Singh v. Warden of lmperial Regional Detention Facility et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HARBEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden,
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-589-RSH-BJW
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On January 29, 2026, petitioner Harbeet Singh filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner, a citizen of
India, is detained by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Imperial
Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. Respondents have filed a
return. ECF No. 4. As set forth below, the Court grants the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On February 18, 2025, Petitioner applied for entry to the United States from Mexico
at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry. ECF No. 1 ¶ 21; ECF No. 4-1 at 4. Petitioner did not possess
any valid entry documents. He was taken into immigration custody and thereafter placed
in removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for relief from removal, including through
seeking asylum. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 65. On October 24, 2025, Petitioner had an individual
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merits hearing on his relief application before an immigration judge. ECF No. 4 at 3. The
immigration judge denied relief from removal, and ordered Petitioner removed to India. Id.
On November 6, 2025, Petitioner timely filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Id. His appeal remains pending.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which
provides, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings.
The issue presented here is whether, in the circumstances of this case and at this point in
time, applying this mandatory detention regime violates Petitioner’s due process rights.
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the Petition, relying on
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). ECF No. 4 at 4–5. That provision states that, except as otherwise
provided in Section 1252, and notwithstanding any other provision of law including
8 U.S.C. § 2241, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that because Petitioner challenges his
detention during removal proceedings, that detention “arises from” the Attorney General’s
decision to commence such proceedings. ECF No. 4 at 4–5.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the jurisdiction-stripping provision in Section
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1252(g) narrowly, limiting it to “three discrete actions”: the “‘decision or action’ to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.–Arab
Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The
Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that may
be part of the deportation process.” Id. In a later decision, the Court explained that it did
not interpret Section 1252(g) “to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to “arise
from” the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, [the Court] read the
language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018).
Here, Petitioner is seeking to review the legality of his detention, arguing that the
length of time he has been detained here is unlawful—rather than challenging the decision
to commence proceedings, the adjudication of his removal case, or an action to execute his
removal order. He does not seek to litigate in this Court questions of whether he is
removable or whether he is entitled to relief from removal. The relief he seeks here is
release from custody or a bond hearing at which his release may be considered by an
immigration judge. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim is not barred by Section
1252(g).
B. 	Whether Petitioner Has a Due Process Claim
Respondents argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), Petitioner has no due process
rights beyond those that Congress has provided, and that his due process claim therefore
fails. ECF No. 4 at 10–11. In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court rejected a habeas
petitioner’s argument that the due process clause conferred rights to challenge his
expedited removal beyond those established by Congress, stating that “an alien at the
threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.”
591 U.S. at 107. The petitioner in that case had “attempted to enter the country illegally
and was apprehended just 25 yards from the border.” Id. The Supreme Court determined
that the “political department of the government” had plenary authority to admit or exclude
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aliens seeking initial entry, and thus “an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights
regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 139–40.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts have
adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b). See Petgrave v.
Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“As far as Petitioner is concerned,
whatever procedure Congress has authorized is sufficient due process.”); Gonzales Garcia
v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Petitioner is on the threshold of
initial entry into the United States and . . . he accordingly is not entitled to procedural
protections beyond those provided by statute.”).
Most courts have ruled otherwise. See Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-98-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25,
2025) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process
requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) … ‘essentially
all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.’”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL
5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019)); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding
that 	an 	unreasonably 	prolonged 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b) 	without 	an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). This Court agrees with the majority
position that a person detained under Section 1225(b) may assert a due process challenge
to prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing.
This Court likewise agrees with those district courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as
circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to admission, rather than limiting that
person’s ability to challenge detention. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D.
Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in [Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens
being held under § 1225(b) may be held indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process
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implications, nor that such aliens have no due process rights whatsoever.”); Hernandez v.
Wofford, No. 25-cv-986-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 2420390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2025) (“Although the Supreme Court has described Congress’s power over the ‘policies
and rules for exclusion of aliens’ as ‘plenary,’ and held that this court must generally ‘defer
to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,’ it is well-established
that the Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the
political branches may exercise their plenary authority’—through detention or otherwise.”)
(citations omitted); Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The
holding in Thuraissigiam does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ due process claims which seek to
vindicate a right to a bond hearing with certain procedural protections.”).
Respondents also argue that a much older case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207–09 (1953), establishes that arriving aliens subject to a mandatory
detention scheme, regardless of the length of their detention, never become entitled by the
due process clause to a bond hearing. ECF No. 4 at 8–9. This Court does not read Mezei to
establish such a proposition. Mezei involved a noncitizen who had been “permanently
excluded from the United States on security grounds but [who was] stranded in his
temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not take him back.” 345
U.S. at 207. In 1950, the Attorney General determined, pursuant to emergency regulations
that based on certain confidential information, the noncitizen should be excluded from the
United States “for security reasons.” Id. at 208-10, 214–15. The Supreme Court rejected
the noncitizen’s constitutional challenge, citing “considerations” of “danger to the national
security”:
Thus we do not think that respondent’s continued exclusion deprives
him of any statutory or constitutional right. It is true that resident aliens
temporarily detained pending expeditious consummation of deportation
proceedings may be released on bond by the Attorney General whose
discretion is subject to judicial review. By that procedure aliens
uprooted 	from 	our 	midst 	may 	rejoin 	the 	community 	until 	the
Government effects their leave. An exclusion proceeding grounded on
danger 	to 	the 	national 	security, 	however, 	presents 	different
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considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for such
release exists. Ordinarily to admit an alien barred from entry on
security grounds nullifies the very purpose of the exclusion proceeding
….
