Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Roberto MACEO RODRIGUEZ, by next
friend Yanaris Rodriguez Trujillo,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25-cv-3626-AGS-MSB
ORDER GRANTING AMENDED
HABEAS PETITION (ECF 4)
Petitioner has now been in immigration custody under a final removal order for well
over the six months that the Supreme Court deemed “presumptively reasonable” in these
circumstances. On the current record, it appears there is no significant likelihood that he
will be removed from the country in the reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, the Court
grants his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and orders his release under his prior terms
of supervision.
BACKGROUND
Although petitioner Roberto Maceo Rodriguez has a convoluted immigration
history, for present purposes the relevant facts are straightforward: For the past seven
months, he has been in continuous immigration custody under a reinstated final order of
removal. Specifically, on “August 5, 2025,” Maceo Rodriguez was “arrested” at a
scheduled ICE check-in. (See ECF 4, at 3.) The same day, the Department of Homeland
Security “issued a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order.” (See ECF 7-1, at 2.)
Petitioner then “expressed fear of returning to Cuba and was placed in withholding[-]only
proceedings.” (Id.) A couple months later, an immigration judge “denied withholding of
removal and ordered [petitioner] removed to Cuba.” (Id.) Maceo Rodriguez appealed that
denial of withholding. (Id.)
Maceo Rodriguez’s earlier immigration proceedings are murkier, but a couple
pertinent points are clear. First, in 2019 an immigration judge ordered him removed from
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the United States, and the next month he was removed to Cuba. (ECF 7-1, at 2.) Second, a
few years later, Maceo Rodriguez “[re]entered the United States” and was then “released
under an Order of Supervision (Form I-220B).” (ECF 4, at 3; see also ECF 7, at 2.) This
form of release is afforded to those who have a final removal order but aren’t immediately
removable. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a) (describing orders of supervision).
DISCUSSION
Before reaching the merits, the Court must decide whether Maceo Rodriguez’s
petition is procedurally deficient.
A. “Next Friend” Filing
The amended habeas petition here was signed by petitioner’s wife, Yanaris
Rodriguez Trujillo. A habeas application must be signed by either the petitioner or
“someone acting in his behalf,” known as a next friend. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Such “‘next
friend’ standing is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an
action on behalf of another.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990). To establish
such standing, “the putative next friend must show: (1) that the petitioner is unable to
litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or other similar
disability; and (2) the next friend has some significant relationship with, and is truly
dedicated to the best interests of, the petitioner.” Coalition of Clergy, Laws., & Professors
v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2002). The “burden is on the ‘next friend’ clearly
to establish the propriety of [her] status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.”
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164.
Although she didn’t file a formal motion, petitioner’s wife has met her burden as a
next friend. Taking the second prong first, Rodriguez Trujillo swears under penalty of
perjury that she is petitioner’s “wife” and is working “in support of his [p]etition.” (See
ECF 4, at 12.) As to the first prong—the petitioner’s inability to litigate on his own—his
wife asserts that Maceo Rodriguez “has limited formal education,” a “lack of access to
legal resources,” and “limited English proficiency.” (ECF 11, at 1.) This suffices to meet
the next-friend burden. See Florez Perez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3820-AGS-MSB, 2026 WL
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59785, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026) (granting motion to act as next friend because of the
petitioner’s “limited English proficiency,” which the next friend swore was “insufficient
to understand or litigate federal habeas corpus procedure,” and the petitioner had “no
access to legal research tools, law library resources, or federal procedural materials”
(cleaned up)). Also, petitioner originally filed a petition on his own (see ECF 1), which
failed this Court’s screening (see ECF 2), lending additional support to the request for next-
friend status.
To be clear, although “next friend” status permits Rodriguez Trujillo to file the
petition on her husband’s behalf, “the statute does not authorize the ‘next friend’ to proceed
without an attorney.” Morrison v. Tuolumne Cnty. Sheriff, No. 1:25-cv-01591-JLT-EPG-
HC, 2025 WL 3268269, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025). So, unless Rodriguez Trujillo
retains counsel, she cannot file anything else nor represent her husband in court. See
Hinojosa v. Warden, SATF/SP, No. 2:22-cv-1780 DB P, 2023 WL 2874169, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2023) (requiring next friend to “be represented by counsel in order to
proceed as a ‘next friend’ because pro se litigants have no authority to represent anyone
other than themselves”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-01780-KJM
DB P, 2023 WL 4711303 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2023).
