Moron et al v. General Motors LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ERICK M. MORON, an individual, and
MAURICIO MORON-GONZALEZ, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, and DOES 1 to
10, inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-02458-H-BLM
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
[Doc. No. 19.]
On December 19, 2025, Plaintiffs Erick M. Moron and Mauricio Moron-Gonzalez
(“Plaintiffs”) filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. 	(Doc. No. 19.) 	On December 30, 2025,
Defendant General Motors (“GM”) filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion.
(Doc. No. 20.) On February 2, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a reply. (Doc. No. 26.) On February
3, 2026, the Court took the matter under submission. (Doc. No. 27.) For the reasons below,
the Court grants in part Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees.
Background
On August 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego against Defendant, alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil
Code § 1793.2(d); (2) violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) violation of Civil Code §
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1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of Civil
Code § 1791.1 and § 1794; and (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301-2312. (Id. ¶¶ 8-44.)
On September 17, 2025, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Doc.
No. 1-3, Answer.) Subsequently, on September 18, 2025, Defendant timely removed the
action to United States District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1446(b) on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, Notice
of Removal.) On October 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. (Doc. No. 8.) On
November 21, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc. No. 16.)
On October 29, 2025, following a neutral evaluation conference, the parties partially
settled except as to attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. No. 10.) On December 12, 2025, after
weeks of discussion regarding attorneys’ fees and costs without resolution, the Court
ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. (Doc. No. 18.)
On December 17, 2025, the parties partially resolved this matter via Defendant’s Offer of
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (“Rule 68 Offer”). 	(Doc. No.
19-6.) 	In the Rule 68 Offer, the parties agreed “Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, expenses and
costs that have been reasonably incurred pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(d) may
be determined by the Court via noticed motion. For purposes of any such motion, GM will
agree that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party.” (Doc. No. 19 at 5; Doc. No. 19-6 ¶ 4, Rule
68 Offer; Doc. No. 20 at 2.)
By the present motion, Plaintiffs move for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses
pursuant to Civil Code § 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Doc. No.
19 at 2, 18.) 	Specifically, Plaintiffs request that the Court award attorneys’ fees in the
amount of $27,337.50 1 plus a lodestar multiplier of .2 in the amount of $4,922.50. (Id. at
1-2, 18.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iii) (requiring that any motion for attorney’s fees
1 Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees in the amount of $24,612.50 with anticipated time of $2,725.00.
(Doc. No. 19 at 18.)
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must “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it”). Plaintiffs also move this
Court for reimbursement of verifiable costs and expenses in the amount of $507.39, totaling
$32,767.39. (Doc. No. 19 at 1-2; Doc. No. 26 at 11.)
Discussion
I. 	Legal Standard
Because Defendant removed this action under diversity jurisdiction, “the law of the
state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is entitled to attorney fees,”
but “the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by federal
law.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Thus, California law is determinative “not only [of] the right to fees, but also in
the method of calculating the fees.” Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470,
1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Under California Civil Code § 1794, the “prevailing buyer” in a Song-Beverly
action “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the
aggregate 	amount 	of 	costs 	and 	expenses, 	including 	attorney’s
fees.” 	Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). 	The Ninth Circuit utilizes the lodestar method for
calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees, “multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480
F. 3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007). The burden is on the party seeking fees to establish their
reasonableness. Id. at 945-46 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should consider: (1) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (2) the outcome of the proceedings; (3)
customary fees; and (4) the novelty or difficulty of the question presented. Hiken v. Dep't
of Def., 836 F. 3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d
1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986)). 	Additionally, district courts may “rely[] on their own
knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper
fees.” Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F. 3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011).
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District courts have broad “discretion in determining the amount of a fee award ...
in view of [their] superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding
frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at
437. 	The “district court may exclude from the fee request any hours that are ‘excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” 	Ingram, 647 F.3d at 926 (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434). If a court determines that some hours billed are not reasonable, it may exclude
them using one of two methods: the court may either conduct an “hour-by-hour analysis”
of the fee request or make an “across the board percentage cut.” 	Gonzalez v. City of
Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013).
