Anderson v. Brooklinen, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PARKER ANDERSON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
BROOKLINEN, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-2446-RSH-KSC
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
REMAND
[ECF No. 5]
Pending before the Court is a motion to remand filed by plaintiff Parker Anderson.
ECF No. 5. As set forth below, the motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed this putative class action against defendant
Brooklinen, Inc., in the California Superior Court for the County of San Diego. ECF No.
1-2 (“Compl.”). The Complaint alleges as follows. Defendant markets and sells bed sheets,
linens, and other bedding products online through its website. Id. ¶ 2. At issue in this case
are products that Defendant’s website lists for sale at a price that is purportedly discounted
from a higher reference price—for example, a comforter listed for sale at “$199 $159.20,”
accompanied with the words “20% off everything”—where Defendant allegedly did not
actually sell that product at the higher reference price in the preceding three months. Id. ¶¶
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4, 21. California law provides that “[n]o price shall be advertised as a former price …
unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price … within three months next
immediately preceding” the advertisement, or unless the date of the alleged former price is
clearly stated in the advertisement. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17501. Additionally, the
Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	(“FTC”) 	prohibits 	false 	or 	misleading 	“former 	price
comparisons.” See 16 C.F.R. § 233.1. The Complaint describes Defendant as engaging in
a “false discount” scheme. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23.
Plaintiff alleges that he bought two sheet sets from Defendant’s website that were
falsely advertised as being discounted from a higher reference price; that he was misled
into believing that the sheet sets had actually been offered at that higher reference price
within the preceding three months; and that he would not have purchased the products if
he had known that the products had not in fact been previously sold at the higher price. Id.
¶¶ 25, 31–36. Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class of “[a]ll persons residing in the
State of California who, during the applicable limitations period, purchased one or more
items from any website operated by Defendant, at a represented discount from a higher
reference price.” Id. ¶ 67.
The Complaint brings claims for: (1) violation of California’s Unfair Competition
Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (2) California’s False Advertising Law, Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.; and (3) California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act,
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 78–134. Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, restitution
from Defendant of all money obtained from Plaintiff and the class members as a result of
Defendant’s false and misleading advertising. Id. ¶¶ 97, 119.
Defendant asserts it was served with process on January 23, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 3.1
On May 30, 2025, Defendant filed a general denial and affirmative defenses in San Diego
1 The proof of service of summons, however, appears to indicate that Defendant was
served on January 15, 2025, and that the proof of service was subsequently filed with the
state court on January 23, 2025 ECF No. 1-3 at 7.
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Superior Court. ECF No. 1-4.
On September 17, 2025, Defendant filed its notice of removal. ECF No. 1. Defendant
asserts that this Court has original jurisdiction over this lawsuit under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Id. at 4.
On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed his motion to remand. ECF No. 5. The motion
is fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 9 (opposition), 10 (reply).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived entirely from the statutory
authorization of Congress.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1979). Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, “only state-court actions that originally could have
been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). “[R]emovability is
generally determined as of the time of the petition for removal[.]” Local Union 598,
Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones
Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988).
CAFA “provides the federal district courts with ‘original jurisdiction’ to hear a ‘class
action’ if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the
‘matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.’” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v.
Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (5)(B)). “The burden
of establishing removal jurisdiction, even in CAFA cases, lies with the defendant seeking
removal.” Wash. State v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2011). “[N]o
antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating
Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).
To satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, “a removing party must initially
file a notice of removal that includes ‘a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’” LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202
(9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89). “[T]he defendant seeking removal
bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount-
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in-controversy requirement is satisfied.” Id.
“Generally, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made
in good faith.” Lewis v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Similarly, when a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication,
the defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested
by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87. However, “if
the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegation ... both sides submit proof and the court
decides, 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence, 	whether 	the 	amount-in-controversy
requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88.
“Because the Court evaluates a challenged amount-in-controversy estimate under
the preponderance of the evidence standard, the defendant need only establish ‘that the
potential damage could exceed the jurisdictional amount.’” Campbell v. Skywest Airlines,
Inc., No. 3:24-cv-2141 TWR (SBC), 2025 WL 720188, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2025)
(quoting Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014)). “The amount
in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective
assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis, 627 F.3d at 400.
“While the defendant’s amount-in-controversy estimate must be grounded in the
plaintiff’s 	complaint, 	the 	parties’ 	additional 	evidence 	may 	include 	‘affidavits 	or
declarations, 	or 	other 	summary-judgment-type 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	the 	amount-in-
controversy at the time of removal.’” Campbell v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-
2141 TWR (SBC), 2025 WL 720188, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2025) (quoting Ibarra v.
Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Amount in Controversy
Plaintiff’s motion to remand argues that Defendant has not satisfied the amount-in-
controversy requirement. ECF No. 5-1 at 8–10. Plaintiff asserts that “this Court’s
jurisdiction should not be premised by unsubstantiated say-so” contained in the notice of
removal, and that “[b]ecause Plaintiff contests that jurisdiction is proper, Defendant must
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now substantiate its claim with actual data and demonstrate that CAFA’s amount in
controversy requirement is met.” Id. at 9.
In response, Defendant offers a declaration from its Chief Financial Officer, stating
that Defendant’s sales data demonstrates that products that were either shipped or billed to
a California address and sold at a discount from the list price during the class period
accounted for over 663,000 transactions with combined sales prices totaling over $150
million. ECF Nos. 9 at 11–12; 9-1 ¶¶ 7, 8. Plaintiff’s reply brief does not dispute that this
declaration is sufficient to establish an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million here.
