Sanchez v. County of San Diego et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FERNANDO ALLEN SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, by and
through its Health & Human Services
Agency (HHSA); VANESSA HUERTA,
in her individual and official capacities;
JUDGE NAVARRO, Administrative Law
Judge, in her official capacity for
injunctive/declaratory relief,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-02987-DMS-KSC
ORDER:
(1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT SUA SPONTE; and
(2) DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
[ECF Nos. 6, 7]
Pending before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff Fernando Allen Sanchez’s First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”), (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 6), and motion
seeking temporary restraining order (“TRO”), (ECF No. 7). This Court previously granted
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but dismissed the original
Complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 5). Because Plaintiff is
proceeding IFP, the Court must screen the FAC sua sponte before ruling on Plaintiff’s
motion for TRO. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the Complaint and denies
the motion for TRO.
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I. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF FAC
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to
prisoners”).
The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure
to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6)
requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the
Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not
initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
1982).
B. Factual Background
This suit arises from Defendants—the County of San Diego (“County”), County
employee Vanessa Huerta, and Administrative Law Judge Navarro (no first name
provided)—allegedly depriving Plaintiff of his CalFresh benefits in violation of due
process. Beginning in 2021, Plaintiff’s CalFresh benefits required renewal. (FAC ¶ 46).
Over the course of multiple years, Plaintiff attempted to renew or reapply for CalFresh
benefits over twenty one times. (Id. ¶ 47). Specifically, Plaintiff called the County’s
CalFresh Access Line twelve times and submitted five online applications through the
County’s BenefitsCal portal. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 51). The County’s administrative records show
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at least nine of these attempts. (Id. ¶ 48). During the calls, Plaintiff received “contradictory
instructions, was told to wait for callbacks that never came, and was informed that his
applications could not be located in the County’s system.” (Id. ¶ 50). Plaintiff’s online
applications were rejected due to system errors, “[l]ost entirely with no confirmation or
follow-up, or “[b]locked by technical failures in the County’s application processing
system.” (Id. ¶ 52). Plaintiff also emailed Huerta three times and called and left voicemail
messages four times, asking for assistance with his benefits renewal. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 60).
Huerta never responded to Plaintiff’s communications. (Id. ¶ 61). Plaintiff was unable to
renew his benefits. (Id. ¶ 53).
Eventually, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing regarding the denial of his
CalFresh benefits renewal. (Id. ¶ 65). The hearing was before Judge Navarro on an
unspecified date. (Id. ¶ 66). At the hearing, Huerta falsely testified that she never received
communications from Plaintiff; however, the County’s electronic records showed
Plaintiff’s emails at the time. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 63). Huerta also admitted that the County’s
outbound telephone calls are routinely blocked by Verizon Wireless’s spam-filter
technology, that applicants using Verizon Wireless frequently do not receive County calls,
that County is aware of this “systemic problem,” and that the County has no “workaround,
alternative contact method, or mitigation strategy.” (Id. ¶ 54). Notably, Plaintiff uses
Verizon Wireless as his cellular provider. (Id. ¶ 55). At the end of the hearing, Judge
Navarro ordered Huerta to contact Plaintiff and help him with his renewal, to which Huerta
agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 69). Judge Navarro did not issue a written decision following the
hearing. (Id. ¶ 70).
Following the hearing, the County attempted to contact Plaintiff via two automated
telephone calls placed at 5:13 a.m. and 5:16 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 73). The robocalls “left no
voicemail, provided no instructions, scheduled no interview, and contained no substantive
information.” (Id. ¶ 76). When Plaintiff called back, an automated message played, stating
that the phone number could not receive calls. (Id. ¶ 75). There were no other
communications from the County. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 77–80).
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Plaintiff submitted his application to reapply for CalFresh one week before filing the
original Complaint (November 4, 2025). (Id. ¶ 84). As of the filing of Plaintiff’s FAC
(November 19, 2025), the County has taken no action on Plaintiff’s application. (Id. ¶¶ 81,
85–87). Plaintiff has yet to receive benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 82, 88).
The FAC asserts (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against all Defendants for violations
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process; and (2) a § 1983 claim
against the County, under a Monell theory of liability. (Id. at 12–14). Plaintiff also asserts
a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking declarations that
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights and that Plaintiff is entitled
to retroactive issuance of withheld CalFresh benefits and immediate reinstatement of
benefits. (Id. at 14–15).
C. Discussion
1. Section 1983–Monell Claim
A municipality may be liable for the deprivations of constitutional rights deriving
from the execution of a municipality’s policies or customs. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must sufficiently allege that “(1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the
municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [the
plaintiff’s] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir.
