Estrada Simon v. Larose et al

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3:25-cv-3587-JES-VET
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HECTOR ESTRADA SIMON,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior
Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center;
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security;
PATRICK DIVVER, ICE San Diego Field
Office Director, in their official capacities,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3: 25-cv-3587-JES-VET
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 2241; AND
(2) DENYING AS MOOT COUNT
TWO OF THE PETITION.
[ECF NO .1]
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Before the Court is Petitioner Hector Estrada Simon’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the
Court’s Order to Show Cause, Respondents filed the Response. ECF Nos. 2; 4, (“Res.”).
Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF No. 5. The Court then took the matter under submission.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition and
DENIES AS MOOT Count Two of the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In March 2004, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection and since
then, has built deep and longstanding ties to his community. Pet. ¶¶ 19-20. On September
19, 2025, Petitioner was operating a motor vehicle when he was stopped and apprehended
by police. Id. ¶ 21. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then detained Petitioner,
initiated removal proceedings against him, and relocated him from Florida to California.
Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Currently, Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention by Respondents,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1225(b)(2)(A), at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Res.
at 1.
Petitioner contends that he has been illegally detained by DHS and that seeking a
bond redetermination hearing from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) would be futile in light of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) precedential decision in the Matter of Yajure
Hurtado. Pet. ¶ 23; 29 I&N 216 (BIA 2025) (holding that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to
noncitizens like Petitioner). Petitioner argues that he has lived in the United States for well
over two decades, and therefore, Section 1225(b) does not apply to him. Pet. ¶ 44. Further,
to the extent he remains in custody, his detention should proceed under Section 1226(a),
which authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. Id.
Accordingly, Petitioner seeks habeas relief from the Court because his continued
detention, resulting from Respondents’ application of Section 1225(b), and not Section
1226(a), to govern to his detention violates: (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”); and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means
of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law
... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps
the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives
prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d
1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In the Response to the Petition, Respondents raise two main arguments. First,
Petitioner’s claim is jurisdictionally barred by Section 1252. Res. at 6-15. Alternatively, if
not barred, is not yet ripe as Petitioner has failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies. Id. Second, Petitioner is lawfully detained under Section 1225. Id. Thus, the
Court should deny the Petition. Id.
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A. 	Applicability of Section 1225 vs. 1226
The Court finds that the parties’ arguments with respect to whether the Court has
jurisdiction to hear this Petition are analogous to those raised in the Court’s recent decision
in Martinez Lopez v. Noem, et al., No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, at *2-7
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning it stated in
Martinez Lopez and incorporates it by reference. Id.
Based on the facts of this Petition, the Court finds that: (1) Section 1252's jurisdiction
stripping provisions do not bar the Court from considering Petitioner's habeas petition.
Further, the prudential administrative exhaustion requirement for Section 2241 claims is
excused. Imposing this requirement would be futile due to the BIA’s decision in Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (BIA 2025) (holding that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to
noncitizens, such as Petitioner). Thus, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear the
Petition; and (2) Section 1226(a)—not Section 1225(b)—applies to Petitioner. Thus,
Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing by an IJ, who may not deny bond
on the basis that Section 1225(b) governs Petitioner’s detention.
B. 	Procedural Due Process
The Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner's due process claim given that
the Court will grant the relief he seeks based on its conclusion that Section 1226(a) applies
here. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing,
pursuant to Section 1226(a), or release him within the time allotted, Petitioner may renew
his Fifth Amendment Due Process claim.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing:
(1) The Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition;
(2) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Count Two of the Petition;
(3) The 	Court 	ORDERS 	Respondents 	to 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an
individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten (10) days
of this Order, or
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otherwise release him from custody, under the same conditions that
existed before his detention; and
(4) Respondents are ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within ten
days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing.
(5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 7, 2026
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