Angga et al v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
AKHMAD, et. al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BUMBLE BEE FOODS, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-00583-BAS-DEB
ORDER GRANTING IN PART,
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 22)
For the reasons discussed herein, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. 	However, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court DENIES Defendant’s
motion 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	Trafficking 	Victims 	Protection 	Reauthorization 	Act
(“TVPRA”) under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1589, 1595(a); and Plaintiff’s negligence claims under
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. 	The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her claim for
injunctive relief under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on
or before December 3, 2025.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs 	Akhmad, 	Muhammad 	Sahrudin, 	Muhammad 	Syafi'I, 	and 	Angga
(“Plaintiffs”) 	initiated 	this 	action 	against 	Defendant 	Bumble 	Bee 	Foods, 	LLC
(“Defendant”) on March 12, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant had
sourced its albacore tuna, for resale to grocery stores in the United States, from fishing
vessels that Defendant knew relied upon Plaintiffs’ forced labor. (Id.) Plaintiff pled causes
of action for: (1) TVPRA, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595; and (2) Negligence,
pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. (Id ¶¶ 252–270.)
Defendant Bumble Bee Foods, LLC filed a motion to dismiss on June 2, 2025. (ECF
No. 22.) In its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant countered that:
(1) Plaintiffs lack standing to seek equitable relief (ECF No. 22-1 at 16–18); (2) Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim under the TVPRA (ECF No. 22-1 at 19–24); (3) Plaintiffs’ TVPRA
claim is impermissibly extraterritorial (ECF No. 22-1 at 24–30); and (4) Plaintiffs fail to
state a California negligence claim (California Code of Civil Procedure § 1714) or to allege
the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over such a claim (ECF No. 22-1 at 31–33). Plaintiffs
filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23.) Defendant
filed a reply. (ECF No. 27.)
The Court finds the matter appropriate to rule on the papers and without oral
argument. See CivLR 7.1.d.1.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss based on
the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “[T]hose who seek
to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement
imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.” City
of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). Article III requires that: “(1) at least one named
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plaintiff suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” 	Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over
an action. 	Ass'n of Med. Colls. v. U.S., 217 F.3d 770, 778–79 (9th Cir. 2000). 	“For
purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial judge and
reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and must
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d
1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). “At the
pleadings stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct
may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, [courts] presume that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” 	Id. 	(citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss based on the legal sufficiency of the
claims asserted in the complaint. 	Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 	Cahill v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 	To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations; rather, it must plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
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cause of action will not do.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court need not accept “legal conclusions”
as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the court accepts plaintiff's allegations as true, it
is not proper for the court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not
alleged or that the defendants have violated the ... law[] in ways that have not been alleged.”
Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
526 (1983).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Injunctive Relief
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged grounds
for injunctive relief.1 First, the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) does not provide for injunctive relief, and
instead, only provides for “damages and reasonable attorneys fees.” 	18 U.S.C.A. §
1595(a).
Next, to seek injunctive relief for California negligence claims in federal court,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate Article III standing—which requires demonstrating likelihood
of future harm or threat of irreparable injury. See Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining a plaintiff may have standing in state
court to seek such relief, but nonetheless may be unable to establish Article III standing to
pursue injunctive relief in federal court because he cannot demonstrate real or immediate
threat of irreparable injury); Montana Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 980
(9th Cir. 2013) (“Injunctive relief [under Article III] requires a showing of a significant
likelihood of future injury”).
Here, Plaintiffs make conclusory statements that “Plaintiffs continue to suffer harm
as 	a 	result 	of 	Defendant’s 	actions 	[violating 	the 	Trafficking 	Victims 	Protection
Reauthorization Act]” and “Plaintiffs continue to suffer harm as a result of Defendant’s
1 Defendant incorrectly moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief under Rule 12(b)(6). The
Court considers Defendant’s dismissal under the proper standard set out in Rule 12(b)(1).
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actions [violating California negligence law], which prevent Plaintiffs from earning a safe
and adequate living as distant-water fishermen.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 262, 270.) As Defendant
points out, Plaintiffs have not “specifically allege[d] they would seek similar jobs in the
future if Bumble Bee [changed its] policies.” (ECF Nos. 23 at 30:26–27, 27 at 14:20–21.)
Thus, without more, the statement that Plaintiffs “continue to suffer harm” is precisely the
type of bare assertion and conclusory statement that the Supreme Court has held
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Brecher v. Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc.,
No. 3:09-CV-1344 AJB MDD, 2011 WL 3475299, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2011) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). It is true
that in cases wherein Plaintiffs are representing a broader class or intend to re-engage in
activities necessitating Defendants’ involvement, showing an official policy that led to
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries may be sufficient for injunctive relief. 	See Los Angeles Press
Club v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:25-CV-05423-HDV-E, 2025 WL 2640421, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 2025). That is not the case here.
Because Plaintiffs lack Article III standing for injunctive relief, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and, thus, GRANTS dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims for injunctive relief WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s
claims for damages.