Id. at 215 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
This Court agrees with those courts that distinguish the constitutional holding in
Mezei as addressing the national security considerations presented in that case. See
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Mezei Court
explicitly grounded its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and
the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei presented a threat to national
security.”); Lett v. Decker, 346 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Mezei may compel
the conclusion that arriving aliens already excluded on national security grounds are not
entitled to a bond hearing prior to their arranged deportation. However, Mezei does not
compel the categorical conclusion that all arriving aliens may be subject to prolonged
confinement without a bond hearing.”); Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (finding Mezei
inapposite to the issue of whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates due
process); Rash v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-8-LL-DEB, 2026 WL 249324, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
30, 2026) (same). Here, in contrast, neither the Attorney General nor any other government
component has made a determination that Petitioner should be excluded on grounds of
national security; Petitioner is not seeking to circumvent such a determination by obtaining
release into the United States. Petitioner is merely seeking a bond hearing.
Respondents also rely on Barrera-Echavarria v. Rinson, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), superseded by statute as stated in Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 837 (9th
Cir. 2002). Barrera-Echavarria stated that Mezei “suggests that the Court found that
excludable aliens simply enjoy no constitutional right to be paroled into the United States,
even if the only alternative is prolonged detention.” 44 F.3d at 1450. But the Ninth Circuit
went on to say that the case before it did not involve indefinite detention; instead, the
noncitizen in that case was subject to a set of regulations known as the Cuban Parole Plan,
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under which he had “the opportunity on an annual basis to show that since the previous
review he has changed his behavior and would no longer constitute a danger to society if
paroled.” Id. This case, too, is inapposite here. Petitioner here has never received a
consideration of whether he should be granted release on bond, and it appears that in
Respondents’ view, no length of detention would entitle him to such a review.
The Court concludes that it has authority to review whether Petitioner’s detention,
pursuant to a scheme of mandatory detention, has become unconstitutionally prolonged.
C. 	Whether Petitioner’s Detention is Prolonged in Violation of Due Process
In determining whether Petitioner’s detention has become prolonged, the Court
applies a six-factor balancing test used by some district courts. See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp.
3d at 773–74; Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019). That
test considers: (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the
likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. See Kydyrali,
499 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74.
Here, Petitioner has been detained for just over one year. Respondents argue that
“[i]n general, as detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of
permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.” ECF No. 4 at 11–12 (quoting
Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-cv-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
20, 2023)). This proposition, applied to Petitioner’s length of detention, favors a bond
hearing. The fact that courts have granted habeas relief in some other cases involving
longer periods of detention does not indicate that Petitioner is ineligible for such relief; still
other courts have granted habeas relief in cases involving shorter periods of detention.1
1 See, e.g., Hoyos Amado v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 25-cv-2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL
3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months
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Petitioner’s conditions of detention also favor setting a bond hearing. Courts in this
district 	have 	found 	that 	conditions 	at 	the 	Otay 	Mesa 	Detention 	Center 	are
“indistinguishable from penal confinement,” and that this factor weighs in favor of
petitioners’ due process arguments of prolonged detention. Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at
773; see Hoyos Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *6. The likely duration of future detention
also slightly favors Petitioner here, where his appeal was filed approximately three months
ago.
As to responsibility for delay, Respondents state that “DHS requested some short
continuances,” but that in contrast, Petitioner has “sought and obtained multiple prolonged
continuances.” ECF No. 4 at 14. Respondents rely on “adjournment codes” from the
immigration court’s docket which they contend support this conclusion. Reviewing the
record, the Court does not assign responsibility to either party for the length of time taken
to reach this stage of the proceedings. These factors are therefore neutral.
Finally, on the record presented, the Court is not in a position to assess the likelihood
that the proceedings will result in a final order of removal; this factor is also neutral.
On balance, the Court determines that the applicable factors indicate that Petitioner’s
detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonable and violates due process.
Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents
must justify his continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that
without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”) (collecting cases);
Tanoyan v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-00815-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 28, 2025) (“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period …
qualifies as prolonged.”); Gao v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2084-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 2770633,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention for over 10
months without a bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances described
above, has become unreasonable and violates due process.”); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F.
Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“Petitioner has been in immigration detention …
approximately one year. District courts have found shorter lengths of detention … without
a bond hearing to be unreasonable.”) (collecting cases).
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Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released. See Singh v.
Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake”
warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing
evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of
bond”); see also Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that “the
BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond
hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are directed to
arrange an individualized bond hearing for petitioner Harbeet Singh before an immigration
court within seven (7) days of this order as described above. The Court declines to order
further declaratory relief. To the extent Petitioner seeks to recover attorneys’ fees, he must
do so by noticed motion in a manner consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Local Rules of this Court, and the undersigned’s chambers pretrial procedures.
The hearing set for February 26, 2026 is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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