2020). The plaintiff must show a “direct causal link” between the policy and the
constitutional deprivation. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc). “Isolated or sporadic incidents” are generally insufficient to establish
municipal liability. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff purports several policies as the basis of his Monell claim: (1) the use of
automatic calls from non-operational phone numbers as the primary method to contact
applicants; (2) the “[f]ailure to remedy known call-blocking technology failures”; (3)
“[i]gnoring applicant emails and written communications”; (4) the “[a]utomated rejection
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of online applications without functional alternatives”; (5) the “[f]ailure to issue written
administrative decisions”; (6) failure to respond to Temporary Restraining Order requests;
and (7) the tolerance and ratification of false testimony by County employees during
administrative hearings. (FAC ¶¶ 95, 116). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that these
supposed policies are “widespread, persistent, and well-settled,” (FAC ¶ 117), is
insufficient to establish his reported injury “resulted from a ‘permanent and well settled’
practice” arising from a “local government custom.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles,
885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Rather, there must be sufficient
factual allegations demonstrating that these policies are indeed “widespread, persistent,
and well-settled.” Even when construing the allegations liberally, there are at best very
few instances of these “policies” occurring. For example, there is at most one alleged
instance of tolerating false testimony. There are no alleged instances of the County failing
to respond to Temporary Restraining Order requests. Further, Plaintiff fails to establish
the causational element. In other words, even if these policies do occur on a permanent
and well settled basis, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how these policies were the “moving
force” behind the expiration or rejection of his CalFresh benefits. In fact, even after
experiencing unsuccessful phone calls and online applications, Plaintiff was provided an
administrative hearing wherein Judge Navarro directed Huerta to assist Plaintiff with his
benefits renewal application. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Monell
claim against the County with leave to amend.
2. Section 1983–Official Liability
“Suits against governmental officers in their official capacities are subject to the
same requirements as Monell claims against local governments.” Johnson v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, No. CV 14-4407 JLS (KK), 2015 WL 4881349, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (internal
citation omitted). Thus, “as with claims against local governments under Monell, to
impose liability against officials acting in their official capacity, the entity’s policy or
custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (citation modified)
(internal citation omitted). As stated above, the FAC does not sufficiently allege the
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County had a policy that caused his alleged due process violations. Further, Plaintiff does
not allege that either Huerta or Judge Navarro are policymakers such that a single act by
either would amount to Monell liability. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s § 1983 official capacity claims against Huerta and Judge Navarro with leave to
amend.1
3. Section 1983–Individual Liability
To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under § 1983,
Plaintiff must sufficiently allege “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the
Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.”
Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (internal
citation omitted). “Property interests are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law.” Id. at 1067 (citation modified) (internal citation
omitted). “Once a state creates a liberty interest, it cannot take it away without due
process.” Johnson, 2015 WL 4881349, at *4 (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216
(2011)). Therefore, “procedural due process protections apply to the termination of welfare
benefits for those statutorily entitled to them.” Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
260 (1970)). “Key to a property interest determination is whether the person alleging a
due process violation has an entitlement to the benefit at issue, conferred through statute,
regulation, contract, or established practice.” Armstrong, 22 F.4th at 1067.
Plaintiff must sufficiently allege that he was entitled to CalFresh benefits. Plaintiff
simply alleges that he “is eligible for CalFresh food assistance benefits.” (FAC ¶ 44). This
is conclusory. Plaintiff fails to specifically and factually allege that he is entitled to
CalFresh benefits. It thus follows that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that he had a
1 In light of this determination, the Court does not examine whether Plaintiff’s claims against Huerta and
Judge Navarro are barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
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property interest that carries due process protections. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Huerta in her individual capacity with leave to amend.2
4. Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action against Defendants under § 2201, seeking
declarations that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights and that
Plaintiff is “entitled to immediate reinstatement of CalFresh benefits with retroactive
issuance of withheld benefits.” (FAC ¶ 125). Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim “rises and
falls with [his] section 1983 claims.” Est. of Posard v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
No. CV 23-10460 PA (EX), 2024 WL 3467775, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2024). Because
Plaintiff has no surviving § 1983 claims, his declaratory relief claim is also DISMISSED
with leave to amend.
II. MOTION FOR TRO
Because the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, there is no operative complaint
on which to base Plaintiff’s motion for TRO. Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC, No. 3:25-
CV-01437-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 1645593, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025). The Court
DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion for TRO as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court: (1) DISMISSES the FAC with leave to amend;
and (3) DENIES the motion for TRO without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a Second
Amended Complaint to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21)
days from the date this Order is entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 2, 2025
_________________________________
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
United States District Judge
2 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege a protected property interest, the Court
declines to address whether the other elements are sufficiently pled.
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