II. 	Analysis
The 	parties 	do 	not 	dispute 	that 	Plaintiffs 	are 	entitled 	to 	attorneys’ 	fees
under § 1794(d) as the prevailing parties in this action. 	Rather, at issue is whether
Plaintiffs’ request for $27,337.50 in attorneys’ fees plus a lodestar multiplier of .2 in the
amount of $4,922.50 is reasonable. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for costs
in the amount of $507.39. (Doc. No. 19 at 18; Doc. No. 20 at 1, 12.)
A. 	Reasonable Rates
The first step in calculating the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate.
In determining a reasonable rate for attorneys’ fees, “the burden is on the fee applicant to
produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the
requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The relevant community is that in which the district court
sits.” 	Carr v. Tadin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 3d 970, 978 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Weeks v.
Kellogg Co., 2013 WL 6531177, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2013)). 	“Once the fee
applicant has proffered such evidence” of the prevailing market rate in the community, “the
opposing party must produce its own affidavits or other evidence to rebut the proposed
rate.” 	Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2023 WL 173921, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2023) (quoting Cortes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal.
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2005)).
Plaintiffs contend that the following hourly rates for their attorneys are reasonable:
(1) $545 for Stephanie Pengilley (10 years of practice); (2) $525 for Michelle Yang (7
years of practice); (3) $450 for Andrea Plata (3 years of practice); and (4) $545 for John
Myers (8 years of practice). (Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-8; Doc. No. 19 at
11-13.) 	Plaintiffs also contend that the hourly rate of $125 is reasonable for paralegals,
legal assistants, and case managers. (Id. at 11, 14; Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶ 13.)
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' counsel's requested rates “are excessive and
unsupported.” 	(Doc. No. 20 at 6.) 	Defendant asserts that the rates are far too high for
“relatively junior attorneys with minimal trial and appellate backgrounds” and “a largely
routine lemon law case”. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant notes “the highest biller, Christine Haw,
is not mentioned in Plaintiffs’ declaration”. (Id. at 7.) Defendant requests that the Court
award a rate of $250 per hour for all attorneys. (Id. at 9.)
In support of Plaintiffs’ motion, Stephanie Pengilley submits a declaration citing
several cases in which hourly rates comparable to those requested here were awarded to
that specific attorney or to an attorney of similar experience in the Central and Southern
Districts of California. (Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13.) 	See e.g.,
Zamora v. BMW of North America LLC, 2023 WL 8896264, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 28,
2023) (concluding hourly billing rates of $565 for Sephanie Pengilley and $545 for John
Myers were reasonable). Pengilley’s declaration also attests that Michelle Yang, founding
partner of Prestige Legal Solutions, P.C. (“PLS”), “considered factors such as experience
as a litigator, years as a practicing attorney, the skills and knowledge acquired over those
years, and the rates reasonably charged by other attorneys in the area” when setting the
hourly rates of all attorneys at PLS. (Doc. No. 19-1, Pengilley Decl. ¶ 6.)
Based on Pengilley’s declaration, the requested rates for Stephanie Pengilley,
Michelle Yang, and John Myers are reasonable. These rates are also comparable to those
awarded to different counsel in other recent Southern District of California “lemon law”
cases. 	See Garcia v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL 3961090, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12,
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2023) (upholding attorney rates ranging “between $475 and $605 per hour”); Scherer v.
FCA US, LLC, 2022 WL 22902332, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022) (finding rates from
$410-$550 per hour were “supported by evidence and [were] reasonable”); Bendavid v.
Kia Am., Inc., 2023 WL 6063442, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2023) (concluding that
requested rates of $410-$550 per hour were reasonable in light of orders from comparable
cases reflecting approval of similar rates).
i. 	Christine Haw
The Court agrees with Defendant that the hourly rate of $625 for Christine Haw is
too high. Plaintiffs do not include or provide any support for Christine Haw’s billing rate
in their motion or supporting declaration. (See Doc. Nos. 19, 19-1.) Further, the submitted
bill contains only two entries for Haw, one of which was “not charged”. (Doc. No. 19-2 at
4.) 	The charged entry is for 0.3 hours for “review[ing] and revis[ing] fee invoice and
provid[ing] direction to S.P. re same.” 	(Id.) 	Based on the lack of support for Christine
Haw in Plaintiffs’ motion declaration, the Court concludes that the requested rate is
unreasonable and declines to include Haw’s single entry in the attorneys’ fee calculation.