B. 	Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595
In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of forced labor in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (“§ 1589”), and sought damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (“§
1595”), the civil remedy provision of the TVPRA. The two central issues Parties dispute
regarding Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims are: (1) whether Plaintiffs’ claims are impermissibly
extraterritorial, and (2) whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the statutory requirements for
their TVPRA claims.
1. 	Whether 	Plaintiff’s 	TVPRA 	Claims 	are 	Impermissibly
Extraterritorial
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Defendant turns to the statutory canon of the presumption against extraterritoriality
to argue that provisions § 1595 and § 1589 of the TVPRA do not permit a private right of
action for foreign conduct. 	(ECF No. 22-1 at 24:19–30:24.) 	Application of the
presumption is a two-step process, which may reveal that Congress has rebutted the
presumption for an entire statutory provision or that the presumption is displaced in the
context of a particular case's facts. 	Under the first step, a court considers “whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives
a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.” 	Al Otro Lado, Inc. v.
McAleenan, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1201–02 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing RJR Nabisco v. Eur.
Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016)). Second, if the statute does not clearly indicate an intent
that it applies extraterritorially, the court must consider “whether the case involves a
domestic application of the statute. . . by looking to the statute's ‘focus.’ ” 	Al Otro Lado,
394 F. Supp. 3d at 1202. 	“If the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the
United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other
conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign
country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of
any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.” Id.
i. 	Whether 	the 	TVPRA 	Clearly 	Indicates 	Extraterritorial
Application for Violation of § 1589 and Civil Remedy Under
§ 1595
Defendant contends that, though the TVPRA contains provisions that have express
language applying the statute extra-territorially to criminal actions, the civil remedy in §
1595 does not. (ECF No. 22-1 at 24:27–25:10.) 	Defendant bases its position in part, on
RJR Nabisco, which states: “The presumption against extraterritoriality must be applied
separately to both Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s [(“RICO”)]
substantive prohibitions and its private right of action. . . It is not enough to say that a
private right of action must reach abroad because the underlying law governs conduct in
foreign countries. Something more is needed.” 	RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 350 (holding
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although certain substantive criminal prohibitions in RICO applied extraterritorially, the
civil cause of action did not). 	Based on various theories of statutory interpretation and
caselaw, 	Defendant 	alleges 	that 	the 	language 	explicitly 	permitting 	extraterritorial
application for causes of action in 18 U.S.C. § 1596 (“§ 1596”) does not also apply to
causes of action under § 1595. (ECF No. 22-1 at 24:27–29:12.)
By contrast, Plaintiffs argue in their response that § 1595 applies extraterritorially
“for the same reason the Supreme Court found that RICO…had extraterritorial application.
. . [the statutory provision] incorporates ‘a number of predicates that plainly apply to at
least some foreign conduct.’ ” (ECF No. 23 at 26:21–27:10 (citing RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S.
at 338–41).) One such “predicate” cited by Plaintiff is § 1596. (ECF No. 23 at 27:11–28
(citing Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 204 (5th Cir. 2017)).
Aligned with Plaintiff’s position, the Ninth Circuit held: “§ 1595 permits a private
cause of action for extraterritorial violations of the substantive provisions listed in § 1596
so long as § 1596's other requirements are satisfied.” Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35
F.4th 	1159, 1168 	(9th 	Cir. 2022). 	The 	Ratha 	court 	specified: 	Ҥ 	1596 	supplies
extraterritorial application to §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, and 1591, but only if the
alleged offender is a United States citizen, a lawful permanent resident, or is present in the
United States.” 	Id. 	The Court therefore finds that, if Plaintiff can fulfill the criteria set
out in Ratha, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that §§ 1595, 1596, and 1589 provide the
“something more” necessary for rebutting the presumption of extraterritoriality. 	RJR
Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 350. Though courts in other circuits have questioned whether § 1595
can apply extraterritorially, courts within the Ninth Circuit have consistently held they can
if they fulfill the criteria in Ratha and § 1596. See e.g., Doe v. WebGroup Czech Republic,
a.s., No. 2:21-CV-02428 SPG(SKX), 2024 WL 3533426, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2024)
Here, Plaintiffs bring their TVPRA forced labor claims under § 1589, one of the
provisions for which § 1596 provides a private cause of action. 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 254.)
Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business is San Diego,
California—meaning Defendant is at the very least, clearly “present in the United States.”
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(Id. ¶ 12.) Cf Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1169 (9th Cir. 2022) (Finding defendants were not “present
in” the United States for purposes of § 1596 because defendants were both Thai companies
who did not “have any address, employees, or physical presence in the United States during
the period at issue in this case”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met the criteria set out in Ratha to prove that § 1596
supplies clear intent of extraterritorial application for cases arising under § 1589. 	See
Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1168; cf Doe v. WebGroup Czech Republic, a.s., No. 2:21-CV-02428
SPG(SKX), 2024 WL 3533426, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2024) (“if a plaintiff can show
that [requirements under § 1596] is satisfied, then there may be reason to extend the reach
of Section 1595 extra-territorially.”)
