Al Zoubani v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ANAS MAMOUN AL ZOUBANI,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security; et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-378-BJC-KSC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1, 2]
Before the Court is Anas Al Zoubani’s (“Petitioner”) petition for a writ of habeas
corpus that was filed on January 22, 2026. ECF No. 1. That same day, Petitioner also filed
a motion for a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 2. On February 2, 2026, Respondents
filed a return, and on February 4, 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse. 	ECF No. 8. 	For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2015, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Syria, entered the United
States seeking asylum. ECF No. 7-2 at 2. On December 13, 2016, he obtained status as a
lawful permanent resident. 	Id. 	On December 7, 2022, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty
to the offense of transportation of illegal aliens for profit in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). 	Id. 	On March 10, 2023, the court sentenced him
to probation for a term of 36 months. Petitioner was not placed in removal proceedings at
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that time. Id.
On July 1, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to
Appear, thereby initiating immigration proceedings against Petitioner. 	Id. 	That same
month, Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Petitioner outside
of his home. ECF No. 1 at 2.1 On July 22, 2025, the Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner
removed to the United Kingdom or Syria in the alternative. ECF No. 7-2 at 2. Both parties
waived appeal. Id.
Since his detention, ICE learned that Petitioner “ha[s] no ties to the United Kingdom
that would authorize removal there.” 	ECF No. 7 at 3. 	Therefore, ICE has focused its
efforts on removing Petitioner to Syria. See ECF No. 7-2 at 2. On October 17, 2025, the
San Diego Field Office routed a written request for issuance of a travel document for
Petitioner to the Syrian Mission to the United Nations in New York. Id. As of January 30,
2026, the travel document request is pending action by the Syrian Government. 	Id.
Petitioner has continued to remain in detention since his arrest in July 2025. See generally
ECF No.1 at 2.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 	Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a
district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). The petitioner must demonstrate that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
1 Neither Petitioner nor Respondent specifies the precise date on which Petitioner was taken
into custody. See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 7 at 2.
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III. 	DISUCSSION
A. 	Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Continued Detention Under
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)
Section 1231 governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens subject to a final
removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. It directs the Attorney General to effectuate removal
“within a period of 90 days,” known as the “removal period,” during which detention is
authorized. § 1231(a)(1)–(2). 	In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court clarified that detention
beyond the removal period is presumptively lawful for up to six months; after that, a
noncitizen may make a prima facie case for relief by sharing “good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” at which
point the burden shifts to “the Government [to] respond with evidence sufficient to rebut
that showing.” 533 U.S. at 701.
The Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied his burden under Zadvydas. Petitioner
was ordered removed on July 23, 2025, ECF No. 1 at 2, and the six-month presumptive
detention period has expired. Petitioner has presented evidence that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. No travel documents have been
obtained at this time, and there is no indication when they might be obtained. See generally
ECF No. 7-2 at 2-3. While Respondent contends that detention remains lawful because of
“ICE’s diligent efforts to obtain Petitioner’s travel document,” ECF No. 7 at 5, the Court
finds that mere good-faith efforts is insufficient under Zadvydas. See Nadarajah v.
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the government lacked
authority to detain an individual indefinitely under § 1231 where removal was not
reasonably foreseeable despite ongoing diplomatic efforts). Continued detention must be
justified by a significant likelihood of removal within a reasonably foreseeable period, and
Respondents have failed to meet that standard.
B. 	Due Process Constraints on ICE’s Third-Country Removal Policy
Due process supports Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief related to ICE’s policy
regarding third country removals presented in the memorandum dated July 9, 2025. ECF
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No. 1 at 24. Several courts within the Ninth Circuit have held the policies provided in the
ICE memorandum violate due process. Lapshin v. Bondi, No. C25-2245-KKE, 2026 WL
71407, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2026); Elshourbagy v. Bondi, No. 2:25-CV-02432-TL,
2025 WL 3718993, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2025); Escobar v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-
01801-DJC-EFB, 2025 WL 3687639, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025); Azzo v. Noem, No.
3:25-CV-03122-RBM-BJW, 2025 WL 3535208, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025); Vishal v.
Chestnut, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2025 WL 3511815, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); Kumar v.
Wamsley, No. C25-2055-KKE, 2025 WL 3204724, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2025); Vu
v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-01366-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3114341, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
6, 2025); Esmail v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-08325-WLH-RAO, 2025 WL 3030589, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025).
This Court agrees. The memorandum suggests removal to a third country may occur
without an opportunity to be heard if the United States receives and believes diplomatic
assurances that there will be no persecution or torture. According to the Ninth Circuit, “last
minute orders of removal to a country may violate due process if an immigrant was not
provided an opportunity to address his fear of persecution in that country.” Najjar v. Lynch,
630 F. App’x 724 (9th Cir. 2016). Additionally, when the third country does not provide
such assurances, ERO “will not affirmatively ask whether the alien is afraid of being
removed to that country.” However, “[f]ailing to notify individuals who are subject to
deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum. . .and for withholding of
deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates” regulations and due
process. Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Kossov v. INS,
132 F.3d 405, 408–09 (7th Cir.1998)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:
1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.
2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner.
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3. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for his removal.
4. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner without first following
the procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other applicable
statutory and regulatory procedures.
5. Respondents are ENJOINED from removing Petitioner to a third country unless
they adhere to the following procedures:
a. 	provide written notice to Petitioner, in a language he can understand and to his
counsel;
b. provide Petitioner a minimum of ten (10) days to raise a fear-based claim for
CAT protection prior to removal;
c. 	if Petitioner demonstrates reasonable fear of removal to the country,
Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner’s removal proceedings;
d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a reasonable fear of removal to
the third country, Respondents must provide a meaningful opportunity, and a
minimum of fifteen (15) days for Petitioner to seek reopening of his
immigration proceedings.
6. The Clerk of Court shall close this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 25, 2026
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