Soro v. FCA US, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DUNYA SORO,
Plaintiff,
v.
FCA US, LLC; CARL BURGERS
DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP RAM
WORLD; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-02200-GPC-SBC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
FCA US, LLC’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF No. 33]
This case involves alleged vehicle defects in a 2017 Ram 1500 truck. Currently
before the court is Defendant FCA US, LLC’s (“FCA”) motion for summary judgment
and request for judicial notice. The Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the
papers under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d) and vacates the hearing set for October 9, 2026. For
the reasons outlined below, the Court grants FCA’s motion for summary judgment in its
entirety.
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Background
I. 	Factual Background
On February 18, 2017, Plaintiff leased a 2017 Ram 1500. Ex. 1 (Complaint, ECF
No. 1-2) at ¶ 7. FCA’s warranty records list a “EXTENDED FEDERAL EMISSSIONS”
warranty of 96 months or 80,000 miles expiring February 18, 2025. ECF No. 33-17, Ex.
10 at 12, 32, 50, 82. Meanwhile, the FCA warranty booklet identified the powertrain
control module as a part covered for 8 years or 80,000 miles. Id. During Plaintiff’s lease
term, vehicle repair records indicate the vehicle was serviced in October 2017, December
2017, October 2018, and March 2019. ECF No. 33-17, Ex. 10 at 1-23, 24-37, 38-67, 68-
96; Tremonti Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 11.
As to the October 2017 visit, Plaintiff reports that the rearview camera image “got
smaller” (ECF No. 33-17, Ex. 10 at 7) and had “completely disappear[ed].” In addition,
the check engine light was on. ECF No. 33-18, Ex. 11 at 31:18-32:16. In December 2017,
Plaintiff brought the vehicle in for oil and filter service. Plaintiff stated in her deposition
that on this occasion the check engine light was on again but the concern was not written
up. ECF No. 33-18, Ex. 11 at 36:20-37:4; 37:20-38:3.
In October 2018, Plaintiff testified that while driving home from Los Angeles with
her two sons, "the whole screen froze, and the check engine start flashing… The stereo
went off… Cameras didn't start -- didn't work." ECF No. 33-18, Ex. 11 at 27:8-28:20.
Asked directly whether the vehicle shut off, Plaintiff testified: "Yes. The whole thing shut
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off, except the vehicle." Id. at 28:2-4. A second, similar event occurred en route to her
son’s school with her son in the car. Id. at 29:19-30:12.
From October 17-22, 2018, three recalls were performed: U05 (reprogramming the
PCM, TCM, RF Hub, and IPC software, U61 (“Reprogram Powertrain Control Module”),
and U74 (tailgate latch actuator stop block). ECF No. 33-17, Ex. 10 at 39-41, 58-60; see
also ECF No. 33-16, Ex. 9 at 6-11. Plaintiff testified she also brought the truck in for a
cooling concern and the rear camera, neither of which appears on the order. ECF No. 33-
18, Ex. 11 at 40:9-14, 41:12-15, 45:1-15.
In March 2019, Plaintiff brought the vehicle back for a recall: Recall U53—
"Reprogram Occupant Restraint Controller (ORC) Module—Includes ORC and ABS
Initialization"—reflashing the restraint control module "from old part number
68303218AA to current part number 68346715AC." ECF No. 33-16, Ex. 9 at 13-14; ECF
No. 33-17, Ex. 10 at 69. Plaintiff additionally reported that the radio froze, Bluetooth
stopped working, and the radio had no volume; the dealer "reconfigure[d]
infotainment(radio)." ECF No. 33-16, Ex. 9 at 14.
Plaintiff states that March 2019 was the last time she returned the vehicle for
service before lease-end. ECF No. 33-18, Ex. 11 at 51:7-13. FCA’s records show a lease-
end date of February 18, 2020. ECF No. 33-16, Ex. 9 at 6. When Plaintiff returned the
vehicle, she informed the dealership that “the car has been having issue[s] all these years.