ii. 	Andrea Plata
The Court also agrees with Defendant that the rate charged for Andrea Plata, an
attorney with three years of experience, is too high. 	The Court observes that the cases
Plaintiffs cite in support of the reasonableness of the $450.00 hourly rate primarily involve
attorneys with more experience and skill than Plata. 	(See Doc. No. 19-1 at 4.) 	For
example, Plaintiffs cite to Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, where an attorney with 10
years of experience was awarded a $435.00 hourly rate and an attorney with 13 years
of experience was awarded a $445.00 hourly rate. 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1226 (C.D. Cal.
2020); see also Zomorodian v. BMW, 2019 WL 6534513 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2019)
(granting an hourly rate of $435.00 for an attorney with 10 years of experience and $410.00
for attorneys with 9 years of experience).
The Court adjusts the hourly rate for Andrea Plata to $250.00. 	In making this
determination, the Court considers rates awarded to attorneys with similar years of
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experience in other recent Southern District of California “lemon law” cases. See Cabrera
v. Ford Motor Co., 2025 WL 2462442, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) (upholding
as reasonable rates of $250/hour–$325/hour for associates); Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co.,
2020 WL 1820126, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. April 10, 2020) (same).
B. 	Hours Reasonably Expended
Plaintiffs request $24,612.50 in attorneys’ fees for pre-litigation efforts and actual
time billed. (Doc. No. 19 at 8-11, 13.) Plaintiffs claim their attorneys spent a total of 30.1
hours litigating this case, with an additional 5 hours anticipated for replying to Defendant’s
opposition to the instant motion and to attend the hearing. 	(Id. at 1-2, 13.) 	Defendant
contends that Plaintiffs’ hours should be reduced to 7.4 hours of attorney time and 0.4 hours
of support staff time because Plaintiffs charged an “excessive” amount for routine work.
(Id. at 5, 9-10, 12.) Defendant further asserts that Plaintiffs should not be able to recover
any pre-litigation fees due to “block billing” and use of a “flat fee”. (Doc. No. 20 at 3.)
The submitted bill contains an appropriate level of detail to permit the Court to
conduct a meaningful review for reasonableness. 	Attorneys seeking fee awards are “not
required to record in great detail how each minute of [their] time was expended.” Hensley,
461 U.S. at 437 n.12. Attorneys need only “keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral
judge can make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service,
and the reasonable fees to be allowed.” 	Id. at 441 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see
also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan For Hourly—Rated Employees of
ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 565 (9th Cir. 2008).
Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ hours on the basis that many of Plaintiffs’ pleadings
were “cop[ies] of hundreds of similar motions in Plaintiffs’ other cases.” 	(Id. at 5.) 	In
particular, Defendant notes the time Plaintiffs billed to prepare their complaint and motion
to remand. (Id.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that 0.9 hours is reasonable for preparing,
revising, and editing a complaint. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 1; Doc. No. 26 at 5.) See Rahman v.
FCA US LLC, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (finding that “drafting a
boilerplate complaint should not take more than an hour”). Defendant also contends that
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it was “problematic” for Plaintiffs' counsel to bill 2.9 hours to review Defendant's removal
and draft a motion to remand. 	(Doc. No. 20 at 5.) The Court disagrees, concluding that
the 2.9 hours billed by Plaintiffs' counsel for these tasks is not unreasonable, given that this
time encompassed reviewing Defendant's 11-page removal, conducting legal research, and
drafting a 22-page motion to remand. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 8.)
i. 	Preparation of Fee Motion and Anticipated Time
Plaintiffs 	request 	17.9 	hours 	for 	drafting 	the 	present 	motion, 	reviewing 	the
opposition, drafting the reply, and attending a hearing. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 4-5; Doc. No. 26
at 10.) 	Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ request is “excessive” and that Plaintiffs' fees
for this motion should be rejected. (Doc. No. 20 at 8.)
The Court need not determine whether the fees for preparing and defending motions
for attorneys’ fees are always recoverable. Some courts permit the fees. See Quinonez v.
