Prabhpreet v. LaRose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SINGH PRABHPREET,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE; PATRICK
DIVVER: KRISTI NOEM; and PAMELA
BONDI,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-393-JES-SBC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Singh Prabhpreet’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s order
to show cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 7. After due
consideration and for the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native of India who entered the United States at the San Ysidro Port
of Entry when he was 18 on December 5, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 9. He was apprehended at
the border that same day. Id. He claimed credible fear and received an interview, which
resulted in a positive credible fear determination. ECF No. 1-2 at 5-8. He was served with
a Notice to Appear on January 21, 2025. Id. at 2. Since his initial detention, he has been
held at Otay Mesa Detention Center. ECF No. 1 at 9.
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Petitioner’s removal proceedings are still pending. He asserts that he had a merits
hearing on August 5, 2025, and it was then moved four times. Id. at 4. He states that he has
a new hearing date of April 27, 2026. Id. Regarding bond, Petitioner states that he did have
a bond determination hearing in front of an immigration judge (“IJ”) on June 6, 2025, but
it was denied because the IJ found that she did not have jurisdiction to consider bond. Id.
at 5; ECF No. 1-2 at 38 (stating denied because “The Court does not have jurisdiction for
bond.”). He claims that during his detention, he has developed mental health problems,
including panic attacks, inability to sleep, and nightmares, for which he is in therapy
sessions. ECF No. 1 at 6, 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
In Respondents’ return to the petition, they raise the following arguments: (1)
Petitioner’s claim is jurisdictionally barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252; (2) Petitioner is lawfully
detained under § 1225; and (3) his detention has not become unconstitutionally prolonged
as to violate due process. ECF No. 7. The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
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A. Jurisdiction and Section 1252
The arguments with regards to jurisdiction being barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 are
identical to those recently addressed by the undersigned in Martinez Lopez v. Noem et al.,
No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The
Court adopts it reasoning as to these issues and incorporates it by reference. See also
Beltran et al. v. Noem et al., No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *3-4 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding same).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the jurisdiction stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 do not strip it of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims.
B. Detention Under § 1225 and Length of Detention
Respondents argue that Petitioner is mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b) because he was detained at the border as an “applicant for admission” and he has
never been granted any form of parole. ECF No. 7 at 4-5. Further, Respondents argue that
Petitioner’s detention has not become unconstitutionally prolonged. Id. at 5-9.
The Court agrees that Petitioner was detained at the border and has not been granted
any form of parole, so Respondents have the authority to detain him under § 1225(b).
However, the Court disagrees that no due process violation can therefore arise, as
Respondents claim. ECF No. 7 at 5-7. Respondents essentially argue that § 1225(b)
provides no limitation on the length of detention and that the statute provides all the due
process that the petitioner is owed. Id. This position has been called into question by the
Ninth Circuit:
We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged
detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our
democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation
of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of
our American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial
or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Civil detention violates due process outside of
“certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256-57 (9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original). Indeed,
numerous district courts have found that prolonged mandatory detention at some point will
raise due process considerations. See Maksin v. Warden, Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-
CV-00955-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2879328, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (“Several courts
including the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit, as well as numerous district courts, have
found that unreasonably long detention periods may violate the due process clause.”
(collecting cases)); Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-
CV-00098-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (“[E]ssentially all
district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.”) (internal citation omitted); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768,
772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in
concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). Further, even Respondents recognize
in their return that district courts within this Circuit have found a potential due process
violation to arise when the detention has become too prolonged. See id. at 9-11 (citing
Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) and analyzing factors).
“Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have provided guidance regarding
the point at which an immigration detainee’s prolonged mandatory detention becomes
unconstitutional.” Amado v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL(DDL), 2025
WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). Thus, district courts within this Circuit have
employed similar but slightly varying tests. In the Lopez case cited by Respondents, the
court employed a test with three factors to decide when mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c) becomes unconstitutionally prolonged: “the total length of detention to date, the
duration of future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
petitioner and the government.” 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879. In Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.
Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019), the district court considered the following six
factors in the § 1225(b) context: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely
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duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal
proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order
of removal.” Other courts have simply applied the generalized Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), procedural due process test. See Henriquez v. Garland, No. 22-cv-869-
EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022).
The Court finds it most appropriate to apply the Banda test to Petitioner’s detention
here under § 1225(b), as other courts within this district have done in the past.1 See, e.g.,
Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (applying 6-factor Banda test to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)); Kadir v. LaRose, 25CV1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 15, 2025) (same); Gao v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2084-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 2770633, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 2025 WL
3154520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025).