In sum, the amended habeas petition is accepted, but the Court rejects all the
subsequent filings by Rodriguez Trujillo. (See ECF 7–ECF 13.)
B. Habeas Petition
Maceo Rodriguez argues that his prolonged immigration detention violates due
process, and he seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his release. To succeed in a habeas
application, petitioners must establish that they are “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3). The Court’s
task is to ascertain the applicable law here and to determine whether Maceo Rodriguez’s
detention violates it.
1. Legal Framework for Detention
Petitioner is subject to a final “reinstated order[] of removal,” so “[8 U.S.C.] § 1231’s
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detention provisions” apply. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 535 (2021). That
statute directs the Attorney General to “remove the alien from the United States within a
period of 90 days,” which is known “as the ‘removal period.’”1 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A),
(B)(i). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
§ 1231(a)(2)(A).
Maceo Rodriguez has been detained longer than this 90-day “removal period,” so
his continued custody must be justified instead by § 1231(a)(6), the so-called
“post-removal-period detention statute.” See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001).
That statute provides that certain immigration detainees “may be detained beyond the
removal period,” including any “alien,” like Maceo Rodriguez, “who is inadmissible under
[8 U.S.C.] section 1182.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); (see ECF 7-2, at 5 (noting that Maceo
Rodriguez “is removable under Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,” which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii))).
But the post-removal-period detention statute has limits. In Zadvydas, the Supreme
Court refused to interpret that law “to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,”
which would be “a serious constitutional threat.” 533 U.S. at 699. The Court instead
blessed a “6-month period” of “presumptively reasonable” detention under that statute. Id.
at 701. After that period, if the “alien provides good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. If the government cannot
meet that burden, the detention is “no longer authorized by statute” and must end. Id. at
699–700.
1 The removal period does not begin until a removal order is “final.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)&(ii). Notably, Maceo Rodriguez’s appeal of the adverse withholding-
of-removal ruling has no effect on the finality of his removal order: “[A]n alien’s initiation
of withholding-only proceedings does not render non-final an otherwise ‘administratively
final’ reinstated order of removal.” Johnson, 594 U.S. at 541.
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2. Application to Petitioner’s Detention
Maceo Rodriguez has been held in immigration custody under § 1182 for at least
seven months, which is longer than the “presumptively reasonable” period of six months.
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Under Zadvydas, Maceo Rodriguez has also satisfied his
initial burden of showing that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” See id. In 2022, immigration authorities released him on a
Form I-220B order of supervision. (ECF 4, at 3; ECF 7-1, at 2.) To qualify for such release,
the government had to determine that Maceo Rodriguez met six criteria, including that
“[t]ravel documents for the alien are not available or, in the opinion of the Service,
immediate removal, while proper, is otherwise not practicable or not in the public interest.”
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)(1). This finding suggests that, at least as of 2022, officials believed
that removal was not reasonably foreseeable. That inference is bolstered by the fact that
the government didn’t deport Maceo Rodriguez in the ensuing three years, even while he
“fully complied with all reporting requirements.” (ECF 4, at 3.)
So, the burden shifts to respondents to “rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. Yet the government offers no argument nor evidence regarding a change in
circumstances since the 2022 order of supervision. (See ECF 7, at 2.) Rather, respondents
argue merely that Maceo Rodriguez “has been detained for less than six months,” and thus
the government has no need to rebut petitioner’s showing. (Id. at 2, 6.) In fairness, when
respondents filed their return, Maceo Rodriguez had been in continuous detention for just
over five months, not counting any prior periods of custody. (See ECF 4, at 3 (“August 5,
2025” arrest); ECF 7-1, at 2 (same); ECF 7, at 7 (“January 13, 2026” return).) But the
Court is still left with only conclusory assurances, unsupported by sworn evidence, that the
government “will promptly carry out Petitioner’s removal to Cuba” or “seek to remove him
to another country.” (ECF 7, at 6.) The government’s declaration is tellingly silent about
whether it has secured—or even attempted to secure—any travel documents to remove
petitioner to another country. (See generally ECF 7-1.) Thus, respondents have failed to
rebut petitioner’s showing that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the
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reasonably foreseeable future,” and he must be released. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
CONCLUSION
Maceo Rodriguez’s habeas petition is GRANTED. Respondents must immediately
release him under the terms of his I-220B order of supervision. The unauthorized
next-friend filings (ECF 7–ECF 13) are stricken, and all other pending motions are denied
as moot.
Dated: March 17, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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