Citing a non-binding case from the District of Columbia, Defendant alleges that
Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims are barred by the presumption of extraterritorial application
because “standing alone, [§ 1595] does nothing to rebut the presumption that it applies only
domestically.” (ECF No. 22-1 at 25:16–19) (citing Doe I v. Apple Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737,
2021 WL 5774224, at *14 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021), aff’d, 96 F.4th 403 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
(affirming without reaching extraterritoriality)).) It is true that “in isolation, § 1595 is silent
as to its extraterritorial application.” Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1167. However, Plaintiff’s claims
for damages under § 1595 are not brought “in isolation,” but instead, are paired with
allegations of violations under § 1589 and fulfill § 1596 requirements. Id. Thus, the Court
finds Plaintiff’s TVPRA claims against Defendant overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
ii. 	Whether 	the 	Case 	Involves 	Permissible 	Domestic
Application of the TVPRA
Defendant also alleges that Plaintiffs’ § 1589 claims do not have permissible
domestic application because “§ 1589’s focus is where the forced labor occurred” and the
alleged forced labor, and other alleged conduct violating § 1589, happened outside of the
United States. (ECF No. 27 at 13:14.) However, since the TVPRA clearly intends to allow
extraterritorial application of Plaintiffs’ § 1589 and § 1595 claims under the first NJR
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Nabisco step, the Court does not need to reach the second NJR Nabisco step considering
“whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute ... by looking to the statute's
‘focus.’” 	Al Otro Lado, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1202 (citing RJR Nabisco v. Eur. Cmty., 579
U.S. at 337.)
* * *
Finding the TVPRA explicitly intended to apply §§ 1589 and 1595 to extraterritorial
conduct, the Court thus DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based
on the presumption of extraterritoriality.
2. 	Whether 	Plaintiff 	Plausibly 	Alleges 	TVPRA 	Statutory
Requirements
Section 1595(a) of the TVPRA authorizes any “individual who is a victim of a
violation of” the Act to “bring a civil action seeking damages and reasonable attorneys fees
from the perpetrator, as well as from others who benefitted in specified ways from the
violation.” 	Martinez-Rodriguez v. Giles, 31 F.4th 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotations omitted). The TVPRA creates liability for:
Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by
any one of, or by any combination of, the following means—
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of
physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person
or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;
or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or
physical restraint.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(1)-(4).
18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) provides for beneficiary liability under TVPRA for:
Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value,
from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection (a),
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in
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the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of such means, shall be
punished as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b).
To be liable for a violation under § 1589(b), an entity must benefit from the behavior
prohibited under § 1589(a) and have knowledge or be in reckless disregard of it. Zhang v.
Chevron Corp., No. 24-CV-08641-JSC, 2025 WL 1725006, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 20,
2025). 	To bring a cause of action for civil damages under § 1595(a) against a viable
beneficiary per § 1589(b), courts have generally accepted that plaintiffs must prove three
factors: (1) whether the alleged perpetrators have engaged in forced labor violative of §
1589(a), (2) whether defendants “knowingly benefitted, financially or by receiving
anything of value; (3) whether defendants “participate[d] in the venture” wherein forced
labor took place, and (4) whether defendants “kn[e]w or should have known” about
perpetrators’ practice of forced labor. 	Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159,
1177 (9th Cir. 2022); B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 20-CV-00656-BLF,
2020 WL 4368214 at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020).
i. 	Whether Plaintiff Pleads Forced Labor Actionable Under
TVPRA
Here, neither party contests that Plaintiffs have alleged they were subject to forced
labor prohibited by § 1589(a) by the vessel owners. (ECF No. 23 at 28.) “[V]essel owners
and their agents who obtained Plaintiffs’ labor, physically abused and threatened Plaintiffs,
deprived them of adequate sleep and food, and refused to let them go home.” (ECF No.
23 at 23:1-4 (citing ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 99–106, 113–18, 125–29, 134–143 and United States v.
Barai, 55 F.4th 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 2022) (upholding forced-labor conviction where
victims were subject to “eighteen-hour workdays, limited food, isolation from their
families, verbal and physical abuse, threats of violence, threats to call the authorities, and
no pay.”)). 	The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that vessel owners and
operators engaged in forced labor as defined by § 1589, including: (a)(1) “means of force,”
(a)(2) “means of serious harm,” and (a)(4) “means of any scheme. . . intended to cause the
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person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or
another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.”
ii. 	Whether Defendant Knowingly Benefitted
The “knowingly benefit” element of section 1595 “merely requires that Defendant
knowingly receive a financial benefit.” B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 20-
CV-00656-BLF, 2020 WL 4368214, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (citing H.H. v. G6
Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-755, 2019 WL 6682152, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019). Here,
Plaintiffs allege Defendant received direct financial benefit in U.S. markets from re-selling
tuna procured from the vessels on which Plaintiffs were forced to work. 	(ECF No. 1 ¶¶
218, 224, 234, 237, 253, 259.) Given Defendant’s active role in obtaining albacore tuna
from the vessels on which Plaintiffs were subject to forced labor and reselling the tuna for
a profit, Defendant clearly has knowledge of the financial benefit it received. (Id. ¶¶ 253,
261.) 	Plaintiff’s allegations are, thus, sufficient to meet the “knowingly benefitted”
element of a civil claim under § 1595 of the TVPRA at the motion to dismiss stage.
