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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
IVAN RAMON RODRIGUEZ ALBA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv561-LL-DEB
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 5]
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Rodriguez Alba’s Amended Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 5). Also before the Court
is Respondents’ Return in Opposition to the Habeas Petition (“Response,” ECF No. 10).
Petitioner also filed a Traverse. ECF No. 11. 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Cuban national, came to the United States on January 21, 2024 through
a CBP One Appointment. Pet. at 2. On the same day, Petitioner was given humanitarian
parole and he was released into the United States. Id. His work authorization documents
are marked “C11,” which indicates he received a form of humanitarian parole. Id. On
January 29, 2025, Petitioner was pulled over by highway patrol for an alleged traffic
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violation and taken into custody. Id. at 3. Petitioner was not given any reason why his
parole was being revoked or a chance to be heard. Id. (citing Exhibit A, Decl. of Mr.
Rodriguez Alba, ¶¶ 4-5). Accordingly, Petitioner argues that his detention violates Due
Process and the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). Id. at 3-11.
Respondents in their Return state that “Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictionally
barred.” Return at 2. Respondents also argue that because Petitioner’s parole expired on
April 6, 2025, he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Return at 2-6 (citing
Exhibit 1). Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to release because the government violated
his due process rights by revoking his parole without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Traverse at 6. Petitioner also argues that the I-94 is not specific to noncitizens paroled under
the humanitarian parole statute, and that the alleged April 6, 2025 expiration date is
unlikely to bind humanitarian paroles who are governed under the parole framework. Id.
In sum, Petitioner argues that Petitioner’s parole thus remains active. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
1. 	Jurisdiction Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C.
§ 	1252(g). 	Section 	1252(g) 	states 	that 	“[e]xcept 	as 	provided 	in 	this 	section 	and
notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section
2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction
to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The Court finds § 1252(g) does not bar its jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. The
Supreme Court has explained that § 1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction for the “universe of
deportation claims” but instead “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney
General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
482 (1999); see also Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *2
(9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we should read § 1252(g)
narrowly.”). The Supreme Court later reiterated this narrow application of § 1252(g):
“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to
‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language
to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 294 (2018) (citation omitted). Petitioner is not challenging the commencement of
removal proceedings but is instead claiming a lack of legal authority to detain him for a
prolonged time without a bond hearing during proceedings. See Ibarra-Perez, 2025 WL
2461663, at *2 (noting that a claim based on a lack of legal authority to execute a removal
order due to a violation of a court order, the Constitution, INA, or international law, does
not 	challenge 	the 	decision 	or 	action 	to 	execute 	a 	removal 	order). 	Therefore,
§ 1252(g) does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter.
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2. 	Revocation of Parole
Petitioner argues that revocation of his parole, without reasoning or an opportunity
to be heard denied him of his due process rights. Pet. at 8. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the State
deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
“Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty
the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.”
Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2025)
(citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be
within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual
from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their
liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’”
Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has
the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after
that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected liberty interest in remaining
out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-
20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that “[i]t is the government’s position that Petitioner is subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).” Response at 4-6. Respondents contend that
“[w]hile Petitioner was previously released from custody on parole, his parole was
terminated and, in any event, has expired. After Petitioner was detained on January 31,
2025, he was served with a Notice to Appear, which served to terminate his parole status.”
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Id. at 4-5. The Court disagrees. On January 30, 2024, Petitioner was granted humanitarian
parole and was released into the United States. Pet. at 2. At the time of Petitioner’s release,
he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk. Id. Petitioner has
complied with the conditions of his parole, but in January 2025, ICE arrested him. Pet. at
2-3; see also ECF No. 5-1, Decl. of Rodriguez Alba ¶ 3. Petitioner has a protected liberty
interest in remaining out of custody. 	See, e.g., 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4
(“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
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a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody in light of his initial release.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in continuing to work and continuing
the process of seeking asylum. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and
friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason and without an opportunity to be heard.
Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should be released because he posed no
danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings
have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to
the community or a flight risk.”). There is nothing in the record to show that Petitioner has
a criminal record, nor has he been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble. See docket.
“Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him
merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760.
“Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed
circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a
flight risk. . . .” Id.
Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response,
do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant revocation
of his parole. 	See generally Response. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner has not received
any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’
because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine
whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5
(quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)).
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Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Response.
Therefore, because Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole in violation of the Due
Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. Larose et al., No. 25-
cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting a TRO based on a
procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-deprivation
hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas corpus
releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process
grounds).1
Regarding Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s parole is expired, as an initial
matter, the Court notes that Respondents have discrepant dates in their Response as to what
date the parole expired (April 6, 2025 or August 28, 2025). See Return at 2 (citing Exhibit
1 at 2). Petitioner disputes that his parole has expired. Traverse at 2-3, 5. Even assuming
arguendo that his parole has expired, the Court disagrees with Respondent that an
expiration of parole automatically extinguishes any due process claim. Courts have
repeatedly held that liberty interests do not expire when parole does. See, e.g., Osartin v.
Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25-cv-3612-JES-MSB, 2026 WL 280077, at *2 (S.D.
1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be resolved
on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA
based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of
petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the
revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized
determination or provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”).
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Cal. Feb. 3, 2026). “When he was released from his initial detention on parole, Petitioner
took with him a liberty interest which is entitled to the full protections of the due process
clause.” Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
Rejecting similar arguments from the government, the court held that “this private interest
did not expire along with Petitioner’s parole agreement. Once established, Petitioner’s
interest in liberty is a constitutional right which may only be revoked through methods that
comport with due process.” Id.; see also Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-
01551-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 3072687, at *11 (D. Nev. Nov. 3, 2025) (“Petitioner has a
fundamental interest in freedom from physical confinement, and that liberty interest is
particularly strong given his initial release from detention in 2022, and the fact that
Respondents did not seek his return to custody upon the expiration of his parole in
December 2022, or in the three years since.”); Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-01471-
KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“[P]etitioner’s liberty
interest did not expire along with his parole.”).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting
release. The Court ORDERS, prior to any revocation of Petitioner’s parole or re-detention
of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for the revocation or his re-
detention and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is
warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.2 The Clerk of
Court SHALL CLOSE the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 19, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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