And I'm returning it with those issues." ECF No. 33-18, Ex. 11 at 12:12-16, 50:17-24.
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Plaintiff stated she no longer has the vehicle and did not purchase it after lease-end. ECF
No. 33-18, Ex. 11 at 9:22-25-10:1-4.
II. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 30, 2025, in San Diego Superior Court.
ECF No. 1-2, at 2. On August 25, 2025, FCA removed the case from the superior court to
this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1, at 2. That same day, FCA filed an
answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 2.
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges four violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”) against FCA, including: (1) failure to timely replace the
vehicle or make restitution Plaintiff pursuant to California Civil Code § 1793.2(d) (Count
1); (2) failure to commence repairs of her vehicle within a reasonable time and repair the
vehicle to conform with the applicable warranties within thirty days pursuant to
California Civil Code § 1793.2(b) (Count 2); (3) failure to make available to its repair
facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the
express warranty period pursuant to California Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3) (Count 3); and
(4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to California Civil Code
§§ 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5 (Count 4). ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 39-57. Plaintiff also alleged that
FCA committed fraudulent inducement by concealment by failing to disclose the
existence of the alleged engine defect (Count 6). Id. ¶¶ 63-71. Plaintiff seeks general
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damages, restitution, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 1-2, at
14.
On November 18, 2025, FCA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On
February 19, 2026, the Court denied the motion as to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly express
warranty counts 1 through 3 and granted the motion as to count 4 (implied warranty of
merchantability) and count 6 (fraudulent inducement concealment). ECF No. 23, at 23. 1
On July 20, 2026, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that (1) Plaintiff’s remaining Song-Beverly claims are untimely, and (2) Plaintiff cannot
establish the essential elements of the remaining claims. ECF No. 33-1. Defendant also
filed a request for judicial notice. ECF No. 33-5. Plaintiff responded on August 21, 2026.
ECF No. 36. Plaintiff also filed a list of Evidentiary Objections. ECF No. 36-2.
Defendant filed their reply on September 11, 2026. ECF No. 37.
III. 	Evidentiary Objections
Before granting summary judgment in a case, a district court must rule on
evidentiary objections that are material to its ruling. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629
F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has filed evidentiary objections to evidence in
support of Defendant's motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 36-2. To the extent that
1 Count 5 was a negligent repair claim filed against Carl Burgers, the seller of the Ram
truck, and was dismissed by Plaintiff prior to the case being removed to federal court.
ECF No. 1 at 3).
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the evidence is proper under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court considered the
evidence. To the extent that the evidence is not proper, the Court did not consider it.
As to material objections, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s Second Evidentiary
Objection challenging the Tremonti Declaration ¶ 3 and ECF No. 33-17, Ex. 10 based on
a lack of adequate authentication, lack of personal knowledge, and hearsay. Fed. R. Evid.
901; Fed. R. Evid 803(6); Fed. R. Evid 601. ECF No. 36-2. At summary judgment a
district court may consider hearsay evidence submitted in an inadmissible form, so long
as the underlying evidence could be provided in an admissible form at trial, such as by
live testimony. JL Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2016). “At the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the
evidence’s form. We instead focus on the admissibility of its contents”. Fraser v.
Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir. 2003).
The Court is satisfied that Defendant could present Ex. 10, Carl Burger Dealership
Repair Records, in admissible form at trial. Defendant has stated they could present Ex.
10 through testimony from a qualified dealership witness or a certification complying
with Rules 803(6), 902(11), and 601. ECF No. 38, at 5. Based on this, the Court finds that
Ex. 10 could be introduced at trial consistent with the federal rules of evidence. Arellano
v. Calderon, No. 22-CV-441 TWR (LR), 2024 WL 1163177, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
2024). At this stage, that is all that is required. Therefore, the court denies Plaintiff’s
Second Evidentiary Objection.