iii. 	Whether Defendant Participated in a Venture
§ 1589(b) requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that Defendant had “participat[ed] in a
venture” to establish beneficiary liability. Importantly, Courts have held that “participation
in the venture” under § 1595 does not require an “overt act” of participation in the criminal
act (here, forced labor) itself to redeem TVPRA’s civil remedy. See e.g., Wyndham Hotels
& Resorts, Inc., 2020 WL 4368214, at *3 (“[A]pplying the ‘participation in a venture’
definition from the criminal liability section of the TVPRA to the civil liability section of
the TVPRA, would void the ‘should have known’ language in the civil remedy and ...
violate[ ] the cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be construed so that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant”).
The issue is, thus, whether Defendant participated in a venture with Rongcheng City
and Rongcheng Ocean (collectively, “Rongcheng”)—the owners and operators of the
fishing vessels on which Plaintiffs worked (ECF No. 1 ¶ 253). 	Plaintiffs allege that
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Defendant participated in an illegal venture, inter alia, because: (1) Defendant profited
from selling tuna obtained from the fishing vessels (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 253, 259); and (2)
Defendant collaborated with vessel operators to obtain environmental certifications from
the Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”) via implementing fishery improvement projects
(“FIPs”) (ECF No. 1 ¶ 217). The Court considers each of these allegations in turn.
a. Whether Profiting from Tuna is Alone Sufficient to Allege
Participation
Courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that establishing an ongoing “business
relationship” between the alleged beneficiary and criminal perpetrator may be sufficient
for establishing participation in a joint venture actionable under the civil remedy provisions
of TVPRA. See e.g., Olive v. Mahboubi-Fardi, No. 2:23-CV-04370-JAK (EX), 2025 WL
2946987, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2025); Doe (K.R.D.) v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings
Inc., No. 5:24-CV-06993-PCP, 2025 WL 2539010, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025);
Acevedo v. eXp Realty, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d 740, 783 (C.D. Cal. 2024). However, mere
“arms-length transaction[s]” characteristic of an “ordinary buyer-seller” transaction is not
sufficient to establish an “ongoing business relationship” characteristic of participating in
an unlawful venture. For instance, in Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., the District of Columbia Circuit
court held that a relationship between sellers and buyers of cobalt was insufficient to
establish a “shared enterprise” to profit from forced labor. 	Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th
403, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (cited by Doe (K.R.D.) v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., No.
5:24-CV-06993-PCP, 2025 WL 2539010, at *8, n. 5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025)).
Applying that logic here, the mere fact that the fishing vessel operators, Rongcheng
City and Rongcheng Ocean, sell tuna that Defendant buys tuna from Rongcheng City and
Rongcheng Ocean (among other suppliers) does not establish that Defendant and fishing
vessel operators have entered into a joint venture in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595.
“Although a formal business relationship is not necessary to be a participant in a venture,
something more than engaging in an ordinary buyer-seller transaction is required”—like a
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“common purpose, shared profits and risk, or control” by the defendant of the relevant
entity. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th at 415–16.
Having found that an “arms-length transaction” between a typical buyer and seller
would not suffice for “participation” under §§ 1589, 1595, the Court now evaluates whether
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the Defendant has participated in growing fishing vessel
operators’ business beyond merely buying their tuna for resale.
b. Whether FIPs are Sufficient to Allege Participation
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant and its parent company FCF sponsored Fisheries
Improvement Projects (“FIPs”), which enable fishing vessels to obtain environmental
certifications from the Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 217–218.)
Rongcheng City and Rongcheng Ocean, and the particular fishing vessels Plaintiffs worked
on, were all participants in the FIPs. (Id. ¶¶ 219–238.) Beyond financially sponsoring the
FIPs, Defendant also conducted audits (involving office documentation reviews and on-
site vessel monitoring) and electronically monitored Rongcheng’s vessels and harvests to
ensure the participating fisheries implemented sufficient environmental sustainability
measures to obtain MSC certification. (Id. ¶¶ 197, 227–228, 232.)
As part of participation in Defendant-sponsored FIPs, the vessels Plaintiffs worked
on harvested albacore tuna exclusively for sale to Defendant. 	(Id. ¶¶ 234, 237.) 	MSC
certification “preserve[s] market access to the increasing proportion of retail buyers who
prioritize certifications” and “increases the price consumers are willing to pay for a can of
albacore tuna.” 	(Id. ¶ 218.) 	The FIPs, thus, both promoted the sustainability of each
fishery, and the subsequent profitability of Defendant’s sales to customers in the U.S.
overall. (Id. ¶¶ 226–227.) As Plaintiffs put it: “the success and failure of all members of
the venture are closely intertwined and rise and fall together.” (Id. ¶ 172.)
“Participation in the civil context requires only a showing of a ‘desire to promote the
wrongful venture's success.’” 	Fleites v. MindGeek S.A.R.L., No. 2:21-CV-04920-WLH-
ADS, 2025 WL 2902301, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (citing G.G. v. Salesforce.com,
Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 559 (7th Cir. 2023)).
