Neutralsovereignties Corp. et al v. Zions Bancorporation et al

1
3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NEUTRALSOVEREIGNTIES CORP., et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ZIONS BANCORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT;
(3) DISMISSING MOTION TO
COMPEL RULING
[Doc. Nos. 1–3]
On 	December 	11, 	2025, 	Plaintiffs 	Neutralsovereignties 	Corp.
(“Neutralsovereignties”) and Manuel Ernest McNeely (“McNeely”), proceeding pro se,
filed a Complaint against Defendants Zions Bancorporation, California Bank and Trust,
Eric Ellingsen, Paul Burdiss, and Bryan Hane. 	[Doc. No. 1 (“Complaint”).] 	Plaintiffs
bring eight federal and state causes of action based on Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’
loan application. 	Plaintiffs did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, they filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] For the reasons outlined below,
Case 3:25-cv-03544-CAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 02/03/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 5

2
3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the Court GRANTS the IFP motion as to Plaintiff McNeely, DISMISSES Plaintiff
Neutralsovereignties from this case, and DISMISSES the Complaint.
I. 	Motion to Proceed IFP
Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). But under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court may authorize
any suit’s commencement, prosecution, or defense without payment of fees if the plaintiff
submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing he or she is
unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient
where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of
life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking
IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” 	Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Granting or denying leave to proceed IFP in civil cases
is within the district court’s sound discretion. 	Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216
(9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
McNeely states his income is $520 per month in public assistance benefits with
$1,042 in monthly expenses. [See generally Doc. No. 2.] He lists his income and expenses
with sufficient particularity, which demonstrate he cannot pay court costs and still afford
life necessities. The Court GRANTS McNeely’s motion to proceed IFP.
II. 	McNeely Cannot Represent Neutralsovereignties
As to Neutralsovereignties, the Court notes that a corporation may appear in the
federal courts only through licensed counsel. 	See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony,
506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993); see also In re America West Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058, 1059
(9th Cir. 1994) (“Corporations and other unincorporated associations must appear in court
through an attorney.”). 	It appears that McNeely, who is proceeding pro se and not an
attorney, is improperly seeking to represent Neutralsovereignties. Given that no licensed
counsel appears for them, the Court DISMISSES Neutralsovereignties from this action.
///
///
Case 3:25-cv-03544-CAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 02/03/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 5

3
3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
III. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
A. 	Legal Standard
A plaintiff proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte
dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits
but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim.”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court
costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing
frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court construes pro se
pleadings liberally. See Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2008).
B. 	Discussion
McNeely alleges that Defendants (1) discriminated against him when he attempted
to “obtain a commercial loan in the amount of 14 Million Dollars[,]” and (2) discouraged,
misled, and prevented him from applying for the loan. 	[Doc. No. 1-2 at 4.] 	He brings
federal causes of action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), and various state causes of action. 	[Id. at 2.]
The Court finds that McNeely’s allegations are wholly conclusory.
Case 3:25-cv-03544-CAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 02/03/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 5

4
3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
As to his ADA claims, McNeely does not provide a single fact showing that
Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that courts need not accept as true
“legal conclusions” contained in the complaint or other “allegations that are merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”). Indeed, Plaintiff
merely claims that Defendant Hane “deni[ed] the loan for reasons that are inaccurate,
discriminatory, punitive, and deceptive.” 	[Doc. No. 1-2 at 5.] 	Undermining this
conclusion, Plaintiff states that Defendant Hane’s provided reasons for the $14 million loan
denial were that McNeely’s company had no operating history, McNeely provided
insufficient financial information, his application was incomplete, and the requested loan
was too large with no collateral. 	[Id. at 5.] 	Moreover, McNeely does not plead his
disability with any specificity. See Bresaz v. County of Santa Clara, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1125,
1135–36 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Where . . . a party alleges that he . . . is disabled under the
ADA, courts have generally required the party to plead the disability with some factual
specificity.”). He merely states “Plaintiff is disabled.” [Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.]
McNeely’s ECOA claims are similarly conclusory. 	To plead an ECOA claim, a
plaintiff must sufficiently allege that a creditor discriminated against plaintiff with respect
to a credit transaction or discouraged plaintiff from applying for credit on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age, or because the applicant derives
income from a public assistance program. 	See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a); see also 12 C.F.R. §
1002.4 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulations which carry out the purposes
of 15 U.S.C. § 1691). There are no facts showing that any Defendant discriminated against
McNeely or discouraged/prevented him from applying for a loan on a prohibited basis.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES McNeely’s federal claims.
McNeely filed his Complaint pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 1-
1 at 1.] 	With his federal claims dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law causes of action. See United Mine Works v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
Case 3:25-cv-03544-CAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 02/03/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 5

5
3:25-cv-3544-CAB-AHG
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
the complaint with leave to amend by March 3, 2026. 	The Court also DISMISSES
McNeely’s “Motion to Compel Ruling on IFP Motion” as improperly filed. [Doc. No. 3.]
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 3, 2026
Case 3:25-cv-03544-CAB-AHG Document 4 Filed 02/03/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 5