FCA US, LLC, 2022 WL 2007429, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2022) (“Generally, a plaintiff
is entitled to [reasonable] fees spent drafting and defending the fee motion.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). 	In lemon law cases, however, courts often reduce the
hours spent on motions for attorneys' fees due to the template, “boilerplate” nature of these
motions and their accompanying documents. See, e.g., Cabrera, 2025 WL 2462442, at *11
(reducing the hours spent on the fee motion from 9.2 hours to 5 hours); Ovesepyan v.
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2023 WL 8586384, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (finding
no more than nine hours spent on the fee motion to be reasonable in light of “the
straightforward and boilerplate nature of lemon law fee motions”); Saavedra v. Ford Motor
Co., 2022 WL 16629951, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2022) (reducing the plaintiff's fees for
time spent on the attorneys' motion to $1,250.00 because an attorneys' fees motion in a
Song-Beverly action “is largely a template-driven activity”).
In this case, the parties attempted to resolve the fee issue without a noticed motion
but were unable to do so. (See Doc. No. 18.) As a result, the Court will award reasonable
fees. In comparison to the hours that courts have deemed reasonable for the same type of
motion in other “lemon law” cases, the Court reduces Plaintiffs' counsel's time for drafting
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the present Motion and its supporting documents by 7.9 hours to 10 hours. The Court also
denies Plaintiffs’ requested anticipated fees because the present motion was taken under
submission.
Accordingly, the Court deems the 35.1 hours Plaintiffs billed, less 7.9 hours for the
fee motion and 5 hours for the anticipated time, 2 to be reasonable.
ii. 	Pre-Litigation Efforts
As part of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees request, counsel includes $7,000.00 in pre-
litigation fees. 	(Doc. No. 19 at 8; Doc. No. 19-2 at 6.) 	Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’
request due to the use of a “flat rate” and “block billing”. (Doc. No. 20 at 2-3.)
“Block billing” is “the time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal
assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time
expended on specific tasks.” Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 n.2
(9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under California law, block billing is not objectionable
“per se,” but it “certainly does increase the risk that the trial court, in a reasonable exercise
of its discretion, will discount a fee request.” Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach
v. Willemsen, 2014 WL 12593981, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2014) (quoting Jaramillo v.
Cnty. of Orange, 200 Cal. App. 4th 811, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)). “[B]lock billing only
becomes an issue where there is a need to separate work that qualifies for compensation
from work that does not.” Jaramillo, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 830. 	Courts accordingly find
block-billing unobjectionable where there is “no need to separate out covered from
uncovered work.” Id.; see also Lardizabal v. Am. Express Nat'l Bank, 2023 WL 8264435,
at *8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2023) (determining that block-billing was neither “egregious” nor
“objectionable” where all the billing entries in question were related to the plaintiff's claims
for which he was eligible to receive attorney's fees).
Here, Plaintiffs bill a flat rate for “all services rendered prior to the preparation of
2 Stephanie Pengilley and John Myers are listed as the primary billers for the fee motion. As such, the
reduction of 12.9 hours (7.9 + 5) will be calculated based on their hourly rates of $545 for a reduction of
$7,030.50.
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the pre-litigation letter required to seek civil penalties” and for “all services rendered
relating to the preparation of the pre-litigation demand letter required by the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act”. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 6.) Plaintiffs provide a high-level account of
what these services entail including, but not limited to: “attorney review of client's repair
orders, purchase contract, current registration, vehicle payment information, and incidental
damages; the preparation of the Attorney-Client Retainer Agreement; computation of
client's actual damages;” “analysis of any offers or responses made by the manufacturer;
drafting of the pre-litigation demand letter, compiling all necessary documents for the
demand letter, and calendaring any deadlines associated with the pre-ligation stage
required by the law.” (Id.) The Court concludes that these entries do not contain any tasks
that 	are 	ineligible 	for 	compensation, 	rendering 	block-billing 	unobjectionable. 	See
also Signatures Network, Inc. v. Estefan, 2005 WL 151928, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2005)
(finding “reasonable pre-litigation fees are compensable under both Ninth Circuit and
California law”). Accordingly, the Court concludes the pre-litigation work was reasonably
incurred.