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A “desire to promote the wrongful venture’s success” cannot be shown though one-
time provisions of “off-the-shelf materials and machinery,” but can be shown through
“tailored,” “active, [and] ongoing support.” 	See Mia v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 1:22-
CV-02353 (CJN), 2025 WL 752564, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2025) (holding that defendant
company providing machinery and molds to latex glove manufacturer, from which
defendant purchased an unspecified amount of gloves, did not constitute participation in a
wrongful venture) (contrasting its facts with Salesforce, 76 F.4th at 560–61). 	In other
words, to prove participation in the civil context, Plaintiffs need to demonstrate that
Defendant and fishing vessel operators had a “business relationship [that] was more than
just a purchasing agreement.” Apple, 96 F.4th at 415.
Courts have consistently held that active, ongoing support tailored to the business
needs of criminal perpetrators for the purpose of shared risk and profit goes beyond mere
“ordinary buyer-seller” transactions. See e.g., Acevedo, 713 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (finding a
venture where defendants participated in a multi-level marketing enterprise, in which the
members of the enterprise were partners in a revenue sharing scheme that required
members to continually recruit new agents to financially benefit everyone “upline” from
them); J.G. v. Northbrook Industries, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1236 (N.D. Ga. 2022)
(finding a venture where trafficker regularly paid hotel employees to be on “lookout”
outside of hotel rooms in support of illicit sex trafficking activities); see also G.G. v.
Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 549–50, 554 (7th Cir 2023) (finding a venture where a
software provider that had entered contracts with an online marketplace used for trafficking
and provided the marketplace “active, ongoing support” tailored to its business needs).
Here, Defendant did not merely “provide materials” to fishing vessel operators. An
MSC certification, which involves significant ongoing financial investment and business
advice from Defendant, can hardly be akin to “off-the-shelf materials and machinery.” It
constitutes “tailored,” “active, [and] ongoing support.” 	Cf Apple, 96 F.4th at 415;
Salesforce, 76 F.4th at 560–61. 	Further, Defendant clearly had a vested interest in
“promot[ing] the wrongful venture’s success,” given that Defendant contracted with the
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fisheries for them to exclusively sell albacore tuna to Defendant. Salesforce.com, 76 F.4th
at 559.
The present case can thus, be readily distinguished from that in Kimberly-Clark
Corp., or Apple, in which defendant companies only purchased an unspecified amount of
goods from criminal perpetrators, and so, did not exercise enough financial leverage over
perpetrators to arise to “participation” in a venture under § 1595. 	Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
2025 WL 752564, at *4; Apple, 96 F.4th at 415. Thus, even if Defendant contests that it
lacked a “direct association with [perpetrators]” (i.e., Defendant did not itself inflict forced
labor, and its parent company FCF acted as middlemen in certain interactions with
Rongcheng), the Court finds that FCF and Rongcheng have a “continuous business
relationship . . . such that it would appear that [they] have established a pattern of conduct
or could be said to have a tacit agreement.” See Fleites, 2025 WL 2902301, at *12.
iv. 	Whether 	Defendant 	Should 	Have 	Known 	about 	Forced
Labor
Like in the present case, in the Ratha complaint, plaintiffs alleged violation of §
1589 and sought damages under the civil remedy provision § 1595. § 1595(a) states:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil
action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or
conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court
of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
Because § 1595 is a civil remedy, courts—including the Ninth Circuit—have
adopted a civil negligence standard to plead a cause of action. To prove a mental state
actionable under § 1595, Plaintiffs are required to prove that Defendant “knew or should
have known” about the forced labor practices violating the TVPRA at the vessels on
which Plaintiffs worked. Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1177. As Ratha explains: “[T]he phrase
‘knew or should have known’ usually connotes negligence. . . [a]nd ‘[n]egligence is a
less culpable mental state than actual knowledge.’” Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1177 (citing
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Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1358 (9th Cir. 1980) and Erickson Prods.,
Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2019)).
“Should have known” could entail that Defendant had notice that forced labor was
likely occurring on the particular vessels on which Plaintiffs alleged experiencing
abuse—but not that the albacore tuna industry presents risk of forced labor as a whole.
Cf Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1177 (9th Cir. 2022) (generalities about the Thai shrimp industry
are “too attenuated to support an inference that Wales knew or should have known of the
specifically alleged TVPRA violations at the Songkhla factory between 2010 and 2012”);
Salesforce.com, 76 F.4th at 555 (holding that defendant “knew or should have known,”
pursuant to § 1595, about perpetrator’s violative conduct through public news reports and
state attorney general notices identifying perpetrator in particular); Wyndham Hotels &
Resorts, Inc., 2020 WL 4368214, at *5 (“While Defendants need not have actual
knowledge of the sex trafficking in order to have participated in the sex trafficking
venture for civil liability under the TVPRA, Plaintiff must allege facts to support that
Wyndham and Choice, at the very least, rented rooms to people they should have known
were engaging in her sex trafficking”).