The first Banda factor, the length of detention, is “the most important factor.” Banda,
385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. Petitioner has been detained since December 5, 2024, so his
detention is at the 14-month mark While this factor itself is not dispositive, the length now
is above the range such that this factor should weigh in favor of Petitioner. Amado, 2025
WL 3079052, at *5 (“Courts have found detention over seven months without a bond
hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable” (citing cases) and finding detention
of thirteen months to weigh in favor of the petitioner); Sadeqi, 2025 WL 3154520, at *3
(though “almost 12 months” detention was not dispositive, finding it to weigh in favor of
petitioner); Gao, 2025 WL 2770633, at *5 (“The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention for
over 10 months without a bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances
described above, has become unreasonable and violates due process.”); Tonoyan v.
1 Even though the Court does not employ the Lopez test as Respondents cite, the Court notes that the Lopez
factors are a subset of the Banda factors. Based on a discussion of the Banda factors below, the Court
would reach the same conclusion even if it were to consider solely the Lopez factors because it finds the
first two Lopez factors to weigh in favor of Petitioner and the last factor to be neutral.
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Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00815-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
2025) (“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period . . . qualifies
as prolonged.”); Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) (“In general, ‘[a]s detention continues past a year, courts become
extremely wary of permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.’”) (citation
omitted). In even the Lopez case cited by Respondents, that court found a detention of
“approximately one year” to weigh in favor of the petitioner and recognizing that “[d]istrict
courts have found shorter lengths of detention . . . without a bond hearing to be
unreasonable.” Thus, this first and most important factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
The second Banda factor is the likely duration of future detention, and considers
“anticipated duration of all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial
appeals.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. Here, Petitioner has an upcoming hearing on
April 27, 2026, but Petitioner alleges that he has had other scheduled hearings that have
been moved and there is also no indication that this hearing will even result in a final
decision in his removal proceedings. Even if it were, however, a removal order may not
become final until after the appeals Petitioner could file, to both the Board of Immigration
Appeals and Ninth Circuit. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
108 (2020) (“The usual removal process involves an evidentiary hearing before an
immigration judge, and at that hearing an alien may attempt to show that he or she should
not be removed. . . . If that claim is rejected and the alien is ordered removed, the alien can
appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, if that appeal is
unsuccessful, the alien is generally entitled to review in a federal court of appeals.”). These
appeals can take a long time. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (finding appeal of
removal order with the BIA and review in the Ninth Circuit may take up to two years or
longer). In Banda, the petitioner had a final removal order from an IJ and had just filed an
appeal to the BIA, and the court still found that this factor favored the petitioner. Here,
Petitioner’s removal is not even yet final, so the Court finds even more reason to find that
this factor falls in his favor.
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The third Banda factor is regarding the conditions of detention. “The more that the
conditions under which the noncitizen is being held resemble penal confinement, the
stronger his argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119
(citation omitted). Courts have recognized that the conditions at OMDC are
“indistinguishable from penal confinement.” See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773; Amado,
2025 WL 3079052, at *6. Further, Petitioner is only 19 years old and claimed both mental
and physical harm resulting from detention. The Court finds that this factor also weighs in
favor of Petitioner.
The fourth and fifth Banda factors look to the nature and extent of any delays in the
removal proceedings caused the petitioner and then the government respectively. Banda,
385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119-1120. There is no indication in any of the filings before the Court
that either Petitioner or Respondents caused any delays in the proceedings. While Petitioner
mentions that his merit hearing has moved several times, he does not state why or if it was
at the request of either party or due to court conflicts. Thus, the Court finds that both of
these factors are neutral.
The sixth Banda factor looks to the likelihood that the removal proceedings will
result in a final order of removal. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (“In other words, the
Court considers whether the noncitizen has asserted any defenses to removal.”). Here,
Petitioner has in his favor a positive credible fear determination, but there is no other
information provided to the Court regarding how an IJ would eventually rule on his
removal proceeding. Thus, the Court finds this factor mostly neutral, weighing at most only
slightly in favor of Petitioner.
In summary, at least three of the six factors weigh in favor Petitioner, with the other
factors being neutral. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s 14-month long
detention under § 1225(b) has become unreasonable and due process requires the
Government to provide him with an individualized bond hearing at this time.
//
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus, and ORDERS as follows:
(1) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an
individualized bond determination hearing within ten days of this Order. At
the hearing, the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight
risk if released.2
(2) Respondents are ORDERED to File a Notice of Compliance within five days
of providing Petitioner with the bond hearing, including apprising the Court
of the results of the hearing.
The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 5, 2026
2 As courts have recognized, due process violations on this ground entitles Petitioner to a “a prompt and
individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if
released.” Sadeqi, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)
and Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2024)); see also Kadir, 2025 WL 2932654, at *6
(ordering similar relief, including specifying proper standards to be applied at bond hearing); Idiev v.
Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-01030-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3089349, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (ordering bond hearing where “the government must justify Petitioner’s
continued confinement under § 1225(b) by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or
a danger to the community”).
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