C. 	Lodestar Modification
Plaintiffs argue for an upward modification of 0.2 to “adequately reflect the
challenges faced throughout this litigation.” (Doc. No. 19 at 17.) Plaintiffs contend that
an enhancement is warranted because representation was undertaken on a contingency
basis and the attorneys had to account for “recent changes to the Lemon Law, the
potentially protracted nature of this case, and GM’s history of gamesmanship in this area
of law”. (Id. at 16.) Defendant argues that a multiplier should not be allowed given that
the matter is a “basic lemon law case” that posed no significant litigation risk. (Doc. No.
20 at 10.)
The Ninth Circuit has plainly stated that the lodestar amount is “presumptively the
reasonable fee amount,” and that a modification of the lodestar is appropriate only in “rare”
and “exceptional” cases supported by both “specific evidence on the record and detailed
findings ... that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” 	Van
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Gerwen 	v. 	Guarantee 	Mut. 	Life 	Co., 	214 	F. 	3d 	1041, 	1045 	(9th 	Cir.
2000) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
565 (1986)). Generally, courts consider the following factors when determining whether
to enhance a lodestar: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill
displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded
other 	employment 	by 	the 	attorneys, 	[and] 	(4) 	the 	contingent 	nature 	of 	the 	fee
award.” Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (2001). 	Courts have also recognized that
“the lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a
‘reasonable attorney's fee’ and ‘an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor that
is subsumed in the lodestar calculation.’” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542,
553 (2010) (quoting Pennsylvania, 478 U.S. at 566).
Here, the Court declines Plaintiffs’ request to apply an upward multiplier of 0.2,
given the routine nature of this case and the lack of novel or complex issues. See Rahman,
594 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (concluding that none of the factors “support[ed] an enhancement
of the lodestar” in “a largely routine lemon law case that involved few procedural demands
and the exercise of limited skill from lawyers who specialize in this practice area and
generally rely upon boilerplate pleadings and work product”). The amount of time and
skill required to properly resolve this litigation, counsel's success in resolving the matter,
and the case's novelty or complexity are reflected in the number of billable hours recorded
and the reasonable hourly rate. The Court acknowledges the contingent nature of this case;
nonetheless, “the [Song-Beverly Act] is a mandatory fee-shifting statute which ‘eliminates
any 	uncertainty 	about 	whether 	costs 	will 	be 	awarded 	to 	the 	prevailing
party.’” Id. (quoting Arias v. Ford Motor Co., 2020 WL 1940843, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27,
2020)). This case does not warrant the requested enhancement. The lodestar reflects the
reasonable amount of attorneys' fees Plaintiffs should recover, and the Court denies the
requested 0.2 multiplier enhancement.
/ / /
/ / /
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E. 	Calculating the Lodestar
In sum, the Court calculates the lodestar amount as $17,639.50. 3
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court awards $17,639.50 in attorneys’ fees and
$507.39 in costs. The Court declines to award a lodestar multiplier in the amount of
$4,922.50 or any other multiplier or additional amount. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’
Fees is, therefore, granted in part. The Court orders Defendant to pay this fee award to
Plaintiff's counsel within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, unless otherwise
agreed by the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 9, 2026
MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3 $27,337.50 (initial requested amount) - $187.50 (Christine Haw’s single entry) - $2,480.00 (Andrea
Plata’s adjusted rate) - $4,305.50 (excessive hours billed to fee motion) - $2,725.00 (anticipated time) =
$17,639.50.
The above calculation reflects the reduction of Christine Haw’s single billed entry of $187.50 and
Andrea Plata’s adjusted hourly rate from $450.00 to $250.00. Note, Andrea Plata billed a total of 12.4
hours. (See Doc. No. 19-2.) At Plaintiffs’ proposed rate, Andrea Plata charged 12.4 hours * $450 =
$5,580.00. At the adjusted rate, Andrea Plata will charge 12.4 hours * $250 = $3,100.00. Accordingly,
the Court subtracts the difference ($5,580.00 – $3,100.00 = $2,480.00). Next, the Court reduces 7.9
hours * $545 = $4,305.50 to bring the hours billed for the preparation of the instant fee Motion to a
reasonable rate. Lastly, the Court reduces 5 hours (anticipated time) * $454 = $2,725.00 for Plaintiffs’
anticipated time because the present motion was taken under submission and no hearing was required.
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