The Ninth Circuit has held that public reports on “industry-wide” abuse in a
particular country and on buyers of perpetrating companies’ products cannot “support a
reasonable inference of [Defendant’s] knowledge of alleged labor abuses.” See Ratha, 35
F.4th at 1178. However, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation here does not preclude the
Seventh Circuit’s reading of § 1595’s knowledge requirement—in which public reports
identifying serious workplace abuse by perpetrators at issue in the action during the
relevant time-period can provide adequate notice to defendants doing business with
perpetrators. See id; Salesforce.com, 76 F.4th at 555 (holding that defendant “knew or
should have known,” pursuant to § 1595, about perpetrator’s violative conduct through
news reports and state attorney general notices identifying perpetrator in particular).
Here, Plaintiffs had suffered physical abuse and forced labor on Rongcheng vessels
from roughly 2020 to 2023. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 96–106 (Plaintiff Akhmad worked on a
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vessel from 2020 to 2023), ¶¶ 107–119 (Plaintiff Angga worked on a vessel for at least
several months in 2021), ¶¶ 132–144 (Plaintiff Sya’fi worked on a vessel from roughly
2021 to at least 2022).) Plaintiffs cite public sources identifying forced labor conditions
on vessels supplying Defendant with albacore tuna that were published during the time of
Defendant’s alleged violations of the TVPRA from 2020 to 2023, including inter alia:
1. In March 2020, Greenpeace East Asia released a report on forced labor on
Taiwanese fishing vessels which included a fisher working on vessel supplying
FCF, Defendant’s parent company and primary supplier (id. ¶ 82);
2. In August 2020, U.S. Customs Border Protection issued a withhold release order
against tuna harvested by Da Wang, a Taiwanese distant-water fishing vessel that
supplied Defendant (id. ¶ 85);
3. In May 2021, Greenpeace Southeast Asia and SBMI released a report summarizing
complaints against Indonesian migrant workers on ten tuna longliners for abuses
indicative of forced labor – two of which (Da Wang and Lu Rong Yuan Yi 139)
have supplied Defendant with albacore tuna (id. ¶ 90);
4. In February 2022, Global Labor Justice – International Labor Rights Forum filed a
lawsuit against Defendant in the District of Columbia Superior Court for claiming
its tuna was produced with “fair and responsible working conditions” “when, in
fact, Bumble Bee sells tuna products caught by laborers who are subjected to
inhuman conditions” (id. ¶ 91);
5. In September 2022, Greenpeace East Asia published a report entitled “Fake My
Catch,” which specifically linked Defendant to tuna produced with forced labor—
including tuna that was sourced from Da Wang, the ship that U.S. Customs Border
Protection issued a withhold release order for in August 2020 (id. ¶ 93); and
6. In July 2023, Greenpeace USA directly contacted representatives from Defendant
via email and invited them to discuss potential improvements to Defendant’s
human rights policies. Defendant declined the invitation (id. ¶ 95).
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Notably, these sources do not indicate whether forced labor was happening on the
specific vessels on which Plaintiffs experienced forced labor. Like the reports in Ratha,
these sources also do not identify Rongcheng as a specific vessel operator that employs
force labor, and do not identify the specific vessels on which Plaintiffs allegedly
experienced abuse. Yet, these sources can hardly be said to be an “industry-wide” reports
that Ratha had criticized as too general to establish knowledge. In contrast to the reports
in this action, those reports refused to identify specific perpetrators and their relationship
to Defendant. See Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1178. Indeed, the instances listed above identify
public reports and legal actions against Defendant and Defendant’s parent company
during the same time Plaintiffs allege experiencing forced labor. Further, Plaintiffs
distinguish Defendant from others in the fishing industry who they identify have
complied with human rights measures. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 239, 240 (comparing Bumble
Bee and FCF to other major international sea food corporations that rank higher on
criteria for human rights on civil society reports).)
Nonetheless, courts within the Ninth Circuit have also held that “should have
known” in § 1595 could also entail Defendant being “on notice about the prevalence of
[forced labor] generally at [the vessels it sources tuna from] and failed to take adequate
steps to train staff in order to prevent its occurrence.” Cf Acevedo, 713 F. Supp. 3d at 780
(interpreting Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, 425 F. Supp. 3d 959); Fleites, 2025 WL
2902301, at *10 (finding Defendant “knew or should have known perpetrator was
engaged in sex trafficking” because, in part, Defendant knew about troves of illicit
content on its platforms but still embraced a business model that allowed such content to
proliferate and maximize profit).
In addition to the public reports Plaintiffs identified above, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendant has been an “active participant” in its parent company FCF’s “Social
Responsibility Program”—which “set[s] crew recruitment, wage and benefits, and health
and safety policies and procedures.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 192.) As part of the program,
Defendant claims to have worked directly with “fleets and vessels that supply
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[Defendant] to review their operations and assist with capacity building, including on
issues of crew health, safety, and livelihood.” (Id. ¶ 191.)