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IV. 	Judicial Notice
Defendant seeks judicial notice of eight documents. ECF No. 33-5. Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Harris
v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that a court may take
judicial notice of “undisputed matters of public record”). As Exhibits 1-3 are court filings
and available as an undisputed matter of public record, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
request with respect to Exhibits 1-3. Next, Exhibits 4-7 are documents evidencing the
legislative analysis for Assembly Bill No. 1755, 2023-24 Regular Session and the signing
message of the Governor. The Court denies the motion for judicial notice of Exhibits 4-7
as moot, as these documents concern only legislative facts for which “[j]udicial notice ...
is unnecessary.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954,
960 (9th Cir. 2010). Since the associated exhibits contain only legislative facts, we are
free to consult them to the extent we find them useful. See Owino v. Holder, 771 F.3d
527, 534 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014); Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee notes.
Exhibit 8 is a copy of a webpage maintained by the State of California and is
challenged by Plaintiff. ECF No. 36-2. The Court addresses this objection below at
section I(A).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary
judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just,
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speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when it affects the outcome
of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can
satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing
sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's
evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest
on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and
by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element
of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 325. “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this determination, the court
must “view[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” JL
Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th Cir. 2016). The
Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of fact. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255.
An affirmative defense is something “the defendant must plead and prove.” Albino
v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). If a defendant moves for summary
judgment based on an affirmative defense, they must show that “no reasonable trier of
fact could fail to find” that defendant proved their affirmative defense. Nia v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 725 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2024), aff'd, 172 F.4th 1065 (9th Cir.
2026). For limitations-period defenses, a defendant must show that no jury could
reasonably conclude the claim was timely. Stiles v. Walmart, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 3d 1029,
1062 (E.D. Cal. 2022). If Defendants establish that plaintiffs’ claims are time barred
absent application of an equitable exception, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating
the applicability of any such exception. Wolf v. Travolta, 167 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1092
(C.D. Cal. 2016).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Claims Are Not Barred by § 871.21
A. Section 871.21 – Six-Year Bar
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are time barred pursuant to California
Code of Civil Procedure § 871.21(b). ECF No. 33-1, at 10-11. California Code of Civil
Procedure § 871.21 went into effect on January 1, 2025 and Defendant claims to have
opted into the statutory regime. Id. The statute reads: “[A]n action covered by Section
871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the
motor vehicle.” California Code of Civil Procedure § 871.21(b). Defendant states that the
vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff on February 19, 2017, and the action was not filed until
January 30, 2025, nearly 8 years later. ECF No. 33-1, at 10-11.
Plaintiff responds that Defendant cannot invoke § 871.21’s six-year time bar as it
has failed to provide sufficient evidence on whether Defendant “opted into” the Section
871.20 et seq. statutory regime. ECF No. 36, at 13. California Code of Civil Procedure §
871.30 identifies the opt in process. The relevant provisions are listed below.
(a) Within 30 days of the effective date of the act adding this section, a manufacturer
may elect to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in subdivision (a)
of Section 871.20 with respect to all of its motor vehicles sold in the year 2025 and
in all prior years by providing written notice of that election to the Arbitration
Certification Program within the Department of Consumer Affairs.
(b) Within 60 days of the effective date of the act adding this section, the Arbitration
Certification Program within the Department of Consumer Affairs shall publish to
its website the list of all manufacturers that have elected under subdivision (a) to
proceed under this chapter for actions related to motor vehicles sold in the year 2025
and in all prior years.
California Code of Civil Procedure § 871.30
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Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to § 871.30(a), Defendant has failed to offer
adequate proof that it provided written notice of Defendant’s election to proceed under
the statutory regime. ECF No. 36, at 13. As proof of the opt in, Defendant requests
judicial notice of the webpage to the Arbitration Certification Program’s (ACP) accepted
manufacturer list. ECF No. 33-15, Ex. 8. Plaintiff objects to the admissibility of the
website or the Court taking judicial notice of it. ECF No. 36, at 13.
