JES (MMP), 2025 WL 2770629, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the Court had jurisdiction in a similar matter); Noori v. Larose
et al., 25-cv-1824 GPC (MSB), 2025 WL 2800149, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (same).
II. 	Merits
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or
consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶
36. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
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U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and
constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 6. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted
humanitarian parole, granting him parole for a year.1 Pet. ¶ 17; ECF No. 7-1. Petitioner is
1 Respondents contend that because Petitioner’s parole expired after a year, any due process arguments
are foreclosed. Ret. at 6–9. The Court disagrees because Petitioner’s liberty “interest did not expire
along with Petitioner’s parole agreement.” Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136
(W.D. Wash. 2025). “Once established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which
may only be revoked through methods that comport with due process, such as a hearing in front of a
neutral party to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detainment is warranted.” Id. (citing Padilla v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)). Therefore, the expiration
of Petitioner’s parole does not impact the liberty interest in his release. See, e.g., Omer G. G. v. Kaiser,
No. 1:25-CV-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (finding the
expiration of petitioner’s parole did not extinguish his liberty interest); Quiroga-Chaparro v. Warden of
Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-1731 AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31,
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not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in
the United States since August 2024. Pet. ¶ 16. Upon arrival, he was determined to not be
a danger to the community or a flight risk and has attended his check-in appointments. Id.
¶¶ 19–22. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal
due process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.
See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after
her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither
a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in
remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149,
at *10 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our
country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth
Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-
1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner
had a protected liberty interest in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
Id.
2025) (same); Kazybayeva v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-0421-GPC-MMP, 2026 WL
280478, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (same).
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The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for his family and
continuing the asylum process. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and
friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Traverse at 4. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner
should be paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,
there is no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”).
Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble,
has work authorization, and has filed an asylum application. 	Traverse at 13. 	“Once a
noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to
present 	evidence 	of 	materially 	changed 	circumstances—namely, 	evidence 	that 	the
noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d
at 1760. 	Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their
response, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of his parole. 	See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not
received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is
high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine
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whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5
(quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas
corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due
process grounds).
III. 	Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 10. The EAJA provides in part:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within
thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an
application for fees and other expenses which shows that the
party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an
itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended
and 	the 	rate 	at 	which 	fees 	and 	other 	expenses 	were
computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
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determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the
civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under
the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). 	The Court 	ORDERS 	Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting
parole. 	The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is
entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral
decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The Government shall bear
the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger
to the community or a risk of flight.2 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status
Report by March 4, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released.
Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and
corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are
instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee
application.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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