Again, to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, Plaintiff must “plead[] factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Reading Parties’ papers in favor of the nonmoving party (Plaintiff) as required by Rule
12(b)(6), the Court finds that Defendant likely had “notice about the prevalence” of
forced labor on the vessels from which it sourced tuna “and failed to take adequate steps
to train staff in order to prevent its occurrence” on the vessels that Plaintiffs experienced
abuse. Acevedo, 713 F. Supp. 3d at 780; Cahill, 80 F.3d at 337–38.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently pled their TVPRA
claims. 	Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s TVPRA
claims.
B. 	Negligence, Cal. Civ. Code § 1714
1. 	Whether the Court Can Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Once judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims under § 1367(c) is discretionary. 	Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114
F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997).
§ 1367(a), which confers supplemental jurisdiction, provides:
[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.
Because the Court has not “dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction” (see § 1367(c)(3)) and has not found any of the other factors in § 1367(c) to
be met, the Court finds it can exercise supplemental jurisdiction here—even if Plaintiffs
have not explicitly raised a claim for it.
2. 	Whether Defendant Had a Duty to Exercise Ordinary Care
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Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs need to establish a “special relationship” to
establish duty under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. 	Under California law, the elements of a
negligence tort cause of action are duty, breach, causation and damages. 	Brown v. USA
Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 722 (2019). In general, each person has a duty to act
with reasonable care under the circumstances. 	Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior
Ct., 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 432 (2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a), establishing a
“general duty of each person to exercise, in his or activities, reasonable care for the safety
of others.”) “However, ‘one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn
those endangered by such conduct.’ ” Regents, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d at 424.
A plaintiff alleging that the defendant had a duty to protect her against a third party
must establish: (1) that an exception to the general no-duty-to-protect rule applies, for
instance, that a special relationship exists, and (2) that the factors enumerated in Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 108 (1968), support the imposition of the duty. Brown v. USA
Taekwondo, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d at 723; Doe by Doe v. Piraino, 688 F. Supp. 3d 635, 659
(M.D. Tenn. 2023). 	The Court also considers Plaintiffs’ alternative theory Defendant’s
conduct amounted to misfeasance. (ECF No. 23 at 32:6–34:14.)
i. 	Special Relationship
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendant has a special
relationship with “[Rongcheng] [such that it] places [Defendant] in the best position to
protect against the risk of harm.” (ECF No. 21:13–15 (citing Brown, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d at
723).) To plead a special relationship, Plaintiffs must demonstrate “[Defendant’s] ability
to control the person who caused the harm must be such that ‘if exercised, [it] would
meaningfully reduce the risk of the harm that actually occurred.’ ” Brown, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d
at 723 (holding, 	inter alia, 	plaintiffs alleged that the United States Association of
Taekwondo (“USAT”) had a special relationship with sexually abusive coach because the
USAT had instituted codes of conduct compliant with United States Olympic Committee
requirements and the USAT had the power to suspend and expel coaches for ethics
violations); see also Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 (2002) (police
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department that sponsored “explorer program” was in special relationship with the teenage
explorers and owed them “a duty of care to protect them from foreseeable harm,” including
from sexual relationship with police officer who served as adviser during ride-alongs at
night); see also Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 680 (2019)
(national fraternity did not have special relationship with its local chapter and therefore had
no duty to protect student who was injured at party held by local chapter, despite national
fraternity's adoption of policies governing local chapter and ability to discipline chapter for
policy violations because it had no ability to prevent injury on a day-to-day basis).
Defendant contests that it does not exercise sufficient control over Rongcheng for
there to be a special relationship because Defendant does not control the staffing agencies
and vessel captains responsible for the vessels on which Plaintiffs suffered forced labor.
(ECF No. 22-1 at 33.) Defendant alleges its role is more akin to the United States Olympic
Committee that the California Court of Appeals declined to find negligent—since the
Committee had only set policies to regulate the USAT, rather than the sexually abusive
coach directly. 	Brown, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d at 732. 	Crucially, in 	Brown, the Court
distinguished the Committee from governing bodies that could set requirements for hiring
and exercise authority to deny certification to coaches. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled facts to establish a special
relationship between Defendant and Rongcheng. 	Unlike the Committee in Brown,
Defendant allegedly “set[] policies and procedures for the vessels in its fleet through the
FCF “Social Responsibility Program,” and it “set and enforced policies and procedures that
each vessel in its FIPs were required to follow.” 	(ECF No. 23 at 33–34.) 	Like the
governing bodies the Brown court specified would qualify as having a special relationship
with the tortfeasor, Defendant allegedly sets out “crew recruitment, wage and benefits, and
health and safety policies and procedures” via its “social responsibility program.” 	(ECF
No. 1 ¶ 192.) 	Defendant also allegedly has “worked directly with the fleets and vessels
that supply [Defendant] to review their operations and assist with capacity building.” (Id.