Courts are permitted to take judicial notice of government-provided information on
their official website. Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 946 n.17 (9th Cir. 2018)
(judicial notice of a government website containing a list of registered trading systems);
Daniels–Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010)
(judicial notice of school district web site where neither party disputes the authenticity of
the web site or the accuracy of the information displayed). Accordingly, the Court takes
judicial notice of Ex. 8, the Department of Consumer Affairs website.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court is not permitted to take judicial notice of the
truth of a disputed fact. ECF No. 36, at 13-14. However, courts are permitted to take
judicial notice of the truth of facts when they are not subject to reasonable dispute.
Balboa Cap. Corp. v. Shaya Med. P.C. Inc., 623 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1064–66 (C.D. Cal.
2022) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)). Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the
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website or challenge the accuracy of the information displayed. 2 Moreover, “[a] fact is
‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ if it is ‘generally known,’ or ‘can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’ Gray
v. Luxottica of Am., Inc., No. 8:24-CV-00160-MRA-DFM, 2024 WL 5689566, at 12, n.2
(C.D. Cal 2024). Ex. 8 is comprised of a screenshot of ACP’s official website. The
exhibit also contains a hyperlink which directs the Court to the Department of Consumer
Affairs official website. Id. at 2. At the top of the webpage, the following is stated “These
manufacturers have elected to opt-in to the new Lemon Law procedures (Civil Code of
Procedures sections 871.20 to 871.30)”. Id.
The Court takes judicial notice that FCA US LLC is listed as a manufacturer who
opted in pursuant to 871.30. The Court finds that the fact that Defendant opted in is not
subject to reasonable dispute as the information in Ex. 8 can be accurately and readily
determined from a source whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. The court
GRANTS judicial notice of Exhibit 8 and the fact that FCA US LLC opted into Section
871.30.
B. § 871.21 Does Not Apply Retroactively to Plaintiff’s Song Beverly Claims
2 Plaintiff argues that production of the written notice is required to show that the opt in
occurred. ECF No. 36, at 23. However, Plaintiff provides no authority for such
proposition and therefore the court rejects this argument.
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Plaintiff argues that the bar under § 871.21 is not applicable to this case because it
would impose an impermissible retroactive application of the statute. ECF No. 36, at 14.
Section 871.21 was signed into law on September 29, 2024. The statute went into effect
on January 1, 2025. As the car was initially acquired on February 18, 2017, application of
§ 871.21 to this claim would be retrospective. ECF No. 1-2, at ¶ 7. The California
Supreme Court has explained that in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the
contrary, statutory enactments apply only prospectively. Evangelatos v. Superior Ct., 44
Cal. 3d 1188, 1193–94 (1988) (recognizing the common-sense notion that it may be
unfair to change “the rules of the game” in the middle of a contest); McClung v.
Employment Development Dept. 34 Cal.4th 467, 475 (2004) (there is a presumption
against retroactive application of statute unless legislature plainly directed otherwise by “
‘express language of retroactivity or ... other sources [that] provide a clear and
unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application.’ ”.
In response, Defendant argues that the legislative record and language of the
statute make it clear that § 871.21 applies retroactively. ECF No. 33-1, at 15-16. At no
point does Defendant identify any legislative history or statutory provision that directly
addresses retroactivity. Instead, Defendant cites to caselaw stating “[i]n the absence of
such an express declaration of legislative intent for retroactive application, a court may
look to a variety of other factors to determine such legislative intent, such as the context
of the legislation, its objective, the evils sought to be remedied, the history of the times
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and similar legislation, public policy, and/or contemporaneous statutory construction”.
Santangelo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 804, 814 (1998). However, Santangelo is
a California appellate decision that is difficult to reconcile with the presumption against
retroactive application of statutes that the California Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized. Santangelo fails to acknowledge this presumption and its force and
persuasiveness to this case is slight as a result.
