Ramirez Caracosa v. Noem et al

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25cv3446-LL-MMP
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JUAN GABRIEL RAMIREZ
CARACOSA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Department
of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25cv3446-LL-MMP
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Juan Gabriel Ramirez Caracosa’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. The matter is fully briefed,
and the Court deems it suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ORDERS an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who came to America in 2006 without authorization.
ECF No. 1 (“Ramirez Caracosa Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. He has worked for the same employer in
construction for the past 15 years, and he has no criminal history. Id. ¶¶ 9, 15. On July 1,
2025, he was pulling out of the driveway of a house he was working on when DHS detained
him. Id. ¶ 10. He has remained detained ever since. Id. ¶ 11. This is because an immigration
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judge denied his request to be released on bond, reasoning that he lacked jurisdiction to
consider it due to DHS charging Petitioner as an alien under § 1225(b)(2) as opposed to
§ 1226(a). ECF No. 1, at 28. The former mandating detention, the latter permitting release
on bond when it is determined that the alien is not a danger to others or a flight risk and the
like. Petitioner argues that DHS’s classification of him and the IJ’s ruling based on that
misclassification was wrong. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Thus, on December 5,
2025, he petitioned this Court to be reclassified as an alien eligible for a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). Id. Finding this to be dispositive, the Court declines to rule on the other claims.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Courts have long had jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to petitioners held
in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C § 2241(c)(3). In doing so, we carry out the “historic purpose of the writ,” namely
“to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001). Had Petitioner sought to challenge the Government’s decision
to execute any removal order, it would bar this Court’s review. See Arce v. United States,
899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)’s “jurisdiction-stripping
power to actions challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions to initiate
proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders”). But Petitioner only contests
the Government’s purported legal authority to subject him to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), so the Court has jurisdiction to weigh in. See Ibarra-Perez v. United States,
154 F.4th 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2025) (noting that courts often have “jurisdiction” to hear a
claim “premised on a lack of legal authority”); Beltran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2650-LL-DEB,
2025 WL 3078837, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (finding that § 1252(g) does not strip us
of jurisdiction to hear a petitioner’s claim premised on “a lack of legal authority to subject
[him] to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) during [removal] proceedings”).
Nor does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) strip this Court of jurisdiction. This statute “bars
review of claims arising from actions or proceedings brought to remove an alien,” that is
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“an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability
will be determined.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1,
19 (2020) (quotation marks, alterations, and ellipses omitted). It does not bar claims that
are merely “collateral” to the removal process. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032
(9th Cir. 2016). Like here, such collaterality includes claims predicated on “a lack of legal
authority to subject [petitioners] to mandatory detention under § 1225[b][2] instead of
detention with a bond hearing under § 1226(a).” Beltran, 2025 WL 3078837, at *3.
B. 	Merits
The Government has now acknowledged that: “Petitioner appears to be a member
of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-
01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). The
Bautista court has entered final judgement as to the Bond Eligible Class. Bautista,
ECF No. 94. Accordingly, Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner is detained under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are entitled to an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be
held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” ECF No. 7. The Court agrees.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 and DENIES AS MOOT all other motions. By January 12, 2026,
Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), during which they shall not deny him bond
based on 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory-detention requirement; it does not apply here.
Petitioner’s requests for attorney fees and costs is denied without prejudice. The Clerk shall
close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 5, 2026
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