¶ 193.) 	Defendant further financed and implemented policies for Rongcheng vessels to
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obtain MSC certification via its FIPs. (Id. ¶ 227.) Additionally, at this stage in pleadings,
the Court takes Plaintiffs at their word that Defendant can refuse to do business with
Rongcheng vessels and take other disciplinary actions against Rongcheng vessels. 	Cf
Brown, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d at 723 (USAT had a special relationship with abusive coaches
because it had the power to suspend and expel coaches for ethics violations). 	Thus,
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a “special relationship” between Defendant and the
Rongcheng vessels on which Plaintiffs experienced abuse to survive the motion to dismiss
stage.
ii. 	Rowland Factors
The “Rowland” factors—which California courts employ to evaluate whether there
should be a categorical exception to the general duty of care—can be generally broken
down into “foreseeability” factors and “public policy” considerations. 	Hughes, 723
F.Supp.3d at 701; Fleites, 2025 WL 2902301, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). 	When
considering these factors, courts evaluate “not whether they support an exception to the
general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case ..., but whether carving
out 	an 	entire category 	of cases 	from that 	general 	duty 	rule is 	justified 	by 	clear
considerations of policy.” 	Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 726 (quoting Regents v. Superior
Ct., 413 P.3d 656, 670 (2018)).
The foreseeability factors are “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [and] the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered.” Social Media Cases, 2023 WL 6847378,
at *24. 	The policy factors are “the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing 	future harm, the extent 	of the burden 	to 	the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”
Id. 	Courts should create such an exception only when it is “clearly supported by public
policy” and when it is possible to “promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules
of law applicable to general classes of cases.” Id. at 1143–44.
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Regarding the Rowland foreseeability factors, the Court has already found that
Defendant “should have known” about the risks of forced labor in the vessels on which
Plaintiffs were employed, and that Defendant monetarily benefitted from that forced labor.
Supra § III.B.2.iv. Thus, the Court finds that the foreseeability factors weigh in favor of
Plaintiff.
The Court also finds that the Rowland policy factors weigh in favor of imposing duty
onto Defendant. 	“[M]oral blame” attaches to Defendant’s conduct because Defendant
“could have taken reasonable ameliorative steps earlier but failed to do so.” 	Brown, 253
Cal.Rptr.3d at 729. 	More specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendant could have adopted
human rights policies (such as “a policy banning recruitment fees and deposits, in line of
ILO Convention 188, to phase out the use of transshipments”), and Defendant could have
refused to do business with Rongcheng vessels upon finding abuse. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23,
241.) 	Further, the societal goal of safeguarding fisherman from forced labor weighs in
favor of imposing a duty on Defendant to “take measures to prevent future harm, and that
imposing this duty on it would not be unduly burdensome or costly in light of the benefits
to society.” Doe, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 661 (M.D. Tenn. 2023). Lastly, the fact that Defendant
can sponsor FIPs and can participate in the social responsibility program suggests that it
would not be “unduly burdensome or costly” to require Defendant to reach the human
rights standards it has purportedly set out for itself. In fact, doing so “may foster a greater
sense of community confidence in and respect for [Defendant].” 	City of Murrieta, 126
Cal.Rptr.2d at 227.
iii. 	Misfeasance
Alternatively, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	Defendant’s 	negligence 	under 	a 	theory 	of
misfeasance. 	(ECF No. 23 at 32:6–34:14.) 	Under misfeasance, when a defendant has
“create[d] or contribute[d] to the [plaintiff's] risk of [harm],” the defendant owes the
plaintiff a duty of care under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. 	Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks,
Inc., 310 Cal.Rptr.3d 97, 116 (2023). 	That legal duty arises when Defendant, “through
[its] own action (misfeasance)[,] has made the plaintiff's position worse and has created a
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foreseeable risk of harm from the third person.” 	Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 19-CV-
03310-JSC, 2020 WL 2097599, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (citing Melton v. Boustred,
183 Cal. App. 4th 521, 531 (2010)). This includes instances of “liability premised on the
conduct of a third party,” at least where the “defendant had a duty to prevent injuries due
to its own conduct or possessory control.” Id. To plead misfeasance, the “proper question
... is whether the defendant's ‘entire conduct created a risk of harm’ to the plaintiff.” Doe
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 90 F.4th 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Kuciemba v. Victory
Woodworks, Inc., 310 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 (2023)).
Here, Defendants’ conduct discussed in prior sections “created the opportunity and
[financial] incentive for the vessel owners to abuse Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 23 at 33:14–15.)
Further, as discussed in the prior section on whether Defendant had a special relationship
with Rongcheng (supra § III.B.2.i), Defendant “controlled the vessels on which Plaintiffs
were abused.” 	(Id. at 33:22–24.) 	Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged that misfeasance triggering Defendant’s duty to protect Plaintiffs from forced labor
on Rongcheng vessels.
* * *
For the reasons above, the Court concludes Defendant’s special relationship with
Rongcheng vessels, the Rowland factors, and Defendant’s misfeasance establish that
Defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiffs from becoming victims of forced labor on
Rongcheng’s vessels through reasonable protective measures. 	The Court, therefore,
DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claims.
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend her claims for injunctive relief under
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12(b)(1), 	the 	Court 	GRANTS
Defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	WITHOUT
PREDJUDICE. 	However, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court DENIES Defendant’s
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motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s TVPRA claims under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1589, 1595(a); and
Plaintiff’s negligence claims under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff
leave to amend her claims for injunctive relief under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. Plaintiff may
file an amended complaint on or before December 3, 2025.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 12, 2025
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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