However, even considering Santangelo, Defendant has failed to show sufficient
legislative intent to warrant retroactive application. Defendant’s citations to the context,
public policy, or reports on the statute provide little, if any, support for retroactive
application. A fair reading of the legislative intent makes it clear that retroactivity or
prospectivity was simply not addressed. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d, at 1209. Furthermore,
other courts that have analyzed this issue have held that § 871.21 does not apply
retroactively based on the strong presumption against retroactive application and absence
of legislative intent. Galdamez v. FCA US LLC, 830 F. Supp. 3d 982, at 986-87 (C.D.
Cal. 2026) (applying presumption against retroactive application of Section 871.21 where
absence of legislative history indicating it was intended to apply retroactively); Veronica
G. Perez et al v. Gen. Motors LLC et al, No. 2:25-CV-08189-WLH-BFM, 2026 WL
2466530, at 1–2 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (same).
Applying the presumption against retroactive application of § 871.21 and finding
no express language to support it, Defendant’s argument fails.
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C. The Constitutionality of Applying § 871.21
In addition to an attack on the retroactive application of § 871.21, Plaintiff argues
that retrospective application would be an unconstitutional violation of due process. As
the Court has already ruled that § 871.21 does not apply based on the presumption against
retroactivity, the court declines to rule on the issue of constitutionality.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by Cal. Com. Code § 2725
A. Background
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by California Commercial Code
§ 2725. Plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act allege violations of the Act’s
express warranty provisions. “The Song–Beverly Act does not include its own statute of
limitations.” Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–1306 (2009).
“Accordingly, ‘California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for
breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by . . . section 2725 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.’” Dale v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-00868 WBS JDP,
2025 WL 2912627, at 2 (E.D. Cal. 2025), (quoting Mexia, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 1306).
The relevant provisions are listed below:
An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued. California Commercial Code § 2725
§ 2725(1). (emphasis added)
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
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performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of
such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered. California Commercial Code § 2725(2). (emphasis added)
Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s express warranty claims are untimely because
they were made more than four years after delivery of the vehicle. ECF No. 33-1, at 10.
Generally, a cause of action for breach of a contract for sale “accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. Yi v. BMW of
N. Am., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-06467-SVW, 2018 WL 3359016, at 6 (C.D. Cal. 2018), aff'd
sub nom. Kwon Yi v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 805 F. App'x 459 (9th Cir. 2020). A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made[.]” California Commercial Code §
2725(2). However, an exception provides that, “where a warranty explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.” Id.
B. The Emissions Comp Warranty is an Express Warranty of Future Performance
Plaintiff asserts that the VIP Summary Report lists a “MAJOR EMISSIONS
COMP WARRANTY” that provides express warranty coverage for eight years or 80,000
miles. ECF 36 at 11. 3 Defendant argues that this is a statutorily mandated emissions
3 The VIP Summary Reports interchangeably reference an “EXTENDED FEDERAL
EMISSIONS” warranty (Ex. 10 at 12, 32) and a “MAJOR EMISSIONS COMP
WARRANTY” (Ex.10 at 50, 82).
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warranty which is distinct from manufacturer-offered express warranties for purposes of
Song-Beverly. ECF 37 at 5. However, Defendant does not cite any caselaw to support
such proposition. Courts have considered emission control system warranties as the basis
for a Song-Beverly claim, see Spingola v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 18-cv-00528-JCS,
2019 WL 6050905, at 4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing California emissions warranty as
basis for Song-Beverly claim); Yi, 2018 WL 3359016, at 4 (same); see e.g. Dong v. BMW
of N. Am., LLC, No. 19-CV-2202 DMS (BGS), 2021 WL 824771, at 5 (S.D. Cal. 2021).
The plain language of the emissions warranty extends 8 years which is an “express time
limit” and therefore qualifies as a warranty of future performance. Rodarte v. Ford Motor
Co., No. CV18-10499-DMG-JEMX, 2019 WL 1100150, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019);
See Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 169 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133 (2008).