The Court concludes that Defendant has met its burden to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. See ECF No. 10.
Plaintiff’s motion also does not contest that the Complaint satisfies the other
requirements for jurisdiction under CAFA, namely, a class of more than 100 members, and
minimal diversity. The Court determines that these requirements are also met here.
B. 	Timeliness of Removal
Plaintiff also seeks to remand the case on the grounds that Defendant’s notice of
removal was untimely. ECF No. 5-1 at 5–8. “The mechanics and requirements for removal
are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA Ltd. Liab. Co., 707
F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal “shall
be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of
a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based ….” Additionally, “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable.” 18 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
Plaintiff argues that “the thirty-day deadline to remove began on January 15, 2025,
when Defendant was served with Plaintiff’s Complaint, and Defendant was put on notice
by 	the 	Complaint 	that 	this 	case 	was 	removable 	under 	both 	CAFA 	and 	diversity
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jurisdiction.” 	ECF 	No. 	5-1 	at 	7. 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	the 	following 	allegations
collectively demonstrate, on the face of the Complaint, that the amount in controversy
requirement is met: “Defendant, through its website, has sold millions of units of
merchandise to customers in California and nationwide,” Compl. ¶ 19; “all or nearly all of
the reference higher prices on the website are false or misleading,” id. ¶ 7; “many, if not
all” of Defendant’s products are sold on its website, id. ¶ 43; and “Defendant has earned
millions of dollars selling products at misrepresented discounts that do not actually exist,”
id. ¶ 8. See generally ECF Nos. 5-1 at 6 (listing allegations in the Complaint that allegedly
establish removability); 10 at 4–5 (same).
Plaintiff’s argument that the Complaint is removable on its face is in tension with
Plaintiff’s separate argument, in the same motion, that the Complaint is not removable at
all. The Court agrees with Defendant that this action is removable, although not on the face
of the Complaint. The Complaint alleges that Defendant has sold millions of units of
merchandise on its website, including many or all of Defendant’s products; and that where
the website contains “reference higher prices,” all or nearly all of those prices are false or
misleading. But the Complaint does not set forth a basis for estimating that the amount of
harm suffered or that the restitution sought exceeds $5 million. The Complaint’s allegations
that Defendant has “millions” in unjustly received revenues, without more, does not meet
the threshold either.
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that the allegations in the Complaint, combined
with sales data outside the Complaint but within Defendant’s control, established the
removability of the Complaint and immediately upon service began the running of the 30-
day window for removal. However, this argument is precluded by the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, L.P., 720 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013).
Roth held that where an initial pleading is “indeterminate” as to removability—that is,
where “[i]t did not reveal on its face … that there was sufficient amount in controversy to
support jurisdiction under CAFA”—“a defendant does not have a duty of inquiry.” Id. at
1125. Roth stated that the removal statutes “permit a defendant to remove outside the two
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thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of
either of the thirty-day deadlines,” id., and that “a defendant’s subjective knowledge cannot
convert a non-removable action into a removable one” for purposes of beginning the 30-
day time limits of Section 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3), id. at 1226. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that “in some diversity cases, defendants will be able to take advantage” of the
indeterminacy of the complaint, and “may sometimes be able to delay filing a notice of
removal until it is strategically advantageous to do so.” Id. The Court of Appeals continued,
however: “Our best answer—and a likely sufficient answer—is that plaintiffs are in a
position to protect themselves. If plaintiffs think that the defendant might delay filing a
notice of removal until a strategically advantageous moment, they need only provide to the
defendant a document from which removability may be ascertained.” Id. The Court finds
unpersuasive Plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish Roth.
In a case decided months before Roth, the Ninth Circuit stated that the removal
statute “requires a defendant to apply a reasonable amount of intelligence in determining
removability.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (quoting
Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit in
Kuxhausen gave, as an example of that duty, “[m]ultiplying figures clearly stated in a
complaint,” including multiplying the number of class members with the amount in
controversy for each class member. Id. at 1140. But the court added that the defendant “was
not obligated to supply information which [the Complaint] omitted.” Id. at 1141. The Ninth
Circuit reversed a district court’s determination that removal was untimely, where the
district court determined whether a complaint was removable by postulating an amount in
controversy for each class member: “Presumably, [the district court] thought that [$25,000
in controversy per class member] was a plausible-enough guess for a case involving
German luxury automobiles, perhaps doubly so since [the plaintiff’s] individual vehicle
contract was for more than twice that amount.” Id. The Ninth Circuit continued:
The fact remains, however, that we “don’t charge defendants with
removability until they’ve received a paper that gives them enough
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information to remove.” This principle helps avoid a “Catch-22” for
defendants desirous of a federal forum. By leaving the window for
removal open, it forces plaintiffs to assume the costs associated with
their own indeterminate pleadings. … Thus, because nothing in [the
plaintiff’s] complaint “indicate[d] that the amount demanded by each
putative class member exceed[ed] $25,000” it fell short of triggering
the removal clock under Section 1446(b).
Id. 	(citations 	omitted). 	Although 	Plaintiff 	cites 	Kuxhausen 	in 	its 	remand 	motion,
Kuxhausen like Roth favors denial of this motion. Defendant was not, upon service of the
Complaint here—that was indeterminate as to removability—required to consult its sales
data and file its notice of removal within 30 days. Defendant’s removal was timely.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand [ECF No. 5] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 24, 2025
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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