C. Accrual of the Express Warranty of Future Performance
Defendant argues that Plaintiff confuses the duration of warranty coverage with the
accrual of her claims. ECF No. 37, at 6. The Court agrees. “Where an express warranty
guarantees performance for a defined term . . . ‘the four-year clock begins to tick when
the breach is discovered or should have been discovered, or when the explicit time period
expires, whichever occurs first.’” See Ngo v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, No. CV 20-06197-
MWF (GJSX), 2025 WL 819568, at 5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2025) (quoting 2 The Law of
Product Warranties § 11:4 (2024)); Yetter v. Ford Motor Co., 428 F. Supp. 3d 210, 222
(N.D. Cal. 2019). In the context of the Song-Beverly Act, courts have found a plaintiff to
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be on notice of his claim - beginning the running of the statute of limitations - before the
expiration of the express warranty if a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his
claim before then. Yi, 2018 WL 3359016, at *6. Once Plaintiff has “a suspicion of
wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue,” they have to “decide whether to file suit
or sit on [his] rights”. Id. (citing Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111, 245
(1988)).
Courts have found the statute of limitations period to commence when a plaintiff
reasonably knew that their vehicle would not perform as it should and defendant would
not replace it. Ehrlich v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 (C.D. Cal.
2010). Here, Plaintiff states that she returned the vehicle at lease end in February 2020.
ECF No. 36, at 12. In her deposition, when asked about returning the vehicle, plaintiff
told the dealership "that the car has been having issue[s] all these years. And I'm
returning it with those issues." Ex. 11 at 12:12-16, 50:17-24. These admissions represent
knowledge of the alleged issues at the time the vehicle was returned and are fatal to
plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 37, at 3. Plaintiff’s own admission and actions reveal an
awareness that the vehicle was not performing as it should and Defendant would not
replace it. Specifically, the statements show Plaintiff returned the vehicle, was no longer
in possession of the vehicle, had knowledge of the issues, and that the issues had not been
resolved. As a result, Plaintiff had reason to believe the car would not be repaired for her
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future use. These facts are sufficient to show that Plaintiff was on notice of her claim as
late as February 2020.
Once Defendant meets their burden, the burden moves to Plaintiffs to produce
enough evidence to rebut Defendant’s claim and create a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. Here, Plaintiff presented no evidence to refute
Defendant’s claim. Plaintiff does not state any facts or present any evidence relating to
when the breach was discovered or could have been discovered. Instead, Plaintiff argues
that Defendant failed to prove or provide evidence that the breach was discovered “or
should have been discovered” more than four years before January 30, 2025. ECF No. 36,
at 8. Under Celotex, this is plainly insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
By comparison, courts have found that a Song-Beverly plaintiff was on notice of
his claims for statute of limitations purposes after as few as two visits for the same
problem. Durkee v. Ford Motor Co., 2014 WL 7336672, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2014)
(first or second repair would also put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that there had
been a Lemon Law breach). Here, Plaintiff states that her vehicle was serviced for camera
and infotainment system problems in October 2017, October 2018, and March 2019 and
were never repaired. ECF No. 36, at 19-20. Plaintiff also points to continued issues with
the check engine light, PCM circuit, and four recall procedures. Id. at 11-13. All these
visits occurred prior to the return date of February 2020. Id. This prior repair and recall
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history provided Plaintiff with actual notice as early as 2018 but no later than February
2020.
D. The Court Did Not Set a Binding Outer Accrual Date
The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s claim that the Court fixed an outer accrual
date that makes the complaint timely. ECF No. 36, at 18. This is a mischaracterization of
the court’s ruling. At the pleading stage, the Court recognized the date Plaintiff took
delivery of the vehicle was February 18, 2017. ECF No. 23 at 13. In its Order, the Court
observed that “Plaintiff’s cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act for violation of the
express warranty accrued no later than February 18, 2022”. Id. In deciding the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the Court identified caselaw stating “Where an express
warranty guarantees performance for a defined term . . . ‘the four-year clock begins to
tick when the breach is discovered or should have been discovered, or when the explicit
time period expires, whichever occurs first”. Id. (citing Ngo, 2025 WL 819568, at 5). At
the time of the prior ruling, the Court did not have before it evidence as to the accrual
date. In applying the law, the Court acknowledged a possible outer accrual date of
February 18, 2022. This did not foreclose an inquiry into an earlier accrual date based on
when the breach is discovered or should have been discovered. Now, at the summary
judgment stage, Defendant has offered unrebutted evidence which establishes Plaintiff’s
claim accrued no later than February 2020.
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that
there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff’s claim accrued as of February 2020 and no jury
could reasonably conclude the claim was timely at the date of filing of her complaint.
III. 	Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Tolling
California Commercial Code § 2725(4) states that “This section does not alter the
law on tolling of the statute of limitations…….”. Plaintiff states in her Complaint that any
applicable statute of limitations has been tolled by equitable tolling, the discovery rule,
fraudulent concealment, equitable estoppel, and the repair rule. ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 37.
Plaintiff bears the burden to prove any exception to a statute of limitations defense. Wolf,
167 F. Supp. 3d, at 1092. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Plaintiff Cannot Invoke Equitable Tolling
To establish that equitable tolling applies, a plaintiff must prove the following
elements: fraudulent conduct by the defendant resulting in concealment of the operative
facts, failure of the plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of its cause
of action within the limitations period, and due diligence by the plaintiff until discovery
of those facts. Jamil v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 780 F. Supp. 3d 957, 966 (C.D. Cal.
2025). “The doctrine ‘focuses primarily on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the
limitations period. It is not available to avoid the consequences of one's negligence.’”
Sagehorn v. Engle, 141 Cal. App. 4th 452, 460 (2006).
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Plaintiff’s testimony shows that she was on notice of the claims as of February
2020 at the latest. As a result, she was required to exercise diligence in pursuing the
claim. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence showing that she exercised diligence to
pursue her claims. Plaintiff has not provided any information regarding her actions after
returning the vehicle in February 2020, to bringing this claim in January 2025.
As such, the Court finds that plaintiff has not met the requirements for equitable
tolling because she did not present any proof regarding her diligence in bringing her
claim.
B. The Discovery Rule Does Not Apply to Toll the Statute of Limitations
The “discovery rule” can “[postpone] the accrual of a cause of action until the
plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 807 (2005). Plaintiff has a “reason to discover” the cause
of action as soon as he “has a suspicion of wrongdoing.” Jolly, 44 Cal.3d at 1112, 245. As
discussed above, Plaintiff had reason to discover the claim as of February 2020 as they
were aware that the vehicle had issues and would not be repaired. Additionally, Plaintiffs
seeking to benefit from the delayed discovery rule must show that they diligently pursued
their claims, and that they could not have discovered their claims earlier, even if they
exercised diligence. Yi, 2018 WL 3359016, at 6.
As in the Court’s equitable tolling analysis, the Court finds that plaintiff has not
met the requirements for the discovery rule because she did not present any evidence
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regarding her diligence in bringing her claim. As a result, the discovery rule cannot apply
to toll the statute of limitations.
C. Plaintiff has Failed to Invoke Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel “focuses primarily on actions taken by the defendant to prevent
a plaintiff from filing suit.” Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.
2008). For equitable estoppel to apply, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the
plaintiff was “ignorant of the true state of facts.” Smothers v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 813
F. App'x 291, 294 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence and failed to
raise a triable issue as to whether FCA induced her to delay in filing suit, as necessary for
estoppel. Therefore, Defendant was not equitably estopped from asserting a statute of
limitation defense.
D. Plaintiff Cannot Invoke Fraudulent Concealment to Protect her Claims
“The doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a
defendant, through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim to grow stale.” Aryeh v. Canon
Bus. Sols., Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1192 (2013). “This doctrine requires the plaintiff to (1)
plead with particularity the facts giving rise to the fraudulent concealment claim and (2)
demonstrate that he or she used due diligence in an attempt to uncover the facts.” Allen v.
Similasan Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1071 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Hunter v. Gates, 68
F. App'x 69, 71 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Court finds that plaintiff is unable to invoke the
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fraudulent concealment tolling as she presented no evidence regarding her exercise of
diligence in pursuing her claims.
E. Plaintiff is Unable to Show that the Repair Rule is Sufficient to Toll Her Claims
Plaintiff has not provided any authority for her claim that the “repair rule” tolls the
statute of limitations. The “repair rule” is found in Civ. Code § 1795.6.(a)(1) which states
that:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) warranty period relating to an implied or express
warranty accompanying a sale or consignment for sale of consumer goods selling
for fifty dollars ($50) or more shall automatically be tolled for the period from the
date 	upon 	which 	the 	buyer 	either 	(1) 	delivers 	nonconforming 	goods 	to 	the
manufacturer or seller for warranty repairs or service or (2), pursuant to subdivision
(c) of Section 1793.2 or Section 1793.22, notifies the manufacturer or seller of the
nonconformity of the goods up to, and including, the date upon which (1) the
repaired or serviced goods are delivered to the buyer, (2) the buyer is notified the
goods are repaired or serviced and are available for the buyer's possession or (3) the
buyer is notified that repairs or service is completed, if repairs or service is made at
the buyer's residence.
In sum, the warranty period is tolled or extended under only three circumstances:
(1) the car is in the shop for warranty repairs (§ 1795.6, subd. (a)(1)), (2) there are delays
in warranty repairs beyond the control of the buyer, and (3) upon notice from the buyer,
given within 60 days of completion of warranty repairs, that those repairs did not solve
the problem (§ 1795.6, subd. (b)). The statute provides no other circumstances under
which the warranty is tolled or extended. Ruiz Nunez v. FCA US LLC, 61 Cal. App. 5th
385, 393 (2021).
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As discussed above, Plaintiff’s claim accrued as of February 2020. Therefore, she
had until February 2024 to bring her claim. Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 30,
2025. As a result, Plaintiff is required to show that the repair doctrine provides for tolling
of 11 months. Plaintiff has not presented any formulation or calculation of dates
sufficient to bridge her untimely claim. While Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s
calculation of repair days is understated, her calculation is plainly insufficient.
Specifically, Plaintiff points to the following periods: October 3-11, 2017, with a seven-
day rental, October 17-22, 2018, and March 7-14, 2019. ECF No. 36 at 16. These dates
total up to 29 days. Even crediting Plaintiff with the full tolling period provided by
California Emergency Rule 9 and the one-month Plaintiff attempted to obtain an
appointment, the limitations period would have expired prior to the date of filing.
Therefore, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no
genuine dispute of fact that the repair doctrine is insufficient to toll the untimely claims.
IV. 	Trial Burden
Plaintiff claims that providing evidence supporting the timeliness of her claims is a
trial burden and therefore not required at Summary Judgment. While “resolution of the
statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact,” summary judgment is
appropriate “where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible
of only one legitimate inference.” Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Dev., LLC v.
Pandora Mktg., LLC, 656 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2023) citing Jolly, 44 Cal.3d
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at 1112, 245; see Gen. Bedding Corp., 947 F.2d at 1398 (“Ordinarily we leave the
question of whether a plaintiff knew or should have become aware of a fraud to the
jury.... Where there are disputed questions of fact or facts susceptible to opposing
inferences as to when the statute of limitations for fraud commenced, summary judgment
is not appropriate.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit
has upheld summary judgment on Song-Beverly claims when there was no triable issue
as to whether those claims were timely under the applicable four-year limitations period.
Kwon Yi, 805 F. App'x 459, at 461. As in Kwon Yi, there is no triable issue as to whether
the claims were timely which permits the court to enter Summary Judgment.
As we conclude that Plaintiff’s claims were untimely, we need not, and do not
address damages or whether triable issues exist regarding Plaintiff’s claims.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
x 	The Court GRANTS FCA’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s express
warranty Song-Beverly claims--counts one through three.
x 	The Court GRANTS FCA’s requests for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-8.
x 	As none of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant survive summary judgment, the
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 7, 2026
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